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August Martell in Cognac, France, in the late 1820s, by the ships France 
and Charlemagne. 
At that time, all overseas mail was carried across the oceans by sailing 
ships. A further examination of these two letters opened up a new world to 
me. The France and the Charlemagne were American sailing packets on 
regular line service between New York and Havre. As will be noticed in this 
study, the idea of ‘sailing on schedule’ instead of general merchant shipping 
was one of the most important conditions for the development of business 
information transmission, whether conducted by sail or by steam.
A few years later, when I started this study, Professor Yrjö Kaukiainen’s 
article on the Shrinking World gave my thesis a firm direction at the point 
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Professor Kaukiainen for his patient guidance, which continued even after 
his retirement from his university post.
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detailed observations and recommendations by Jari Ojala were extremely 
valuable in the final phase of the study. The international group of researchers 
led by him and Leos Müller also shared ideas of good value during the 
congresses under the title ‘Information Flows 1600-2000’ in Jyväskylä 
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Earlier studies have shown that the speed of information transmission increased 
markedly in all parts of the world during the 19th century. Before that period, the 
development in duration and frequency of sailings had been very much slower.1 
The fast progress was primarily based on the change from sailing ships and 
horse-driven coaches to steamers and railways. The telegraph, introduced by the 
mid-19th century and taken into intercontinental use twenty years later, finally 
revolutionized the speed of information transmission over long distances. This 
development has generally been described as a chain of technical improvements. 
In the real world, things were of course more complicated. 
The title of this study, Across the Oceans – Development of Overseas 
Business Information Transmission 1815–1875, has been chosen to indicate 
that shipping and overseas information transmission were unquestionably linked 
in the 19th century, before the time of aircraft or electric communications. 
Maritime history is usually seen as the history of shipping, while the development 
of the speed of information transmission is often included in the history of 
communications. In particular, Yrjö Kaukiainen, Ian K. Steele and Allan R. 
Pred have carried out important research by combining these aspects. 
The starting point for this particular study was Yrjö Kaukiainen’s article, 
in which he showed that the general duration of information transmission 
had continuously decreased several decades before the breakthrough of the 
electric telegraph. Kaukiainen based his arguments on maritime intelligence 
published by Lloyd’s List, calculating how many days it took for the 
information on ship arrivals in different ports around the world to reach 
London and be published. 
Interestingly, the shortest time lag e.g. between Barbados and London was 38 
days in 1820, but only 20 days in 1860. Similarly, the time lag decreased on the 
route between Buenos Aires and London from 72 to 40 days; between Valparaiso 
and London from 109 to 49 days; and between New York and London from 23 
1 See Yrjö Kaukiainen, ‘Shrinking the world: Improvements in the speed of information 
transmission, c. 1820–1870’. European Review of Economic History, 5 (Cambridge, 2001), 
1–28; Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic 1675–1740. An Exploration of Communication 
and Community (Oxford, 1986); and Allan R. Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation 




to ten days during the same period. The most remarkable changes were seen on 
the East India route, where the time lag between Bombay and London decreased 
from 121 to 25 days; and between Calcutta and London, where it decreased 
from 128 to 35 days between 1820 and 1860.2 All this happened before the long 
distance telegraph was brought into use. The Atlantic cable was laid successfully 
in 1866, and a direct connection from London to India was opened in 1870. A 
direct telegraph line to Buenos Aires was available in 1875.
A great part of the development can naturally be explained by the overall 
change from sail to steam and the opening of railways over the isthmuses 
of Suez and Panama. But it is also evident that such changes took time. The 
networks – shipping routes and regular sailings, railways, canals, and telegraph 
lines – had to be established, financed and built, as well as coordinated to 
serve the mail system. Everything could not be done immediately when a new 
innovation was made. Sometimes a new innovation had to be technologically 
improved for years before becoming commercially successful, as with the 
different steam engine solutions for ocean transport.
Earlier research has already shown that the shift from sailing ships to 
steamers in bulk transport was mainly based on reducing fuel costs, extending 
from short trade voyages to longer distances over several decades, instead of 
just being one technological event.3 Also the cost development of shipping 
during the shift period, particularly the freight rates as well as capital, fuel 
and labour costs, have been thoroughly examined by maritime historians.4 
However, most of these studies cover primarily cargo shipping. Mail and 
passenger services were a rather different business, where speed and regularity 
were highly valued and the (bulk) freight rates only played a minor role.5
New technology was always more expensive to build and use than the 
old, and included more risks. Financing depended on the expected benefits of 
2 Kaukiainen (2001), 1–28. – Westbound, the difference on the New York route would 
obviously have been much greater due to the prevailing winds and currents.
3 Charles K. Harley, ‘The shift from sailing ships to steamships, 1850–1890: a study in 
technological change and its diffusion’ in Donald N. McCloskey (ed.), Essays on a Mature 
Economy: Britain after 1840 (London, 1971), 215–237. Harley’s study does not cover the mail 
and passenger steamship services, which competed in a very different market. In accordance 
with Harley’s paper, it has also been argued that the huge increase in cargo carrying capacity 
was the end result of a century of evolution, starting from the 1860s and ending in the 1960s. 
The process was basically a matter of successive relatively small increments in size and 
speed, in carrying capacity and fuel efficiency. The two major ‘revolutions’ in technology 
were the interaction of metal construction and steam propulsion to produce ships capable 
of operating economically over long distances on regular schedules, and the introduction of 
containerization. See Malcolm Cooper, ‘From Agamemnon to Priam: British liner shipping in 
the China Seas, 1865–1965’ in Richard Harding, Adrian Jarvis & Alston Kennerley, British 
Ships in China Seas: 1700 to the Present Day (Liverpool, 2004), 225.
4 In addition to the above, see for example Yrjö Kaukiainen, ‘Coal and Canvas: Aspects of 
the Competition between Steam and Sail, c. 1870–1914’ in Lars U. Scholl and Merja-Liisa 
Hinkkanen (eds), Sail and Steam. Selected Maritime Writings of Yrjö Kaukiainen. Research 
in Maritime History No. 27 (St. John’s, 2004), 113–128. For the investment cycles and 
development of capital and labour costs, see also Yrjö Kaukiainen, Sailing into Twilight. 
Finnish Shipping in an Age of Transport Revolution, 1860–1914. (Helsinki, 1991), 73–128.
5 A good overview to the financial management of a government-sponsored joint-stock 
company can be found in Francis E. Hyde, Cunard and the North Atlantic, 1840–1973. 
A history of shipping and financial management (London, 1975).
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the business. To find entrepreneurs or investors for such experiments, there 
had to be a clear demand for the service. Distant places far from the world’s 
business centres, such as California or Australia, had to wait for a gold rush 
to become interesting enough for regular communications services.
To date, no attention has been paid in discussion on the speed of 
information transmission to the somewhat varying needs of the heavy users of 
long distance mail services, especially newspapers and business enterprises. 
For newspapers, it was extremely important to receive urgent news as quickly 
as possible, and special arrangements were frequently made to beat the 
competitors. While fast one-way information transmission was clearly also 
important from the merchants’ point of view, they needed a system which 
would work efficiently in both directions. This is the reason why the name 
of this study includes the term ‘business information transmission’ instead 
of just ‘information transmission’ or ‘market information transmission’. 
Although the business enterprises certainly took all the advantage they 
could of, for example, the telegraph, there was always the need of physical 
mail transmission as well. This study is about the business information 
transmission: how new systems were introduced and developed during the 
period, and how the merchant houses and their trade partners used the growing 
network of world communications for their different needs.
TABLE 1. Differences between the nature of information transmission for newspapers 














Special needs Asap. The first one 
receiving the news 
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Asap. The first one 
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Asap. Also the 
possibility to react 
rapidly 
was important.
Contents Any news of 
general interest.
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In addition to newspapers and business enterprises, there was also a third 
major group of interests, i.e. the governmental and military needs for rapid 
information transmission. As administrative letters could also be carried by 
naval ships, it has not been possible to include them in this study, except 
in the cases where the naval vessels also carried ordinary mail, e.g. in the 
Mediterranean as part of the East India mail route in 1830–1857, or when they 
were replacing the Admiralty-governed Falmouth packets for one reason or 
another. Private letters were carried in the same way as the commercial ones, 
and they are implicitly included in this research without further remarks.
As this is a study of the logistical development of mail transmission, it 
will not discuss the networks of the specific merchant houses or the contents 
of the letters carried. These will be described only by way of example in a 
few cases.
In the business world, information flows often consisted of multiple 
transactions. Although fast one-way information could be crucial in the 
trade – for example the news of changes in the market situation – it was at 
least equally important that there was a possibility to react rapidly. Overseas 
business consisted of numerous letters sent back and forth across the oceans. 
It was not only important to know the market situation and the prices before 
making an order, it also had to be known when and by which vessel the freight 
would be shipped, a bill of lading should be sent to confirm the shipping and 
a bill of exchange should be sent for the payment.
Regular correspondence with different companies and agents was often 
necessary throughout the year. The role of agents has been recently covered 
by e.g. Jari Ojala, according to whom the constant flow of information was 
needed not only for the business itself or for vital market information, but 
also as an important way to achieve trust between the parties undertaking 
transactions.6
Improvements in the speed of communications were crucial for many 
commercial, financial and shipping business activities. Speedier information 
made capital move faster, directly affecting world trade. Or, as it was seen in 
Victorian England: ’Increased postal communications… implies increased 
relations with that country, increased commerce, increased investment of 
English capital, increased settlement of energetic middle-class Englishmen; 
and from all these sources, the wealth and prosperity of England… are 
greatly increased.’7
To what extent economic growth was based on improving communications 
is difficult to show. There was clearly a connection between them and it seems 
that the growth in exports correlated positively with the need to create and 
improve systems for long distance mail transmission.
In Britain and the United States, the value of merchandise exports grew 
tenfold between 1820 and 1870, and many other countries followed closely. 
6 Jari Ojala, ‘The Principal Agent Problem Revisited: Entrepreneurial networks between 
Finland and ‘world markets’ during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ in Margrit 
Schulte Beerbühl and Jörg Vögele (eds.) Spinning the Commercial Web. International 
Trade, Merchants, and Commercial Cities, c. 1640–1939 (Frankfurt-am-Main, 2004).









As Britain in the early 19th century was so much ahead of any other country 
in economic performance due to the early industrial revolution, its real figures 
show an even more impressive increase during the period in question. In 
1870, the value of British merchandise exports equalled the corresponding 
figures of the United States, France and Germany combined, even though 
colonies such as India were not included.8
TABLE 2. Value of merchandise exports at constant prices 1820–1870 (million 
1990 USD).
Source: Maddison, 236–237.
In 1820, employment between major economic sectors in Britain differed 
markedly from any other country. While agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
employed 37.6% and mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities 32.9%, 
services already employed 29.5%.9 The service sector included financing 
activities and shipping, both of which were strongly dependent on fast 
information transmission. 19th century Britain was the world’s main source 
of foreign capital, investing mainly in Europe and Latin America until 1830, 
but thereafter increasingly in canal and railway construction in the United 
States and India.10
In 1870, less than a quarter (22.6%) of British employment came from 
agricultural activities, more than 42% came from industry and 35% from the 
service sector. At the same time, agriculture still accounted for almost half of 
employment in France and Germany, and for as much as 70% of employment 
in the United States, where business activities were concentrated in the large 
cities of the north eastern coast.11
In the light of these figures, it is no wonder that the development of faster 
business information transmission was especially in British interests. The 
economic structure of other comparable countries did not require it to the 
same extent. And in terms of potential, the British had coal, iron and the 
8 Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820–1992. OECD Development 
Centre Studies, (Paris, 1995), 236–237. 
9 Maddison, 39. See also James Foreman-Peck, A History of the World Economy. 
International Economic relations since 1850 (Sussex, 1983), 18–21.
10 See A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy 




technological knowledge to develop steamship services; a manufacturing 
industry that created new capital to the market; and tolerable labour costs 
on board the ships.12 Additionally, there was the long tradition of overseas 
mail services by the British Post Office sailing packets, starting on the route 
between Falmouth and Lisbon in 1689.
The aim of this study, methods, structure and sources in brief
This study aims to find out how efficiently the information transmission 
systems used on the world’s most important mail routes served business 
during the period 1815–1875. Several concrete cases have also been examined 
to see how efficiently these services were used in practice.
We can of course not judge the effectiveness of the 19th century mail 
systems by any modern criteria. What could be extremely slow in our 
view, might have been acceptable and even good performance in those 
circumstances. Thus the development of mail services can only be measured 
by comparable criteria such as speed, frequency, regularity and reliability. 
Of these criteria, reliability is the most intangible. It is viewed here from the 
perspective of information transmission, observing the regularity of sailings 
as well as the safety of shipping measured by the number of wrecks, both of 
which varied greatly between the different companies.
As the study covers a period of six decades, as well as several of the world’s 
most important trade routes and different mail-carrying systems operated by 
merchant ships, sailing packets and several nations’ mail steamship services, 
a specific method has been developed to measure the duration of business 
information transmission in a systematic and commensurable way.
The method of calculating consecutive information circles enabled by 
different means of communications gives a clear picture of the best options 
available for business information transmission during the year. The 
development of communications can easily be seen from the comparative 
figures of different time periods. To complete the picture, the business 
correspondence of several merchant houses has been used for postal historical 
research to illustrate how the system worked in practice.13 Much emphasis 
has also been put on the research of the historical context, which is essential 
for understanding why and how things changed.
As world trade was so much in British hands during the time period in 
question, and the most important long distance mail routes were mainly 
12  E.g. in the 1860s, the average wages of able-bodied seamen were 3.1 pounds sterling per 
month in England, compared with 6.0 in British North America. The average in Europe 
was 2.8. but for example in Finland and Norway less than 2.0. See Yrjö Kaukiainen, 
‘Finnish sailors, 1750–1870’ in Lars U. Scholl and Merja-Liisa Hinkkanen (eds), Sail 
and Steam. Selected Maritime Writings of Yrjö Kaukiainen. Research in Maritime History 
No. 27 (St. John’s, 2004), 19.
13 Postal historical research focuses on the postal markings and handstamps of the letters 
instead of their contents. In a few cases, some attention has also been paid to the contents 
to shed more light on the circumstances in which the information was transmitted. As will 
be explained in Chapter II, this study is not about mercantile networks but about how the 
systems of business information transmission developed during the chosen period.
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those connecting Britain and its (former) colonies or other important trade 
partners, the approach of this study is unavoidably British in orientation. 
Yet the overseas mail services of American, French and German steamship 
companies have been included where the sailing data has been available. It 
should be noticed that these services started much later than the British and 
many of them were active only for a short period.
Before 1840, the British Post Office sailing packets carried mails from 
England to North America, the West Indies and South America, while the 
route to India was covered by the British East India Company until the end 
of its monopoly. In the 1820s and 1830s, most of the North Atlantic mails 
were carried by the commercial American sailing packets. At the end of 
the 1830s, the British Post Office made three important mail contracts: one 
for the route from England to Halifax (Nova Scotia) and Boston with the 
Cunard Line, starting in 1840, another for the service to the West Indies 
with the Royal Mail Line, starting in 1841, and a third for the service via 
the Mediterranean and Suez to India with the P&O, starting gradually in 
1840. The mail steamship service to South America by the Royal Mail Line 
started in 1851, and the P&O also extended their Asian network markedly 
during the years thereafter.
American competition on the North Atlantic route was extremely hard in the 
1850s but declined sharply after 1857, when the U.S. Congress made a decision to 
terminate the government subsidies for mail steamship companies. After the Civil 
War, the government’s interest was mainly in developing internal structures such 
as canals and railways, and foreign trade did not expand to the same extent.
Excluding the short experiment on providing government subsidies 
for a French steamship company in 1847, the French did not organize 
corresponding mail services on long-distance routes before the 1860s. The 
German steamship companies Hamburg-Amerika Linie and Norddeutscher 
Lloyd were established in the 1850s but they gained greater importance 
only later, when the emigration to North America expanded after the Civil 
War and the frequency of the sailings increased. For these obvious reasons, 
the space given to the different mail services and companies in this study 
depends very much on the length of the time the services existed. The electric 
telegraph entered the picture rather late from this study’s point of view. The 
importance of telegrams as business communication tools increased notably 
later, towards the end of the century, when the prices of the service were 
reduced to a more reasonable level.
John J. McCusker has compressed the overall development of business 
press and the ‘Information Revolution’ during the last five centuries in three 
words: ‘better, faster and cheaper’.14 However, the question of information 
costs could not easily be covered here. There would not only be the angle of 
the users of different mail services, but also the viewpoints of mail-carrying 
shipping companies as well as the governments that paid for the services by 
awarding mail contracts.
14 John J. McCusker, ‘The Demise of Distance: The Business Press and the Origins of the 
Information Revolution in the Early Modern Atlantic World’ In The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 110, Number 2, April 2005, 295–321.
Introduction
16
During the period in question – the time before the Universal Postal 
Union, or the UPU – there was no uniformed system for overseas mail, 
but only bilateral postal treaties between the countries. The contents of the 
treaties varied and they were renegotiated several times over the decades in 
question. The postage rates varied in each case depending on the ship by 
which the letter was carried (private or official mail-carrier), on the route 
and the mail contract under which the letter was carried, as well as the length 
of the inland voyage at both ends of the journey. Even during the same 
period there were alternatives for sending mail with different costs.15 And 
furthermore, in the first half of the 19th century it was mostly the recipient 
who paid for the letters when receiving them, not the sender who chose the 
means of communication.
From the operator’s – the mail-carrying shipping company’s – perspective, 
faster communication increased costs. The expenses of building and operating 
steamships were manifold compared with sailing vessels. And newer and faster 
steamers were needed all the time to keep up with the competitors. Also the 
laying of submarine cables was conducted by huge expenses. Many companies 
failed, and only a few succeeded. For the governments, the mail contracts were 
usually a fiscal burden and a subject for continuous political debate.
Due to the wide spread of the subject, the costs of information transmission 
are touched here only as examples of different aspects. The intention of this 
study is mainly to try to find an answer to the question: was there a ‘revolution’ 
in the way of organizing the global business information transmission in the 
19th century. And if there was, when was it and what happened really?
Earlier research on business communications will be discussed in Chapter 
II and the use of different methods and sources in measuring the speed of 
information transmission in Chapter III. A short introduction to the overseas 
mail systems and the development of the speed of communications before 
1815 will be presented in Chapter IV.
The study covers the time period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars 
in 1815 to the formation of the UPU in 1875, which finally uniformed the 
regulations of the world’s mail systems and rates. Two important shift periods 
are thus included: the transition from sail to steam in overseas mail transport, 
and the introduction of the intercontinental telegraph.
There would have been at least two different ways of organizing the 
main contents (chapters V–VII) of the study. The first would have been a 
chronological approach:
• Sail vs. sail
• Sail vs. steam
• Steam vs. steam 
• Steam vs. telegraph
15 There are several distinguished postal historical studies of the postage rates of the period. 
See George E. Hargest, History of Letter Post Communication Between the United States 
and Europe 1845–1875 (Massachusetts, 1975); Jane Moubray & Michael Moubray, 
British Letter Mail to Overseas Destinations 1840–1875 (London, 1992); Richard Winter, 
Understanding Transatlantic Mail, Vol. 1. (Bellefonte, PA, 2006).
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These periods of different means of overseas communication, including the 
two shift periods, would then have been examined geographically. To make it 
easier for the reader to follow the long-term development of communications 
on each main trade route, another approach has been chosen. The development 
of the speed of communications is examined route by route with the North 
Atlantic, the West Indies, South America, Panama, East India, China, 
Australia and South Africa being the main areas of interest. This appeared 
to be the right solution, as the improvements in the mail systems did not 
take place simultaneously but each route had its own character, depending 
on historical background, economic importance, geographic location, 
technological challenges and other matters.
Of all the sources available, the sailing data of the mail-carrying ships 
give an answer to most of the general questions about how overseas business 
information transmission was organized during the different time periods. 
Therefore the sailing lists, to date rather unknown in academic research, have 
been chosen to form the basis of this study. Postal historians have worked 
for several decades collecting the sailing data of mail-carrying ships from 
different newspapers and organizing all the information into comprehensive 
lists. The objective has been to serve philatelists, who need this kind of 
accurate information to verify the authenticity of letters in their collection.
The published lists cover the sailings of the Falmouth packets to Halifax 
and New York between 1815 and 1840, and to South America until the end 
of 1850. They cover all the North Atlantic mail sailings of more than 30 
shipping companies between 1838 and 1875; the mail steamship services to 
the West Indies by the Royal Mail Line from 1841 onwards; all British mail 
steamship contract services to South America from 1851; and the French 
services from the early 1860s. They also cover the P&O's various routes from 
the 1840s, the British Admiralty's services on the Mediterranean between 
1830 and 1857; and American coastal steamship services of the early 1850s, 
to name but a few of the most important ones.
To get an impression of the number of sailings listed, we can look at Walter 
Hubbard's and Richard Winter's extremely useful North Atlantic Mail Sailings 
1840–1875, which alone includes some 14,000 Atlantic crossings with all 
relevant data from the ship’s departure port and sailing date to the details of 
the arrival. The ports of call are also included, and delays are often explained 
in the notes.16 The lists do not repeat the schedules advertised before the trip 
by agents or shipping companies, but they are based on factual sailing data 
published by newspapers, thus describing what happened in reality. During 
the age of sail and steam, this was often a very different story.
Although much has been done, there are also gaps in the published 
sailing data. The writer of this study has not been able to find sailing lists 
of the Falmouth packet sailings to the West Indies or Central America. The 
departure and arrival dates of the American sailing packets have not been 
published either. The historian Robert Albion, who calculated the duration 
of each of the more than 4,000 westbound voyages of these packets for his 




book Square-Riggers on Schedule,17 never published the actual sailing dates. 
And furthermore, sailing data has not been systematically collected from 
journeys made by merchant vessels, which also carried mail.
If the sailing data needed for this study has not been found from previously 
published postal historical sources, it has been collected from Lloyd’s List, 
with a few years’ double-checking from the Liverpool Customs Bills of Entry. 
In addition to the new details about the Falmouth and American sailing 
packet services, this work includes nearly 600 records from the merchant 
ship traffic between Britain and British Guiana in 1840, as well as all port 
calls of the whole round trip of nearly 400 British merchant vessels between 
around 20 ports on the way from England to India, China, Southeast Asia 
and Australia in January 1832 – June 1834. The number of recorded dates 
in the last mentioned period exceeds 2,000.
To find out the difference between the duration of the mail transport itself 
and the duration of the whole process between writing a letter and receiving it, 
postal historical studies of merchant correspondence have also been included 
in this research. For this, the overseas correspondence of several Liverpool 
and London merchant houses, as well as the honourable East India Company 
have been studied and compared with respective sailing data.18
The material includes correspondence of the following merchant 
houses:
• Sandbach, Tinne & Co., 1825–1870 (West Indies–Liverpool)
• Thomas and William Earle & Co., 1836–1870  
 (West Indies–Liverpool)
17 Robert Greenhalgh Albion, Square-Riggers on Schedule. The New York Sailing Packets 
to England, France, and the Cotton Ports (Princeton, 1938).
18 Liverpool, being the European port of three American sailing packet lines with weekly 
transatlantic service, as well as of the most important transatlantic mail steamship 
companies (Cunard Line, Collins Line, Inman Line, White Star Line, etc.), was the most 
important information hub in the North Atlantic communications ca. 1820–1870 and the 
second trade port of England after London only, when it comes to business with e.g. the 
West Indies, South America or East India. The merchant correspondences have been 
chosen here mainly from the philatelic point of view: there had to be postal markings 
on the covers received. For example, the letter copy books of senders (which normally 
form a great part of the correspondence examined in network studies) are not at all useful 
from this point of view.  In earlier times, letters were not put into covers but just folded 
and sealed. In these cases, the postal markings have been saved on the backside of the 
received documents. Later, only the contents were often saved while the merchant houses 
threw away the unnecessary covers or they have later been sold to philatelic markets by 
the descendants of the merchant families, or other persons involved in the business. Much 
material has been destroyed in wars, fires, mergers, etc. All this limits the possibilities 
to find relevant merchant correspondence especially for postal historical studies. In the 
case of the East India Company, their letters were carried in bundles with no Post Office 
markings. However, the clerks of the India House have carefully documented the date 
of arrival of each letter as well as by which ship the letter has arrived. By using this 
information, it is possible to find out from the sailing data published by Lloyd’s List, how 
long time the sea journey took in each case from the entire duration of the information 
transmission. All the letters of these merchant correspondences have been compared with 




• Rathbone Bros & Co., 1841–1870 (North Atlantic)
• Daniel Williams, 1854–1870 (South America–Liverpool)
• Henry Eld Symons, of Kirkdale, 1857 
 (Australia & New Zealand–Liverpool), and 1857–1858 
 (South America–Liverpool).
• The East India Company, 1832–1833 (India–London)
• Frederick Huth & Co., 1836–1850 (North America–London)
The total number of letters analysed exceeds 2,000. For the published sailing 
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Where does this study stand in the history of communications? It is obvious 
that the history of communications can be viewed from several different 
perspectives. It might be understood as the history of logistics or transport, 
the history of journalism, or postal history, the history of postal organizations, 
the history of personal networks, or the history of the development of the 
speed of communications, just to mention a few.
Also the history of information transmission includes different 
angles. Roughly, it can be divided into two: personal contacts and public 
communications. In both cases, information is transmitted in spoken or 
written (or printed) form through various networks or public transport and 
delivery systems.
Traders – whether they were merchants, agents, brokers, bankers, 
shipowners, underwriters or other businessmen, sometimes even women 
– were individuals, who used all kinds of personal communications in
their everyday life. They were also heavy users of public communications,
sometimes also involved in their contents. In principle, any kind of
communication could include a business aspect.
A short introduction to the research already conducted in the fields of 
personal as well as public information transmission may be useful for the 
reader. Both these ‘categories’ may include a local and an overseas dimension, 
although their respective emphasis may vary.
For example, Graeme J. Milne has studied the information order of 
the mercantile community of Victorian Liverpool, i.e. which members 
of society had access to which kinds of information, how much it cost to 
acquire it, and how institutions were formed to disseminate or restrict it.19 
This approach includes a question about the limits between personal and 
public communications. As Milne noted, although frequently marginalised in 
economic theory, information of all sorts was a central preoccupation of 19th-
century business. For example, placing information with its costs, benefits and 
uncertainties, at the centre of the historical analysis of these operations can 
19 Graeme J. Milne, ‘Knowledge, Communications and the Information Order in Nineteenth-
Century Liverpool’, Forum: Information and Marine History, International Journal of 
Maritime History, Vol. XIV No.1 (2002), 209–224.
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therefore offer a more appropriate interrogatory approach than the powerful, 
but sometimes ahistorical, tools of classical economics.20
Several other historians have lately studied the personal networks of 
particular merchant houses or mercantile communities. As an example, 
Sheryllynne Haggerty has examined the transshipment of knowledge in the 
business environments of Philadelphia and Liverpool in the late 18th century. 
She notes that various means of communications were already available for 
traders, allowing them to assess, manage and reduce their risks. Newspapers 
were crucial in providing information in an increasingly impersonal 
environment, but the written word in the form of personal letters was also 
important, not only for recording and directing business, but for introductions 
and transmitting gossip – very necessary in keeping up to date with the state 
of people’s reputations. Haggerty divides the field of communications into 
printed, written and spoken word, with a fourth category of religion, family 
and friendships.21
Gordon Boyce continues the idea with a more economic viewpoint as 
follows: the commercial communities, where business, family, religious 
and political ties were often interwoven, provided necessary information 
and capital even for large enterprises. Within the closely-knit commercial 
communities of British ports, successful operation of the basic network 
mechanism generated over time the interpersonal learning, mutual interest 
and enhanced reputations needed to support larger operations.22
In a local business environment, the reliability and reputation of business 
partners and counterparts were continuously under the microscope in 
different formal and informal business activities, including correspondence, 
participation in events, associations, etc. When considering foreign business 
opportunities, the reputation of foreign partners was extremely important. All 
means were used to keep the most reliable connections for foreign business 
up to date.23
In Finland, Mika Kallioinen and Jari Ojala have recently studied the 
business communications networks of specific merchant houses with 
overseas trade.24 In Britain, e.g. Graeme J. Milne’s Trade and Traders in 
Mid-Victorian Liverpool covers several aspects of this topic.25 There is also a 
major ongoing project by the name Mercantile Liverpool at the University of 
Liverpool, involving a mix of quantitative and qualitative studies to broadly 
cover the networks of Liverpool merchants in 1851–1911. Kalevi Ahonen 
20 Milne (2002), 224.
21 Sheryllynne Haggerty, ‘A Link in the Chain: Trade and the Transhipment of Knowledge 
in the Late Eighteenth Century’, Forum: Information and Marine History, International 
Journal of Maritime History, Vol. XIV No.1 (2002), 157–172.
22 Gordon Boyce, Information, mediation and institutional development. The rise of large-
scale enterprise in British shipping, 1870–1919 (Manchester, 1995), 32–39.
23 Mika Kallioinen, Verkostoitu tieto. Informaatio ja ulkomaiset markkinat Dahlströmin 
kauppahuoneen liiketoiminnassa 1800-luvulla (Helsinki, 2002), 90–96, 113–115, 200.
24 For the latter, see Jari Ojala, Tehokasta liiketoimintaa Pohjanmaan pikkukaupungeissa. 
Purjemerenkulun kannattavuus ja tuottavuus 1700- ja 1800-luvulla (Helsinki, 1999), 
especially 311–332, 440–441.
25 Graeme J. Milne, Trade and Traders in Mid-Victorian Liverpool. Mercantile business 
and the making of a world port (Liverpool, 2000), passim.
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has also examined a great number of merchant house correspondences in 
the United States to cover the trade between America and Baltic Russia, 
touching furthermore upon the difficulties in obtaining information on both 
sides of the Atlantic.26
Merchant networks can be studied from different angles. A good recent 
example is Mika Kallioinen’s Verkostoitu tieto, which covers the networks 
of a Turku-based merchant house in the mid-19th century. It is based 
on the following classification: 1) technology, meaning new forms of 
communications, their adaptation, improvements in the speed of information 
transmission, 2) communications as means of social interaction, network as 
a channel of information, 3) cultural basis of communications; confidence, 
international ‘entrepreneurial culture’, and 4) information of business 
activities; contents, availability, usefulness.27 Even if the perspective is 
wide, the merchant house aspect predominates in the study, and it does not 
therefore cover the public communications aspect.
In addition to the research on personal networks, important studies 
also exist covering different kinds of public communications: the 
general news circulation, early newspapers, carrying mails, and speed of 
communications.
Ian K. Steele’s The English Atlantic28 includes several interesting 
viewpoints concerning early overseas information transmission. Steele divides 
the English Americas of 1675–1740 into four main areas which received and 
forwarded information from the mother country in a very different way. The 
sugar route for the West Indies, the tobacco route for Chesapeake, the Western 
route for Philadelphia, New York and Boston, as well as the Northern routes 
for Canada all had their typical traffic and information streams. Steele’s work 
covers the development of sea transport (‘news-bearing ships’), mail routes 
and post offices, newspapers and packet boat service, as well as some good 
case examples of news circulation following important historical events. 
Additionally, Steele notes that emigrants and diseases, e.g. smallpox and 
yellow fever, also spread along the same routes.
Another extensive and equally interesting study about the development of 
the speed of information transmission is made by Allan R. Pred. Although 
mainly concentrating on this development between American cities, the 
Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information gives a wide view of 
the ways in which the information flows proceeded during the last ‘pre-
telegraphic’ half century. Pred’s study covers the spread of information 
through newspapers, postal services and coastal trade, as well as inter-urban 
travelling, and the spread of innovations and diseases. His model of large-
city rank stability is of special interest.29
What Pred describes as an urban city system on the north eastern coast 
of the United States, was rather parallel with the major cities in Britain. The 
26 See Kalevi Ahonen, From Sugar Triangle to Cotton Triangle. Trade and Shipping between 
America and Baltic Russia, 1783–1860 (Jyväskylä, 2005), 163–168.
27 See Kallioinen, 20.
28 Steele (1986), passim.
29 Pred, passim.
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city merchant middlemen (e.g. importers and shipping merchants), agent 
middlemen (e.g. auctioneers, brokers, commission merchants, and factors) 
and retailers were the most important capital accumulators, but even the 
so-called manufacturing establishments combined small scale production 
with retailing or wholesaling functions, or gained provisions by offering 
repair services. The system included coastal and interregional distribution 
of hinterland production, hinterland and coastal distribution of interregional 
and foreign imports, foreign export of hinterland commodities and re-export 
of trade commodities. While the wholesaling-trading system dominated the 
urban economy, the relative importance of its functions varied over time and 
from city to city.30 The more developed the urban systems of an area were 
during the period, the more important was the speed of business information 
transmission.
The history of printed business communications goes back to ancient times, 
as John J. McCusker has shown in his studies on the early modern Italian 
business press, and the business press in England before 1775. His essays 
on the early financial and commercial newspapers published in the Italian 
and other European business centres cover a period of more than two and a 
half centuries prior to the 1780s.31
At the turn of the 18th century there were four basic types of commercial 
and financial newspapers published in London during a business week: the 
Bills of Entry, the Commodity Price Current, the Marine List and the Exchange 
Rate Current. Several hundred Bills of Entries were printed and published 
every day. They were subscribed to not only by individual merchants but 
by the London coffee houses, government agencies, etc. Merchants also 
subscribed to the newspapers for their overseas correspondents on a regular 
basis.32
The business newspapers – as well as the national papers – were widely 
spread. Large numbers of commodity price currents of Venice can be 
found in the archives of the Netherlands, and large numbers of Amsterdam 
commodity price currents in the archives of Indonesia. The British Post 
Office prioritized incoming Lloyd’s List news in its London Post Office, 
and all newspapers carried by mail were for long periods free of postage 
fees and stamp duty.33
According to McCusker, ‘quicker distribution of business news meant that 
businessmen could react more rapidly to changes in market conditions’, while 
newspapers were ‘filled with information gathered, published, distributed, 
and sent off in the post all in the same afternoon or evening; these business 
newspapers spread the news of prices and the rest much more quickly than 
in the past’.34
30 Pred, 189.
31 See John J. McCusker, ‘The Italian Business Press in Early Modern Europe’ and ‘The 
Business Press in England before 1775’, in McCusker, Essays in the Economic History 
of the Atlantic World (London, 1997), 117–176.
32 See McCusker, 149–172.
33 See McCusker, 138–139; Charles Wright & C. Ernest Fayle, A History of Lloyds, from 
the Founding of Lloyd’s Coffee House to the Present Day  (London, 1928), 73–74.
34 McCusker, 139.
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In practice, however, the newspapers could not be in Indonesia faster than 
the following sailing ship would take them there, forwarded by the ship’s 
captain or an individual traveller. This meant something like an approximately 
five months delay after the rapid ‘posting’ of the news. In Central Europe, 
the mail coaches normally managed to bring the news from one country to 
another within a couple of weeks or even a shorter time, depending on the 
distance.
Why then was the speed of information so important for a trader, whether 
he was a merchant, an agent, a broker or a banker? Those who knew first 
about the market changes – prices, exchange rates, declining or growing 
stocks, etc. – could naturally make money. Businesses like the cotton trade 
across the Atlantic were typically influenced by speculations. New York 
merchants, usually being the first to learn of radical price changes for cotton in 
Liverpool were often ruthless in their exploitation of the market in Charleston, 
Savannah, Mobile and New Orleans, while interests in those cities, being the 
first in the South to acquire New York news, could make quick back-country 
purchases before the word of price adjustments became public property. 
Similarly, hastily dispatched representatives of New York mercantile houses 
could frequently take advantage of early news of domestic price changes in 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and other major cities, with entrepreneurs in those 
cities frequently repeating the process in their respective hinterlands.35 In this 
kind of trade, the impact of the telegraph would be the greatest.
Despite the progress in developing electric communications, which started 
in the mid-19th century, most business activities still required physical 
movements of documents, as they did up to the age of the fax and Internet. 
As Yrjö Kaukiainen has pointed out, the improvements in communications 
widened the already existing speed gap between the transport of information 
and of bulk goods, giving merchants an opportunity to sell the cargo further 
before it had even arrived. The bill of lading, a certificate of specific goods 
being loaded on a specific ship, normally signed by the master, legally 
respected the actual cargo. This document could be sent by a fast mail steamer 
to the port of arrival, and the recipient of the goods could make further 
transactions before the actual arrival of the ship.36 Money was changing 
hands quicker than ever before.
While the pace of business transactions was typically slow, merchants 
could gain from completing sales deliveries and purchase acquisitions as 
quickly as possible, being able to avoid the unnecessary tying up of capital 
in goods-in-transit or goods-in-stock. In places where the intervals between 
information receipt were shorter and transport services were more frequent 
and rapid, the merchant could in the course of a year complete a greater 
number of capital turnovers, or action cycles, than his counterpart with similar 
capital resources but slower communications.37
Shipments were usually paid by a bill of exchange, which was considered a 
legal promise to pay a certain sum of money on a particular date, most usually 
35 See Pred, 221.
36 Kaukiainen (2001), 21–22.
37 Pred, 222–223.
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in three month’s time. A supplier issued a bill for the value of the goods he was 
shipping and for which he expected to be paid at some definite future date; the 
supplier agreed to ‘draw a bill’ on the buyer, who acknowledged responsibility 
for eventual payment by writing on the bill his ‘acceptance’. The acceptance 
signified that the buyer was a good risk for a lender, as the acceptance house 
was liable to the financing house in the event of default. After acceptance 
the bill was sold to a financier; a lender would then ‘discount’ the bill (buy 
it for less than the sum payable in the future) and the supplier would thereby 
borrow. The difference was the interest charged on the loan. When the goods 
were sold, the supplier was able to pay the debt and withdraw the bill. The 
bill could change ownership (be rediscounted) during its currency should 
the original lender suddenly need cash. Bills of exchange therefore were a 
valuable means of facilitating both national and international trade at a time 
when transport was slow and communication difficult.38
The German Ernst Samhaber depicts in his book Merchants make history 
how a Hamburger merchant, John Parish, used the system for his credit. 
He shipped Baltic grain to Western Europe and imported West Indian 
merchandise – coffee, sugar, rum, tobacco and tea – via Liverpool. He paid 
for the grain with colonial merchandise and for the colonial merchandise with 
grain. While the cargo was still at sea, he made out a bill of exchange, on 
which they advanced money. As security he handed over the ship’s papers, 
the bills of lading. He himself bore the major part of the risk, only partly 
covered by insurance, and simply added the premium to the price of the grain 
and the colonial merchandise.39
In the North Atlantic cotton trade, where prices could change sharply, 
importers in Liverpool tried to guard themselves against price falls by 
making forward sales as soon as they had made their purchases in America. 
Speculators and others purchased the forward-sold cotton either to safeguard 
their future supply or in the hope of profiting if the price of cotton did rise 
while in transit.40
Until the early 19th century, notable financial development had already 
taken place. There was the establishment of a de facto gold standard, the 
evolution of specialised merchant banks, the growth of a market in mortgages, 
the increasing use of bills of exchange to settle domestic and international 
38 Foreman-Peck, 68–69. Kalevi Ahonen describes in his doctor’s thesis different means of 
financing trade between America and Russia. While bills of exchange, based on sterling 
dominated international trade, and were especially popular in Anglo-American trade, 
the Americans often operated with Russia on credit accounts arranged by the ‘American 
houses’ in London, and ‘as London was the centre of world trade an importer of any kind 
of product could manage his payments using bills drawn on his London banker’. Ahonen 
also describes how direct barter trade was used in the Havana sugar trade, as well as the 
use of Spanish silver dollars, where the right moment to buy and use specie was always 
a topical question for shippers interested in Cuba. See Ahonen, 257–282.
39 Ernst Samhaber, Merchants make history (New York, 1964) 279. Graeme J. Milne 
describes the use of bills of exchange by Liverpool merchants in the mid-19th century, 
see Milne (2000), 114, 154–155. For more about the credit systems in the international 
trade in 1850–1875, see Foreman-Peck, 67–70.
40 Nigel Hall, ‘The Liverpool Cotton Market’, Transactions of the Historic Society of 
Lancashire and Cheshire, Vol 149 (1999), 105.
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obligations, the rise of the stock exchange, the development of marine 
and fire insurance, and the appearance of a financial press. The effects of 
these innovations were felt on other activities. Improvements in credit and 
commercial services boosted the shipping industry, promoted overseas trade 
and assisted the balance of payments by generating invisible earnings. The 
expansion of overseas commerce encouraged the rise of mercantile firms 
whose size enabled them to mobilize the capital and credit needed for long-
distance trade.41
International bankers like the Rothschilds and Barings, both of German 
origin, were very powerful in the British overseas business. While the 
Rothschilds established banks in Vienna, Paris, London and Naples, the 
Barings concentrated to a much greater extent on overseas transactions. 
They bought and sold merchandise and securities on commission as well as 
for themselves, they operated their own ships, kept the accounts of selected 
depositors, and acted as financial agents for merchant houses and governments 
all over the world, especially in Latin America and the British Empire.42
The business practices and the common use of financial instruments, 
combined with growing world trade and investment flows, caused a growing 
need for fast business information transmission. Although there was a 
continuous improvement in the speed of communications during 1820–1870, 
the improvements were far from even.43 Each of the important world trade 
routes had its own historical background, and the development of the speed of 
information transmission varied markedly from one place to another. In fact, 
technical improvements played only a partial role in the development, while 
many other factors have been rather untouched in historical research.
To put this specific study on the ‘map’ of the history of communications, 
its focus is on the public long-distance mail systems, concentrating on the 
current possibilities to maintain personal networks of overseas business 
relations. Whether the mail carried consisted of personal letters or trade 
documents has no specific importance from this perspective.
The study thus concentrates on overseas business information transmission, 
leaving out the local merchant networks and means of communications. 
Spoken information, like ‘news of mouth’, rumours and personal travelling, 
is only implicitly involved – mails and passengers were usually carried by 
the same ships. Before the time of the telegraph, the speed of information 
transmission was the same as the speed by which a person could travel. 
While studying the development of mail transport, the other related aspects 
are also automatically involved. The chosen methods will be explained in 
the following chapter.
41 P.J. Cain & A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688–2000 (London, 2002), 68.
42 See Foreman-Peck, 67–68.
43 See Kaukiainen (2001), 1–28.
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Means of communications Local Overseas











travelling and writing 
letters
Public Spoken Speeches for large 
audience








Systems Local mail & newspaper 
delivery
Long distance mail 
systems
TABLE 3. Different forms of information transmission (before telegraph).
This study concentrates on public long-distance mail systems and the possibilities 
to maintain personal overseas networks (mainly business relations) by using these 
systems.
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Introduction to the different methods of measuring the speed and frequency 
of communications – Consecutive information circles as tools in measuring 
the speed of business information transmission
Introduction to the different methods of measuring the speed and 
frequency of communications
Historians often find it difficult to receive an accurate answer to the question 
of the duration of information transmission. Problems vary depending on the 
mail route (sea, overland, or mixed), the time period (war times, seasonal 
variations, general level of technological development) and the source material 
in question (correspondence, newspapers, administrative documents).
The nature of sources available, as well as their quality and quantity, 
gives firm limits to what can be attained by examining the information 
flows. If the interest is in personal contacts, for example the speed of a 
particular merchant’s business information transmission, the main sources 
are the received letters in the company’s correspondence. Yet they can be 
complemented with maritime intelligence from contemporary newspapers 
or postal historical studies. Sailing data from newspapers, customs bills etc. 
are the main sources if the interest is in the general conditions of information 
transmission. Letters with postal markings and handstamps give more and 
better information on the transmission than privately sent or very early letters 
with only the writer’s and recipient’s handwritten markings.
Generally speaking, there are three main aspects to consider when choosing 
the method for measuring the speed of information transmission:
• measurement of the duration of information transmission from
the sender to the recipient of the message
• measurement of the duration of transport between two places
• measurement of the frequency of transport between two places
These aspects have often been used for the measurement of the speed of 
information transmission without clearly distinguishing the difference 
between what has been measured and what is talked about.
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The information transmission from the writer to the recipient obviously 
includes the second aspect, the duration of transport between the two places 
in question, and is very much dependent on the third one, the frequency of 
the transport available.
The first aspect deals mainly with correspondence between two individuals 
and leads to the research of personal communications, while the two other 
aspects generally deal with public sources – like newspapers, customer bills, 
post office records and collected sailing data in postal historical studies 
– and focuses on public communications. The two latter aspects explain the 
duration of personal communications, while the personal correspondence 
with its postal markings and handstamps can verify the data and statistics 
given by public sources. Therefore, the use of different aspects together can 
portray an issue better than the use of one aspect only.
The most common method in measuring the speed of information 
transmission in history studies has been the simple calculation of days 
between writing and receiving letters. This method can only give limited 
results, however.
Firstly, only received letters are useful in the research, as the copies of 
letters sent do not include information about the arrival date in the other end. 
Copy books of sent letters can sometimes complete the picture shedding light 
on the information circulation or the frequency of communications. By using 
only the writing and arrival dates of the letters for measuring the speed of 
information transmission, several important aspects remain unknown.
The transmission of an overseas letter can be described as a process, which 
is sliced into several independent parts: how long it took for the writer to send 
the letter after writing it, how long it took for the local system (coffee house, 
forwarding agent, post office) to forward it to an ocean going vessel (if overseas 
mail), how long it took before the ship was ready to leave from the port, how 
long the sea journey was, and how efficiently the letter was forwarded and 
finally delivered at the other end. Naturally, the duration of the whole process 
also depended on the frequency of the mail transport available.
To understand how the process worked and thus be able to distinguish 
the fixed elements of information transmission from occasional delays, it is 
useful to learn to understand the postal historical elements of the material 
examined.
Postal handstamps and other markings on the letters made by post 
offices are of great help when examining the factual speed of information 
transmission. They give accurate dates of departures and arrivals of the 
letters, as well as the transit places. The handstamps were needed to inform 
the receiving post office, as well as the final recipient who had to pay for 
the transport, by which route the letter had been carried. The inland postage 
rates depended on the length of the route by which the letter was carried, 
while the ship letters had their own instructions. For fiscal purposes, it was 
important that the system worked promptly, and much effort was put into 
correcting mistakes instantly.
Handwritten instructions on the covers are also very useful for a historian, 
regarding the means of communications (‘per Packet’, ‘per English Steamer’, 
‘per Neptune’, ‘p. Capt. Read’) or the route (‘via Panama’, ‘via Marseilles’). 
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Also these markings are usually reliable, as there were strict regulations about 
the rates depending on different mail routes, mail contracts, etc. The changes 
en route were most often corrected on the cover, or they can be noticed from 
differing postal handstamps.
By carefully reading the postal markings of the covers and examining the 
postal history, it is usually possible to discover further information regarding 
the letter’s trip from the writer to the recipient instead of just calculating the 
days between writing and receiving it.
One of the rare academic studies crossing the border of philatelic postal 
history has been conducted by John J. McCusker, who examined the origins 
of one single letter in his essay New York City and the Bristol Packet.44
The letter, found by McCusker himself as a boy, appeared to be an 
important document in the history of the first packet service between Bristol 
and New York in 1710–13. As the author puts it, ‘administrative, philatelic, 
archival and genealogical evidence united to support the validity of the 
conclusion’ that the letter was really sent from New York early in May 1711 
by one of the packets. ‘The letter traveled on precisely the business and 
precisely the route that the organizers of the packet service had intended. It 
linked English and colonial merchants and secured their communications 
during a time of war. London merchants, like Joseph Levy [the recipient of 
the letter], had been the ones who had pressed for the packet. For Levy and 
Simson, and many more like them, the mails meant the continuation of their 
business but government, too, realized the need, and reaped the advantages 
of secure lines of communications with the Continental Colonies.’45
Complementary methods obviously add value to the research. In addition 
to the data collected from personal correspondence, and especially if the 
main interest of the study is in public communications, general news flows 
or the efficiency of mail systems, maritime intelligence from contemporary 
newspapers or relevant postal historical studies are of great help. As already 
mentioned in the Introduction, most British and French mail steamship 
routes as of 1838 are well covered by postal historians at least to 1875, the 
year when the Universal Postal Union, or UPU, was established and the 
international postal rates were uniformed. Earlier mail sailings are also often 
well documented in postal historical studies, or the data can be found from 
contemporary newspapers.
An example from the writer’s postal historical collection may clarify the 
usefulness of combining the classic method of calculating the difference 
between the dates of writing a letter and receiving it, the postal markings on 
the letter and the sailing data published in the contemporary newspapers or 
postal historical studies:
In the late 18th century, there was a monthly British Post Office sailing 
packet service between Falmouth, England, and New York. A letter from 
Richmond, Virginia, with the note ‘p. Packet’, was handstamped in the 
44 John J. McCusker, ‘New York City and the Bristol Packet. A chapter in eighteenth-century 
postal history’, in John J. McCusker, Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World 
(London, 1997), 177–189.
45 McCusker (1997), 189.
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Richmond Post Office on 2 September, 1796 and on arrival in London 18 
weeks later, 5 January, 1797.46 (See Fig. 1) As the letter was obviously written 
in Richmond (it is not dated) and it was addressed to London, there should 
not have been any delays at either end of the journey. But how could it take 
125 days to bring the letter from South Carolina to England?
According to Lloyd’s List, two mail packets had arrived at Falmouth from 
New York on the same day, 2 January, 1797. This matched perfectly with 
the arrival handstamp of London on 5 January. One of the packets was the 
Countess of Lei[ce]ster, which had sailed ‘in 7 weeks’, and the other was the 
Princess of Wales, ‘in 5 weeks’.47 As the mails should have arrived once a 
month, at least one of the ships was at least two weeks late. There had been 
problems in the westbound packet service already, as the writer starts his letter 
by complaining that ‘your last of 2d May only reachd me last week owing 
to the delay of the Packet’. Due to the war time (French war 1793–1802), 
dozens of mail packets were captured, including one in June which probably 
should have carried the letter if available.48
The unlucky combination of a late incoming packet and the need for 
waiting at port, primitive inland connections between Richmond and New 
York – only one post rider was in service, as the mail coaches would start on 
the Virginia route just a few years later49 – and the five to seven weeks sailing 
from New York to England caused an accumulated delay to the information 
transmission. However, the facts known verify that the sea transport had 
taken only 30–40 per cent of the whole transmission time. Studying only the 
writer’s and recipient’s markings on the letter would have given an incorrect 
picture of the overseas communications, and studying only the sailing data 
would have given a mistaken picture of the whole process of information 
transmission.
Sometimes the historian’s interest is not only in the duration of the 
information transmission but in learning more about the process of how the 
mail was carried. The letter itself may give little to start with but even those 
markings may open a path to an exciting story about how information was 
transmitted during that period.
For example, a letter (see Fig. 2) to ‘Messrs Magowe & Son, Boston’ was 
written in Calcutta on 6 December, 1851, and handstamped on the reverse 
by the Calcutta General Post Office on the 8th. Additionally, there are the 
British handstamps of London and Boston on 15 January, 1852; ‘INDIA’ 
by red letters; a few rate markings; and a handwritten remark ‘America’. 
The recipient has finally marked the arrival date on the reverse, February 
9th. All the needed information exists to find out the duration of information 
transmission: 65 days from the writer to the recipient. We even learn that the 
46 A ship letter from Richmond, Virginia, 2.9.1796 to Duncan Davidson Esq., London. 
In Seija-Riitta Laakso, Development of Transatlantic Mail Services from Sail to Steam 
(2005). Postal historical collection. (SRLC).
47 Lloyd’s List 6.1.1797.
48 The Countess of Leicester was also captured by a French privateer in December 1797 
and the Princess of Wales in May 1798. See Howard Robinson, Carrying British Mails 
Overseas (London, 1964), 312.
49 Pred, 91.
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letter was handled by the Calcutta G.P.O. only two days after the writing, 
so there was not much delay. The British markings show that the letter has 
been carried via England.50
But how did the letter arrive in Britain and further to the United States? By 
combining the facts available on the cover and what can be achieved from 
existing postal historical studies, we learn a lot more about the information 
transmission process. After being written in Calcutta on December 6th 
and handstamped by the Post Office on the 8th, the letter was taken by 
the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company’s, or the P&O’s, 
branch steamer to Galle, Ceylon, and from there on the 16th by a larger 
P&O vessel, the Oriental, via Aden to Suez, arriving there on 1 January, 
1852. From Suez the letter was taken overland across the desert by donkey, 
dromedary and riverboat services to Alexandria, Egypt, from where the 
letter continued on 5 January by a third P&O vessel, the Ripon, to Malta. It 
arrived on the 9th and proceeded on the same day by the British Admiralty 
steam packet Banshee, Lieutenant Hosken as the Captain, to Marseilles, 
arriving on the 11th.51
The mails were taken by railway to Calais, across the Channel by a branch 
steamer, and again by train to London, from where the letter was forwarded 
to Boston on 15 January. However, the letter was meant to be delivered to 
50 A letter to Messrs Magowe & Son, Boston, from Calcutta 6.12.1851. (SRLC)
51 Reg Kirk, The P&O Lines to the Far East. British Maritime Postal History, Vol. 2 (printing data 
missing), 30; Colin Tabeart, Admiralty Mediterranean Steam Packets 1830 to 1857 (Limassol, 
Cyprus 2002), 212. For the Overland trip, see Boyd Cable, A Hundred Year History of the P&O, 
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, 1837–1937 (London, 1937), 85–93.
FIG. 1. War time 
communications was slow 
and unpredictable. The 
letter, sent on 2.9.1796 
from Richmond, Virginia, 
was delayed for more 
than two months in the 
United States until it was 
finally carried from New 
York to England by one of 
the Falmouth packets. The 
letter arrived in London 
on 5.1.1797, in 125 days. 
(See the text.)
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Boston in the United States, not in Britain. The word ‘America’ was added 
to the address, and the letter was sent across the Atlantic by the Cunard Line 
mail steamer Niagara, which departed from Liverpool on 17 January and 
arrived in New York on 7 February, or by the same company’s Europa, which 
departed on 24 January and arrived in Boston on 8 February.52 In both cases 
the letter would have been dispatched in Boston on the 9th, as it happened. 
The trip by the Niagara took 21 days but that of the Europa only 15 days. 
The rough winter winds in the Atlantic were sometimes unpredictable, and 
the Niagara’s trip had been lengthened so much that the ship had to put into 
Halifax for coal on 4 February.53
By slicing into pieces the letter’s trip from Calcutta to Boston according 
to the means of transmission during the voyage, we discovered a great deal 
of information not available in the original letter. Instead of just finding out 
the duration of the information transmission, we learnt that the letter was 
carried by six different mail steamers and several trains, as well as donkey, 
dromedary and river boat. We could notice that the international mail system 
worked smoothly already in the mid-19th century, especially when the letters 
were carried by British services all the way. The waiting times were short, 
but there could be some variation in the duration of longer sea journeys as 
in the Atlantic crossing.
In addition to the use of personal correspondence, the speed of arriving 
news has generally been measured from the time lag of foreign news published 
in the newspapers. Päiviö Tommila calculated in his pioneering article in 
52 Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 30.
53 J.C. Arnell, Atlantic Mails. A History of the Mail Service between Great Britain and 
Canada to 1889, National Postal Museum (Ottawa, 1980), 311.
FIG. 2. The letter sent on 6.2.1851 from Calcutta, India, was carried by P&O, 
Admiralty and Cunard Line mail steamers, as well as railways, camels and donkeys, 
via Galle, Suez, Alexandria, Malta, Marseilles, London and Liverpool, before being 
received in Boston, United States, on 9.2.1852, in 65 days. (See the text.)
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1960, how long it took for the news of Finlands Allmänna Tidning, an official 
newspaper, to arrive in Finland from different countries in 1830.54 Ian K. 
Steele used the same method to calculate the age of London-based news in 
some American newspapers in 1705–1740, and Allan R. Pred for calculating 
the spread of news between the major American cities in 1790–1840.55
The method of comparing known facts of historical events with the dates 
on which the news was published in the newspapers in other countries leave 
several questions open. By which means was the news carried, how long was 
the waiting time before the transport, what was the duration of the transport, 
how long did it take before the next issue of the newspaper was published, 
and finally, how long did it take before the newspaper was delivered to the 
readers, probably again far from the place where the paper was printed.
To measure the duration of maritime news transmission, Yrjö Kaukiainen 
calculated the difference between the dates on which the sailing lists from 
distant ports were sent and on which they were published by Lloyd’s List in 
London. This method gives comparable knowledge from different routes and 
different time periods, and is very useful for measuring the speed of one-way 
information transmission.56 However, it does not tell the whole truth about 
the duration of information transmission from the recipient’s point of view. 
As the news in the earlier times was carried by occasional merchantmen, 
the readers in Britain often had to wait one or two extra months to learn e.g. 
of a particular ship’s arrival, simply because there were no vessels arriving 
from that port to bring the news.
For example, a sailing list from Hong Kong published in Lloyd’s List on 
25 October, 1845, included arrivals and departures from that port between 
20 June and 26 August. Thus, the age of the earliest news was 127 days 
while the latest news was only 60 days old when published in the same 
day’s newspaper.57 The frequency of mail transmission definitely played an 
important role in the information flows. When interpreting the figures, it is 
important to keep in mind the difference between the measurement of duration 
of the mail transportation itself (which was chiefly examined by Kaukiainen) 
and the measurement of the duration of spreading the news contents.
Similarly, when using Allan Pred’s figures of the ‘relative level of 
interregional shipping interaction’ between the coast ports of the United 
States, it should be remembered that the ‘weighted arrivals’ are not the same 
as the factual sailings.58
Ian K. Steele calculated the duration of early North Atlantic sailings using 
British port records of customs entrances and clearances, finding important 
information on the frequency and duration of sailings during the period 
1675–1740. Yet, as Steele noted, by this method the duration of sea journeys 
is calculated only from customs to customs.59
54 Päiviö Tommila, ‘Havaintoja uutisten leviämisnopeudesta ulkomailta Suomeen 1800-
luvun alkupuolella’, Historiallinen Aikakauskirja, vol. 81(1960), no. 1, 83–84.
55 Steele (1986), 158–159, 302; Pred, 35–57.
56 Kaukiainen (2001), 1–28.
57 Lloyd’s List 25.10.1845.
58 Pred, 115–126.
59 Steele (1986), 283.
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In real life, the final departure dates could vary several days from the 
customs records. It often took days after the clearance before the ship really 
departed, due to bad weather or other delays. The ship could even put back 
having already sailed due to damage caused by storm or other unexpected 
events.60 Thus, the figures do not reflect the duration of the sea voyage only, 
but may include other elements.
A comparison between the customs records and the final sailing data 
from the port of Liverpool in 1825 give a good example of the difference. 
The American sailing packets, although scheduled for regular line service, 
did not always depart on the given date, even if they had cleared in good 
time to be able to do that. The clearance usually took place on the scheduled 
departure date or the day before, but in half of the cases in 1825 the ship 
was delayed, the average delay being four days and the variation from 
one to 12 days.61 When measuring the duration of sailings, there can thus 
be a major difference in the results depending on which method has been 
chosen.
Naturally, the newspaper dates may have included more errors, while 
the customs bills were administrative records with most obviously correct 
data. Yet the maritime intelligence of Lloyd’s List was at least ‘semi-
official’, being collected by Lloyd’s agents and correspondents for the 
use of underwriters. A general rule in using newspaper data is that the 
longer the distance between the event (e.g. ship arrival) and the place of 
publishing it, the more potential there is for errors. In those cases where 
postal historical studies have been based on e.g. Caribbean newspapers, 
some additional caution is needed when considering the precision of the 
dates given.
Carl C. Cutler used a combination of custom house records, log books 
and maritime intelligence of contemporary newspapers to collect sailing 
lists of the American tea clipper voyages in the 1850s.62 Colin Tabeart based 
his study of the Admiralty Packets in the Mediterranean on data collected 
from the ships’ logs and maritime intelligence from the newspapers, 
combining these with factual postal information from the letters carried 
on the route.63 The latter one is an especially excellent combination, but 
seldom available.
Some historians give figures of exactly how many days, hours and minutes 
a transatlantic crossing took by a specific vessel.64 These figures are usually 
based on newspaper reports or the ships’ log books, sources which are not 
60 An extreme example from the 1840s: ‘Liverpool, put back: 14 Aug, Thomas Bennett, late 
Halsey, for Charleston, the Master having been killed by the Cook, 8th inst.’ Lloyd’s List 
15.8.1844.
61 Calculated from the Liverpool Customs Bills of Entry, 1825; Lloyd’s List 1825.
62 Carl C. Cutler, Greyhounds of the Sea. The story of the American clipper ship (Maryland, 
1930), 475.
63 Tabeart (2002), x–xi.
64 See e.g. N.R.P. Bonsor, North Atlantic Seaway (New York, 1975), vol. 1, 203–205, 
230–237; Jack C. Arnell, Steam and the North Atlantic Mails: The impact of the Cunard 
Line and subsequent steamship companies on the carriage of transatlantic mails (Toronto, 
1986), 241, 248, 254.
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available in all cases.65 To be consistent, all voyages in this study have been 
calculated by using the same sources: sailing lists of mail-carrying ships, 
published by Lloyd’s List or relevant postal historical studies.66
These sources can only afford sailing dates, not hours or minutes. There 
is naturally a difference, if the ship departs early in the morning and arrives 
at the destination port a few days later in the evening, or if she departs in the 
evening and arrives in the early morning. Even if the method of calculating 
the duration of journeys only by dates cannot be really accurate in a particular 
case, it gives a good overview of the situation. The ‘grey margin’ remains the 
same throughout the period, and the system treats all companies evenly. A 
comparison of sailing data published by Hubbard & Winter in North Atlantic 
Mail Sailings 1840–75 and the Cunard Line records for the Admiralty 1840–
1846,67 gives the following results:
The Cunard Line’s ships sailed from Liverpool on regular dates but the 
departing hour varied greatly. There may have been several reasons for this, 
one of which was the exceptionally strong tide at the River Mersey. Besides 
that, especially during the latter part of the period, departures often took place 
in the afternoon or even in the evening, perhaps waiting for the latest business 
correspondence. At the other end of the journey, arrivals often occurred in 
the early morning, but could also take place at any other time of the day.
Comparison between the duration of passages, calculated from the sailing 
lists of Hubbard & Winter and the Cunard statistics, show that even if there 
were several hours’ differences in the duration of sailings on particular 
voyages, the differences balanced each other rather well in the long run. 
Between 4 July 1840 and 5 May 1846, the difference between the sailing lists 
of Hubbard & Winter and the company records concerning 112 westbound 
sailings was only three hours on average. The duration of trips calculated 
using the dates only was longer each year than if the duration was calculated 
by using the exact sailing hours. However, in specific cases the difference 
could be positive as well as negative.
What methods should be used to estimate the mass of information 
transmitted? For example, the statistics of income from postage rates to the 
post offices have sometimes been used to figure out the growth of the number 
65 There are exceptions. E.g. the Cunard Papers (CP) in the Sydney Jones Library Archives 
(SJ) at the University of Liverpool include record books of the Cunard ship departures 
and arrivals. The precision of the record keeping varies but the sailing and arrival times 
are normally given in an accurate form. A considerable problem is, however, that the time 
difference between Europe and North America has been calculated in different ways on 
the voyages, or totally ignored, in each direction. The use of the Passage Books for the 
Cunard voyages would mislead the study, as there are no similar sources available from 
all shipping companies included. Cunard Passage Books 1–4 cover the years 1848–1881. 
CP, GM2/1–4 (SJ). About problems in using these records as sources for measuring the 
duration of the voyages, see also N.R.P. Bonsor, North Atlantic Seaway (New York, 
1980), vol. 5, 1868–1870.
66 The issues of Lloyd’s List used in this study have been reprinted up to 1826 and microfilmed 
from 1827 onwards. They are kept e.g. in the Merseyside Maritime Museum Library and 
Archives (MMM) in Liverpool.
67 Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 17–21; ‘Tenders and Contracts for Carrying the Mails 
by Steam to and from North America. N:o 10. Return of the Dates of Sailing and Arrival 
of the Steamers Employed in Performing the Contract’, 28–29. CP, PR 3/1/12. (SJ)
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of letters sent during a time period.68 Yet the rates of single letters may have 
changed markedly during the period, the relation between cheaper short-
distance and much more expensive long-distance mail may have changed 
– and these figures could not be compared with other cities of different
geographic location even in the same year. Finally, the newspapers were
normally not included in the postage rate figures.69 Therefore, these figures
probably describe best the fiscal importance of the postal services. Numbers of
letters sent during a specific period can naturally be compared with numbers
of letters sent during another period of the same length.
As has been noted, there is no single method which would answer all 
questions regarding information transmission. Even though all methods can 
be used to measure something, it should be kept in mind that there is a great 
difference in what can be achieved by using the alternative methods. Table 
4 may be of help in the consideration.
Consecutive information circles as tools in measuring the speed of 
business information transmission
The need for fast information transmission often varied between the different 
parties in mercantile societies. Newspapers wanted to get the freshest news 
as quickly as possible, and for them rapid one-way information flow was 
critical. But for traders – depending on the nature of their business – it was 
often at least equally important that the system enabled them to answer the 
business letters rapidly, and again to receive fast answers to their letters.
A practical tool which has not previously been used for measuring the 
speed of business information transmission in published studies is to calculate 
the number of consecutive information circles enabled by a particular service 
within a calendar year. This tool enables us to examine in a commensurable 
way the efficiency and development of the information circulation during 
different time periods and on different routes.
One information circle is equal to the time between sending a letter and 
getting an answer to it. While a round trip of a mail-carrying ship means the 
period from the ship departure from the home port to the arrival back home, an 
information circle could be shorter, if there were other mail-carrying vessels 
departing earlier from the other end, and they were able to carry the answer. 
Thus, the length of an information circle depended not only on the duration 
of two one-way trips but also on the frequency of the sailings.
The duration of the sailings can be calculated from the sailing data 
published in different postal historical studies, or if such a study is not 
obtainable for a specific route or time period, from the maritime intelligence 
published by Lloyd’s List or other contemporary newspapers. By combining 
information on the arrivals and departures of mail-carrying ships, it is easy 
to find out how the system worked at both ends of the trip. A combination 
of these facts gives us the length of one information circle and enables the 
calculation of numbers of consecutive information circles per year.
68  Steele (1986), 124; and Pred, 80, 96–101.
69  Pred, 94.
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TABLE 4. Methods for measuring the speed of information transmission.
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How this system worked in reality, and whether the trade partners really 
used it in an optimal way, can be examined from the correspondence of the 
various merchant houses. The handstamps and other postal markings of the 
letters also give us a clear idea of which postal service has been used in cases 
where there were several possibilities, for example the alternating British and 
French government mail services for South America in the 1860s.
It should be noticed that this tool measures the best possible information 
circulation (the maximum number of consecutive information circles) 
between two places within a time period, for example one year. There may 
have been many other possibilities to send mail in one direction, but this 
method gives us an idea about how the two-way communications worked 
in practice. It was surprisingly often a very different story.
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Overseas mail systems before 1815 – Background for the development in 
speed
From the 17th century, merchant letters had arrived at British ports by private 
ships, while official correspondence was often carried by naval vessels. The 
arriving private ship letters were sent from the port of arrival to London, 
where they were marked up with three charges: the ship letter charge, the fee 
paid to the ship’s master for each letter handed over, and the inland postage 
according to the number of miles the letter had been conveyed by road from 
the port of entry via London to the place of address. The addressee could not 
receive his letter before having paid the total amount due.
At first, the only means of identifying incoming ship letters was from 
the endorsements in the manuscript on the letter, such as the name of the 
incoming ship or the name of her master. From the 1760s, the Post Office 
issued individually named ship letter handstamps to postmasters at ports 
in all parts of Britain. Similar kinds of arrival handstamps on ship letters 
were also introduced in France at about the same time.70 The purpose was 
to identify the letter as a ship letter and also name the specific port of entry, 
so that the inland postal charges on the mileage basis could be accurately 
assessed. These handstamps are often very useful for a historian who tries 
to reconstruct a ship letter’s voyage.
Between 1770 and 1840, hundreds of different arrival handstamps 
succeeded each other with a wide distribution of ports, large and small. In 
70 In Britain, the first ports to use this type of handstamps were Liverpool 1757; London 1760; 
Cork 1761; Londonderry 1762; Greenock 1763; Dover 1765; and Deal, Plymouth, Poole 
and Portsmouth 1766. See Colin Tabeart, Robertson Revisited. A study of the Maritime 
Postal Markings of the British Isles based on the work of Alan W. Robertson (Cyprus, 
1997), passim. – According to Tabeart, the first ship letter handstamp of Deal is from 
1767, but a letter in the writer’s collection, dated 26 June and arrived in London 30 July 
1766, verifies an earlier date. (SRLC). – In France, the first ship letter arrival handstamps 
of this type were introduced in Marseille 1757, Brest and Rouen 1760, Bayonne and 
Port-Louis 1761, Bordeaux and Havre 1763, Ile de Rhé 1764 and La Rochelle 1764 and 
Nantes 1766. See Raymond Salles, La Poste Maritime Française. Tome 1, Les Entrées 
Maritimes et les Bateaux a Vapeurs (Cyprus, 1992), 7–9, Addendum, 1–4.
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the days of sail, ships put in at convenient ports for shelter from the weather, 
for water and stores, and also to report safe arrival and receive orders at the 
first opportunity. As the letters carried were required by law to be handed 
over at the first port of call, any port or haven was a potential landing place 
for ship letters carried by the early sailing ships.
The outward letters were sent similarly by ship passengers, by courier 
or, in most cases, by masters of ships sailing from British ports. The agents 
of shipowners also accepted letters in their offices, and handed them to the 
care of their captains. In London and other major ports, the owners of coffee 
houses collected outward letters in a bag, which was then forwarded to the 
ship’s captain, who took them on board and delivered them in the port of 
destination to the local Post Office or coffee house, getting the nominal two 
pence charge per dispatched letter.
The unofficial system of private arrangement with ship masters continued 
to be the main channel through which letters to overseas destinations left 
from Britain throughout the 18th century. The Act of 1711 made it illegal 
to dispatch by private ships letters which could be sent by regular packets, 
but to places for which no Post Office packet service existed, ship masters 
were free to carry letters. Enforcement was difficult, and little respect was 
forthcoming from the letter-writing public.71
In 1799, a ship letter rate of four pence was imposed on single letters 
brought into Britain with a gratuity of two pence to the ship’s master. 
Outwards, the rate for private ship letters was fixed at one half of the packet 
ship postage, while the gratuity to the ship’s captain was increased from one 
penny to two pence. Merchants were encouraged to take their letters to the 
Post Office, which would undertake to find a suitable ship to carry them. 
Even though the Post Office repeated offers to the owners of coffee houses 
and taverns to become its salaried agents, the old practice continued as it 
had done for nearly two centuries. The coffee house proprietors were not 
interested, and the general public could not see any advantage in sending 
to the Post Office mail that was going out of Britain by private ships. Due 
to treasury needs after the war in 1814, the sea postage of incoming letters 
was raised from four to six pence, and a year later to eight pence, which 
was a very high rate, to be collected when the letter was delivered. The rate 
of outgoing private ship letters was decreased from one-half to one-third of 
what was charged by outgoing packets to make the government option more 
attractive, but to no avail.72
In addition to private merchant ships, British Post Office sailing packet 
services sailed from Falmouth at the south western coast of England to 
Halifax, Bermuda, the West Indies, Mexico and South America. The packet 
service started between Falmouth and Lisbon in 1689 and continued on that 
route until the Peninsula Steam Navigation Company, or the P&O, took 
over in 1837.
71 Alan W. Robertson, A History of the Ship Letters of the British Isles. An Encyclopaedia 
of Maritime Postal History (Bournemouth, 1955), A 1, A 3.
72 Frank Staff, The Transatlantic Mail (Massachusetts, 1956), 46, 54; Robinson (1964), 
114–115.
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The Falmouth packets were speedier than the non-scheduled merchant 
ships, for which time was of little concern, while a fully loaded ship could 
bring the owners a satisfactory financial return. To carry only mail, as the 
government packets did, was primarily regarded as expensive misuse of 
shipping capacity. The armed mail packets carried just a few passengers, and 
fine freight like bullion and specie. The service was costly to maintain, and 
the Post Office packet charges to meet these costs were much greater than 
the nominal two pence charged by the master of a private ship. The public 
in general preferred private ships, thus avoiding the extra costs paid for Post 
Office packets according to the number of sheets and weight.73
The first transatlantic mail service from Falmouth to the West Indies was 
run monthly by Edward Dummer, a former Surveyor General of the Navy, 
in 1702–1711. This was the first mail contract, by which the government 
sponsored private shipowners for transatlantic mail transmission. The 
service, even though originally very promising from the viewpoint of 
speed and regularity of mail transport, collapsed due to problems in 
financial management and expenses caused by losses of several packets and 
replacement of them.74 Another early attempt to start a regular transatlantic 
packet service was made by William Warren, with sailings between Bristol 
and New York in 1709. This service ceased in 1711 or 1712.75
From 1755, a monthly mail service was usually carried out between Falmouth 
and the West Indies, with several unavoidable delays and interruptions during 
times of war. This route later included a variety of colonies – a rather difficult 
service, as the ports of call were so widely spread in the Caribbean. By 1810, 
six local West Indian mail boats supplemented the sailing packets that crossed 
the Atlantic. Communication from England was then bi-monthly. The packets 
were owned by private shipowners, usually the captains themselves, and they 
each had their separate contracts with the Post Office. The Postmaster organized 
the departures depending on the availability of vessels at port.76
The packet service from Falmouth to New York also started in 1755. 
The New York packets stopped regularly in Boston from 1773 onwards. 
A third leg for the service was established at Charleston, South Carolina, 
in the 1760s but remained occasional. After the American Revolution, the 
New York service was re-established in 1783. It was not conducted during 
the war years 1813 and 1814.77 From 1806, it was common practice to route 
the New York packets via Bermuda from November to February and via 
Halifax during the rest of the year to serve the British naval stations. Finally, 
a packet service for South America was added in the Falmouth schedules 
73 Robertson, A 3; See also Tony Pawlyn, The Falmouth Packets, 1689–1851 (Truran, 2003), 
6. Despite its name, the latter study is mainly focused on the 18th century.
74 See L.E. Britnor, The History of the Sailing Packets to the West Indies. British West 
Indies Study Circle (1973), 3–17; Steele (1986), 168–188; Staff, 27–31; Robinson (1964), 
35–39.
75 Robinson (1964), 38–39. See also John McCusker, ‘New York City and the Bristol 
Packet…’, 177–189.
76 Robinson (1964), 93; Britnor, 39–43, 55–58.
77 Arnell (1980), 7–11, 17–18, 27; J.C. Arnell & M.H. Ludington, The Bermuda Packet Mails 
and the Halifax–Bermuda Mail Service 1806 to 1886 (Great Britain, 1989), 15–17.
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in 1808 and the service for Mexico in 1824.78 Many of these routes were 
reorganized several times during their history.
The East India Company, or the EIC, had a long lasting monopoly in the East 
India trade until 1813 and on the China route until 1833, including a monopoly 
in the mail transmission between Britain and the Eastern trade ports.79
Background for the development of speed before 1815
From the early 18th century, not very much had happened to improve the 
speed of ocean going sailing ships. There were developments in cartography 
and hydrography, including the improvements in calculating the longitude, 
which made it possible to publish more accurate sea charts. A better 
knowledge of geography, as well as of prevailing winds and currents, helped 
the captains to take more advantage of them, and to avoid the most difficult 
sea areas.80
New technical equipment was slow in reaching ordinary ships. Unlike 
the exquisite but costly French chronometers, the English ones came 
gradually down in price until they were within the reach of ships’ captains. 
By 1815, England had produced 4,000 or 5,000 chronometers, compared 
with France’s 300, while in the 1790s only the EIC had equipped their 
ships with these costly devices. The company also had a hydrologist in 
their service and published charts of the Bay of Bengal. The Royal Navy 
did not issue chronometers to all its ships until 1825. In 1833 the French 
Navy had 44 chronometers for its 250 vessels, and the United States Navy 
had 54 in 1835. Not until the 1840s did the supply of chronometers catch 
up with the demand.81
Ship building improved slowly. One important invention was the copper 
sheathing of the planking beneath the waterline of vessels, which sheltered the 
bottom from the teredo worm. The wooden vessels were liable to be damaged 
by worms and they collected barnacles and ‘a kind of musillagenous stuff’, 
particularly in the West Indies, which retarded their sailing, while nothing 
could cling to a copper sheathing; it kept clean and resisted worms.82 The 
gradual modification of the ship’s hull finally created the large and efficient, 
extremely beautiful, fast clipper model – the ships which would make record 
sailings on the world’s longest sea routes from the mid-19th century.83
78 Arnell & Ludington,v–vi; J.N.T. Howat, South American Packets. The British Packet 
Service to Brazil, the River Plate, the West Coast (via the Straits of Magellan) and the 
Falkland Islands. 1808–1880 (York, 1984), 1–4; Robinson (1964), 111.
79 Robertson, B 29, B 30; Staff, 58.
80 For early hydrographic work by the French Dessiou family in 1770–1851, see Paul 
Hughes & Alan D. Wall, ‘The Dessiou Hydrographic Work: Its Authorship and 
Place’ in International Journal of Maritime History, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (St. John’s, 
2005), 167–192. In the 1840s, the American hydrographer, Lieutenant M.F. Maury 
published sailing instructions which covered widely the sea routes of the whole 
world.
81 Daniel R. Headrick, When Information Came of Age. Technologies of Knowledge in the 
Age of Reason and Revolution, 1700–1850 (Oxford, 2000), 108–115.
82 See Steele (1986), 44; Britnor, 40.
83 See Richard C. McKay, Some Famous Sailing Ships and Their Builder Donald Mc Kay 
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Even though heavy weather was always dangerous, sometimes even fatal, 
and caused long delays on the sea voyages, the other alternative was not 
much better. When it was calm, the ships did not move at all. The effect of 
prevailing winds was easily noticed in the duration of sea voyages across the 
North Atlantic, where the westbound journeys were always more difficult and 
the duration of sailings could be several weeks longer than on the eastbound 
journeys. In fact, a sailing vessel’s journey from Liverpool to New York was 
nearly 500 miles longer than a vessel’s journey from New York to Liverpool. 
This was due to the prevailing westerly winds. No sailing vessel could travel 
directly into the wind, and the extra 500 miles came from the tacking while 
the vessel tried to beat her way to the westward.84
During times of war, ship captures became everyday news. In May 1800, 
Lloyd’s List reported 60 captures or recaptures of British ships. To avoid 
losses, large convoys were collected from trade ships sailing in the same 
direction, and escorted by men-of-war. Thus, e.g. on 27 June, 1800, Lloyd’s 
List reported 69 ships arriving off Portsmouth in convoy from the different 
West Indian islands. Simultaneously, 30 ships arrived in Liverpool from the 
West Indies, and seven more at Lancaster. In total, the convoy had included 
more than 100 ships crossing the Atlantic together. The same day’s paper 
told readers that 46 ships had arrived at Jamaica from London, Clyde, 
Liverpool, Newcastle and Cork, one of the ships having been captured by a 
Spanish privateer.85
From 1803, all ships – including armed merchantmen – were compelled 
to cross the Atlantic in convoy. The convoys were strictly scheduled and no 
delays were permitted. If the ships were not ready to sail, they had to wait 
for the next opportunity, even if their cargoes were perishable. Mails were 
carried equally slowly, independent on which of the ships actually carried 
them. The convoy was as slow as the slowest ship involved. Collecting 
large fleets of merchant ships took time, and the protection that could be 
given was limited anyway. Ships could be captured on their way to the 
rendezvous, gales and fog could separate them from each other, and there 
was always a risk that a superior enemy force could destroy the whole 
fleet.86
It was not only the merchant ships that could be captured during troubled 
times, but also the Falmouth packets, which carried important mails and 
sometimes bullion worth many times the ship’s own value. Between 1793 
and 1815, the packets were engaged by an enemy at least 128 times. Of the 
ships, 44 were totally lost to the enemy, and 31 were retaken or restored after 
a fight. 35 packets successfully fought off the attackers, and eight actually 
captured their attackers. As there were in total fewer than 100 Falmouth 
packets in service during those years, the record is quite impressive .87
(New York, 1928), passim.; and David R. MacGregor, The Tea Clippers (London, 1952), 
passim.
84 Albion (1938 ), 9.
85 Lloyd’s List 27.6.1800.
86 Gerald S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic. The Maritime Struggle for North America 
(Great Britain, 1958), 232–235.
87 Pawlyn, 84. For complete lists of captured Post Office packets during the wars of 1777–
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The duties of the commander of a mail packet in the event of enemy action 
were prescribed as follows: ‘You must run where you can, you must fight 
when you can no longer run, and when you can fight no more, you must sink 
the mails before you strike.’88 This was often done, and thousands of letters 
and other important mail never reached their recipients.
Perhaps due to the continuous troubles caused by wars and privateers, the 
speed of information transmission by the government packet service hardly 
improved at all during the 18th century, while all efforts were concentrated in 
keeping the service going. Edward Dummer’s packets, in 1702–1711, made 
the trip between Jamaica and Falmouth in 42.8 days, on average,89 and the 
Post Office packets of 1795–97, almost 100 years later, made the same trip 
in 41.7 days, on average.90
1782 and 1793–1815, see Robinson (1964), 308–314. There are several descriptions of the 
actions between the Falmouth packets and privateers, see e.g. Robertson, B 8, B 8 A–H; 
Robinson (1964), 69–74, 96–104; Pawlyn, 69–84. – For a complete list of the packets, 
see Robertson, B 2–B 7.
88 Robertson, B 1; Robinson (1964), 83.
89 Britnor, 9.







The Great Innovation of Sailing on Schedule
The ‘regular’ Falmouth packets – New York–Liverpool becomes the main 
North Atlantic mail route – The line traffic starts – Effects on business 
information transmission
The ‘regular’ Falmouth packets
The war between Britain and the United States in 1812–1815 stopped 
the only official mail service which had been conducted between the Old 
World and New York. Due to the British trade blockade and the American 
counter actions, including privateering which was very common in the North 
Atlantic,91 the British Post Office mail service between Falmouth and New 
York was discontinued for two years, 1813 and 1814, starting again in 1815. 
The Halifax and Bermuda service continued through the war, but not all of 
the monthly sailings could be conducted. As the same packet ships were 
used on the other Post Office routes for Lisbon, the West Indies and South 
America and no less than 17 of the vessels were captured during 1813–1815, 
the mail service met a continuous series of problems.92
By that time, the Falmouth packets primarily served the naval station 
and the merchants in Halifax, which had become an important entrepôt of 
trade and shipping during the previous few years. This was naturally an 
unsatisfactory situation from the point of view of those who had urgent 
business letters to send to and from New York.
Even if the packet service was called ‘regular’ it did not mean much more 
than that the ships departed monthly. Originally, the packets had sailed 
from Falmouth on the first Wednesday of each month and left from New 
York on the first Thursday of the month thereafter, but ‘as time passed, the 
Falmouth departures had tended to be around mid-month’, as Arnell puts it 
91 About the war time arrangements for shipping in the North Atlantic region, see Graham, 
237–261.
92 See Robinson (1964), 314.
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in the Atlantic mails.93 For example in 1816, the sailing day from Falmouth 
was only once a Wednesday, while it was four times a Monday, twice a 
Tuesday, three times a Thursday and twice a Sunday. The departure dates 
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29.1.17 28.3. 11.4.a 22.5. 113                           113
Francis 
Freeling
24.2. 16.4. ~10.5. 8.6. 104 104
Princess 
Elizabeth








19.5. 14.7. 14.8. 12.9. 116 116
Princess 
Elizabeth 2
16.6. 12.8. 6.9. 20.10. 126 88
by Lord Sidmouth
Grace 18.7. 30.8. 10.10. 9.11. 114 94
by Pss Elizabeth 2
Swiftsure 20.8. 11.10. 13.11. 5.12. 107b                           107
Lady 
Wellington








18.11. 18.1.18 15.2. 20.3. 122b 122
Grace 22.12. 8.2.18 10.3. 15.4. 114 88
by Pss Elizabeth 2
TABLE 5. Falmouth packet round trips and the consecutive information circles, 
Falmouth–New York, 1817.
Source: Sailing lists of Arnell & Ludington, 23. – The figures in bold show the 
consecutive information circles enabled by the service if the first letter was sent 
from Falmouth on 29.1.1817.
~ Estimated departure date from New York.
a   The earlier ship, Queensbury, had already departed on 17.3.1817.
b  Direct homeward sailings from New York to Falmouth.
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varied between the 8th and 18th of the month. From New York the ships 
sailed between the 2nd and 18th of the month.94
In 1816, the average trip from Falmouth to Halifax took 25 to 41 days, 
the stay at Halifax three to 13 days and the trip from Halifax to New York 
four to nine days. A merchant who sent a letter to New York could not know 
whether it would be received in 33 or 64 days. He could not even know when 
a ship would leave from New York carrying the answer to his letter. The 
stays at port in New York varied between 20 and 51 days.95
There was a major difference from the information transmission point of 
view whether the replies were bound to one ship’s round trip, or whether they 
could be sent by a vessel which departed earlier from New York.
When there was another mail packet leaving from New York to England 
before the last arrived ship’s departure, the time to receive an answer to a 
letter sent by the latter ship shortened markedly. The difference between a 
ship’s round trip and an information circle, in which the minimum time was 
used to send an answer by the next packet, can clearly be noticed in Table 
5, which depicts the Falmouth packet service in 1817.
It can also be noticed that the number of consecutive information circles 
enabled by the system was only three if calculated from the beginning of the 
year, and three also if calculated from the February departure. However, if 
the first letter of the chain was sent on 25 March, it connected with a series of 
reliable sailings, which enabled four consecutive information circles within 
the year, the last one ending on 20 March, 1818.
The earlier packet had already departed from New York before the next mails 
arrived from England no less than five times out of twelve, thus causing long 
delays in replies. A letter sent by Princess Elizabeth on 25 March, 1817, from 
Falmouth could receive an answer on 8 June in 75 days, as the Francis Freeling 
was still at port in New York and departed a few days after the arrival of the 
English mails. But the answer to another letter sent by the Princess Elizabeth (2) 
from Falmouth on 18 November missed the Countess of Chichester’s departure 
in New York and was carried to England by the Princess Elizabeth (2) on her 
return voyage, arriving in Falmouth on 20 March, 1818, in 122 days.
The problem was also well-known at the other end of the journey. While 
the mail ships arrived at Falmouth very irregularly, the leaving packets did 
not wait for them. Therefore, when e.g. the Countess of Chichester arrived 
on 22 May, 1817, the Lord Sidmouth had departed just three days earlier. The 
next opportunity to send letters to New York by official mail was on 16 June, 
3.5 weeks later. In England, the dates of mail arrivals and the next departures 
were somewhat better-coordinated than in New York, however.
The examples show that the speed of information transmission across the 
Atlantic could have been improved by several weeks by more careful schedule 
planning even in the days of slow sailing ships. It can also be asked, why this 
94 See the sailing lists of Arnell & Ludington, 15–19.
95 The winter sailings via Bermuda were even longer and more unpredictable. The trip from 
Falmouth to Bermuda took 28 to 54 days, the stay at Bermuda three to four days and the 




planning was not done. The answer was probably mainly in the complexity 
of the sailing packet system, as will be shown in Chapter VI.1.
The Falmouth packet service to Halifax, Bermuda and New York was an 
administrative compromise which should have served everybody, but which 
made nobody happy. It did not serve the British well due to its slowness 
and irregular schedules, and several days had to be added for the inland 
journey between Falmouth and London (or any other place) both outwards 
and homewards.96 The New York merchants felt that the stops at Halifax or 
Bermuda unnecessarily lengthened the duration of the journeys. The mails 
for Bermuda were carried most of the year from Halifax by naval sloops 
after the European mails had arrived, and the answers did not always reach 
Halifax in time to catch the packet leaving for England. Finally, the Halifax 
merchants were often in a situation where, because a packet departed for 
England a few days before another packet arrived from there, the answers 
to the mails could not be sent until three or four weeks later.97
In 1816, the average duration of the westbound sailings was 34 days 
between Falmouth and Halifax, and 39 days between Falmouth and Bermuda. 
The average stop at Halifax or Bermuda was five days, after which the rest of 
the trip to New York took about seven days. An average eastbound journey 
to Falmouth took 23 days from Halifax and 24 days from Bermuda. The 
speed of the government packet sailings did not improve during the following 
years. In 1816–1820, the average duration of the trip between Falmouth and 
Halifax was 34 days, and between Falmouth and Bermuda 39 days.98 The 
Falmouth packet system, with all the mail routes included, will be discussed 
further in Chapter VI.1.
New York–Liverpool becomes the main North Atlantic mail route
Falmouth had originally been chosen as the primary port for the 
government’s mail sailings in the 17th century due to its good geographical 
advantages for shipping. It was sufficiently far away from the French coast 
to prevent seizure of the packets by privateers and it offered good shelter 
from the weather and wind. The location was sufficiently well fortified 
to deter enemy raids and, due to being at the eastern end of the shortest 
Atlantic sea route, the port enabled the fastest passages and reduced the 
risks of shipwreck.99
96 Falmouth is located on the southwest coast of England, some 270 miles from London. The 
‘Great Post Road’ from Cornwall to London was not much more than an old ridgeway 
keeping to the drier high ground whenever possible. Despite the mostly poor condition of 
the road, ‘strategic staging’ had reduced the duration of mail transport between Falmouth 
and London to three or four days by the mid-18th century, and by 1798 to 2.5 days, which 
remained the norm for several decades. See Pawlyn, 9–16. Before the railways were 
built, about two more days had to be added for the mail service to places like Liverpool 
in northwest England.
97 For example the June packet arrived in Halifax on 26 July while the packet to England 
had left four days earlier. The September packet arrived on 21 October, while the packet 
to England had left three days earlier. See the sailing lists of Arnell & Ludington, 21.




In peace time, the advantages of Falmouth were less evident. The owners of 
the newly established American sailing packet companies hardly considered 
that port as an alternative when they decided to start regular sailings between 
New York and England. These decisions were made on a purely commercial 
basis, and the primary port of trade for them was Liverpool – although 
sailings were later added to London, and to Havre on the French side of the 
Channel.
Before looking at the regular line service started by the American shipping 
companies from 1818, a few words need to be said about the reasons why 
these two ports, New York and Liverpool, could play such an important role 
in the history of transatlantic trade as they did between 1820 and 1860.
Although New York had already become the leading port for American 
exports and imports by 1797, the city lost the lead once more to Boston. 
According to Albion, the first step in New York’s significant rise after the war 
was the British decision to ‘dump’ the bulk of their manufactures there instead 
of some other city. It seemed better for the purpose than Boston, where the 
British tolerated a reasonable amount of leakage in the blockade and which 
consequently had not been deprived of European goods to the extent of New 
York, where imported goods were scarce and prices high. Anticipating the 
peace news, the British sent a large number of well-laden merchantmen to 
Halifax, Bermuda, and other nearby places ready to sail for New York with 
the lifting of the blockade and take full advantage of the situation.100
Two years later, when it seemed probable that the British would turn their 
shipments from New York’s over-stocked market to somewhere else, New 
York took several steps to maintain its lead in the import business. Within 
a few years, it had drawn to itself three major trade routes: from Europe, 
from the southern ports and from the West. New auction legislation, aiming 
to attract more buyers, was passed at Albany on the same day as the Erie 
Canal bill. During the years when the canal was being constructed, a ‘cotton 
triangle’ – following the model of the old ‘flour triangle’ of the seventeenth 
century and the ‘sugar triangle’ of the later colonial period – was formed on 
the southern route. It diverted the commerce between Europe and the cotton 
ports some two hundred miles out of its normal course, in order to collect 
toll and at the same time to provide eastbound cargoes to Liverpool. These 
cargoes mainly included cotton, rice and naval stores.101
Without producing many articles of commerce itself, New York 
became an entrepôt where goods of every sort from every place were 
exchanged in the early 19th century. As Albion puts it in his history 
of the port of New York, ‘the New Yorkers grew rich from the profits, 
commissions, freights, and other excuses for levying toll upon that volume 
of the business’.102
100 Robert Greenhalgh Albion, The Rise of New York Port 1815–1860 (New York, 1939), 
10–12.
101 Albion (1939), 3–15, 95–121; Albion (1938), 50–52. – Part of this cargo was transported 
forward to the Baltic. See Ahonen, 318, 328.
102 Albion (1939), 10. – According to Ahonen, perhaps a half of the re-exports were traded 
via New York and a fifth via Boston in 1821–1860. Britain was the major trading partner 
of both the United States and Russia over the whole period discussed. Its central role in 
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In 1800, Philadelphia had been the largest city of the United States with 
a population of 69,000 compared with around 60,000 in New York. Ten 
years later, New York’s population was already 96,000 compared with 
Philadelphia’s 91,000.103 In his study of urban growth and information 
circulation, Allan Pred came to the conclusion that, by 1817, New York had 
clearly outdistanced Philadelphia and all other competitors by establishing 
an informational hegemony which led to complete domination of the entire 
American system of cities. According to Pred, this superiority was mainly 
based on the information and shipping frequency advantages of the city.104
Only shortly before the rise of New York, Liverpool had overtaken Bristol, 
which had long stood second only to London in terms of population and 
commerce. In the mid-1810s, Liverpool was a fast growing port town of 
around 100,000 inhabitants.105 In 1817, more than 6,300 vessels entered the 
port, their total tonnage being almost 693,000.106
Until the abolition of the British slave trade in 1807, Liverpool had been 
Britain’s centre of that business. Between 1795 and 1804, the Liverpool 
sailings accounted for 85% of the almost 1,300 slave voyages undertaken 
from British ports.107 Towards the end of the era, other trading activities 
were growing and it did not take many years to find new business for the 
former slave ships.108 Goods produced by slave labour in the Americas were 
imported via Liverpool in increasing amounts. For example, between 1810 
and 1850, imports of raw cotton increased from 40,000 tons to just under 
360,000 tons, American wheat from just over 8,000 tons to nearly 75,000 
tons, flour from 900 tons to 103,000 tons, sugar from 46,000 tons to 52,000 
tons and rum from 578,000 gallons to 726,000 gallons.109
In 1802, half of Britain’s cotton imports had arrived through Liverpool, 
mainly to supply the needs of the nearby cotton manufactories of Lancashire. 
By 1812, nearly 70% of Britain’s cotton imports arrived via Liverpool, and 
by 1830 Liverpool’s share of the imports had reached 90%.110 The city’s 
Atlantic trade can be illustrated by the fact that around 1830 it produced about 45% of 
European pig iron and consumed 66% of its cotton wool. In the years 1821–1860 between 
41% and 53% in value of U.S. domestic exports went to Britain. See Ahonen, 40–41.
103 Albion (1939), 419. – According to Pred, there were over 100,000 inhabitants in New 
York and 87,000 in Philadelphia in 1810. Philadelphia’s population equaled the size of 
Boston’s and Baltimore’s population together. See Pred (1973), 5.
104 Pred (1973), 43, 203, 223, 270.
105 Liverpool had over 94,000 inhabitants in 1811, an increase of almost 17,000 in the previous 
ten years. Liverpool Street Directories, 1818, Appendix, 160.
106 Liverpool Street Directories, 1818, Appendix, 161.
107 Williams, David M. ‘Abolition and the Re-Deployment on the Slave Fleet, 1807–1811’ 
in Merchants and Mariners: Selected Maritime Writings of David M. Williams. Research 
in Maritime History No. 18 (St. John’s, 2000), 1. – A detailed analysis of the volume and 
tonnage of the Liverpool slave trade, including annual clearing ratios etc. can be found 
in D.P. Lamb’s ‘Volume and tonnage of the Liverpool slave trade 1772–1807’ in Roger 
Anstey & P.E.H. Hair (ed.), Liverpool, the African Slave Trade, and Abolition. Essays 
to illustrate current knowledge and research. (Chippenham, 1989), 91–112.
108 See Williams, ‘Abolition and the Re-Deployment…’, 6–11.
109 Francis E. Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey. The Development of a Port (An Economic 
History of a Port) 1700–1970 (Devon, 1971), 41.
110 Gail Cameron & Stan Crooke, Liverpool – Capital of the Slave Trade (Liverpool, 1992), 
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hinterlands included major industrial areas such as Lancashire, Yorkshire, 
the Midlands and the Black Country. Liverpool exported piece-goods – coal, 
iron bars, rails, hoops, rods and pigs, linen, manufactured goods, pottery and 
copper – to all parts of the world.111
During the period between 1815 and 1860, Liverpool had a somewhat 
larger volume of trade than New York, while New York had a somewhat 
larger ownership of shipping. In population the two ports were relatively 
equal. The cargoes which travelled the Liverpool–New York shuttle in the 
course of a year were doubtless the most valuable of any route in the ‘seven 
seas’.112
The line traffic starts
As the lively traffic between New York and 
Liverpool ensured that there was always 
cargo for the return voyage, shipowners 
were encouraged to start regular line 
traffic between the two ports. There would 
naturally have been no need for all the 
trouble involved in starting a packet line 
just to carry one’s own goods. The potential 
profits depended on how successfully the 
operators could fill up the rest of a packet’s hold with fine freight (instead 
of bulk) belonging to other merchants who had goods to ship. Most of the 
major commercial houses in New York had their own vessels, but the dry 
goods merchants, auctioneers and manufacturers’ agents were not interested 
in shipping itself. They only wanted to receive their goods from abroad as 
soon as possible.113
According to Albion, this service provided for shippers was the most 
important aspect in the development of the packets, and the main explanation 
for the success of the line principle. The rapid delivery appealed to the 
recipient and meant quicker financial returns for the shipper. While it had 
been necessary earlier to study the sailing notices of the various regular traders 
and transient ships and guess which one would be most likely to sail first, the 
packet service obviated that difficulty. Not only were the sailing dates known 
in advance, but the goods could be forwarded to one of the small group of 
operators or agents instead of a large and varying number of them.114
In addition to the merchant goods, mails and passengers, the American 
sailing packets soon carried large quantities of specie in both directions across 
31. In addition to the transatlantic trade, Liverpool quickly took its part from the East
India sailings after the abolition of the EIC monopoly in 1813, and instead of the former
triangular slave trade, started direct imports of gum, ivory and palm oil from West Africa.
See Cameron & Crooke, 33; Williams, ‘Abolition and the Re-Deployment…’,10–11.
111 Hyde (1971), 29–30, 41. See also Adrian Vaughan, Railwaymen, Politics & Money. The 
Great Age of Railways in Britain (Cambridge, 1997), 44–47.
112 Albion (1938), 30.
113 Albion (1938), 37.
114 Albion (1938), 37.
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the Atlantic. At that time, gold or silver coins were shipped in great amounts 
back and forth to balance inequalities in international trade, for the alternative 
was an excessive discount of premium in bills of exchange. This business 
– earlier taken care of by the Falmouth packets – was soon undertaken almost 
exclusively by the American packets and it was not uncommon for a ship to 
carry in her ‘strong room’ boxes or casks full of minted coins worth a quarter, 
or even a third, of a million dollars. If the Bank of England needed major 
amounts of specie or bullion to balance its reserves and meet the London 
bankers’ balances, it was shipped in several instalments by successive packets 
to reduce the risk of shipwreck.115
The New York packets began to draw business away from the less regular 
vessels for shipments not only to New York but also to other American ports. 
If a Manchester manufacturer wanted to send a consignment of woollens to 
Boston, Charleston or New Orleans, it was easier and generally quicker to 
ship it by packet to New York and have it sent to the final destination by 
one of the coastal packets than to search for vessels which might, sooner or 
later, sail directly to the other port.116
The importance of the American sailing packets may have been 
overestimated by American maritime historians like Albion, Cutler, or 
Lubbock,117 but it has certainly been underestimated by British scholars. 
For example, Francis E. Hyde hardly mentions the packets in his important 
study of the Liverpool Port.118
Compared with the slow and unpredictable Falmouth packet service, a 
direct regular line between New York and Liverpool was a most welcome 
improvement from the business information transmission point of view. 
The American packets sailed (mostly) regularly on the date announced, 
regardless of weather, and without waiting for a full cargo. The captains, as 
well as nearly all the seamen of the American packet lines, had learned to 
handle sail in the fast American privateers during the war and had developed 
techniques for speed. The first packets were small, about 400 tons, regular 
traders which had already been in service under the same ownership, or 
purchased second-hand. In the mid-1820s they were replaced by a larger 
and more uniform type, which increased gradually from about 500 to 800 
tons.119
The first American sailing packet line – later known as the Black Ball Line 
due to the black ball on the company’s red house flag and a large black ball 
painted on the vessels’ topsail – started sailing simultaneously from New 
York and Liverpool in early January 1818. The line was owned by five New 
York merchants, all textile importers. Jeremiah and Francis Thompson were 
sons of a prosperous woollens manufacturer, Benjamin Marshall was in the 
textile importing business, while Isaac Wright and his son William were also 
115 Albion (1938), 39; A. Andréadès, History of the Bank of England 1640–1903. (London, 
1909), 224–225, 320–327.
116 Albion (1938), 37–38.
117 See Basil Lubbock, The Western Ocean Packets (Boston 1925).
118 See Hyde (1971), passim.
119 Staff, 59; Albion (1938), 79; Carl C. Cutler, Queens of the Western Ocean. The Story of 
America’s Mail and Passenger Sailing Lines (Annapolis, Maryland, 1967), 99–100.
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in the importing and shipping business. They chose two old firms of the first 
rank – Cropper, Benson & Co. and Rathbone, Hodgson & Co. – to act as the 
Liverpool agents, each being responsible for two ships.120 This allowed the 
owners to send their own shipments by the fastest possible way, and take 
full advantage of the information their ships carried from Europe before it 
became public property.121
During the first year of their existence, the ‘Black Ballers’ sailed on the 
first day of each month from Liverpool and on the fifth day of the month from 
New York. This service marked the beginning of the practical application 
of the ‘line’ to ocean navigation, with several vessels under co-ordinated 
private management, sailing in regular succession on specified dates between 
specified ports.122
In keeping with their claim that the ships would leave on schedule ’full or 
not full’, the owners went to great lengths to ensure that the first packet would 
sail punctually. Despite a heavy snow storm in New York on 5 January, the 
James Monroe123 slid into the stream on time as advertised. However, the owners 
apparently failed to convince their Liverpool agents of the importance of such 
initial punctuality, for the Courier, which should have departed on 1 January, was 
three days late in leaving.124 The delay might have been caused by the chronic 
Liverpool complaint, the prevailing north-westerly winds, which often prevented 
ships from getting under way in winter. In fact, only a few packets sailed from 
Liverpool on their appointed days until towing became general.125
For an unknown reason, the scheduled departures of Black Ball Line 
vessels from New York were changed in the first year of operations from the 
5th of each month to the 10th. The actual departures of the first year took place 
as follows: 5 January, 5 February, 5 March, 6 April, 11 May, date missing 
in June, 10 July, 12 August, 10 September, date missing in November, and 
11 December. The sailing dates from Liverpool are totally missing because 
Lloyd’s List did not report them that year, but at least the James Monroe 
put back into port on 6 March, probably damaged by heavy weather, and 
arrived in New York as late as 30 April.126 Due to the late arrival, the vessel 
was again six days behind schedule when departing from New York on 11 
May, 1818.127 This could even have been the reason for the overall change 
120 Albion (1938), 112–114; Cutler (1967), 99.
121 Albion (1938), 112. – This was not always positive, however. In 1828, cotton speculations 
caused Jeremias Thompson’s crash and bankruptcy, and he had to sell his share in the 
Black Ball Line to his brother Francis. See Albion (1938), 114.
122 Albion (1938), 20.
123 A full list of the American sailing packets, 1818–1858, including their names, 
measurements, builders, years of launching and starting the service, years when service 
ended, total packet service years, each ship’s average westbound sailings and longest 
and shortest trips, and remarks on each ship’s subsequent service or faith at sea, is given 
by Albion (1938), 276–287. He also lists the respective coastal line ships. See Albion 
(1938), 288–295. For other, less regular and often short-lived sailing lines, see Cutler 
(1967), 371–413 for the transatlantic lines, and 414–548 for the coastal lines.
124 Albion (1938), 20–22.
125 Cutler (1967), 101; Albion (1938), 237; and the data collected for this study.
126 Lloyd’s List  respectively. – For the James Monroe, see Lloyd’s List 10.3.1818; 
5.6.1818.
127 Lloyd’s List 12.6.1818.
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of sailing dates, if the company really wanted to show for PR reasons that 
their ships were sailing on schedule.
Although not a complete success, the new American packet line was far 
more regular than the British government mail service and, due to the direct 
sailings with no time-consuming call at Halifax, the American packets were 
remarkably faster. An average eastbound sailing took 24.4 days from port to 
port. The fastest sailings took only 20 days, while the slowest took 29 days.128 
The average duration of westbound trips was 43 days.129
Interestingly, the fastest eastbound trips of the Falmouth packets, in cases 
when they sailed directly from New York to Falmouth (the November–
February departures from New York in 1816–1822), were sometimes even 
quicker than those of the Black Ball Line packets. The Falmouth packet 
Francis Freeling sailed from New York to Falmouth in 17 days in November 
1818 and the Montague in 19 days in February 1819.130 But the average 
eastbound sailing from New York via Halifax or Bermuda took 38 days – a 
huge difference compared with an average Black Ball Line trip of 24 days, 
128 Lloyd’s List 1818. According to Cutler, who has used American sources, there were two 
18-day sailings eastwards in 1818. This can not be verified by Lloyd’s List maritime
intelligence but it is not impossible as three departure dates from New York are missing
from the data. See Cutler (1967), 105.
129 Cutler (1967), 105; Albion calculated for his book Square-Riggers on Schedule the 
durations of all westbound journeys using the maritime intelligence of New York daily 
newspapers 1818–1857, but never published the exact sailing dates. See Albion (1938), 
318–323, 349.
130 Sailing lists of Arnell & Ludington, 25.
FIG. 4. The letter sent from Georgetown on 4.12.1819 to Cambridgeshire, England, 
was carried from New York to Liverpool by the pioneering Black Ball Line packet 
Courier on her sixth round trip. She departed from New York on 10.12.1819 and 
arrived in Liverpool on 5.1.1820, in 26 days.
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even if the Falmouth packets stayed seven days on average in Halifax or 
Bermuda before proceeding to Europe. An average westbound Falmouth 
packet trip all the way to New York took 50 days, including a three days’ 
stop at Halifax or Bermuda.
It is not known by how many days the Falmouth packet departures were 
delayed in each case from their original schedule, as there seems to have 
been no fixed sailing dates on the Halifax route. In the case of the Black Ball 
Line packets, it can easily be calculated. If the packets had really sailed on 
schedule, the mails would have been transmitted from New York to Liverpool 
in about 25 days. As they did not always do so, the average duration of mail 
transmission from the original sailing date in New York to the actual arrival 
date in Liverpool was almost 28 days. Letters could, of course, be processed 
for the packet’s mail bag as long as the ship stayed in port, but the bulk of 
the letters were written in order to leave at the scheduled time, and these 
mails naturally suffered from the delay. Westbound, the difference between 
theory and practice must have been even greater.
During the coming years, the speed and regularity of the new American 
packet line improved. According to Staff, an average sailing by the Black 
Ball Line packets during the first nine years of the company’s existence 
took 23 days eastwards, and 40 days westwards.131 The benefits for business 
information transmission were remarkable, especially because the success of 
the pioneering company soon attracted competitors to the same route.
The first sailings of the new line traffic were not noticed by Lloyd’s List, 
but Lloyd’s agents who always tried to find the fastest possible ways for 
their information transmission, started to use the Black Ball Line’s packets 
as their primary means of communication in the autumn of 1818.132 This 
can be verified by following the thread of incoming maritime intelligence 
published by Lloyd’s List. The New York port lists of ship arrivals and 
departures were still carried by merchantmen (not Falmouth packets!) in 
August and September.133 From then on, the lists were sent by the Black Ball 
Line packets if they were sailing rather soon – one monthly sailing was not 
enough for the newspaper’s needs, however.
Thus, the Black Ball Line packet James Monroe brought for Lloyd’s List the 
maritime intelligence of the New York port regarding the time period 27.8–
10.9.1818. The ship departed from New York on 10 September and arrived 
131 Staff, 61.
132 This was no wonder, as the sailing lists of Liverpool port were sent to Lloyd’s in London 
by the Liverpool underwriters’ agents who were soon deeply involved in the American 
sailing packet business. The Liverpool underwriters had started an agency system of their 
own in 1815, but whenever possible they appointed as their agents men who were already 
acting as Lloyd’s agents. About the cooperation between Lloyd’s and the Liverpool 
underwriters, see Wright & Fayle, 285, 340.
133 The maritime intelligence regarding arrivals and departures 15–27.7.1818 at the port of 
New York was sent to England by the merchantman Carolina Ann. The ship departed from 
New York on 29 July, 1818, and arrived in Liverpool 30 days later, on 28 August. The 
sailing lists were published in Lloyd’s List 1.9.1818. – The maritime intelligence regarding 
the period 29.7–3.8.1818 was sent by the merchantman Fair Cambrian, which departed 
from New York on 7.8.1818 and arrived in Liverpool 28 days later, on 4 September. The 
sailing lists were published in Lloyd’s List 8.9.1818.
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in Liverpool 26 days later, on 6 October. The intelligence was published in 
Lloyd’s List on 9.10.1818.134 The Amity brought the intelligence for the period 
25.9–10.10.1818 (exact sailing date from New York not published by Lloyd’s 
List), while the Courier brought the intelligence for 6–9.11.1818 in 21 days, 
and the Pacific the intelligence for 5–9.12.1818 in 24 days.135 The lists in 
between were sent by the fastest merchantmen. For example, the 9–19.10.1818 
list was sent by the Hercules in 24 days, the 21–27.10.1818 list by the Ann 
in 26 days, and the 30.10–4.11.1818 list by the Falmouth packet Francis 
Freeling, which sailed from New York to Falmouth in 17 or 18 days.136
The examples show clearly that there was no real difference between the 
existing options concerning the speed of transport. Even if the speed of the 
Falmouth packets also improved during the coming years, while new and 
faster ships were built for the purpose, the American sailing packet line service 
became the most important means of business information transmission 
especially because of its frequency and regularity.
Even if the Black Ball Line’s performance in 1818 cannot be reconstructed 
accurately by using the sources available, a theoretical construction can easily 
be made based on the line’s general schedule. It was built in a safe way to 
enable exact sailing dates. A departure from both sides of the Atlantic on the 
first of each month allowed a two-month sailing westwards and a one-month 
sailing eastwards – targets which could be met in almost any circumstances. 
During the period 1818–1832, only 11 out of 521 journeys took more than 60 
days on the Liverpool – New York route.137 Even if the ship left a few days 
late, which sometimes happened, it could easily come back on schedule at 
the other end, and there would be enough time for the merchants to answer 
their letters before the next packet departure from the port.
By this simple organizing of regular line traffic, with the same number of 
annual sailings as the Falmouth packets made, and with the same problems 
with prevailing winds and rough weather, the tiny American sailing packet 
line was able to notably improve the transatlantic information transmission 
from its very first year. Instead of the three consecutive information circles 
enabled by the Falmouth packets, information could now circle four times 
back and forth across the Atlantic during a year. However, to achieve the 
full benefit of the regular traffic, more ships were needed on the route – and 
they would be there soon.
The first announcement of new competition for the Black Ball Line came in 
early January, 1822, from Byrnes, Trimble & Co., a New York firm engaged 
134 The inland mail from Liverpool to London by daily mail coach before the opening of 
the railway took about 24 hours in the mid-1820s (Wright & Fayle, 340).or 30 hours ‘by 
the new stage coach’ which ‘carries but four insides, and only one night on the road’ 
(‘Coaches’ in Post Office, Liverpool Street Directories, 1818, Appendix, 85). As Lloyd’s 
List was published only twice a week before 1837, there were at least two obvious causes 
of delay between the ship arrival and the publishing of the intelligence.
135 These sailing lists were published in Lloyd’s List 6.11.1818; 4.12.1818; 8.1.1819.
136 Lloyd’s List 20.11.1818; 27.11.1818; 1.12.1818. According to the sailing lists of Arnell 
& Ludington, the Francis Freeling departed from New York 9.11. instead of 8.11. as 
reported by Lloyd’s List, thus making the trip in seventeen days. (Arnell & Ludington, 
25)
137 See the records of Albion (1938), 318–319.
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principally in the Chesapeake flour trade. The partners had been operating 
regular traders to Liverpool for several years and now started line traffic with 
four packet ships from 25 January. The monthly service included sailings 
from New York on the 25th and from Liverpool on the 12th of each month. 
In 1823, the dates were changed to the 24th and 8th respectively. The line 
was soon named the New Line or Red Star Line138, while the Black Ball Line 
became the Old Line. The Black Ball owners quickly met this first challenge 
with an announcement of doubled service. They expanded the line from four 
to eight ships and stated that they would maintain sailings twice instead of 
once a month, departing on the 1st and 16th of the month from each port. This 
service started in mid-March, 1822.139
For the Black Ball Line, the new competitor was not the only blow that 
year. In April, their packet Albion was dashed to pieces on the Irish coast with 
heavy loss of life140 and in July, their Liverpool sank on her maiden voyage 
after striking an iceberg, though no lives were lost. Despite the threatened 
loss of public confidence from these disasters, and the expense involved just 
at the very time when they were expanding their service, the Black Ball Line 
managed to survive the year with its prestige intact.141
Five days after the sinking of the Liverpool, the newspapers of 30 July 
published an announcement concerning another new Liverpool line. This 
would be known as the Swallowtail Line, or the Fourth Line, as the added 
Black Ball service had already been considered as the third line. The agents 
in whose name the advertisement appeared were Fish & Grinell, who, under 
the later names of Fish, Grinell & Co., and Grinell, Minturn & Co., would 
become the foremost packet and general shipping house in New York. Two 
years later, in 1824, the company started a packet service to London by 
the same name. For recognition, the Liverpool line packets carried a blue 
and white swallowtail house flag, while the London line packets carried a 
red and white one, thus giving the following names to the lines: the Blue 
Swallowtail Line and the Red Swallowtail Line. Additionally, another packet 
line to London was established in 1824, the Black X Line. Both London lines 
operated via Portsmouth. Three packet lines were also established for the 
New York–Havre route in 1822–1823: the Old Line, or later Union Line, 
the Havre-Whitlock Line which was later merged with the Union Line, and 
the Havre-Second Line.142
 After some readjustments, the traffic was organized as follows: the Black 
Ball Line packets departed from both New York and Liverpool on the 1st 
138 There was a red star on the company’s house flag to distinguish it from the Black Ball.
139 Albion (1938), 30–31; Cutler (1967), 149–150, 377.
140 Of the 54 people on board, 46 perished. In addition to the April mail, the ship carried a 
considerable amount of gold and silver, as well as normal freight. One box of £5,000 in 
specie was recovered, and the shores were strewn with commercial letters in large amounts 
from the mailbags. See Albion (1938), 202–208.
141 Albion (1938), 31.
142 The names of the lines are somewhat confusing and mixed, as their organizations and 
owners changed during the years. The classification above is adequate for what has been 
used by Albion and Staff, while Cutler’s is slightly different. See Albion (1938), 276–286; 
Staff 121–126; and Cutler (1967), 376–380, 389–391, 394–396.
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and 16th of each month, while the Red Star Line packets departed from New 
York on the 24th and from Liverpool on the 8th of each month. The Blue 
Swallowtail departures used an opposite schedule, sailing on the 8th from 
New York and on the 24th from Liverpool. Thus, there was a weekly sailing 
from both ports all year round. All the packets made three round trips per year, 
compared with only two of most merchantmen. There was a great difference 
in efficiency, as the American packet owners could share their capital costs 
between three instead of two annual voyages, and some extra income could 
also be gained during the winter months when most other transatlantic 
vessels lay idle.143 In 1824, an average packet round trip on the New York 
– Liverpool route took fewer than 84 days, while the Falmouth packets made
their Falmouth – New York round trip in 118 days, on average.
By 1824–1825, the regularity of the line sailings had improved markedly. 
Hard competition made the companies try their best to keep to their schedules, 
and speed records were followed intensively by the public on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Table 6 shows how punctual the packet departures from New 
York – the ships’ home port where a good reputation was most important 
– were in these years.
As can easily be noticed by one glance at the table, the departure dates
from New York were very punctual in the mid-1820s. Of the 76 departures 
published by Lloyd’s List 1824–1825,144 only 17 sailings were delayed or 
changed, while 59 departures were made exactly on the date announced. The 
delay was usually only one day. To compare with the Liverpool departures, 
see Table 7.
The losses of the Black Ball Line packets Amity in April 1824 and Nestor 
in December 1824 caused a gap in the schedule only for the January 1825 
departure.145 Timetables were reorganized and both wrecked ships were 
soon replaced by new, larger vessels. The 520 tons Florida sailed for her 
first voyage already in early November 1824 and the 560 tons Manchester in 
May 1825. The Silas Richards replaced the Blue Swallowtail Line’s smallest 
vessel Robert Fulton, which was sold in 1824.146
Departures from Liverpool were never as punctual as those from New York. 
At least 23 out of 47 departures were delayed in 1825.147 The autumn and winter 
sailings in particular could be delayed by several days due to bad weather. It 
143 Albion (1938), 27.
144 The dates in Table 6 do not cover exactly the two calendar years, but for technical reasons 
the intelligence published by Lloyd’s List during those years. – There are normally two 
reasons for a missing date: it was not reported by Lloyd’s List, or the particular issue is 
missing from the microfilm available.
145 Albion notes that ‘had it not been for the high reputation of the Black Ball owners and their 
natural desire to preserve the prestige of the line after the loss of the Albion and Liverpool 
two years before, there might be grounds for suspecting an attempted marine insurance 
fraud in thus bringing in a new captain who disposed of their two oldest vessels, wrecking 
both of them at low tide where they would be constantly awash and consequently much 
more difficult to salvage’. See Albion (1938), 220.
146 Staff, 123; Cutler (1967), 378.
147 The Liverpool sailing dates of 1824 are not available. Lloyd’s List did not publish them 






















New York BB 16.12.23 3.5.24 16.8.24 16.12.24 16.4.25 16.8.25
Panthea RS 24.12.23 9.5.24 24.8.24 25.12.24 27.4.25 - -
Columbia BB 1.1.24 16.4.24 1.9.24 1.1.25 1.5.25 1.9.25
Cortes BSw 8.1.24 8.5.24 - - 9.1.25 8.5.25 8.9.25
Orbit BB 16.1.24 - - sold – – –
Meteor RS 24.1.24 - - - - 24.1.25 24.5.25 - -
Amity BB - - wrecked – – – –
Corinthian BSw - - 8.6.24 8.10.24 8.2.25 8.6.25 12.10.25
Pacific BB 16.2.24 16.6.24 1.10.24 1.2.25 1.6.25 1.10.25
John Wells RS 24.2.24 24.6.24 24.10.24 - - 25.6.25 24.10.25
William 
Thompson
BB 1.3.24 1.7.24 16.10.24 16.2.25 - - - -
Leeds BSw 8.3.24 8.7.24 8.11.24 - - 8.7.25 8.11.25
Canada BB 16.3.24 16.7.24 16.11.24 17.3.25 16.7.25 16.11.25
James 
Cropper
BB 1.4.24 1.8.24 3.12.24 1.4.25 1.8.25 - -
Manhattan RS - - 22.7.24a 25.11.24 27.3.25 24.7.25 - -
Nestor BB 17.5.24 16.9.24 wrecked – –
Robert 
Fulton
BSw - - sold – – –
Florida* BB 2.11.24 1.3.25 1.7.25 2.11.25
Silas 
Richards*




Source: Lloyd’s List 1824–1825.  BB = Black Ball Line, scheduled sailing dates 
1st and 16th of each month; BSw = Blue Swallowtail Line, sailing date 8th; RS = 
Red Star Line, sailing date 24th. Sailings which took place on the scheduled date 
are marked in bold.
- -  = data missing    –  = not sailed
a This date may be incorrect. The packets hardly departed before scheduled
date.
often happened that the clearing at the Customs House of Liverpool was done 
in time for sailing on schedule, but the ship departed several days later. There 
were also second or, in later years, even fifth clearances before the ship really 
sailed, probably caused by the late arrival of important freight.148
148 Liverpool Customs Bill of Entry 1825, 1834, 1835.
North Atlantic
64









Canada, BB 1.1. 1.1. 4.1. 3
Manhattan, RS 8.1. 8.1. 10.1. 2
James Cropper, BB 16.1. 15.1. 22.1. 6
Silas Richards, BSw 24.1. 24.1. 26.1. 2
New York, BB 1.2. 1.2. - - - -
Panthea, RS 8.2. (8.2.); 2nd clear. 10.2. 13.2. 5
Columbia, BB 16.2. 16.2. 16.2. 0
Cortes, BSw 24.2. 23.2. 24.2. 0
Meteor, RS 8.3. 8.3. 8.3. 0
Pacific, BB 16.3. 16.3. 16.3. 0
Leeds, BSw (16.3.) (14.3.); 2nd clear. 15.3. (16.3.) - -*
Corinthian, BSw 24.3. 24.3. 24.3. 0
William Thompson, BB 1.4. 31.3. - - - -
John Wells, RS 8.4. 8.4. 8.4. 0
Florida, BB 16.4. 16.4. 17.4. 1
Canada, BB 1.5. 30.4. - - - -
Manhattan, RS 8.5. 7.5. 10.5. 2
James Cropper, BB 16.5. 16.5. 16.5. 0
Silas Richards, BSw 24.5. 24.5. 24.5. 0
New York, BB 1.6. 1.6. 8.6. 7
Panthea, RS 8.6. 8.6. 9.6. 1
Columbia, BB 16.6. 16.6. 16.6. 0
Cortes, BSw 24.6. 24.6. 27.6. 3
Manchester, BB 1.7. 1.7. - - - -
Meteor, RS 8.7. 8.7. 8.7. 0
Pacific, BB 16.7. 16.7. 16.7. 0
Corinthian, BSw 24.7. 23.7. 24.7. 0
William Thompson, BB 1.8. 1.8. 1.8. 0
John Wells, RS 8.8. 8.8. 11.8. 3
Florida, BB 16.8. 16.8. - - - -
Leeds, BSw 24.8. 24.8. 24.8. 0
Canada, BB 1.9. 1.9. 1.9. 0
Manhattan, RS 8.9. 8.9. 9.9. 1
James Cropper, BB 16.9. 16.9. 16.9. 0
Silas Richards, BSw 24.9. 24.9. 28.9. 4
New York, BB 1.10. 1.10. 1.10. 0
Panthea, RS 8.10. 8.10. 12.10. 4
Columbia, BB 16.10. 15.10. 23.10. 7
Cortes, BSw 24.10. 24.10. 5.11. 12
Manchester, BB 1.11. 1.11. 8.11. 7
Meteor, RS 8.11. - - 10.11. 2
Pacific, BB 16.11. 16.11. 17.11. 1
Corinthean, BSw 24.11. 24.11. 29.11. 5
William Thompson, BB 1.12. 1.12. 1.12. 0
John Wells, RS 8.12. 8.12. 8.12. 0
Florida, BB 16.12. 16.12. 21.12. 5
Leeds, BSw 24.12. - - 27.12. 3
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Table 7, sources: Lloyd’s List 1825; Liverpool Customs Bills of Entry, 1825. – Sailings 
which took place on the scheduled date are marked in bold.
* The Leeds had sailed from Liverpool on 4.1. but ran on the Banks (at Mersey)
and sustained great injury. (See Lloyd’s List 7.1.1825, 11.1.1825, 14.1.1825.) She 
was now leaving after repairs, having stayed in port for over three months. This was 
probably the reason why there was no Blue Swallowtail Line departure on 24.4.
As can be noticed from Table 7, it should never be assumed that clearing 
dates were automatically the same as the final sailing dates. A comparison 
between the official sailing dates published by the companies, the dates of 
clearing at customs and the final sailing dates shows significant differences. 
This is also a good example of the diversity of information received when using 
different sources in calculating the duration of information transmission.
A calculation based on Tables 6 and 7 gives the result that the average 
delay of the departure of an American sailing packet at the port of Liverpool 
in 1825 was about two days, while the delay in New York was just a half 
day. As can be noticed from Table 7, the ships were in each case cleared at 
customs at the right time for a scheduled departure, but the delays took place 
when the ship was due to leave the port. During the worst winter months, 
only two vessels managed to leave on the scheduled date from Liverpool.
Despite these delays, there was now more frequency and regularity in 
North Atlantic communications than ever before. The speed of the packets 
varied, especially on westbound trips, but the averages were extraordinary: 
24 days eastwards and 36 days westwards in 1825.149
Effects of the regular sailing packet service on business information 
transmission
What did all this mean from the business information transmission point of 
view? It can be illustrated by examining the consecutive information circles 
enabled by the service.
As can be seen from Table 8, a letter sent from Liverpool by the Red 
Star Line packet Manhattan on 10 January (the ship was delayed two days 
from its original schedule), arrived in New York on 20 February, and if the 
recipient was in New York, he or she was able to answer quickly enough 
to send the letter by the same company’s John Wells, which departed from 
New York on 24 February (or a few days later, but not earlier than that). This 
letter arrived in Liverpool on 20 March, only 69 days after the departure of 
the original letter from that port. If the recipient was in Liverpool, he could 
again answer this letter quickly enough to send it by the Blue Swallowtail 
packet Corinthian, which departed on 24 March. Within one year, five letters 
could be sent successively back and forth across the Atlantic, while a sixth 
one would already be on its way when the year ended.
149 Calculated from 37 trips of which enough data has been available.
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By way of comparison, the information circulation enabled by the 
Falmouth packets in one year (1825) was as follows:
 
The example shows that the government mail service was not very well 
co-ordinated even in 1825, although the British merchants now seemed 
to have had better chances to answer the letters before the next packet 
departure. At the other end, there were still problems. The mails sent by 
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10.1. 20.2. John Wells, 
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~ 24.2. 20.3. 69
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1.8. 5.9. Cortes, 
BSw
8.9. 3.10. 63
Panthea, RS 12.10. 10.11. Canada, 
BB
16.11. 8.12. 56
TABLE 8.  Consecutive information circles enabled by the American sailing packets 
between Liverpool and New York, 1825.













































Swallow 14.9. 26.10. Kingfisher 9.11. 12.12. 89
TABLE 9.  Consecutive information circles enabled by the Falmouth packet service 
in 1825, an example.
Sources: Sailing lists of Arnell & Ludington, 37–39.  ~ = estimate.
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the Marchioness of Salisbury arrived in New York on the same day as the 
packet to England departed. Somebody might have been able to send a quick 
answer immediately, but it is also possible that the mails were not handled 
and delivered from the Post Office before the deadline for answers to be 
brought in to catch the departing vessel.150
Thus the answers to the January mails could primarily be sent by the arriving 
packet, Marchioness of Salisbury, on her way homewards. The next round 
was inconvenient as well. The Queensbury had left from New York two days 
before the May mails arrived by the Lord Melville. But the September mails 
carried by the Swallow could be answered during the next two weeks and 
carried by the Kingfisher, which departed from New York on 9 November. 
Sending a letter and getting an answer to it took 105 days on average and only 
three consecutive information circles could be achieved within that year.
From this we can draw two important conclusions. Compared with the 
Falmouth packet service, the speed of information circulation across the 
North Atlantic was notably improved when the American packet lines started 
their better organized sailings. Instead of three round trips of letters by the 
Falmouth packets, information could be circulated more than five times within 
a year by the American sailing packets.  A second conclusion is that Liverpool 
and New York enjoyed the cumulative advantage of faster communications 
compared with other ports due to slow inland communications. If further 
inland transmission was needed, the next packet had already sailed long 
before the answer was at the port of departure.
Even though there was also a packet service between New York and London, 
as well as New York and Havre, these services were never as effective as the 
weekly departures on the New York – Liverpool route. The service for London 
and Havre was most of the time only twice a month, and it was conducted by 
smaller ships – many of the Red Swallowtail Line packets had first served on 
the more important Liverpool line, and been replaced there by newer and larger 
vessels.151 The average duration of westbound passages during 1818–1857 was 
35 days from Liverpool (1,993 trips), 36 days from London (928 trips), and 38 
days from Havre (1,239 trips).152 Consequently, important outgoing letters were 
often sent from London by inland mail directly to Liverpool to be forwarded 
to the next departing packet, and incoming letters vice versa.153
Due to the superiority of the American sailing packet service, Liverpool 
became the de facto information centre for Britain on the Atlantic side without 
the government taking any measures. Instead, the Post Office closed up the 
150 Even if the mails had been carried from New York by the Rinaldo, which departed on 10.3 
(see Table 9) the next packet from Falmouth would have been the same Lord Melville, 
which departed on 21.5.1825.
151 See the list of mail-carrying packets in Staff, 125.
152 Albion (1938), 197, 317. The averages are rounded here into full figures. – The London 
line mails were landed at Portsmouth, from where they were taken to the City by mail 
coach, a one day’s voyage.
153 For example, a letter was sent from New York on 22.11.1823 to the Fredrick Huth banking 
house in London by the Red Star Line packet John Wells, which sailed from New York 
precisely on schedule on 24.11.1823 and entered Liverpool on 15.12.1823. The letter 
arrived in London on 17.12.1823 – only 25 days after leaving the sender. Johan Snellman, 
North Atlantic Mail (2004). Postal historical collection. (JSC).
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Falmouth packet mail service to New York at the end of 1826. The American 
ships had literally driven the Falmouth packets from the route, and even the 
official mail of the General Post Office in London, destined for the Canadian 
General Post Office, was carried by the American packets instead of their own 
mail service.154 Yet the Falmouth packet service for Halifax and Bermuda 
continued until the Cunard Line steamers took it over in 1840.
The American sailing packets accepted letters from England to the United 
States at two-pence a letter, irrespective of the weight or number of enclosures. 
The packet line agents provided mail bags in their Liverpool and London offices, 
and the bags were sealed when the vessel was due to sail, and taken on board. 
The same procedure was usual at Havre and Bordeaux on the French side. In 
England the practice was widespread and used by the majority of merchants 
throughout the kingdom. Special messengers of the different companies would 
carry their bags to Liverpool, and although this was a direct infringement of 
the Post Office monopoly for the carriage of mail within Britain, little could be 
done about it. The practice had become so usual and was done so openly that 
it became an accepted procedure. In the late 1830s it was revealed by Roland 
Hill, the Secretary of the Post Office, when advocating his postal reform, 
that the American sailing packets carried some 4,000 letters each westbound 
voyage, none of which had passed through the Post Office.155
On their arrival at New York or Boston, letters for the United States went 
into the Ship Letter Office to be rated for postage. If addressed to a place at 
the port of arrival, six cents was charged. For anywhere beyond, a ship letter 
rate of two cents plus the inland postage was levied. The letters for Canada 
were sent to the New York Post Office or via Boston, and then forwarded 
154 See Arnell & Ludington, viii; 43; Staff, 62.
155 Staff, 54; Robinson (1964), 114–115. – Even the arriving letters were often delivered 
directly to the merchants without going through the Post Office. The Secretary of the 
Treasury wrote a letter to the American Chamber of Commerce in Liverpool 8.4.1837 
to remind the merchants about the fact that it was required by law to send the arriving 
letters via the Post Office. Between 14.2.1836 and 28.2.1837 no less than 2,371 letters and 
packages ‘beyond the privilege allowed to consignees’ had been found by the Liverpool 
Customs and sent to the Post Office. In one instance alone, 530 letters were discovered, 
and out of 111 packages of newspapers opened between 29.9.1836 and 20.2.1837, 
containing 822 newspapers, there were also found concealed 648 letters. – In the ACC 
Minute Book, February 1842 – December 1866, related to the meeting on 13.4.1837. 380 
AME/2. Liverpool Public Record Office (LPRO).
Destination 1820 1825 1830 1835 1840 1845 1850 1855
Liverpool 4 16 16 16 20 24 24 24
London – 4 8 10 12 12 16 16
Havre – 12 12 14 16 16 12 16
Source: Albion (1938), 274. – The number of vessels varied within these frames due 
to replacements, etc.
TABLE 10.  Number of mail-carrying American packets from New York, 1820–1855.
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to the exchange office at the Canadian border, where the Canadian Post 
Office accepted them. The postage charge was made up of the ship rate, the 
United States postage to the border, and then the Canadian inland postage. 
By this means, a letter to Quebec would cost 47 cents instead of 92 if it was 
brought by the Post Office packet. Likewise, the postage on a letter from 
London to Montreal and York, instead of being 96 cents, and one dollar 
12 cents respectively, would cost 31 cents, and 47 cents. Apart from the 
notable benefits to the merchants, this cheap means of communications was 
a blessing to the emigrants who could thus more easily keep in touch with 
their relatives at home.156
A letter from a Bible Society member in Montreal to a colleague in London 
gives a good example of the general thinking: ‘I would again recommend 
your writing us by the New York and not the English packets as by it much 
time will be saved as well as the saving in postage of the value of two or 
three Bibles.’157
Indeed, the British Post Office’s losses of postage rates were a major reason 
for the decision to start subsidizing transatlantic mail steamship services in 
the coming years.
There is one more important and rather confusing aspect to be discussed 
regarding the American packets and their central role in business information 
transmission during their heyday: the unpredictability of the duration of 
sailings. As already noticed, the actual sailings did not always take place 
accurately on schedule, but that was a minor problem compared with the 
discomfort caused by the common unawareness of the duration of each 
voyage. The passengers on board were normally betting upon the length of 
the voyage, with a ten-day range. That was about the normal spread.158
The unknown length of the voyage was not only an inconvenience to 
the passengers. While the date for outgoing mail was set in advance at the 
ports of New York and Liverpool, no one knew the date when the mails 
would arrive from overseas. The staff in the Post Offices on both sides of 
the Atlantic had to be ready for emergencies, for sometimes several packets 
could arrive on the same day due to delays caused by rough weather or other 
problems at sea.
 For example, one day in August 1827 the New York Post Office received 
two incoming Black Ballers, one line packet from London and Havre each, as 
well as a few regular traders. Two years later, more than 17,000 letters came in 
on a single week, three Black Ballers and some other packets having arrived 
at the port during the same time. Some of the mails were for New York, while 
the rest were to be handled and forwarded to other parts of the country.159 
When the well known New Orleans packet line owner Edward Knight 
Collins started his Dramatic Line between New York and Liverpool in 1837, 
the rush in the Post Offices became even more frequent as the line decided 
156 See Staff, 54.
157 A letter to Joseph Jarn, Esq. in London, dated in Montreal 8.10.1829. Published in the 
catalogue of Charles G. Firby Auctions, British North America Stamps and Postal History. 
Dr. Kenneth M. Rosenfeld Collection, June 18, 2005 (Waterford, MI, 2005), lot 722.
158 Albion (1938), 200, 244.
159 Albion (1938), 187.
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to use the same sailing dates (the 16th from New York and the 1st from 
Liverpool) as the Black Ball Line. The race between the two companies’ 
ships at sea often ended with both packets arriving on the same day.160 From 
a business information transmission point of view, this arrangement was 
not really satisfactory. Even if the competition between the two companies 
might have shortened the duration of a single trip by a few days, it gave no 
possibility to send mail across the Atlantic more often. Even if the monthly 
Dramatic Line sailings increased the number of regular transatlantic sailing 
packet journeys from 48 to 60 per year, the number of annual information 
circles remained at five, as it had been since the early 1820s.
Another problem which caused stagnation in the development of 
transatlantic mail services was that the speed of an average trip could not 
really be improved. Despite the rather punctual departures and hard driving, 
better knowledge about sea routes and currents, or technical improvements, 
the packet arrival dates always depended heavily on the winds at sea. Even if 
the eastbound sailings were more predictable, the westbound trips could take 
anything between three and eight weeks, or even more.
The slow trips generally occurred in the winter when gales or ice sometimes 
stretched out a trip even to ten or 12 weeks. The slowest passage of all was 
the 89-day crossing of the Blue Swallowtail Line’s Patrick Henry late in 
the sailing packet period. Another slow passage, depicting the effects of 
160 In 1838, this happened at least on 5.1.1838, 19.3.1838, 16.4.1838, 12.5.1838, 22.10.1838, and 
30.11.1838 in New York; and on 27.1.1838, 24.4.1838, 20.6.1838, 21.7.1838, and 19.10.1838 
in Liverpool. See Lloyd’s List 1838, respectively.
TABLE 11.  Consecutive information circles enabled by the American sailing packets 





























2.1. 8.3. Orpheus, 
BB
~ 16.3. 10.4. 98
England,
BB
20.4. 12.5. Europe, 
BB
~ 16.5. 9.6. 50
Siddons, 
DL
16.6. 19.7. Shakespeare, 
DL
~ 1.8. 19.8. 64
England, 
BB
20.8. 23.9. Sheridan, 
DL







Sources: Lloyd’s List 1838. – If the exact departure days from New York have not 
been recorded by Lloyd’s List, the line’s general sailing date has been used as an 
approximate. This does not affect the calculation of the information circles.   
~  = scheduled.
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prevailing winds, was the 69-day crossing of the Black Ball Line’s South 
America in the winter of 1833–1834. Although she had one of the fastest 
general averages of all packets, and her Captain Robert H. Waterman later set 
up a series of all-time speed records as a clipper commander, there were only 
about a dozen packet journeys slower than that in the whole 40 years.161
Diagram 1 clearly illustrates this key problem of the sailing packet service. 
The average length of a westbound journey was 34 days, but it varied very 
much from one journey to another. Even though there were slower and faster 
vessels,162 one and the same ship could make a westbound trip in 41 days 
and the following one in 22. It was not unusual that the vessels arrived in 
another order than they had left from the port of departure, even if there was 
one or two weeks difference between the sailing dates. Though it was true 
that winter sailings were harder and often longer than those of the spring or 
autumn163 (summer sailings often suffered from fog on the North American 
coast), even the winters were variable.
The mid-1830s until 1838 were the heyday of the American sailing packets. 
In 1834, all three companies on the Liverpool route again replaced one of their 
older and smaller ships with a new one: the Black Ball Line replaced the New 
York of 516 tons with the Columbus of 663 tons, the Blue Swallowtail Line 
replaced the Silas Richards of 454 tons with the Independence of 732 tons, 
and the Red Star Line replaced the John Jay of 502 tons with the England 
of 729 tons. The new vessels were not necessarily faster than the old ones, 
as can be seen from Diagram 1, but they were certainly more attractive from 
the passengers’ point of view. The wage costs did not seem to be a major 
problem during this phase. While the old ships of 450 to 500 tons had sailed 
with 18 to 26 men on board, the new ones needed 30.164.
As it was always impossible to predict the duration of each trip, duplicates 
of letters were often sent to ensure the fastest possible dispatch of the 
information. For example in 1837, the Dramatic Line’s Sheridan sailed from 
Liverpool on the same day as the Black Ball Line’s Columbus. Both ships 
were delayed – according to the original schedules, the Sheridan should 
have sailed on the 12th or 16th and the Columbus on the 16th March165 
– and they both sailed on the 19th. Johan Snellman’s philatelic collection 
includes a cover with two separate letters written in Liverpool on 17 and 18 
March 1837, sent by the Sheridan. According to the hand marking made by 
the writer of the letters, they were duplicates, while the originals were sent 
by the Columbus. The duplicate cover arrived faster than the original, and 
was handstamped in New York on 16 April, while the Columbus arrived in 
161 Albion (1938), 52.
162 See the records of Albion (1938), 320–321.
163 For the monthly averages of 1818–1827, see the records by Albion (1938), 322.
164  Records of the number of personnel on board when the ship cleared outwards, Liverpool 
Customs Bills of Entry, 1834. – The ship weights are from Staff’s packet lists, 121–
123.
165 According to Cutler, the Dramatic Line’s sailing dates were ‘eventually’ fixed at the 25th 
from New York and the 12th from Liverpool, but this system did not work for a long time. 
At least from the beginning of 1838, the Dramatic Line sailed from both ports on the same 
day as the Black Ball Line. See Cutler (1967), 377, 380; Lloyd’s List 1838, passim.
North Atlantic
72
Sources: Lloyd’s List 1834; Liverpool Customs Bills of Entry, 1834. All scheduled 
sailings were made, but in some cases the sailing data is missing from the sources. 
The selection of which regular traders have been included in the figures as mail-
carrying packets is based on the list published by Staff, 121–127.
Diagram 1. Mail carrying American sailing packets, duration of 
westbound trips, Liverpool - New York, 1834



























New York on 17 April. The recipients have not marked the arrival date in 
Richmond, but the letter was answered already on 21 April.166
The example shows again how useful it was to be involved in business 
at the main port cities. The latest information could be written or added to 
existing letters even after the ship’s scheduled sailing date. Also, by using 
duplicates, the fastest possible answer was ensured.
Until the introduction of ocean-going steamships, the American sailing 
packets offered a superior mail service compared with any other world trade 
route. Surprisingly, they could also keep their position for one more decade 
during the shift period from sail to steam, as can be noticed in the following 
chapter.
Wind vs. Steam – a Decade of Struggle
Early experiments – The start of the transatlantic steamship service – The 
origins of the North Atlantic mail contract – The early years of the Cunard 
Line – Competition between early transatlantic mail carriers – Wind vs. 
steam – the finale
Early experiments
Steam technology was transferred from land to sea in the early 19th century. 
The earliest commercially successful steamboat was built by Robert Fulton 
in 1807. His 18-horsepower engine steamer made the passage from New 
York to Albany in 33 hours. In Britain, the first steamboat was launched on 
the Clyde in 1811. In 1814 there were still only two steamboats in Britain, 
in 1816 there were 15, in 1825 there were 163, in 1835 there were already 
538 and in 1839 as many as 840. A similar development was seen in the 
United States, where approximately 1,300 steamboats were built during 
1808–1839.167
 Steamboats replaced sailing packets in the British Post Office coastal 
services in the early 1820s. The mails for Ireland were carried by steamboats 
from Holyhead to Dublin over the Irish Sea from May 1821 and the mails 
for the continent from Dover to Calais from the end of the same year. The 
Milford station was converted to steam in 1824, though the receipts from 
mail and passengers were rather slight. The Bristol Chamber of Commerce 
bombarded the Post Office with reasons for transferring the Milford packets 
to the port of Bristol, which could easily become a busy packet station due 
to the demands of commercial activities. The Post Office ignored these 
demands, but added Liverpool as a new packet port on the west coast of 
England.168
166 Ship letter from Liverpool on 17.3. and 18.3.1837 to Messrs John & Dan K. Stewart, 
Richmond, Virginia. (JSC); Lloyd’s List 21.3.1837; 9.5.1837.
167 Peter Allington & Basil Greenhill, The First Atlantic Liners. Seamanship in the Age of 
Paddle Wheel, Sail and Screw (London, 1997), 12.
168 Robinson (1964), 120–121.
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The steam packet service from Liverpool to Dublin started in 1826. 
Previously, the Liverpool letters to Ireland had gone first to Chester and from 
there joined the London mails on their way to Holyhead. This was rather 
inconvenient as the mails had to leave from Liverpool before the business 
day was over, and the letters were on their way for 24 hours. The direct steam 
ship traffic between Liverpool and Dublin reduced the time to some 12 hours. 
Liverpool also had a steam-powered mail service to the Isle of Man.169
Even though there were already private steamship companies serving on 
the coastal routes, the British Post Office ignored them and built a competing 
steam packet service. The reason was, according to Francis Freeling, the 
Secretary of the Post Office, that private owners ‘would have no inducement 
to avoid delay or irregularity, and that the safety of the mails was so important 
that it could not be left in private hands’. Due to these investments, the annual 
expense for the services, which had been about £78,000 in 1817, more than 
doubled during the next ten years.170
A report by the Commissioners of Revenue in 1830 showed that the 
expenses for the first eight years of the Post Office steam packet service had 
amounted to over £620,000 while the receipts were less than £243,000.171 It 
seemed to be a poor business for the Post Office to build steamboats and run 
the mail service. These figures, together with the public pressure to reduce 
the high postage rates,172 were among the most important reasons when the 
Post Office later decided to change its policy and ‘outsource’ the overseas 
mail services to private, subsidised steamship companies.
Before any transatlantic steamers became reality, steam vessels were 
already in use for a regular foreign mail service on shorter sea routes, such 
as crossing the North Sea between London and Holland or Hamburg. The 
steamship service shortened the trip notably compared with the horse-drawn 
mail coach to Harwich and crossing of the North Sea by sailing packets. The 
170-year-old Harwich mail service was given up, and mails to Holland were
carried by the General Steam Navigation Company. This line, founded in
1824, received its first mail contract in 1831. The steam packets would depart
regularly from London for Rotterdam and Hamburg, reaching Rotterdam in
28 hours and Hamburg in 54. By the mid-1830s, steam packets were leaving
169 Robinson (1964), 121.
170 Robinson (1964), 118–122.
171 Robinson (1964), 122.
172 Roland Hill, Secretary of the Post Office, published his well-known pamphlet Post Office 
Reform: Its Importance and Practicability in 1837. Hill’s calculations about the benefits 
of reducing the high inland postage rates to a uniform one penny rate caused a furious 
debate in public and in the Parliament. The uniform inland rate was introduced in 1840, 
together with the first prepaid postage stamp in the world, the Penny Black, as well as the 
prepaid stationery covers, known as Mulready covers according to their designer. These 
inventions supported the decision to adopt the one penny postage, as the stamps and 
stationery covers could be bought in quantities before use, and prepaid letters were easier 
and quicker to handle in the Post Office. See Robinson (1948), 258–320; Gavin Fryer & 
Clive Akerman (ed.), The Reform of the Post Office in the Victorian Era, Vol. 1 (London, 
2000), 79–139. For the pamphlet, see Fryer & Akerman, 1–46. For the parliamentary 
debate, see the Reports of the Select Committee on Postage in BPP, Transport and 
Communications, Posts and Telegraphs, 1 and 2, passim.
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from London twice a week. The mails for Sweden were sent across the North 
Sea via Hull from 1840.173
In France, the first regular steam packet service was established on the 
Saône in 1826, after many fruitless attempts. In 1833 there were only 75 
steamboats in France; in 1835 there were 100; and in 1838 still only 160. 
The French started their Mediterranean mail steamship service between 
Marseilles and Constantinople in 1837.174
The first steamship to cross the Atlantic was the American Savannah in 1819. 
Her trip from Savannah, Georgia, to Liverpool took 29 days, and the engine was 
used for only 100 hours of the total of 700 spent at sea. The ship had no passengers 
or cargo on board during the trip, despite advertising in the local press before 
the voyage. Even though the trip could be called nautically successful, the result 
clearly indicated that ocean-going steamships were not yet economical.175
The Royal William was another vessel which crossed the North Atlantic 
eastbound once. She even carried passengers on her voyage. The ship was 
originally built for Quebec–Halifax–Pictou traffic in 1831, but in 1833 the 
owners decided to send her across the Atlantic to be sold in Europe. The 
eastbound trip took 22 days to Cowes and 25 days to London, including all the 
stoppages due to a problem common for the early steamers: the fires under the 
boilers had to be put out for hours several times during the trip to remove the 
salt crystals which came from the sea water that was used for cooling.176
A few more transatlantic trips at least partly under steam were recorded 
during the 1820s and 1830s on the southern route: the Conde de Patmella 
from Liverpool via Lisbon to Brazil in 1820; the Rising Star to Valparaiso, 
Chile, in 1822; and the Curaçao from Antwerp to the Dutch West Indies in 
1827, after which she probably made two or three more round trips before 
becoming a man-of-war in Belgium in 1830. The City of Kingston sailed 
from London for Madeira, Barbados and Jamaica in 1837, continuing later 
to New York but ending up in Baltimore due to a heavy storm.177
173 Robinson (1964), 123; Moubray & Moubray, 105–106.
174 Allington & Greenhill, 12. For the early French Mediterranean service, see Raymond 
Salles, La Poste Maritime Française, Historique et Catalogue, Tome II, Les Paquebots 
de la Méditerranée de 1837 à 1935 (Limassol, Cyprus, 1992), 9–34.
175 About Savannah’s trip, see Albion (1939) 314; John A. Butler, Atlantic Kingdom: 
America’s Contest with Cunard in the Age of Sail and Steam (Washington D.C., 2001), 
41–44; Arnold Kludas, Record Breakers of the North Atlantic. Blue Riband Liners 
1838–1952 (London, 2000), 33–36; Staff, 63; and Tyler, 1–17.
176 Lawrence Babcock, Spanning the Atlantic. A History of the Cunard Line (New York 
1931), 24–29; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 51–52; Kludas, 35–36; Robinson (1964), 125–126; 
David Tyler, Steam Conquers the Atlantic (New York, 1939), 25–27.
177 Albion (1939), 316; Allington & Greenhill, 14; Babcock, 24; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 45–46; 
Stuart Nicol, Macqueen’s Legacy. A History of the Royal Mail Line, vol. 1 (Gloucestershire, 
2001), 31; Robinson (1964), 125; Tyler, 22–23. Some transatlantic voyages were obviously 




The start of the transatlantic steamship service
A discussion about the possibility of making a westbound voyage across 
the North Atlantic by steamship continued in Britain throughout the 1830s. 
It was asserted by sceptics that the boiler would be completely clogged by 
using sea water for such a long time, the vessel could not carry enough coal 
for a trip of over 3,000 nautical miles while still leaving enough room for 
passengers, crew, freight and stores, and the necessary fuel, when loaded, 
would destroy the trim of the vessel. The Atlantic crossing might be done 
only if the shortest possible distance between the two continents was used, 
from the west coast of Ireland to Halifax.178
The famous race between the steamers Sirius and Great Western from 
Britain to New York in April 1838 was finally the start of a commercial 
transatlantic steamship service. The Sirius was a wooden paddle steamer of 
700 tons and a substitute for the British and American Steam Navigation 
Company’s (B&A) British Queen, a much larger vessel designed for regular 
North Atlantic service. The launching of the British Queen was delayed 
by several months due to the bankruptcy of the company that should have 
delivered the engines, and the B&A decided to charter the Sirius for a 
transatlantic journey to save the honour of the company, as they had already 
announced the commencement of this traffic.179
According to Stephen Fox, the voyage of the Sirius was ‘just a headless, 
dangerous publicity stunt, a desperate gambit by sore losers, and hardly worth 
the historical attention it had received ever since’.180 Even so, the ‘publicity 
stunt’ was very successful, as the amount of attention paid to it shows. This 
was not the first time, and would not be the last time, that shipping companies 
took risks in the North Atlantic for publicity and reputation – and not all 
cases had a happy ending.
The rival Great Western was a much larger and more efficient ship of 
1,340 tons. She was owned by the Great Western Steamship Company and 
was built together with the Great Western Railway, which was opened in its 
full length between London and Bristol in 1841. Isambard Kingdom Brunel, 
the well-known chief engineer, was responsible for both these projects.181
In April 1838 both steamers were ready for their first Atlantic crossing. 
Due to damage caused by a fire in her engine, the Great Western did not 
sail from Bristol as scheduled. She finally left on 8 April, four days after the 
Sirius, which departed from Cork, Ireland, on 4 April. The Great Western 
was so much faster that she arrived in New York on 23 April, only a few 
178 Robinson (1964), 126; Tyler, 39–41. Both refer to Dr. Dionysius Lardner’s article in 
Edinburgh Review of April 1837.
179 Kludas, 36–37; E. Le Roy Pond, Junius Smith: A Biography of the Father of the Atlantic 
Liner (New York, 1927), 100.
180 Stephen Fox, The Ocean Railway (London, 2003), 78. – Bernard Edwards describes the 
risks of the Sirius voyage in The Grey Widow Maker. The true stories of twenty-four 
disasters at sea (London, 1995), 27–33.
181 For its origins, see e.g. Pond, 98; Robinson (1964), 127; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 60; Butler, 
45. For the Great Western Railway, see Vaughan, 178–192.
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hours after the Sirius’s wildly celebrated arrival.182 The Sirius brought with 
her 94 passengers but the Great Western only seven, while 50 others had 
cancelled their bookings when they heard about the engine fire and the 
beaching on a sand bank on the way to Bristol. On the way back, people 
crowded onto the faster and larger vessel, and the Great Western carried 
home 68 passengers.183
Both steamers were equipped with an important innovation made in 1834, 
a circulating freshwater cooling system that eliminated any need for stoppages 
to scrape the caked salt from the boiler’s interior.184 The Great Western took 
600 tons of coal when departing from Bristol, and still had 155 tons a board 
upon arrival, having burnt an average of 29 tons of coal per day.185 The Sirius 
ran short of coal and was forced to burn wooden fittings and a good deal of 
resin to keep her engines going. On the eastbound voyage she had to make 
an extra call at Falmouth for coal, and it was from there that her mails were 
forwarded by land to the recipients.186
182 A comparison of the ships’ logs has been published by Tyler, 384–387.
183 Bonsor (1975), vol.1., 60–61; Kludas, 37; Nicholas Fogg, The Voyages of the Great 
Britain. Life at Sea in the World’s First Liner (Wilts, Great Britain, 2002), 9; Staff, 68.
184 Butler, 45–46; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 55.
185 Allington-Greenhill, 9.
186 The story about the Sirius coal varies in different sources. See Albion (1939), 318; Butler, 
46; Babcock, 32; Tabeart, 16; and Pond, 113;  Robinson (1964), 127; Tyler, 58–59, 
384–386.
FIG. 5. The letter sent from Baltimore on 28.4.1838 was carried by the Sirius on her first 
voyage on the way back home. She left from New York on 30.4. and had to make an extra 
call at Falmouth on 18.5. for coaling. The mails were sent from there by land to London. 
‘PAID’ and the rate marking have been struck out, and only the inland 5s postage has 
been charged from the recipient. On the reverse, ‘SHIP LETTER FALMOUTH’  (used 
in 1835–1840) and the London arrival handstamp of 21.5.1838.
North Atlantic
78
Both ships carried mail on board. These letters are usually regarded as 
the first transatlantic steamship letters in postal historical collections.187 
There are no records of the number of letters carried on the ships’ 
westbound journeys, but on the way back the Sirius carried some 17,000 
and the Great Western some 20,000 letters.188 According to a newspaper 
columnist of the Albion in New York on 5 May, 1838, no charge was 
taken for the mails. 
The loss of profit this caused for the Sirius owners was calculated at 
up to $4,000 – or £1,000 – a sum that would have paid for a large part 
of the costs of the voyage. According to the paper, the letter bags would 
187 Robertson shows a very early cover sent as private ship letter by the Savannah in 1819. 
It is the only one known from the experimental period. See Robertson, B.48/C.
188 Pond, 113; Staff, 68; Robinson (1964), 127.
FIG. 6. The letter sent from Baltimore on 11.6.1839 was carried by the Great Western 
on her 8th round trip. She left from New York on 13.6. and arrived in Bristol on 27.6. 
The letter arrived in London on 28.6., in 17 days. 
North Atlantic
79
have been more profitable for the company than the 28 cabin passengers 
carried.189
According to Tyler, the Sirius brought with her some Liverpool newspapers 
of 3 April and Cork newspapers of 4 April, while the Great Western brought 
London newspapers of 6 April and one from Bristol of 7 April. An employee of 
the New York Courier & Enquirer found the Great Western’s mails on arrival 
and managed to get off with the newspapers and mail bags. The Courier’s 
editors kept them for several hours, went through the contents and published a 
special foreign news edition. The other newspapers were greatly annoyed, and 
so was the British Minister in Washington, whose mail was thus delayed.190
Although somewhat unplanned, this was the start of the regular steamship 
mail and passenger service between Britain and New York. As a mail carrier, 
the Great Western took letters westward at ship letter rates. From New York 
the rate was the same as on the American sailing packets, 25 cents each, and 
her captain received 2d from the British Post Office for each single letter he 
landed at Bristol.191
The Sirius made only two round trips across the Atlantic, and then returned 
to coastal service. The Great Western made more than 40 North Atlantic round 
trips during 1838–1846, and was then sold to the Royal Mail Steam Packet 
Company for the British – West Indian service. In 1855, she was used as a troop 
carrier in the Crimean War, and in 1856 was finally sold to be scrapped.192
The Sirius and the Great Western were soon followed by other transatlantic 
pioneers. The Royal William of the City of Dublin Steam Packet Co. entered 
the traffic in July 1838 and the Liverpool of the Transatlantic Steam Ship Co. 
in October 1838. The British and American Steam Navigation Company’s 
British Queen, which had chartered the Sirius for the first Atlantic voyage, 
entered the traffic in July 1839 (see Fig. 7).193
In 1838–1839, these five steamers made 26 transatlantic round trips in total. 
While the average westbound trip of the American sailing packets between 
Liverpool and New York took 34.3 days during 1833–1847,194 the average 
trip by the pioneering steamers was made in 17.7 days during 1838–1839 
– in about half of the time.195
Despite the good start and great publicity, several of the pioneering
steamers appeared to be non-profitable and they had to be taken out of 
service after a few trips. The Royal William ended her last voyage in 
February 1839. The British Queen was also short-lived in this service, 
primarily due to the financial problems caused to the company by the loss 
of its new flagship the President, which sailed from New York for Liverpool 
in March 1841 with 136 people on board and was never heard of again.196 
189 Staff, 155.
190 Tyler, 56.
191 Robinson, 128; Staff, 155–156.
192 Tabeart (1997), 16–19; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 60–66.
193 Tabeart (1997), 16–17. The Royal William should not to be confused with the earlier 
Canadian namesake.
194 Albion (1938), 317.
195 Calculated from the sailing lists of Tabeart (1997), 17.
196 Tabeart (1997), 18. For the loss of the President, see e.g. Pond, 210–222; Bonsor (1975), 
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vol. 1, 56–58; Staff, 77–78; Robinson (1964), 129–131; Butler, 46–47; Albion (1939), 
320; Fox 99–101. – The shipowning company B&A announced to their shareholders in 
December 1841 that the total receipts for the nine voyages of the British Queen had been 
£82,000 and the total expenses less than £71,000. This would have meant an average profit 
of over £1,200 per voyage, compared with £1,350 of the ill-fated President. Bonsor notes 
that the figures most probably did not take into account interest charges, depreciation, 
insurance or management expenses, which turned the profit into a substantial loss and 
forced the company into liquidation. Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 58. In 1837, the company’s 
prospectus had optimistically estimated that the profits of the British Queen would be 
FIG. 7. The letter sent from New York on 31.7.1840 to the Rothschild banking 
company in Paris, was carried by the British Queen on her 6th round voyage. She 
departed from New York on 1.8. and arrived in Portsmouth on 15.8. The letter was 
forwarded to the ship in New York by ‘T. H. Young, Cashier’. It was carried across 
the English Channel on 17.8.1840 and must have arrived in Paris within a couple 
of days, in about 19 days in all.
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The only long-lived pioneering steamer in the North Atlantic service was 
the Great Western.
The Great Western was clearly the fastest of all the pioneering steamers. 
She made her westbound trips in 15.8 days on average in 1838–1842, and 
in 16.4 days in 1843–1846. Her eastbound trips took 13.7 days on average 
in 1838–1842, and 14.8 days in 1843–1846.197
It has been argued that steamships offered ‘a huge advantage of 
independence from the wind’ and that they maintained a regular schedule 
regardless of the weather.198 Even if this was very much true compared with 
the sailing ships, the pioneering steamship traffic was not regular in the sense 
of line service. The Great Western sailed from both ports at about seven-week 
intervals, staying approximately ten days at port, on average.199  The duration 
of the trip was still unpredictable, even if the journeys were generally faster 
than by the sailing packets. Winds and streams also affected the steamers. 
Diagram 2 shows the difference between the duration of the Great Western’s 
westbound and eastbound sailings between 1838 and 1846.
over £4,500 per round trip or about £27,000 for a whole year. See Tyler, 44.
197 See sailing lists of Tabeart (1997), 19. – The Great Western changed her home port from 
Bristol to Liverpool in 1843, but this was not the reason for the longer trips during the 
later period. The vessel was able to make 13-day voyages from New York to both ports 
in 1842 when she sailed a triangle while testing the port of Liverpool.
198 E.g. Kludas, 38; Talbot, 133; Pond; 1–3; Babcock, 80.
199 Her actual sailing dates in 1838 were 8.4., 2.6., 21.7., 8.9. and 27.10. from Bristol; and 
7.5., 25.6., 16.8., 4.10., and 23.11. from New York. See Tabeart (1997), 17–19.
Source: Sailing lists of Tabeart (1997), 17–19.
Diagram 2. S/s Great Western, comparison of east- and westbound 














































Western 28.1. 16.2. 19
Great 
Western 25.2. 12.3. 15 43
Liver-
pool 6.2. 25.2. 19
Liver-
pool 9.3. 25.3. 16 47
Great 
Western 24.3. 15.4. 22
Great 
Western 23.4. 7.5. 14 44
Liver-
pool 20.4. 7.5. 17
Liver-
pool 18.5. 2.6. 15 43
Great 
Western 18.5. 31.5. 13
Great 
Western 13.6. 27.6. 14 40
Liver-
pool 13.6. 30.6. 17
Liver-
pool 6.7. 20.7. 14 37
Great 
Western 6.7. 22.7. 16
Great 
Western 1.8. 14.8.* 13 39
British 
Queen 12.7. 28.7. 16
British 
Queen 1.8. 14.8. 13 33
Liver-
pool 1.8. 18.8. 17
Liver-
pool 24.8. 8.9. 15 38
Great 
Western 24.8. 10.9. 17
Great 
Western 21.9. 4.10. 13 41
British 
Queen 3.9. 20.9. 17
British 
Queen 1.10. 15.10. 14 42
Liver-
pool 21.9. 10.10. 19
Liver-
pool 19.10. 6.11. 18 46
Great 
Western 19.10. 2.11. 14
Great 
Western 16.11. 30.11. 14 42
British 
Queen 3.11. 23.11. 20
British 
Queen 2.12. 25.12. 23 52
Liver-
pool 16.11. 5.12. 19
Liver-
pool 15.12. 11.1.40 28** 56
Average, 
Great 
Western 16.8 13.8 41.5
Average, 
all 17.5 15.0 42.9
TABLE 12. Consecutive information circles enabled by the pioneering transatlantic 
steamers in 1839.
Source: Tabeart (1997), 17. The consecutive information circles enabled by the 
sailings of the Great Western are marked in bold and those enabled by the Liverpool 
in italics. The Great Western sailed from Bristol; the Liverpool from Liverpool; and 
the British Queen from Portsmouth.
* The date is corrected here according to Fox, 82–83; Pond, 180–181. Tabeart’s
date is 15.8.
** This was the Liverpool’s last transatlantic voyage. She ran short of coal and 




The Great Western made most of her westbound voyages in 14, 15 or 16 
days, a notable difference compared with the sailing ships. Not all the trips 
were fast, however. While a record voyage was twice made in 13 days, the 
longest trip took 29 days in February–March 1843. In the 1840s, the Great 
Western was not in use all year round but stayed at port during the mid-
winter months. The eastbound trips normally took 13 to 15 days, with only 
a few exceptions. There is a visible difference in the duration of east- and 
westbound voyages.
How did the pioneering steamship service affect the duration of business 
information transmission? Table 12 shows the flow of the consecutive 
information circles during 1839. Compared with the five consecutive circles 
enabled by the American sailing packets in 1838, with an average information 
circle of 64.4 days (varying between 50 and 98 days),200 the pioneering 
steamers enabled six consecutive circles, the average being 41.5 days if the 
letters were carried by the Great Western and 44.5 if carried by the Liverpool. 
The shortest information circle was conducted by the British Queen, which 
carried the answers to letters sent from England in only 33 days. She stayed 
in New York for only four days on her maiden voyage, so as to be able to 
rush away simultaneously with the Great Western. They arrived at Bristol 
and Portsmouth within two hours of each other.201
As can be seen in Table 12, both the Great Western and the Liverpool 
made six round trips to New York during 1839. Each of the two vessels alone 
enabled six consecutive information circles for the letters and answers of the 
British merchants. The port stays were short at both ends, and the length of 
one information circle varied between 33 and 56 days.
The speed of communications was clearly improved by the 
introduction of the pioneering steamers. The westbound trips in 
particular were made faster than ever. The steamers made 11 North 
Atlantic round-trips in 1838 and 15 in 1839. Winter sailings were 
avoided. For example, between 16 November 1839 and 20 February 
1840, no steamer left from British ports on the North Atlantic route.202
There were now four independent shipping companies running the service 
to New York from several British ports, and the sailings were mostly organized 
in ways that complemented each other. Yet there were no regular sailing dates, 
and the unpredictability of the system was still a problem. The next step would 
be similar to that which had made the American sailing packets so revolutionary 
two decades earlier: the organizing of line traffic across the ocean.
The origins of the North Atlantic mail contract
From the early 1820s, the superiority of the American sailing packets had 
been a cause of harm to the British Post Office, not only due to lost postage 
income but also lost prestige. The government packets were a subject of 
continuous complaint in the media. Not only were they slower and less 
200 See Table 10.
201 See Fox, 82–83; Pond, 180–181.
202 See the sailing lists of Tabeart (1997), 17.
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regular than the American sailing packets, but their seaworthiness was also 
publicly suspected, and not without reason.203
The problems dated from the period after the Napoleonic wars, when the 
Admiralty took over the Falmouth packet service. In connection with the 
establishment of peace there was a need for a considerable reduction in the 
number of ships and men in the Royal Navy. By transferring the Post Office 
packet service to the Admiralty, the surplus men and ships could be kept in 
use, and they would – at least in theory – be ready for active service in the 
future. The Treasury supported the plan in the hope of financial savings, and 
despite the strong opposition by the Post Office, the transfer took place in 
April, 1823. The contracts and agreements made between the Post Office 
and the individual Falmouth packet captains were transferred to the Navy 
Board, and as each contract expired, a naval packet took the place of the 
privately owned hired vessel. This was a long process, and the last hired 
packet remained in service until 1839.204
The sailing ships that the Admiralty brought into use in the packet service 
were ten-gun brigs and sloops, later packet brigs. The first category of packets 
was small men-of-war, mainly 230–240 tons, and built for general naval 
purposes in the 1820s. These ships were not designed for the packet service, 
and each vessel had to be modified and re-equipped, including a reduction 
in armaments to six guns in many cases. The packet brigs were built in the 
1830s for the packet service. They were bigger, about 360 tons, and more 
seaworthy than the older ones.205
Between 1827 and 1840, no fewer than nine of the 25 naval packets of 
the first category were lost at sea for varying reasons, mainly a combination 
of the ships’ poor sailing qualities, bad weather and ice. Several ships just 
disappeared. Public concern was strongly expressed in the newspapers. The 
Admiralty packets were called ‘the very refuse and ridicule of the navy’, ‘the 
lowest vessels that swim the seas’, ‘these official bum-boats’, ‘death ships’ 
and ‘coffin ships’. In 1827–1828, a total of 102 officers and crew were lost 
in three different packet disasters, as well as 19 passengers and all mails 
and bullion carried.206 The press advised the Admiralty that ‘…it would be 
better if we cannot build safe vessels ourselves to buy a score or two of the 
New York packets.’207
 After 1826 there was no British packet service to New York, only to 
Halifax and Bermuda, from where the mails to the British Ambassador in 
Annapolis, Maryland, were carried by a mail boat. The service had been 
conducted by Samuel Cunard of Halifax since 1827, this being his first mail 
203 Howat, 30; Staff, 62.
204 Howat, 27–28; Staff, 61. For details of the transfer, see Britnor, 141–146.
205 Howat, 29.
206 Howat, 30. The quotations are from The Times 1824–1834, picked out by Howat. – Some 
details of the packet losses are described by Arnell (1980), 89–90. – The Falmouth packets 
had larger crews than the American sailing packets as they were Admiralty-governed 
ten-gun brigs instead of trade ships.
207 Staff, 62. The quotation is from London Courier of 1834, cited by Staff. – In fact, foreigners 




contract with the British government. Later during the same year the service 
was altered to carry the British mails from Halifax to Boston, and in 1833 
the contract expanded to provide a second mail boat service between Halifax 
and Bermuda.208
In May 1838, when the Sirius steamed homeward on her first transatlantic 
trip (see Fig. 8), she met the Admiralty mail brig Tyrian at sea, which was 
returning from Halifax. As the Tyrian was rolling in the flat calm several 
hundred miles from her home port, the captain decided to send his mails by 
the steamer. A distinguished Nova Scotian by the name of Joseph Howe 
was on board and evidently the meeting in the middle of the ocean made a 
deep impression on him as immediately after arriving he started to press the 
Colonial Secretary for steam communication between Britain and the North 
American colonies. New Brunswick and Quebec joined with Nova Scotia, 
asking for twice-monthly communications with British North America.209
The purpose of these suggestions was mainly political. There were open 
rebellions in Canada at that time, and information reached England slowly 
and incompletely. The Admiralty felt uncomfortable about the fact that 
the British mail transmission depended so largely on the American sailing 
208 Arnell, 21–23; Arnell & Ludington, viii–xi.
209 See Robinson, 131–132; Hyde (1975), 4. Some authors give the honour of being fathers 
of the idea also to Sir Thomas Chandler Haliburton, better known under his pen-name 
Sam Slick, and William Crane, both ‘prominent citizens of the Maritime Provinces’. All 
three men were on board the Tyrian, when she met the Sirius at sea. See Tyler, 71; Staff, 
69; Pond 116–117; Babcock, 33.
FIG. 8. Meeting the Sirius in mid-Atlantic on her first voyage ensured the people a 
board the Admiralty packet Tyrian that it was time to establish a regular steamship 
mail service across the Atlantic. © National Museums Liverpool (Merseyside 
Maritime Museum).
Content (photo) removed from the open access version of this book.
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packets.210 The outcome of the debate and the positive experiences of the 
pioneering steamers was an advertisement by the Admiralty in November 
1838 asking for tenders for a steamship mail service between England and 
Halifax, with an additional link between Halifax and New York. The service 
was to be performed by steamers of no less than 300 hp. Voyages should 
be monthly, and the home port should be Liverpool, Bristol, Plymouth, 
Falmouth or Southampton.211
Two tenders were submitted in response. The first one was from the St. 
George Steam Packet Company, which owned the Sirius, offering a service 
from Cork and connected to a feeder service from Liverpool by smaller 
vessels. There would also be a similar link between Halifax and New York. 
The other tender was from the Great Western Steamship Company, offering 
a monthly service between Bristol and Halifax by 1,000-ton iron steamers 
or 1,500-ton wooden steamers. The service was to Halifax only, with no 
further link to New York.212
These tenders were not exactly what the Admiralty wanted to receive, 
and negotiations were opened with Samuel Cunard of Nova Scotia, who 
had arrived in Britain with a new suggestion.213 Cunard, born in Halifax in 
1787, was well known in the shipping business also in Britain due to the 
mail services between Halifax–Boston and Halifax–Bermuda at that time. 
The family had been involved in the shipbuilding business in Halifax, and 
Samuel Cunard had also worked for a time in Boston, learning the business 
of ship-broking before joining his father’s and brothers’ company.214
Samuel Cunard had been a shareholder in the first Royal William before 
she crossed the Atlantic in 1833. He also had interests in the General Mining 
Association, which ran the Cape Breton coal mines in Sydney, Nova Scotia, 
and was the Halifax agent for the company. Due to this arrangement, Cunard’s 
ships could later be supplied with relatively cheap coal from this source.215
In 1839, Samuel Cunard spent several months in Britain searching for 
partners and collecting capital for a new steamship company that could fulfil 
the Admiralty’s needs. With the help of friends, he was introduced to some 
Cabinet members. He was also introduced to Robert Napier, a marine engineer 
who already had a well-known shipbuilding company in Glasgow; to two 
Glasgow merchants, David and Charles MacIver; and to James and George 
Burns, who operated a small fleet of coastal steamers to Liverpool. These men 
became the main partners of the new British and North American Royal Steam 
210 Tyler, 75–77; Fox, 88.
211 Robinson (1964), 132; Hyde (1975), 5; Tabeart (1997), 16; Babcock, 34.
212 Hyde (1975), 5; Robinson (1964), 132; Staff, 70; Tyler, 77–78.
213 See Hyde (1975), 5; Staff, 69.
214 For Samuel Cunard’s family background and early businesses, see Babcock, 3–14; Hyde 
(1975), 1–4; Butler, 71–74; Fox, 39–49.
215 Hyde (1975), 3; Tyler, 78–80. Coal supplies were a key element in the steamship traffic. 
The coal problem was not that easily solved, however. According to Tyler, Cunard 
mainly used Welsh coal as the American quality was not good enough, and the anthracite 
was not easily obtainable before the railways and canals had been built in the interior 
of Pennsylvania. The owners of the Great Western tried Nova Scotian coal but found it 
‘soft and full of dirt’. As a result they continued to send a supply of English coal to New 
York, even though they had to pay duty on it. See Tyler, 27–128, 187–188.
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Packet Company shipping line, soon to be 
known as the Cunard Line.216
In May 1839, the first contract was 
made with the Admiralty for carrying mail 
regularly  ‘with all possible speed’ from 
Liverpool to Halifax by three steamships 
of at least 300 hp each, and also taking care 
of the mail transport to Boston. In addition, 
the company carried mails from Halifax to 
Quebec twice a month in smaller steamers to connect with the transatlantic 
ships, when the St. Lawrence River was free of ice. The mail contract was 
to last for seven years with an annual subvention of £55,000.217
This was not exactly what the Admiralty had originally wanted either. 
However, Samuel Cunard was aware that a line between Liverpool and 
Halifax alone would probably not get enough passengers and freight to be 
profitable, as Halifax had already lost a lot of its commercial importance 
to American cities. The rapid development of Boston made that port a 
good choice for a new steamship connection. Moreover, the run from 
England to New York via Halifax was much longer than to Boston, and 
this route would have placed Cunard at a disadvantage in competition 
with the ships that crossed the Atlantic directly to New York without 
calling at Halifax. The change was approved by the Admiralty without 
major problems.218
But suspicions surfaced among the Cunard Line’s shareholders concerning 
the profitability of the new business. The company had bound itself to pay 
the Admiralty £500 in addition to other fines for every 12 hours that the 
ships might be late from their prescribed fortnight schedule, on each side 
of the ocean. This meant that an average of only one day’s delay for each 
sailing during the year would practically cancel all revenue to be derived 
from the subsidy. Such a commitment was considered to be a heavy risk in 
the unpredictable North Atlantic conditions.219
The contract did not mean that all trips should be made in 14 days. For 
example, the Great Western had been able to manage only three of her eleven 
westbound journeys in a fortnight or less in 1838–1839. None of the other 
steamers had made it even once. But, according to the schedule, the ships 
should leave twice a month from both ports. Even this was considered too 
risky, if only three vessels were involved in the service, as it would have 
meant continuous running with about two weeks at sea and one at port – rather 
unrealistic at that time.
There was no assurance that the Cunard Line would win passengers and 
freight from the competing steamship companies or the popular sailing 
packet lines, which would be necessary for profitable business. The counter 
216 For the foundation, capital structure and control of the Cunard Line, see Hyde (1975), 
7–15.
217 For the whole contract, see Arnell (1986), 265–273. Copies of several contract versions 
are held by the Sydney Jones Library Archives in Liverpool. See CP, PR 3/1/12a (SJ).
218 Babcock, 42–43; Hyde (1975), 8; Robinson (1964), 133; Bonsor  (1975), vol. 1, 72–73.
219 Babcock, 45–46; Hyde (1975), 10.
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arguments stressed the fame of Robert Napier’s reliable engines, as well as 
the fact that America was rapidly expanding westward, starting new industries 
and attracting more emigrants and travellers from Europe. The company did 
not have to win business from the sailing packets; it could create business 
of its own.220
The Cunard shareholders were finally convinced that the opportunity 
was worth the risk, and the company obtained much more capital than had 
been planned when the original ships were ordered from Napier. With four 
ships instead of three they could ensure a bi-monthly sailing from each side 
of the ocean, and extend the regular service all the way to Boston, making 
only a call at Halifax, as the chief merchants and businessmen of Boston had 
strongly desired. They considered that the new line was of great importance 
for the city’s trade, and had been extremely disappointed to learn that Boston 
would only be served by a branch from Halifax. This would have meant that 
passengers and freight to and from Europe would have to be transhipped at 
extra cost by small steamers at Halifax.221
The Canadians were naturally unhappy with the change in final destination. 
From their point of view, it showed that Cunard was, strictly speaking, an 
American packet line instead of a Canadian one.222 The Admiralty approved 
Cunard’s suggestion however, and a new agreement on government subsidies 
totalling £60,000 was signed in July, 1839.223
The Admiralty also made a similar contract with the newly established 
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company for carrying mails between Britain and 
the West Indies in 1839, to Mexico in 1842 and to South America in 1851. 
A third contract was made with Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company, or P&O, for carrying mails between Britain and Alexandria in 
1840, via Suez to Calcutta in 1842, and to Penang, Singapore and Hong Kong 
in 1845. From 1852, P&O also carried mails to Australia.224 Additionally, 
a steamship mail route was opened to Cape Town, South Africa in 1850.225 
These mail routes and their development will be examined in Chapters VI 
and VII.
The early years of the Cunard Line
The Cunard Line’s first Atlantic crossing was made by the Unicorn, a small 
steamer that was purchased for feeder service between Pictou, Nova Scotia, 
and Quebec on the St. Lawrence River during the months when the river was 
navigable. The Unicorn also carried mail during her trip, thus starting the 
220 Babcock, 46.
221 Babcock, 49; Hyde (1975), 10–12.
222 Arnell (1980), 94.
223 See Arnell (1986), 265–273. In 1841, the subsidy was increased to £80,000 due to the 
need for a fifth vessel. See Robinson (1964), 134.
224 Robinson (1964), 148–149, 165; Nicol, vol. 1, 44–45; Tyler, 98–99. The first P&O contract 
was made for mail service between Britain and the Iberian Peninsula in 1837. See Cable, 
6; Kirk (1987), 5–8.
225 See Philip Cattell, The Union Castle Ocean Post Office. British Maritime Postal History, 
Vol. 3 (Heathfield), 11.
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Cunard mail service across the Atlantic. The first contract steamer Britannia 
started on the route on 4 July, 1840.226
During the first year of the company’s transatlantic mail business, the 
Cunard Line’s ships made the westbound trip from Liverpool to Boston in 13 
or 14 days in summer conditions. This included the required stop at Halifax. 
In November–March, there was only one trip per month in each direction. 
During the most difficult winter season from early December to the end of 
March, the westbound journey took 16 to 19 days.
All the eastbound trips except one were made in 13 to 15 days. In May 
1841, the Britannia ran upon the rocks off Halifax, which caused a ten-day 
delay to that journey, as can be noticed in Diagram 4.227
All the four Cunard steamers in the North Atlantic service – the Britannia, 
Acadia, Caledonia and Columbia – were new and equal in size, each of them 
ca. 1,150 tons. They were wooden paddle steamers with a clipper bow, one 
funnel and three masts. They all had a two-cylinder side-lever engine of 420 
hp, and an average speed of nine knots. The ships accommodated 115 first 
class passengers each. In accordance with the Admiralty agreement, gun 
platforms and bases were also installed on the ships’ decks to be prepared 
for military purposes in case of war.228
226 Hubbard & Winter, 17; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 73–74.
227 Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 17–18.
228 Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 140–141. Kludas, 40–42. Robinson (1964), 134.
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 17–18. 
Diagram 3. Cunard Line, duration of westbound trips 












Due to the ships’ identical size and efficiency, they were able to make 
comparable voyages, which was convenient for the shipping management 
as well as for the mail service. Their performance was more predictable 
and reliable than if they had all been different – one of the obvious benefits 
of giving the mail contract to one shipping line. The average westbound 
trip on the Liverpool–Halifax–Boston route took 14.9 days. The Britannia 
made a westbound trip in 15.0 days on average, the Acadia in 15.2 days, the 
Caledonia in 14.8 days and the Columbia in 14.3 days .229
In the eastbound direction, the differences were even smaller. The 
average duration of the voyages between July 1840 and June 1841 were 
as follows: the Britannia 13.9 days (excluding the ill-fated voyage of May 
1841), the Acadia 13.8 days, the Caledonia 13.8 days and the Columbia 
14.0 days.230
The agreement on a bi-monthly schedule caused no major problems for 
the Cunard Line. The departures from Liverpool regularly took place on the 
4th and 19th of each month from April to October, and on the 4th during the 
winter months. In the eastbound direction the ships departed from Boston 
on the 1st and 16th of each month, and on the 1st in the winter.231 The ships 
229 The Columbia entered the service as the last vessel in January 1841.
230 Calculated from the sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 17–18. For the data on calls at 
Halifax, see Arnell (1980), 287.
231 Hubbard & Winter, 12, 17–18. – As the London Post Office did not make the mails on a 
Sunday, the departures were in these cases postponed to the following day. ‘Tenders and 
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 17–18. – The similarity of the four vessels 
was an obvious advantage. All the voyages could be conducted within the same 
schedule, which made the service more regular and reliable.
Diagram 4. Cunard Line, duration of eastbound trips 












made 29 round trips during the first 1.5 years of the line’s existence. Of the 58 
departures, two from Boston were one day late with no reason given, and one 
from Liverpool was two days late due to an order by the British Postmaster 
General to wait for a late arrival of mail dispatches.232
This was the first time in the world that any shipping company could 
organize a relatively fast and punctually departing, reliable and rather 
predictable service in both directions between Europe and North America. 
Compared with anything else, the Cunard Line’s performance was 
superior.
A Cunard round trip from Liverpool to Boston via Halifax and back home 
was normally run in about 40 days. The duration of the stay at the home port 
was normally approximately 20 days. In 1840, the schedule was tight, as not 
all of the four steamers had yet been launched. The Britannia stayed only five 
days in Liverpool between her two transatlantic voyages in October 1840, 
and so did the Caledonia.233 It is worth noting that the steamers could be 
unloaded, loaded and coaled for a new transatlantic nautical voyage of 3,000 
nautical miles within five days at the port of Liverpool, if necessary. The 
port had invested, and would invest, notable sums in new docks enabling the 
berthing of steamships. The advantages of Liverpool soon became so obvious 
that even the Great Western made the port her regular terminus.234
The Cunard steamers were mainly built for passenger and mail service, but 
they also carried freight, and the coaling took time as well. It was proposed 
that the ships would carry twice the amount of coal necessary for the 
Atlantic crossing.235 The economic balance of the three different businesses 
– passengers, mail and freight – varied during the years. On eastbound trips,
the steamers met hard competition from the American sailing packets. While
Cunard ships were able to charge £7 a ton for freight from Liverpool to New
York, it was only on rare occasions that cargo could be obtained for carriage
homewards, and during the winter months there was very little cargo to carry
at all.236 The early years of the line saw a series of financial crises and the
contract with the Admiralty was modified several times. Only after a few
years’ service could the line turn profitable.237
Contracts for Carrying the Mails…N:o 10. Return of the Dates of Sailing…’, 28–29. CP, 
PR 3/1/12. (SJ).
232 Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 17–18.
233 See the sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 17.
234 For the development of the Liverpool Dock system, see Adrian Jarvis, Liverpool Central 
Docks 1799–1905. An Illustrated History (Bath, Avon, 1991), passim. A brief introduction 
to the early steamship period docks can be found on pages 8–9, 144–145. See also Hyde 
(1971), 79.  For the Great Western, see Bonsor (1975) vol. 1, 61–62.
235 Hyde (1975), 9. This was probably not always the practice, as coal took space from the 
freight carried. Yet the Cunard ships were seldom obliged to make extra calls for coaling. 
The examples known are mainly from the time Cunard served on the Liverpool–New 
York route non-stop and the ships sometimes had to make an extra call at Halifax due to 
lengthened trips in heavy gales, or during the American Civil War. See Arnell (1980), 
310–311, 318, 320. – According to the Cunard coaling records, the ships normally had 
about 100 tons of coal left from the previous trip when they arrived for the next coaling. 
See Cunard Passage Book I, in CP, GM2/1–4 (SJ).




Competition between early transatlantic mail carriers
Maritime historians have criticised the Cunard Line’s mail contracts for 
killing the competition and making rival businesses non-profitable.238 
However, many opinions are based on aspects that were only relevant some 
20 years later, when there were competing companies that really could afford 
a similar service. Occasional trips by various steamship companies were not 
an answer to the requirements of a fast, regular and reliable mail service.239
The only pioneering steamship that could compete with the Cunard 
steamers in speed was the Great Western. Diagram 5 depicts her performance 
compared with Cunard’s Britannia during 1840–1846, when they both were 
in regular North Atlantic service.
As can be noticed, the performance of the two ships was almost equal, 
even though the Great Western was a somewhat larger ship of 1,340 tons 
compared with the 1,150-ton Britannia. Both ships made only one westbound 
trip in 13 days during 1840–1846. The Britannia made a few more voyages 
in 14 or 15 days than the Great Western. Eastbound, the Britannia made 
three voyages in 12 days, while the Great Western made none. In total, the 
Britannia made 23 eastbound voyages in 14 days or less, while the Great 
Western made 20.
It is obvious that the Great Western would have been able to carry the 
mails under Government contract as well as the Cunard steamers. But the 
Admiralty wanted a regular bi-monthly service across the Atlantic, and the 
Great Western Steamship Company could not afford that. In modern terms, 
the Admiralty had organized a competitive bidding to outsource some of 
their services – mail transport, as well as building and maintaining fast 
steamers, and a competent crew for a potential crisis situation – and chosen 
one company to take care of it. A fast and reliable service would also draw 
postage income from the American ships, thus bringing in more revenues to 
the British Post Office. As the Cunard vessels sailed under a mail contract, 
letters could be sent by them only via the official post organization.
As there was no co-ordination between the official mail service and the 
pioneering steamers on the same route, the new potential of faster business 
information transmission could not always be used in an optimal way. The 
post offices were not able to handle this kind of situation. In November 1842, 
238 See Allington & Greenhill, 17; Robinson (1964) 137–138; Fogg, 20; Hyde (1975), 34–36; 
Milne (2000), 170–174; Jeffrey J. Safford, ‘The decline of the American merchant marine, 
1850–1914. An historiographical appraisal’. In Lewis R. Fischer & Gerald E. Panting (ed.) 
Change and Adaption in Maritime History. The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth 
Century (Newfoundland, 1985), 73.
239 This was later admitted even by Alfred Holt of Liverpool, who was one of the bitter 
competitors concurring with subsidized ships on different trade routes, mainly in the West 
Indies and China: ‘Postal subsidies were originally granted in aid of lines of communication 
which, it was supposed, could not live, or at any rate be maintained with regularity, without 
them. No doubt the ends aimed at were realised. Communication was opened at an earlier 
date, and maintained more regularly, than it would have been without subsidies; and some 
most imposing fleets have come into existence under the system.’ Alfred Holt, Review of 
the Progress of Steam Shipping during the last Quarter of a Century. Institute of Civil 
Engineers. Minutes of Proceedings, vol. 51. (Liverpool, 1877), 9–10.
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Sources: Sailing lists of Tabeart (1997), 17–19 and Hubbard & Winter, 17–21. – The 
Great Western served on the Bristol / Liverpool–New York route and the Britannia 
on the Liverpool–Halifax–Boston route.
the problem was discussed by some leading cotton importers at a Committee 
meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce in Liverpool, and as a result, 
a memorial was sent to the Postmaster General representing ‘the grievance 
and praying’ that arrangements would be made to secure the posting of letters 
to a departing mail steamer as late as possible.240
The memorial depicts the problem: ‘For example, on the 4th November 
instant, the day of the departure of the Acadia Steamer for Halifax, the 
letter box was closed at 8 a.m. but on payment of a small fee, letters were 
received until 9, after which all letters were refused, although the letter 
bags did not leave the Post Office until a quarter before 12, and the Packet 
did not get under weigh until 20 minutes past 12. Thus nearly four hours 
elapsed of the Mail from the Post Office, and the Packet remained in Port 
upwards of three hours after the latest period of which letters were received 
at the Post Office upon any terms. It not infrequently happens, especially 
when the Halifax packet leaves early in the day, that letters which it is 
of greatest importance to despatch cannot be delivered at the Post Office 
until within a short time of the departure of the Packet, such for instance 
as Foreign letters addressed to persons in Liverpool to be forwarded to 
Correspondents in America received from London or elsewhere by the 
Morning’s Post.’241
240 The American Chamber of Commerce (ACC), Liverpool, Minutes of the Committee 
meeting on 22.11.1842. 380 AME/2. (LRO).
241 The ACC to the Postmaster General 23.11.1842. (380 AME/2, LRO)
Diagram 5. Great Western vs. Britannia, duration of westbound trips, 















The memorial continues with an example: ‘In illustration, we would state 
that the letters by the British Queen, which had been some days due, reached 
Liverpool on the morning of the sailing of the Acadia but as the delivery of 
the letters at the Post Office did not commence until a quarter before nine, 
it was impossible to answer them or even to acknowledge the receipt before 
the final closing of the Halifax Mail at nine. Under these circumstances, as 
the Post Office refused to receive letters, there was the strongest completion, 
amounting in some cases to an overpowering necessity to send letters in the 
only way in which they could be conveyed, by the hands of Passengers, and 
even those who were most anxious to conform to the law were in a manner 
compelled to evade it.’242
According to the memorial, the number of clerks employed in the Liverpool 
Post Office was inadequate, even for ordinary business, and on packet days the 
increased influx of letters was quite overwhelming. ‘In cases where the tide 
is so early as to make it necessary for the packet to leave the port at or about 
noon, the merchants would gladly pay any reasonable fee for the privilege 
of an extra hour. We would respectfully request that your Lordship will 
cause such arrangements to be made as may afford the public the advantage 
of posting letters within the shortest practicable period before the sailing of 
each packet for Halifax,’ the merchants suggested.243
Unfortunately this was not the only occasion when the American Chamber 
of Commerce in Liverpool had to contact the Postmaster General for better 
ship mail service. In September 1840, two queries were made about the mails 
that were sent from Liverpool to Southampton for the British Queen to be 
carried to New York. There were serious doubts about the faith of those 
letters.244 In February 1846, there were complaints about ‘the delay which 
exists in the despatch of business in the Liverpool Post Office owing to the 
want of a sufficient number of clerks and particularly calling attention to the 
delay in the delivery and despatch of ship letters…’245
There were obviously things to improve in the logistics of overseas mail 
transmission. Not only was it important that the sea voyages were as fast 
as possible and frequent enough, but the inland network should also enable 
the best possible use of the potential. If the answers to the letters sent from 
New York on 8 October were not taken on board the Acadia, which departed 
simultaneously with the incoming mails on 4 November, the next option was 
to send them by the Columbia, which departed 15 days later on the 19th. 
While the Acadia made the trip in thirteen days, the Columbia’s trip took 
242 The ACC to the Postmaster General 23.11.1842. (380 AME/2, LRO). – The British Queen 
had been sold to Belgium in September 1841, but she completed three more transatlantic 
voyages under the Belgian flag. She had departed from New York for the last of these 
voyages on 8 October 1842, made an extra call at the Azores for coal and arrived at 
Southampton after a 26-day journey on 3 November. See Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 58–59.
243 The ACC to the Postmaster General 23.11.1842. (380 AME/2, LRO)
244 The ACC to the Postmaster General 7.9.1840 and 11.9.1840. (380 AME/1, LRO)
245 Resolved at the General Meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce, Liverpool, 




17 days, thus causing an extra four days delay.246 The answers to the letters 
of 8 October would have arrived in New York in 40 days by the Acadia but 
in 59 days by the Columbia. Thus, one or two hours flexibility in the Post 
Office routines could make an almost three weeks difference in the speed of 
information without any changes in the speed of the vessel or the frequency 
of ship departures.247
The Cunard Line sailings improved the number of consecutive information 
circles from five by the American sailing ships and six by the pioneering 
steamers to almost eight per year in 1841, the first whole calendar year of 
the company’s operations. An example from the mid-1840s shows the strong 
and weak points of the service:
One of the obvious strengths in the Cunard Line’s performance was the 
punctuality of the departures throughout the year. Yet the early steamers 
were not able to run equally long voyages, even if their independent averages 
were very close to each other. This meant that the unpredictability of one 
single voyage was still a problem, although hardly considered as such by 
contemporaries, who had never experienced anything better. As can be seen 
in Table 13, the duration of the westbound voyages included in this particular 
chain of consecutive information circles varied between 11 and 20 days. 
Eastbound the duration varied between 12 and 17 days.
As can be noticed by comparing Tables 12 and 13, the pioneering steamers 
could sometimes enable shorter one-time information circles than the Cunard 
Line, as they did not need to wait for a fixed sailing date before leaving from 
New York. Thus, the regularity could also be an obstacle to faster information 
circulation.
There was no co-operation with the Great Western Steamship Company 
steamers but instead they were sailing almost side by side. From the business 
information transmission point of view this naturally meant a series of lost 
opportunities compared with a situation where the sailings would have 
complemented each other. From this angle the pioneering steamers (See Table 
12) were better organized during the time before government sponsored mail 
sailings. It seems that the Great Western Steamship Company’s strategy was 
to induce as many passengers and freight customers as possible to use their 
direct sailings from New York instead of the Cunard Line’s sailings from 
Boston. The Great Western and the Great Britain typically departed one or 
a few days before the Cunard sailings. However, their sailings were so much 
slower that the benefit was not great, as can be noticed in Table 13.
246 See the sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 19.
247 The next sailing packet, Dramatic Line’s Sheridan, would have departed from Liverpool 
on 15.11.1842. She arrived in New York on 25.12.1842. (Lloyd’s List 17.1.1843) By this 
means, the New York letters of 8 October would have received an answer even more 
slowly, in 78 days.
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Sources: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 20–21; and Tabeart (1997), 19. All the 
other vessels were owned by the Cunard Line, except the Great Western and the 
Great Britain owned by the Great Western Steamship Company.
* See note.248
** Hibernia run aground off Cape Race, Newfoundland, and had to put into St. 
John’s for about two days. (Hubbard & Winter, 21.)
248 The departure date 1.8. was mainly possible if the recipient was in Boston and not in New 
York. The Cambria arrived in Boston on 30.7. at 5.10 p.m. and the Britannia departed 
from there on 1.8. at 2.10 p.m. (‘Tenders and contracts for carrying…’, 28–29. CP, SJ) 
The Great Western sailed from New York on 31.7., being another uncertain option for a 
New York business partner to answer the English mail. If the letters had been late for these 
ships, they would have been carried by the Cambria on 16.8. and arrived in Liverpool on 
28.8. The rest of the circle would have been changed as follows: Britannia, CL, 4.9. from 
Liverpool, arrived in Boston 19.9., departure by the same ship 1.10. (the Great Western 
sailed from New York 18.9.), arriving in Liverpool 14.10. Departure from Liverpool by 
the Caledonia, CL, 19.10. and arrival in Boston 3.11., departure by the Great Western 
from New York 6.11. and arrival in Liverpool 21.11. – two days after the Cunard steamer 
Cambria had departed. The letter would have then been carried by the Acadia, CL, which 
sailed from Liverpool on 4.12. and arrived in Boston on 19.12. She departed on 1.1. and 
arrived in Liverpool on 15.1.1846. Thus there was very little help from the other steamships 
in traffic as there was no cooperation between the sailings. Sometimes a delay of a few 
hours could make a two-week delay in the information transmission with a chain effect 

































Cambria 4.1. 24.1. 20 Cambria 1.2. 13.2. 12 40
Cambria 4.3. 18.3. 14 Cambria 1.4. 13.4. 12 40
Hibernia 19.4. 6.5. 17 Hibernia 16.5. 31.5. 15 42
Caledonia 4.6. 19.6. 15 Caledonia 1.7. 14.7. 13 40











Caledonia 19.8. 3.9. 15 Caledonia 16.9. 28.9. 12 40











Cambria 19.11. 4.12. 15 Cambria 16.12. 28.12. 12 39
Average, 
days 15.3 13.4 39




The Cunard Line’s privileged position as the official mail line was often 
claimed to be the reason for the financial problems of its competitors. But 
the company’s success was not due to the government subsidies alone. It was 
based on the same qualifications that had made the American sailing packets 
successful two decades earlier: the regularity and frequency of their sailings, 
the speed and reliability. These requirements would not have been fulfilled 
without good shipping management, regardless of government subsidies.
To counter the competition from Cunard, the Great Western Steamship 
Company had launched a new iron-screw steamer in July 1845, the 3,450-
ton Great Britain, which was three times larger than any of the Cunarders. 
The ship’s performance did not fill the high expectations, however. She met 
continuous difficulties and, in September 1846 on her fifth outward voyage, 
went aground off Ireland and was only refloated the following summer. The 
company was not in a financial position to recondition her and she was sold 
for £24,000 – about one-fifth of her original cost.249
The Cunard mail contract was renewed in 1846, despite all claims to the 
Halifax and Boston Mails Committee, which was investigating the issue. 
Cunard’s plan to make New York the western terminus for their transatlantic 
service was complained of as ruining the Great Western Steamship Company, 
which had served on the route carrying mails for eight years without 
government subsidies. A member of the Select Committee proposed that the 
contract for the New York mails would be opened to public tender, but this 
was not acceptable to the majority of the Committee.250
The Great Western Steamship Company would, of course, have been 
financially more successful had they received at least part of the government 
subsidies, but the contract was for regular mail service and some naval 
readiness, and the Admiralty had already received what they needed. Why 
should the government have provided subsidies to every company who 
wanted to carry mail across the Atlantic?
In the light of the early experiments by the Post Office as an owner of 
mail steamboats, it was not a poor idea to outsource the service to a private 
company. In the absence of government support, there would have been no 
regular mail steamship service across the Atlantic for years. Small companies 
with one or two steamers departing from different ports when they had full 
cargo could not be called a line service. The situation would later change 
dramatically, due to technical improvements that enabled emigrant transport 
by steamships in the late 1850s, as will be described in Chapter V.3.
The Cunard Line’s new contract included two routes, one to New York 
and another one to Halifax and Boston. The sailings would be bi-monthly 
from each port on alternate Saturdays eight months in the year, and monthly 
during the winter. The New York service began in January 1848, in good 
time before the Americans would start their own mail steamship service on 
the same route.251
249 See Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 62–64; Fogg, 12–20.
250 Robinson (1964), 138; Hyde (1975), 35; Babcock, 88–90; Tyler, 161–164.
251 Until September 1850, the New York ship also made a call to Halifax, in both directions. 
The trip between New York and Halifax took approximately 48 hours. See Arnell (1980), 
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Four new steamships – America, Niagara, Europa and Canada – were 
built for the purpose, at a final cost of about £90,000 each. As Fox notes, 
most of the capital for these steamers came from private investors, while the 
mail subsidy mainly provided ‘seed money’ and the prestige of a government 
contract.252 As with all the other companies, the mail contract lines built ships 
on private risk capital, and new investments were continuously needed to 
meet the requirements of faster and more reliable voyages. During the coming 
years, many shipping companies would fail, even if they were mail carriers 
on behalf of their national governments.
For the Cunard Line, the decision to invest in the New York service seemed 
to be right from the beginning. In 1848, the duties collected on Cunard cargoes 
in New York averaged $10,500 and in Boston $29,500. In 1850 the respective 
figures were $118,000 in New York and $63,000 in Boston.253
The Great Western Steamship Company gave up the struggle and sold 
the Great Western to the Royal Mail Steam Packet Line for the West Indian 
service. The Great Britain started a new career on the Australian route.254
Wind vs. steam – the finale
The start of the Cunard Line’s New York service has been called the final 
end of the period of importance for the American sailing packets. Even if 
there had already been steamers on the North Atlantic route for ten years, 
their schedules had mainly been those of regular traders, not of liners. As 
long as Cunard was sailing to Boston instead of New York, the packets could 
hold their own in the competition, but the line’s coming to New York was 
too much for them. The packets could compete rather successfully against 
steamships that operated singly, but when the steamships adopted the line 
principle, the old ‘canvasbacks’ had to give way.255
The steamships’ speed alone had not been enough to displace the sailing 
packets from the North Atlantic traffic. Even if the most important mails as 
well as bullion and specie had been transferred to steamers from the very 
beginning,256 they were not able to carry much freight, and the passengers 
preferred the comfort of the sailing ships. Also the bulk mail, especially 
eastbound, was still carried in great amounts by the sailing packets.
The size of the sailing packets reached their peak during the early 1850s in 
conjunction with the boom in the emigrant business. The first sailing packets 
308–310; Hubbard & Winter, 23. In 1852 the service was made weekly throughout the 
year, the ships leaving from Liverpool on Saturday of each week alternately for the two 
American ports. Hyde (1975), 35. – For the timing of the contract, see Fox, 114–115.
252 See Fox, 115, 121.
253 Albion (1939), 325.
254 Robinson (1964), 138; Tyler, 165–166. The Great Britain made 32 round trips to Australia 
between 1852 and 1876. Later on she was sold, her engines were removed and she became 
a full-rigged sailing ship. She was beached at the Falkland Islands in 1937 and was towed 
back to Britain for restoration in the 1970s. The ship can now be visited in the old Great 
Western Dock in Bristol as a historical monument. See Fogg, 29, 177, 182–186; Bonsor 
(1975), vol. 1, 64–65.
255 Albion (1938), 253.
256 Albion (1938), 258.
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of over 1,400 tons were built in the late 1840s. In 1860 the average size of the 
packets on the New York – Liverpool route was 1,320 tons – three times the 
size of the first Black Ballers in the 1820s. Some of these ships had a capacity 
for 800 or 900 steerage passengers. The largest of all regular packets was the 
Amazon of 1770 tons, built in 1854.257 Even though this was the period when 
the American clippers were world famous for their speed, the Chinese tea 
race and various adventures in distant waters, the information transmission 
on the North Atlantic route was steadily being transferred to the steamers.
Even if the size of the sailing packets grew markedly, their service 
speed did not follow the trend after the introduction of steamships on 
the route in the late 1830s. As can be seen in Diagram 6, the proportion 
of 20–29 days and 30–39 days for westbound packet trips was about 
the same – even somewhat smaller – in 1845 than in 1835, and the 
proportion of the longest trips of 40–49 or 50–59 days had grown 
correspondingly.258 There seems to be no signs of speed improvements 
after 1835.
Another phenomenon which indicates that the sailing packets were losing 
their hold on the first class business – mail, fine freight and cabin passengers 
– was that they no longer cared about the punctuality of the sailing dates 
as much as they did in the 1830s. If the reliability of a mail ship service is 
measured by the regularity of sailings and the safety records, the performance 
of the American sailing packets in the mid-1840s was noticeably below such 
expectations.
257 Staff, 121–127; Cutler (1967), 377–392.
258 In 1825, 11 dates are missing from 48 sailings; in 1835 one date is missing from 48 
sailings; and in 1845 four dates are missing from 70 sailings.

















































TABLE 14. Average size of the mail-carrying American sailing packets, in tons.
Source: Calculated from the lists of mail-carrying packets published by Staff, 121–
127. – The number of packets differs somewhat from Albion’s figures in Table 10 
as the table above also includes replacements made during that particular year.
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As can be seen in Table 15 (in the end of the book, p. 426), the departures 
from Liverpool were mostly delayed from their scheduled sailing dates in 
1844–1845. Only 25 sailings out of 147, or 17%, took place on the scheduled 
date. The number of disasters at sea had also grown alarmingly.
Despite one of the poorest records in sailing regularity, the Red Star Line 
advertised in the Liverpool Mercury in January 1845: ‘Sails on the 26th of 
every Month… These ships are all of first class, recently built in the city 
of New York, and for strength, beauty of model, punctuality and swiftness 
of sailing, as well as for extent and comfort of cabin accommodations, are 
not surpassed by any in the trade, and their commanders are men of great 
experience… To insure punctuality in sailing, no goods can be received 
onboard unless they are down two days before the day of sailing.’259
The Black Ball Line and the New Line did not mention punctuality in 
their advertisements, despite being the most punctual of all the sailing 
packet lines in 1844–1845. The sailing dates were naturally expressed. 
Also their ships were ‘of first class’ and commanded by ‘men of character 
and experience’ or ‘men of experience and ability’. Each sailing packet line 
offered the Atlantic crossing in their ‘elegant and commodious’ cabins for 
£25, everything included except wines and spirits, which could be procured 
from the steward.260
The Dramatic Line, managed by Edward K. Collins, later to be an important 
steamship line owner, had appeared in the transatlantic traffic in 1836. Albion 
259 Liverpool Mercury 24.1.1845.
260 Liverpool Mercury 24.1.1845.
Source: Lloyd’s List 1825, 1835, 1845; Liverpool Customs Bills of Entry, 1825, 1835.  
The number of sailings included is 37 in 1825, 47 in 1835 and 66 in 1845.
Diagram 6. American sailing packets, duration of westbound 














calls the line ‘a group of splendid ships that momentarily threw most of 
the others in the shade’.261 So did the company’s advertisement, too: ‘Line 
of Packets for New York. Sailing of the eleventh of every month… These 
ships are all of the first and largest class, built in the city of New York, of 
the best materials, and with such improvements as to combine great speed 
with unusual comfort for passengers, and they are commanded by men of 
experience and ability... The utmost punctuality will be observed as on the 
day of sailing to insure which, no goods can be received after the 9th of 
each month…’262
On the same page, the Cunard Line announced that ‘British and North 
American Royal Mail Steam Ships of 1200 tons, and 440 horses’ power each, 
Appointed by the Admiralty to sail between Liverpool and Boston, calling 
at Halifax to land and receive passengers and Her Majesty’s Mails’ would 
depart from Liverpool on the 4th of each month and from April (when the 
summer season began) additionally on the 19th. Passengers’ luggage should 
be on board the day prior to sailing. The price for the passage was 38 guineas, 
including provisions but without wines and liquors, which could be obtained 
on board. The steward’s fee was one guinea, and dogs were charged £5 each. 
At the end of the advertisement, there was an important note: ‘All Letters 
and Newspapers intended to be sent by these vessels must pass through the 
Post-office, and none will be received at the Agent’s Offices.’263
Cunard’s advertisement did not mention comfortable accommodation or 
experienced commanders, even though each captain’s name was well 
pointed out in the advertisement, and they were in fact very experienced.264 The 
accommodation on the early steamers was again one of their greatest disadvantages 
and nothing to advertise when compared with the sailing packets.
The advertisements in the Liverpool Mercury on that day265 included 
two sailing packets that had sailed from Liverpool on 26 November and 1 
December 1844, and were never heard of again. The United States of the 
Red Star Line and the England of the Black Ball Line met a tremendous 
storm and were lost with several other ships, including the Havre Line packet 
Normandie as well as the Boston Line packet Dorchester, the crew of which 
was saved by the New Line packet Rochester on her way to New York.266 The 
261 Albion (1938), 43–44.
262 Liverpool Mercury 24.1.1845. Italics are in the original text. – It should be noted that none 
of the American sailing packet lines used their well-known nick names (Black Ball Line, 
etc.) in their advertisements in 1845, but the names Old Line; New Line; New York Line; 
Line of Packets for New York, etc. Only in the 1850s would the corporate identity, built on 
easily recognizable symbols of the company flags, become marketable commodities and 
give ‘an air of solidity and reliability to what were often ad hoc arrangements’, especially 
in the emigrant business. See Milne (2000), 165.
263 Liverpool Mercury 24.1.1845.
264 According to Babcock: ‘The officers were picked from men of long experience at sea. 
Mates generally had to have served before as masters of other ships. The later captains had 
to have served as mates on Cunarders. The engineers were experienced in the profession 
and their assistants were bred in the trade. In short, the primary injunction of safety was 
carried out with a thoroughness hitherto unknown to the sea.’ (Babcock, 54)
265 Liverpool Mercury 24.1.1845.
266 Lloyd’s List 3.2.1845; 10.4.1845. Missing ships were always awaited for several 
months as their voyages could have been seriously lengthened by bad weather or other 
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companies kept the schedules of the United States and the England in their 
advertisements until 21 March. By then, the Red Star Line had replaced the 
United States by a transient ship called the Empire and the Black Ball Line 
had replaced the England by its own packet named Oxford, which should 
have sailed two weeks later and arrived in Liverpool on the same day as the 
newspaper was published.267
The Cunard Line’s advertisement also included a replacement. One 
of the company’s original steamers, the Columbia, had been wrecked off 
Nova Scotia in July 1843, fortunately without loss of life or mail.268 Her 
replacement, the Cambria, mentioned in the advertisement, had just left on 
her maiden voyage and was now advertised as departing for the following 
one.269 Cunard had also purchased a fifth vessel for the transatlantic route; 
the Hibernia was launched just before the loss of the Columbia and took her 
place until the new ship was ready for the route.270
In the pressure of hard competition, packet schedules were tightened when 
reorganizing sailings due to disasters, new launchings, etc. In 1844–1845, 
several ships made three-month round trips instead of the traditional four 
months, calculated from one Liverpool departure to the following one. All 
these ships – the Virginian and Waterloo of the Red Star Line as well as 
the Independence and Patrick Henry of the Blue Swallowtail Line271 – were 
among the fastest on the North Atlantic route.272 However, these short round 
trips did not depend on speed, which was in all cases average, but just changes 
in the schedule. The efficiency of the packet sailings could apparently have 
been improved by tightening schedules, but it would also have increased the 
risk of problems and delays.
As can be seen in Table 15  (in the end of the book, p. 426), westbound 
sailings involved a high risk of disasters. Of the 143 recorded trips of 
1844–1845, at least a dozen ended in reported losses or other problems. 
Additionally, one loss of ‘main top-mast etc.’ was also reported from an 
eastbound voyage.273 Interestingly, five of these misadventures happened to 
the same ships, the Virginian and the Independence, which were among the 
speediest of all in packet history, and made the three-month round trips.274 
Also the lost England was one of the fastest vessels. They had all sailed from 
Liverpool to New York in three weeks or less. The United States was in the 
medium speed class in packet records of 1818–1858.275
   According to Albion’s calculations, nearly one packet in six was totally 
lost in service. The figure could also be put more nicely: only 22 of nearly 
difficulties.
267 Liverpool Mercury, January–March, 1845.
268 See Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 75; Babcock, 73–74.
269 Liverpool Mercury 24.1.1845.
270 See Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 75; Babcock, 75.
271 See Table 14.
272 Albion (1938), 276–281, 318–319.
273 The arrival of the Independence off Liverpool on 2 September 1844 was reported in 
Lloyd’s List 3.9.1844; arrival at port 4.9.1844.
274 The Independence actually took back her own place in the schedule in the spring of 1845, 
having lost it due to repairs after storm damage in December 1844.
275 Albion (1938), 278–279.
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FIG. 10. In case of a disaster at sea, the only hope for saving the people on board 
and the mails was that another ship would pass by and pick them up before it was 
too late. – An old German postcard ‘Rettung naht’ (by E. Schneider).
6,000 packet crossings ended in such wrecks.276 It seems, however, that the 
hard competition between the sailing packet lines as well as between sail and 
steam made the packet captains take more risks than they did in the earlier 
years. Most of the wrecks took place during the period when the competition 
between sail and steam was hardest.
From a mail transmission point of view, the trend was most alarming. 
Between 1838 and 1847 no less than 21 mail-carrying ships were lost 
on the North Atlantic route – two each year on average. Two of the 
ships were Falmouth packets and two were steamers, while 17 were 
American sailing packets. Eight were on the New York–Liverpool route, 
two on the Boston–Liverpool route, two on the New York–London 
route, and five on the New York–Havre route. Six of the ships just 
disappeared, and were lost with all hands.277 It is notable that two out 
of every three wrecks took place in November–February, indicating 
that the packet captains took too heavy risks, especially during the 
rough winter sailings.
The only precautionary measure to ensure solid business information 
transmission across the Atlantic was to send duplicates. This was very typical 
276 Albion (1938), 202.
277 See Staff, 121–128; Bonsor (1980), vol. V, 1888–1897; Pawlyn, 132–133. – In total, 
more than 600 British ships, including all kinds of coastal vessels, were lost each year in 
1833–1835 and 1841–1842. The loss of lives varied between 1,450 and 1,560. See BPP, 
Shipping Safety 3, First and Second Reports of the Select Committee on Shipwrecks in 
1843, Appendix 4, 52.
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during the shift period. The duplicates also ensured the fastest possible 
dispatch of information.
It is not easy to find relevant numbers of North Atlantic merchant 
correspondence from this period. For example, there is almost nothing in the 
Liverpool archives. Fortunately, the huge correspondence of the London-
based banking firm, Frederick Huth Co., was partly saved from being burnt 
during the wartime energy crisis by a philatelist, and these letters can easily 
be discovered in the philatelic exhibitions of today.278 A sample of Huth’s 
correspondence from the period 1836–1850, including 74 transatlantic letters 
to London, interestingly depicts the change from sail to steam:279
As can be seen in Table 16, business information transmission by sailing 
ships did not end in 1838 when the mail-carrying steamships started their 
regular trade across the Atlantic. The sample here is naturally too small to 
give any reliable figures on the share of each means of communications 
during the period. It is too small even to tell anything about these shares in 
the incoming mail of Frederick Huth Co. However, it clearly demonstrates 
278 Other well-known company names of this period in philatelic collections are e.g. Morrison, 
Cryder & Co. in London, Rothschild & Sons in London and Paris, Louis Roederer in 
Reims, August Martell in Cognac, Abraham Bell & Co. in New York and Daniel Gibb 
in San Francisco.
279 This sample is compiled from letters exhibited in five philatelic collections: SRLC; 
JSC; JAC; Seppo Talvio, North Atlantic Mail (2006) (STC); and Richard F. Winter, 
Transatlantic Mails. Steamship (1988) (RWC). Photocopies of each cover with relevant 
postal historical descriptions are held by the writer.








1836 – 3 – 3
1837 1 4 – 5
1838 – 4 1 6
1839 1 2 3 6
1840 1 3 2 6
1841 – 5 5 10
1842 – 4 2 6
1843 – 2 1 3
1844 – 1 2 3
1845 2 1 1 4
1846 – 1 3 4
1847 – 1 5 6
1848 – – 3 3
1849 – – 3 3
1850 – – 7 7
total 5 31 38 74
Source: Letters received by the Frederick Huth & Co. in the 




that a great part of the bulk mail – especially eastwards – was still carried by 
sailing ships during the first decade after the launching of the transatlantic 
steamship service.
There is no reason to believe that any part of this material would have 
been preferred in the philatelic collections. They are all bulk mail and carry 
no prepaid postage stamps, which would make them especially attractive or 
valuable. The letters are collected because of their postal markings: routes, 
ship names, rates and forwarding markings, and none of them should have 
caused distortion in the sample. Even if the proportions might be slightly 
different in a larger sample, it seems obvious that the American sailing 
packets dominated the mail route until the steamship traffic started and that 
they kept a good share of it for several years before the steamers finally took 
over the business.
The sample also shows that merchant ships were still used for information 
transmission on the North Atlantic seaway, even if this was uncommon. One 
of the letters was sent from Buenos Aires by a merchant ship instead of a 
government packet, and another one was sent directly from New Orleans 
instead of using the coastal route to New York, from where the letters were 
normally forwarded to Liverpool by the American sailing packets.
Interestingly, most letters were sent via Liverpool, even if Frederick Huth 
Co. was located in London and there would have been direct packet services 
to London as well. Three of the five merchant ship letters, 25 of the 31 packet 
letters, and 32 of the 38 steamship letters arrived via Liverpool – 57 of 74 
letters in all. Additionally, it happened twice that the original routing was 
via Liverpool, but the forwarding agent in New York had sent the letter by 
an earlier departing London packet instead.
Regarding the steamship letters, the reason is naturally that Liverpool was 
the home port of the Cunard Line as well as of the short-lived pioneering 
steamer Liverpool, and that the Great Western had also used Liverpool as 
her home port since 1843. For most of the sailing packet arrivals, there is no 
explanation other than the more frequent schedules of the Liverpool packets, 
and maybe the reputation for faster sailings. Since the railway was opened 
for the whole distance between Liverpool and London in 1838,280 the letters 
usually arrived in the City on the following day after the ship had entered 
the port at Liverpool. If the ship arrival fell on a Saturday, the letters were 
dispatched in London on Monday.281
At least 19 of the 74 letters were duplicates, or originals of which a 
duplicate had been sent by another vessel. In some cases, it is mentioned in 
the letter by which ship another one of the letters had been sent. In several 
cases it remains unknown, however.
Up to 1838, duplicates of letters were normally sent by two different sailing 
packets from New York. None of the duplicates mentions merchantmen, and 
280 The London–Birmingham railway was opened in 1837, while the Birmingham–Liverpool 
connection already existed. After finalizing the work the trains were able to run to their 
permanent terminus in Birmingham in late 1838. See J.H. Clapham, An Economic History 
of Modern Britain. The Early Railway Age 1820–1850. (Cambridge, 1930), 387; Vaughan, 
89–90.
281 Arrival postmarks of the letters in the Huth correspondence.
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none of the letters by merchant ships indicates that it would be a duplicate. 
It seems that merchant ship letters were not alternatives to normal mail on 
the North Atlantic route but were used on special occasions, probably as 
consignee’s letters in cases where their own cargo was sent by the same 
trader. As the Falmouth packet service to New York had been closed down 
in the 1820s, this alternative as a duplicate was out of the question.282
From 1838, it was common to send one of the letters by a steamship and 
the other one by a sailing packet. From 1844, in all cases where a duplicate 
records a ship name, both letters were sent by steamers.
A particularly interesting duplicate was the one of which the original, dated 
23 November, 1850, in Havana, Cuba, had been sent on the day of writing 
by the Royal Mail Line’s steamer Conway to St. Thomas, where it arrived 
on 2 December. The letter proceeded on the next day by the same company’s 
mail steamer Avon, which arrived at Southampton on 22 December, 1850. 
Meanwhile, the duplicate letter was continued by the writer in Havana on 2 
December, and sent by another route to Frederick Huth & Co. in London. The 
letter was carried by the United States Mail Steamship Company’s steamer 
Georgia, which departed from Havana on the day of writing the continuation, 
and it arrived in New York on 7 December. From there, it was forwarded by 
an agent, A.C. Rossire & Co., to the Cunard Line steamer Europa, which 
departed from Boston on 11 December and arrived at Liverpool on the 21st. 
The letter was received in London on the 23rd – probably simultaneously 
with the original, which had departed from Havana nine days earlier.283 This 
can indeed be called professional use of existing international mail steamship 
services at that time.
As many of the letters arrived from distant places like Havana or New 
Orleans, forwarding agents were often used to ensure that the information 
was sent by the fastest possible means.284 If the writer was not sure of the 
ship schedules, he could write ‘per first Packet’ or ‘per first Steamer’ on the 
cover and the forwarding agent, often a well-known merchant house, took 
care of the rest. In these cases the letter was sometimes addressed to the 
forwarding agent, who struck off his name and address and sent the letter 
forward to the final recipient.
New York agents in the Huth correspondence were, for example, Aldrick & 
Kruger, William W. De Forest & Co., Goodhue & Co. and Meyer & Stucken. 
282 There was one Falmouth packet connection in the sample from the Mexico route: a 
duplicate letter sent from Tampico on 26.7.1836 via New Orleans, New York and Liverpool 
to London.It arrived in 69 days. The original was sent by the Falmouth packet Seagull, 
which sailed from Vera Cruz on 7.8. and from Havana on 26.8.1836, arriving at Falmouth 
on 26.9.1836. This letter arrived in London in 64 or 65 days. For the sailing dates of the 
Seagull, see Lloyd’s List 30.9.1836.
283 A German language merchant letter from Havana 23.11. & 2.12.1850 via New York and 
Boston to Fredrick Huth & Co., London (STC); Phil J. Kenton & Harry G. Parsons, Early 
Routing of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company 1842–1879 (Surrey, England, 1999), 
122, 126; Theron J. Wierenga (ed. Richard F. Winter), United States Incoming Steamship 
Mail 1847–1875 (Austin, TX, 2000), 341; Hubbard & Winter, 28.
284 For the forwarding system, see Kenneth Rowe, The Postal History of the Forwarding 
Agents (Kentucky, 1984), 1–22. A useful Internet link related to this source can be found 
(summer 2006) at the address http://www.pbbooks.com/webfa.htm
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Letters could also be forwarded by Hale’s Foreign Letter Office or Gilpin’s 
Exchange, Reading Room and Foreign Letter Office. In New Orleans at least 
Hermann & Co. was one of the used forwarding agents; in Boston, Shelton 
Brothers & Co. and J. Winslow & Sons.285
In addition to the Frederick Huth Co. correspondence, a sample of 
transatlantic business letters from the same period can be found in the 
collection of Rathbone Bros & Co. This small portion of letters, only 23 from 
the period 1841–1849, gives rather similar results to the sample above. Ten 
of the letters are from the years 1841–1842. Two of them were sent by sailing 
packets, and the rest by steamers. Of the 13 letters from 1848–1849, 11 were 
sent by Cunarders and two by other mail-carrying steamships.286
At least five of the ten earlier period’s letters refer to duplicates in one way 
or another. William Rathbone Jr., the writer of the letter dated New York, 30 
April 1841, notes: ‘Dear Sirs, I wrote on the 28th instant pr Columbia with 
such information as I could collect of your friends here, which however was 
not definite enough to make it worthwhile to send a duplicate…’287 Three of the 
letters are duplicates or enclose duplicates, and in one case the writer tells that 
he will write ‘more fully by the steamer which will probably reach you before 
this’. This letter was sent by a sailing packet and received on 28 July, while 
the steamer Britannia arrived in Liverpool one day later, on 29 July.288
285 Frederich Huth Co.’s correspondence 1836–1850 in JAC.
286 Letters to Rathbone Bros & Co., Liverpool, 1841–1849 in Rathbone Collection (RP 
XXIV.2, SJ). – Rathbone Bros & Co. was a well-known merchant house, at that
time especially engaged in cotton imports from America. See Williams, David M.,
‘Liverpool Merchants and the Cotton Trade 1820–1850’. In Merchants and Mariners:
Selected writings of David M. Williams, 42–51. In Research of Maritime History No.
18. (Newfoundland, 2000).
287 William Rathbone Jr. to Rathbone Esq., Liverpool, from New York 30.4.1841. (RP 
XXIV.2, SJ).
288 William Rathbone Jr. in a letter addressed to Rathbone Esq., Liverpool, from New York 
7.7.1841. Arrival marking of the recipient 28 July. (RP XXIV.2, SJ). – The Britannia’s 
sailing dates, see Hubbard & Winter, 18. – Some of the Rathbone letters were forwarded 
FIG. 11. The port of Boston. (Ballou’s Pictorial, 1856.)
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Although it caused much trouble in the company routines to send 
duplicates and even triplicates of letters across the Atlantic, and the postage 
rates were rather high, the cost was considered acceptable because of the 
general unpredictability of the sailings.289 The examples above were all from 
eastbound journeys. The difference between sailing packets and steamers 
was more evident westbound.
In 1845, there were no less than 102 mail ship departures from Liverpool 
to New York / Boston. All mail-carrying North Atlantic steamships 
departed from Liverpool that year, in addition to no less than five American 
sailing packet lines.290 Compared with the situation ten years earlier, the 
improvement in the scale of options in business information transmission 
was remarkable.
In addition, some of the regular traders called themselves ‘packets’ or 
were hired as transients by the packet lines for a few voyages, and they 
could and often did carry letters and newspapers on board as well. ‘News and 
Observations, American News’ in the Liverpool Mercury of 31 January 1845 
gives a good example: ‘The New York packet ship Sea, Captain Edwards, 
arrived on Monday, bringing New York papers to the 11th inst. Their contents 
are unimportant both politically and commercially…’291
Even though most ‘American News’ of that time was carried by Cunard 
steamers, a fast sailing packet could still be a news-bringer eastbound in 1845, 
especially in winter when there were not many steamship sailings. The Sea 
is not listed as a line packet by Albion or Staff, but Cutler mentions her as 
one of the New Line’s vessels that year.292
It can easily be noticed in Diagram 7 why the sailing packets lost the 
competition against steamers in mail transmission, especially westwards. The 
benefits of steam power in the struggle against the westerly winds were so 
obvious that there was practically no reason to send letters by sailing ships 
any more. There were few situations where the next sailing packet would 
have had an even theoretical chance of arriving in New York before the 
next steamer. Instead of sending an original by a steamer and a duplicate by 
a packet, or vice versa, duplicates were now being sent by two successive 
steamers to ensure solid information transmission, even in the case of 
misadventures at sea.
by an agent: two by T.W. Ward in Boston and one by the Gilpin’s Exchange, Reading 
Room and Foreign Letter Office in New York.
289 Hargest notes that the ‘Cunarders’ made additional savings possible: ‘Their relatively 
fast crossings, together with the regularity and certainty of their sailings, were obviating 
the necessity for sending many duplicate copies of the same letter by different ships in 
order to be certain that a copy would arrive as early as possible, or would arrive at all.’ 
See Hargest, 2. – Duplicates played no further role in Rathbone’s correspondence in the 
1850s.
290 In addition to the Dramatic Line, there was also another later established packet company 
on the New York – Liverpool route: the Red Cross Line, established in 1844. A well-
known mail-carrying packet company on the Boston – Liverpool route was also Enoch 
Train’s White Diamond Line, which began operations in the same year. See Staff, 127; 
and Cutler (1967), 371–373.
291 Liverpool Mercury 31.1.1845.
292 Cutler (1967), 381
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Diagram 7. Duration of westbound trips, the American sailing packets 
and the mail carrying steamers, Liverpool - New York / Boston, 1845






























Source: Lloyd’s List 1845; sailing lists of Tabeart, 19. – The difference between 
sail and steam was remarkable on westbound voyages. The black pillars depict the 
sailings of the mail-carrying steamers from Liverpool to New York or Boston in 
1845: the Cunard vessels and the pioneering steamers Great Western, Great Britain 
and Massachusetts (an American steamer, which only made two round trips). The 
light pillars depict the sailing packet voyages. Their departures on 18.2.1845, 22.9.1845, 
29.10.1845 and 7.11.1845 are missing from the table. They should have been placed 
between trips 11 & 12, 73 & 74, 82 & 83 and 84 & 85.
Even though the Cunard Line’s monthly winter sailings were the only ones 
conducted by steamers in the mid-1840s, using them in business information 
transmission was notably faster than using the sailing packets.
Table 17 shows the different options for business communications from 
November 1844 to February 1845. During those four winter months, at least 
30 mail-carrying line vessels sailed from Liverpool to New York or Boston. 
In November there were eight ships, in December seven, in January seven 
and in February seven – approximately two each week.
The duration of the New York packets’ westbound sailings varied between 
27 and 51 days, and the duration of eastbound sailings between 16 and 31 
days. The respective figures for the Cunard Line steamships were 15 to 20 
days westbound and 12 to 16 days eastbound. The steamers were so much 
faster that it was normally better to keep the letter or its duplicate waiting 
for the next steamship departure instead of sending it by any sailing packet 
that would leave before that date.
If, for example, a letter had been sent from Liverpool to New York by the 
Cunard steamer Britannia on 5 November 1844, the answer to it would have 
arrived in Liverpool on 16 December. An answer to that letter could have 
been sent by the Cambria on 4 January, 1845, and the answer to that letter 
would have been in Liverpool on 13 February. If the sender had instead used 
the sailing packet Queen of the West for carrying the original letter, he would 
have received the first answer to it only on 13 February, 1845, by the same 
vessel.293 The steamship service enabled two consecutive information circles 
for correspondence compared with only one by the sailing packets.
This can be called the ‘leverage effect’ of steamship communications. 
It was not only the single fast crossing of the ocean that counted. As 
communication is basically a two-way activity, this effect doubled the impact 
of the regular steamship mail service, being thus even more revolutionary 
than has generally been estimated in historical research. And, as will be 
demonstrated later, not only could the technology be improved but also the 
whole system of communications.
293 The Queen of the West was one of the finest sailing packets of the time. She was a new 
1,160-ton vessel (the Cunarders were 1,150 tons) that had sailed from New York to 
Liverpool in 15 days in February of the same year. According to Cutler, packets of that 
size and finish – ‘floating palaces’ – cost $100,000 and upwards, which was nearly double 
the cost of the average packets of the thirties. See Cutler (1967), 254–257, 378.
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TABLE 17. Mail sailings on the Liverpool–New York / Boston route, winter 
1844–1845.













Yorkshire BB 1.11.44 29.11.44 28 16.1.45 8.2.45 23
s/s Britannia CL 5.11.44 22.11.44 
(B)
17 1.12.44 16.12.44 15
Queen of the West NL 8.11.44 11.12.44 33 - - 13.2.45 - -
Sheridan DL 14.11.44 30.12.44 46 29.1.45 14.2.45 16
Cambridge BB 17.11.44 7.1.45 51 1.2.45 24.2.45 23
s/s Caledonia CL 19.11.44 7.12.44 
(B)
18 16.12.44 29.12.44 13
Patrick Henry BSw 22.11.44 9.1.45 48 8.2.45 26.2.45 18
United States RS 26.11.44 ‘went 
missing ’
– – – –
England BB 1.12.44 ‘went 
missing ’
– – – –
s/s Acadia CL 4.12.44 21.12.44 
(B)
17 1.1.45 14.1.45 13
Rochester NL 6.12.44 11.1.45 36 - - 22.3.45 - -
Garrick DL 12.12.44 15.1.45 34 - - 26.3.45 - -
Oxford BB 18.12.44 20.1.45 33 - - 21.3.45 - -
George Washington BSw - - - - - - 6.3.45 26.3.45 20
Independence BSw 25.12.44,  
put back 
– – – – –
Virginian RS 28.12.44 14.2.45 48 - - 8.4.45 - -
Montezuma BB 3.1.45 13.2.45 41 8.3.45 8.4.45 31
s/s Cambria CL 4.1.45 24.1.45 
(B)
20 1.2.45 13.2.45 12
Hottinguer NL 8.1.45 16.2.45 39 - - 13.4.45 - -
Roscius DL 12.1.45 16.2.45 35 27.3.45 22.4.45 26
Europe BB 17.1.45 13.2.45 27 1.4.45 26.4.45 25
John R. Skiddy RS 22.1.45 5.3.45 42 1.4.45 26.4.45 25
Independence BSw 28.1.45 14.3.45 45 8.4.45 28.4.45 20
Samuel Hicks* RS 29.1.45 ? ? - - - - - -
s/s Hibernia CL 4.2.45 19.2.45 
(B)
15 1.3.45 17.3.45 16
New York BB 4.2.45 23.3.45 47 - - 11.5.45 - -
Liverpool NL 7.2.45 23.3.45 44 - - 26.4.45 - -
Siddons DL 11.2.45 24.3.45 41 - - 26.4.45 - -
Columbus BB 18.2.45 - - - - - - 3.6.45 - -
Ashburton BSw 25.2.45 31.3.45 34 - - 11.5.45 - -
Stephen Whitney RS 28.2.45 31.3.45 31 - - 4.6.45 - -
Source: Lloyd’s List 1844–1845. – Steamship departures are marked in bold. Only 
the Cunard Line had winter sailings at that time.
* The sailing of Samuel Hicks 29.1.1845 was advertised by the company in the
Liverpool Mercury as one of the line’s regular sailings. She might have been a
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New mail contract lines
Actually, the Cunard Line never had a monopoly in the North Atlantic mail 
transmission. Until the late 1840s, the company competed with the American 
sailing packets and the pioneering steamers, and after that with foreign 
contract mail carriers.294 As letters carried by the competitors in the 1840s are 
not considered rarer in philatelic collections than those carried by the Cunard 
steamers, the amount of mail carried must have been large by all these means of 
communications. One reason for using alternatives to mail contract vessels was 
the high postage rates, which could be partly avoided by private shipments.
It did not take long before other governments adopted the British model 
for their transatlantic mail services, not so much for faster communications 
but for the commercial interest and the prestige of the country, as the French 
Minister Thiers put it in the French Parliament in 1840.295 In April 1847, after 
a few years’ hesitation, the French Government announced that it had made a 
ten-year contract with Compagnie Générale des Paquebots Transatlantiques, 
or the Hérout & de Handel, for a mail service from Havre directly to New 
York. The Government also provided the use of four paddle-wheel transport 
steamships of the French Navy and a substantial financial subsidy.296
The line planned to start its operations from Havre on 31 May 1847, but 
the basin at Havre had to be dredged before it could support steamships. As a 
result, the first voyage had to be delayed, and the next seven voyages started 
from Cherbourg. The company’s small steamships proved to be unsuitable for 
294 The Great Western was in non-regular North Atlantic service up to December 1846; the 
American ship Massachusetts made two round trips in 1846; and the Sarah Sands was 
in traffic 1847–1849, making three more round-trips in 1852. See Tabeart (1997), 19–20. 
The Sarah Sands was the second ocean-going iron screw steamer after the Great Britain, 
and was chartered by the Red Cross Line, one of the New York packet lines of the later 
period. According to Bonsor, ‘it can certainly be said that they [her trips] were a success 
as nearly all her passages were considerably faster than those of contemporary sailing 
packets, which were what she was intended to compete with rather than with the Cunard 
wooden paddle-steamers’. The Sarah Sands was also the first steamer to carry emigrants. 
For example, in August 1848, she was reported to have departed from Liverpool with 
60 first class, 46 second class and 200 steerage passengers. In 1852 she arrived in New 
York with 124 cabin and 238 steerage passengers. See Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 184–185; 
and Arnell (1986), 205.
295 Marthe Barbance, Histoire de la Compagnie Générale Transatlantique. Un Siècle 
d’Exploitation Maritime (Paris, 1955), 30.
296 See Barbance, 30; Staff, 85.
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the North Atlantic route. They were slow, had frequent machinery problems, 
and often ran short of coal before the intended voyages were completed. 
Later historians have not found much positive to say about the company’s 
performance. According to Staff, ‘the line was so ill managed and its ships 
got themselves into so many ludicrous situations that it lasted less than a year. 
Its effect in the field of competition cannot be said to have been serious.’297
It was not only the speed that was important. Albion describes the Hérout 
& de Handel Line’s performance as a comedy of errors: ‘The first trip was 
almost the only one completed in a satisfactory manner. Ship after ship ran 
out of coal and had to finish the trip under sail, while the New York–Havre 
sailing packets sped past them. Some clumsy accidents occurred in New York 
harbor, where the helmsmen, not knowing English, did not understand the 
pilots’ orders. French pride was hurt by the constant jokes on the subject; 
some eighty of New York’s most prominent French residents held a meeting 
to inquire into the matter. The hearing revealed one shortcoming that was 
regarded as more unforgivable than running out of coal or bumping brigs. 
It was at least to be expected that Frenchmen could feed their passengers 
well, but that was apparently not the case. Lieutenant Maury [the well known 
oceanographer] told the tale of one of the French liners putting to sea without 
sugar; when this was discovered, the captain offered to put back to New York 
but, as Maury remarked, it was too late: the passengers had already become 
sour. This sugar business broke up the line.’298
Of the sailings conducted, the average westbound journey took 18.1 days, 
and the eastbound 17.0 days.299 In February 1848, the Hérout & de Handel 
Line suspended operations having lost the government subsidy due to the 
poor performance. The service was not restarted, and it was 16 years before 
another French steamship company would be established on the North 
Atlantic route for mail service.300
There was aroused interest in the United States, too, in establishing their 
own steamship mail services, when it became evident that the sailing packets 
had lost their superiority on the North Atlantic route to the British steamers. In 
October 1845, the U.S. Postmaster invited tenders for a mail steamship service 
from New York to various European ports. Encouraged by Cunard’s example six 
ship operators wanted to start a transatlantic mail service. Of these tenders, three 
were accepted. The mail route from New York via Southampton to Bremerhaven 
– or Havre on alternate voyages – would be taken care of by Edward Mills, a
promoter unknown in the shipping world. The contract with the Ocean Steam
Navigation Company, or the Ocean Line, required four vessels and bi-monthly
mail service. This was changed to a monthly service to Bremerhaven with
only half of the subsidy appropriated. The service started in June 1847 and the
contract was later extended for a second five-year period.301
297 Staff, 85; see also Barbance, 30.
298 Albion (1939), 324. For more stories about the line’s performance, see Tyler, 149; 
Barbance, 30.
299 Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 93. Tyler has come to similar averages in his 
calculations. (Tyler, 149)
300 Hubbard & Winter, 91; Barbance, 30–31.
301 Hubbard & Winter, 81–84; Butler, 99–100; Albion (1939), 323–324; and Tyler, 143–144.
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The mail contract for the Havre route was signed with the New York & 
Havre Steam Navigation Company, or the Havre Line. It was a monthly 
service with a call at Southampton on each voyage. The line started operations 
in October 1850.302
The most important mail service between New York and Liverpool was 
granted to Edward K. Collins, whose Dramatic Line had been running sailing 
packets on the same route since 1836 and earlier packets between New York 
and Vera Cruz, Mexico, as well as between New York and New Orleans.303 
The ten-year contract with the New York & Liverpool United States Mail 
Steamship Company, or the Collins Line, was made to construct and equip 
four steamers for a bi-monthly mail service at least eight months a year, with 
a monthly service during the winter. In 1852 the contract was changed to a 
bi-monthly service throughout the year.304
In the autumn of 1850, the North Atlantic mail and passenger steamship 
service looked very different from what it had been only a year earlier. The 
American mail steamship tonnage clearly beat the Cunard Line’s, whose 
seven vessels in traffic were rather small compared with the new rivals.
302 Hubbard & Winter, 109–111; Albion (1939), 325.
303 The history of the rise and fall of the Collins Line has been told by dozens of maritime 
historians. See for example Tyler, 181–246; Albion (1939), 325–330; Arnell (1986), 
191–204; Staff, 86–90; Kludas, 44–46; Babcock, 91–106; Hubbard & Winter, 95–108; Bonsor 
(1975), vol. 1, 201–208; Butler, 89–103, 199–224; Fox 116–139; and Hyde (1975), 37–39. 
About the Dramatic Line, see Butler, 95–97; Cutler (1967), 198, 210–211, 380; and Staff, 
123–124. About the Vera Cruz Line, see Cutler (1967) 401, and about the New Orleans 
Line, Cutler (1967), 500. Even a fictitious story about the company, based on historical 
events, has been written by Warren Armstrong, The Collins Story (London 1957).
304 Hubbard & Winter, 95–96.
Source: Staff, 129–131. The total tonnage of the mail-carrying steamship lines on 
the North Atlantic route in late 1850 was 31,824 tons.
Diagram 8. Steamship companies with mail contract 







Cunard Line vs. Collins Line
Edward K. Collins started his mail steamship service between New York 
and Liverpool in late April, 1850. The competition between the two shipping 
companies, the Cunard Line and the Collins Line, has aroused more passionate 
feelings among contemporaries and maritime historians than probably any 
other period of transatlantic history. Not only was it a contest between two 
popular companies, but there were also strong political passions and national 
prestige involved.305
This study will focus on the effect of the Cunard-Collins contest on the 
speed of business information transmission. Both companies were generously 
subsidised by their governments and carried mail on the same route, but only 
one of them survived.
According to several maritime historians, it was agreed from the outset 
that the Collins service should beat the Cunarders.306 At the time when the 
Collins Line started its service, the Cunard steamers could occasionally 
make the westbound trip between Liverpool and Boston in 12 days, 
including the stop in Halifax. In 1850, Cunard’s new steamship Asia 
made the voyage to New York in 11 days.307 This was the starting point 
for Edward Collins, who promised that his vessels would make the trip 
faster than any others.
The Collins steamers were notably larger than Cunard’s – wooden paddle-
wheelers of about 2,850 tons with excellent accommodations including, 
for example, the first steam heating system on board.308 The Collins Line’s 
first steamship, the Atlantic, entered service in April and the Pacific in May 
1850. The two other ships, the Arctic and the Baltic, made their first voyages 
in October and November of the same year. They were all sister ships and 
carried 200 cabin passengers each.309
Calculations from the sailing lists show that the Collins Line could reach 
its target of being faster than any other – crossing the Atlantic in 11 days or 
less – only occasionally in 1850–1851. In fact, 43.2% of the line’s westbound 
and 32.4% of its eastbound voyages lasted 12 days or more. The Cunard 
305 The Collins Line’s contract was a political question from the very beginning. In the U.S. 
Congress it was strongly opposed by Senators from Ohio and Missouri as being only a 
waste of money, but warmly supported by Senators from New England, and especially 
from New York. One of the strongest arguments for the contract was borrowed from the 
British: government-controlled vessels could be transformed into warships if needed. At 
the time of the discussion, the United States was at war with Mexico, and the relationship 
with Britain had its critical moments in the 1840s. (Tyler, 136–138, 145–146) There was a 
new discussion in the Congress about the Collins contract in 1852 and once more in 1855. 
See Speech of Mr. Edson B. Olds, of Ohio, on the Collins Line of Steamers, delivered in 
the House of Representatives, February 15, 1855 (Washington, 1855), passim. – Edson 
B. Olds was the Chairman of Committee on Post Office and Post Roads in the U.S.
Congress.
306 See e.g. Albion (1939), 325–326; Kludas, 45; Butler, 99; Babcock, 92; and Hyde (1975), 
37.
307 Hubbard & Winter, 28.
308 For further descriptions, see Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 202; Bonsor (1980), vol. 5, 1859; 
Staff, 86; and Tyler, 182.
309 Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 202–207; Hubbard & Winter, 98.
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Line’s figures on the Liverpool–New York route were 72.5% and 35.0% 
respectively.310
Despite misfortunes and delays in the beginning, Edward Collins’ PR 
efforts impressed his contemporaries, who believed that the Cunard Line was 
playing a losing part in the contest by clear figures. Even Lawrence Babcock, 
the latter company’s historian, wrote in the 1930s: ‘From this time on, the 
fastest passages were made by the Collins ships without a single Cunard 
victory to even the contest.’311
In fact, the speed of the two companies was more identical than could be 
expected, but the public image was different. From the beginning, PR and 
reputation at the home port was considered more important than the image 
on the other side of the Atlantic. Thus, the Collins steamers always strove 
to sail fast voyages westbound towards New York, their home port, even 
though it caused them problems in the form of broken machinery and major 
disasters. Too hard or careless driving was said to be typical of the Collins 
Line’s captains, many of whom were former sailing packet commanders. 
The vessels achieved high speed at the cost of abnormally heavy wear and 
tear on the engines, and it was not unusual that the mechanics worked day 
and night on repairs during the time spent in New York.312
The Cunard steamers made a few more fast eastbound trips than the 
Collins Line, although the larger Collins vessels would probably have been 
able to beat them in that direction as well, if the company had felt it was 
important.
As can be seen in Diagram 9, the Collins Line made several faster 
westbound voyages than Cunard in 1850–1851. However, the spread of the 
duration of voyages was notable. The Collins Line made most trips in 10 to 12 
days and the Cunard Line in 11 to 13 days, but the voyages could sometimes 
last even 17 or 18 days. The average westbound Collins Line voyage took 11.9 
days, while the Cunard Line took 12.5 days.
Eastbound, Cunard made a few faster trips than Collins. During the first 
1.5 years of the contest, Cunard’s ships made seven eastbound trips in ten 
days versus the Collins Line’s four and almost as many 11-day voyages as 
the Collins Line. All trips were made in 10–13 days. The average eastbound 
voyage of both shipping lines took 11.3 days.
The complementing services of the British and American mail contract lines 
now enabled a well-working communications system across the Atlantic.313 In 
addition to the remarkable improvement in speed, the business world derived 
benefit from the markedly increased frequency of mail ship departures. The 
circulation of business correspondence in 1851 is depicted in Table 18, the 
starting point being a letter sent from Liverpool to New York on 1.1.1851.
While the regularity of the Cunard Line vessels and their winter sailings 
had enabled an improvement in information circulation from six times per 
310 Calculated from the sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 28–30; 98–99.
311 Babcock, 93.
312 See Albion (1939), 326–328; Babcock, 94–95; Butler, 202; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 204. 
– For background on the Collins Line’s captains, see Albion (1938), 170–171.
313 For the Ocean Line and the Havre Line, see under the sub title ‘Ocean Line and Havre 
Line – the forgotten contract companies’.
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year by the pioneering steamers to eight times, the frequency of sailings was 
the following step. From 1848, when the Cunard Line started the additional 
mail route directly to New York, the combination of the line’s services 
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 28–30; 98–99.
Diagram 9. Cunard vs. Collins, duration of westbound trips 














Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 28–30; 98–99.
Diagram 10. Cunard vs. Collins, duration of eastbound trips 













– 22 annual round trips to Boston and 22 to New York – alone enabled
ten consecutive information circles between Liverpool and New York,
whether via Boston or directly to New York. However, these sailings were
not coordinated in the best possible way. It often happened that the ship for
England had only just departed when the next one arrived, or she departed
on the same day.314
The tight competition with the Collins Line also forced the Cunard Line to 
improve its service. At that time, the Cunard Line operated with seven vessels 
of various sizes. Of the original four ships built in 1840, the Columbia was 
wrecked in 1843 and the others were sold abroad at the end of the decade. 
When the Collins Line started its transatlantic service, Cunard still had in 
traffic the old 1,420 tons Hibernia, which had replaced the Columbia in 1843, 
Hibernia’s sister ship the Cambria from 1845, the four sisters’ series of 1848 
– the America, the Niagara, the Europa and the Canada, all approximately
1,830 tons – and the new 2,230-ton Asia, which made her maiden voyage
in May 1850.
The Asia’s sister ship Africa started the service in October 1850, replacing 
the Hibernia, which was sold to Spain. All the seven ships in traffic served 
both mail routes, Liverpool–New York and Liverpool–Halifax–Boston. 
Compared with the Collins Line’s four new, large steamers sailing only the 
direct Liverpool–New York route, the Cunard Line’s position was really 
challenging.315
 Cunard did not perhaps ‘trim’ its vessels to move faster like Collins 
did, even if this has been doubted. The company’s main doctrine was 
clearly expressed as safety first,316 and the records are superior to any other 
company. To date, the Cunard Line – still afloat – has lost no passengers’ 
lives and hardly any mail during its 165-year history, excluding the two 
world wars.
Several arrangements were made by the Cunard ship management in the 
early 1850s to improve the company’s position in the competition. Originally, 
all Cunard ships had served on both routes evenly, except the old Hibernia, 
which served only on the Boston route, and the new Africa, which served 
only on the more important and visible New York route.317
In 1851, the new ships Asia and Africa made 65% of the New York trips, 
while the other five ships only made 35% in total. The speed of the new vessels 
was thus utilized on the New York route in the maximum way. These two 
ships were the only ones that could compete with the Collins Line’s vessels 
and make the westbound trip in 12 days or less, while the other Cunard 
314 See the sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 24–25.
315 Until September 1850, the Cunard Line’s ships also made a call at Halifax on the way to 
and from New York. See Arnell (1980), sailing lists, 308–310.
316 See Hyde (1975), 73; Fox 106–109, 113, 138, 187, 276. Several innovations for safety 
at sea were taken in use by the Cunard Line, e.g. the white light at the masthead at night, 
the green light on the starboard side and the red light on the port. Another remarkable 
innovation was the use of safe tracks for the ships to avoid ice and icebergs or collisions 
with other vessels. See Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 78; Hyde (1975), 45–47.
317 Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 28.
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ships made it in 13 to 15 days on average.318 These arrangements enabled an 
improvement in the speed of the company’s westbound voyages.
In 1852, the Collins service was at its best and the line’s ships averaged 
the westbound crossing nearly a day faster than the Cunarders. While 
the enthusiasm over the line’s speed performance was still high, Collins 
318 Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 28–29.
TABLE 18. Consecutive information circulation enabled by transatlantic mail 
steamers in 1851.
Sources: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 29–30, 87, 99, 111. ColL = Collins Line, 
CL = Cunard Line, HL = Havre Line, OL = Ocean Line. – An average westbound 
journey took 12.3 days, varying between 11 and 14 days, while the average eastbound 
journey took 11.1 days, varying between 10 and 12 days. – Note that one extra day 
has been added to the information circle in those cases where the ship departed from 



















































































































determined to take full advantage of it. In the summer of 1852, after what 
Albion calls ‘his masterpiece in lobbying’, the United States Congress 
raised the line’s subsidy from the original $385,000 to $858,000 a year.319 
In comparison with the $33,000 a voyage received by the Collins Line, 
the Ocean Line received only $16,666 and the Havre Line only $12,500. 
Pleading penury, they refused the Postmaster General’s request to increase 
the number of their voyages to 26.320 And Congress did not increase their 
subsidies, on the grounds that no national interest was involved, since they 
had no foreign competitors.321
Even in the new situation, the Cunard Line carried most of the mail: 
2,613,000 letters in 1851, compared with 843,000 carried by Collins, 
313,000 by the Ocean Line, and 139,000 by the Havre Line. But passengers 
preferred the Collins ships’ prestige, speed, comfort and meals. During the 
first 11 months of 1852, the Collins liners carried 4,300 passengers, and the 
Cunarders nearly 3,000.322 
This was a successful period for the Collins Line. No major problems 
were met at sea. The good luck continued until the autumn of 1854, when 
the Arctic, which had been driven ashore off Liverpool in November 1853 
without damage and struck a submerged object off the Irish coast and been 
obliged to put back in the summer of 1854, collided with the French steamer 
Vesta in fog near Cape Race, Newfoundland, at the end of September and 
sank in four or five hours. Only two lifeboats with 35 of the crew and 14 
passengers were rescued, plus one survivor from a raft from which 75 others 
had been washed overboard in a heavy gale. Among the more than 300 lives 
lost were the wife, the only son and a daughter of Edward Collins, as well 
as five family members of the Collins Line president and financier James 
Brown.323 The crew’s behaviour was later strongly criticized; instead of 
attempts to save the vessel, there had been panic and lack of discipline that 
led to the abandonment of floundering women and children. The rush to the 
lifeboats caused serious injury to some of them during the launching.324
In 1855 there was no contest on the Liverpool–New York route as the 
Cunard Line was obliged to provide several of their vessels for Crimean War 
troop transport and could only serve the Liverpool–Halifax–Boston mail 
route. By January 1856, the line was able to resume the weekly sailings to 
New York and Boston.325
319 Albion (1939), 327–328. An opposing Congressman declared that the Collins application 
was sustained ‘by the most powerful and determined outside pressure I have ever seen 
brought to bear upon a legislative body’. (Tyler, 210)
320 In 1852, the Ocean Line and the Havre Line made only 11 round trips each. See the sailing 
lists of Hubbard & Winter, 87, 111–113.
321 Tyler, 215. The only competitors on the Havre route were the American sailing packets. 
On the Bremen route there were no competitors at all, excluding merchant ships.
322 Albion (1939), 328.
323 Butler, 202–206; Albion (1939), 328; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 204; William Henry 
Flayhart III, Perils of the Atlantic. Steamship Disasters 1850 to the Present. (New York, 
2003), 19–38. Descriptions of the disaster were widely published by the contemporary 
newspapers, including Lloyd’s List 12.10.1854 and Liverpool Mercury 13.10.1854.
324 Butler, 206; Albion (1939), 328; and Fox, 128–132.
325 Hubbard & Winter, 13.
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The Collins Line recovered from the loss of the Arctic and continued 
their service with the three remaining vessels. However, another catastrophe 
soon occurred. On 23 January 1856, the company’s Pacific departed from 
Liverpool, and was never heard of again. It was generally thought that she 
had foundered after colliding with an iceberg. Nearly 200 perished.326
The loss of the Pacific so soon after the Arctic was a blow from which the 
company never fully recovered. An additional reason for the Collins Line’s 
difficulties was the delay in launching the new 4,150-ton steamer Adriatic, 
which had been ordered after the loss of the Arctic.327 The new vessel cost 
$1,200,000. In August 1857 the Collins Line was given six months’ notice 
of their government subsidy being reduced from the annual $858,000 to the 
original figure of $385,000.328
The Congress decision to reduce the Collins Line subsidy was the subject 
of furious debate and it has been regarded by some historians as one of the 
most serious mistakes ever made in U.S. maritime history. Some others have 
stated that the unfortunate events affecting the American merchant fleet were 
mainly related to the Civil War and its consequences.329
Whatever the consequences of the decision, it was obvious that the Collins 
Line did not meet expectations as a mail contract company. Diagram 11 
shows the difference between the last good years of the line compared with 
the two years after the loss of the Pacific. No nine or ten-day voyages were 
made in 1856–1857, and only eight 11-day voyages, compared with 17 in 
1853–1854. Almost 50% of the trips took 14 days or more.
The company also lost its grip on the service eastbound. The number of 
short ten to 11-day trips decreased from 36 to 18, and ten journeys were 
made in two weeks or even more.
The reason for the company’s poor performance during the last period 
can easily be noticed from Diagram 12. Since the loss of the Pacific, the 
Collins Line had had to use chartered vessels to keep the service going. The 
company’s own two ships, the Atlantic and the Baltic, could not make all 
the voyages, especially because the Baltic was out of traffic from 5 February 
to 16 August 1857 due to prolonged repairs – as was the Atlantic from 5 
March to 20 June. Between 1 April and 27 May no ship under the Collins 
flag departed from Liverpool, as there were no ships to run.330
The chartered steamships were the Ericsson of 1,920 tons, the Alps of 
1,275 tons and the Columbia of 1,900 tons. Of these, the Ericsson made 
nine trips during the period presented in the diagram, the Alps made one 
and the Columbia two. One trip (trip 20 in Diagram 12) was not made at all, 
apparently due to lack of capacity.331
326 Hubbard & Winter, 107; Albion (1939) 329–330; Butler, 217–218; Bowen, 192. See also 
Fox 135–136.
327 According to Staff, the Adriatic was 3,670 tons. (Staff, 131)
328 Albion (1939), 330; Hyde (1975), 39; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 205. For the Congress debate, 
see Speech of Mr. Edson B. Olds…, 3–56.
329 The discussion about the decline of the American merchant marine has been described 
and analyzed by Safford in ‘The decline of the American merchant marine….’, 60–79.
330 See Hubbard & Winter, 108; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 205.
331 Delayed mails also caused Collins Line extra troubles in the form of penalties. See Tyler, 237.
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Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 101–103 and 107–108. – The profile 
of Collins Line’s westbound sailings changed remarkably during the last difficult 
years. The number of trips included in the calculation was 51 in 1853–1854 and 44 
in 1856–1857.
Diagram 11. Comparison of Collins Line's westbound trips 















Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 107–108. – The dark columns depict trips 
made by chartered vessels. It is easy to notice their negative impact on the profile 
of the Collins Line’s sailings.
Diagram 12. Duration of Collins Line's westbound trips 











It can be noticed in the diagram that most of the delays were caused by 
the chartered ships, while the company’s own vessels’ performance was 
still acceptable even in these abnormal circumstances. On the other hand, 
not all the voyages made by the chartered vessels were slow, and not all the 
voyages made by the Collins ships were fast. An average westbound voyage 
by a chartered vessel took 15.6 days, while an average trip by a Collins ship 
took 12.7 days.
The company’s new Adriatic was scheduled to start service in February 
1857. In April, however, her trials were rescheduled for June and her maiden 
voyage for July. New valves and condensers, the main cause of the delay, 
were in the process of being fitted. In July, it was stated that she was unlikely 
to be ready until the autumn, if then. At this point, the U.S. Congress decided 
on the reduction of the subsidy.
The Adriatic, one of the finest wooden paddle steamers ever built for the 
North Atlantic service, sailed from New York in late November with only 
37 passengers. Her maiden voyage homewards is illustrated in Diagram 12 
as trip 32. This was the only voyage that the Adriatic made for the Collins 
Line, which closed down in January 1858. Trip 33 in the diagram was the 
Atlantic’s and trip 34 the Baltic’s last voyage in the company’s service.
It is interesting to compare the performance of two vessels, the Collins 
Line’s Atlantic and the Cunard Line’s Asia, during the years of tight 
competition. The Atlantic was the Collins Line’s first steamer, brought into 
use in April 1850. She was in traffic until the final closure of the company 
in 1858. Her west- and eastbound transatlantic sailings are depicted in 
Diagrams 13 and 14. As can be seen, her performance did not change very 
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 98–108. Even years are shown in dark 
colour to make it easier to distinguish the different years from each other.
Diagram 13. Collins Line's s/s Atlantic, duration of westbound trips, 
















much during the years, except the temporary lengthening of trips in 1856 
after the loss of the Pacific.
While the westbound sailings were more prolonged during the winter 
months, the differences in the eastbound sailings were smaller. But the 
eastbound sailings were also approximately one day longer in 1856 than in 
any other year. The extra care followed the company’s second total loss within 
two years. The line’s reputation, as well as the government subsidy, was 
seriously endangered. In 1857, the Atlantic made shorter voyages – maybe 
to balance the poor performance of the chartered vessels.
Interestingly, the Atlantic was able to make nine round trips in 1856–1857, 
when she did not make a single ten-day voyage, whereas her service was 
limited to six to eight round trips, or even less, during the years when she 
made her speediest averages. Saving the engines would have made the ships 
more efficient and profitable, and probably saved the company.
As can be seen from Diagram 14, the Atlantic only made two ten-day 
voyages eastbound during her lifetime, compared with five such voyages 
westbound, although they were more difficult to achieve. Each company’s 
public image was chiefly measured at the home port, which can also be 
noticed in Diagrams 17 and 18.
The Cunard Line’s steamship Asia made her maiden voyage in May 1850, 
and continued in service until 1867, making 120 round voyages. Her west- 
and eastbound trips in 1850–1857 are depicted in Diagrams 15 and 16.
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 98–108.
Diagram 14. Collins Line's s/s Atlantic, duration of eastbound trips, 
















It is worth to notice that the Asia made no 10-day voyages after 1851, and 
only two 11-day voyages after mid-1854. Eastbound, there was also a great 
FIG. 12. The letter sent on 22.12.1857 from Manchester to New York, was carried 
by the Collins Line’s Atlantic, which sailed from Liverpool on 23.12. and arrived 
in New York on 6.1.1858. This was the ship’s last voyage under the company’s flag, 
and the second last voyage of Collins Line before its collapse.
Diagram 15. Cunard Line's s/s Asia, duration of westbound trips, 
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Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 28–41. – Trips 1,2,13 and 37–44 were 
made to Boston instead of New York.
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FIG. 13. The letter sent from Liverpool on 16.2.1867 to New York, was carried by the 
Cunard Line’s Asia on her 119th, or second last, westbound Atlantic crossing. She 
arrived in Boston on 3.3. and the letter was received in New York on 4.3.1867.
difference between the performances of the two competing vessels. Compared 
with only two 10-day voyages eastbound by the Atlantic, the Asia made 14 
such voyages. Note the clear change also on the eastbound voyages from 
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 28–41. – Trips 1, 2, 13 and 37–44 were 
made to Boston instead of New York.
Diagram 16. Cunard Line's s/s Asia, duration of eastbound trips, 
















10-day trips in 1850–1851 to 11-day trips in 1852–1855 and 12-day trips
from 1856.
Did the Cunard Line race? Yes, very clearly in 1850–1851. But in 1852 
the company seems to have changed its policy. The trips became slower, and 
in 1856 and 1857 the Asia was about two days behind her records of 1850.
The trend should not be examined independent of the historical context. 
The losses of the Collins Line’s Arctic and Pacific were not the only serious 
disasters at sea during those years. The Havre Line lost both their original 
vessels in 1853–1854; the Humboldt was wrecked in dense fog off Halifax 
in November 1853 and her sister ship the Franklin went aground in similar 
conditions at Long Island in July 1854. The Inman Line lost two of their three 
ships, the City of Glasgow and the City of Philadelphia, during the same year 
1854. The City of Glasgow ‘went missing’ in March 1854 with 480 lives lost. 
Additionally, the emigrant ship Powhatan of Baltimore was lost in the spring of 
1854 on her way from Havre to New York along with about 250 lives. Several 
other serious disasters took place during the latter part of the 1850s.332
The Cunard Line kept to its ‘safety beyond speed’ policy, even in the time 
of tight competition, with the possible exception of the years 1850–1851, while 
other companies constantly took more risks at sea. The weather conditions 
were the same for all ships and the Cunard’s vessels were also involved 
in several incidents during these years,333 but their captains did not take 
unnecessary risks for a faster journey. In addition to their risk-averse policy, 
the Cunard Line management avoided extra costs wherever possible.334
The Cunard Line’s annual subsidy from the British Admiralty had 
increased to £188,040, or $940,200, after the opening of the New York route, 
including a weekly service to New York and Boston on alternate voyages all 
year round. Collins received $858,000 for 26 annual round trips from New 
York to Liverpool.335 It has been estimated that in 1855, a year before the 
loss of the Pacific, the company’s possible fate without the subsidy would 
have been bankruptcy.336 As Tyler has pointed out, the winner of the North 
Atlantic contest required not only the best record for speed and regularity, 
but also a low level of costs.337
The average expense for a round trip by a Collins Line steamer had 
constantly increased over the years. Coal prices were reported as having risen 
between 1852 and 1855 – partly because of the Crimean War – by 50% in 
Britain and by 75% in the U.S. Seamen’s wages had increased by 33%, the 
332 Bonsor (1980), vol. 5, 1888–1889; Hubbard & Winter, 113–115; Bonsor (1975), vol. 
1, 213–215, 220, 238; Liverpool Mercury 9.5.1854. – It was also stated that the Collins 
Line’s Pacific was racing with Cunard’s Persia when she went missing. (Butler, 217). 
The Persia, having sailed on her maiden voyage from Liverpool three days later than the 
Pacific, also hit an iceberg during her voyage, but managed to limp to New York in 14 
days from Liverpool. Yet the Persia departed from New York on schedule 11 days later, 
which indicates that her damage was rather easy to repair.  See Fox, 163; sailing lists of 
Hubbard & Winter, 37.
333 See Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 85.
334 Hyde (1975), 47–49.
335 Speech of Mr. Edson B. Olds..., 3 and 10; Robinson (1964), 139–141.




cost of provisions by 25%, and repairs to machinery by 30%.338 In February 
1855, when the House of Representatives dealt with the continuation of the 
Collins Line subsidy, the reasons given for the huge sums of money needed 
for the service were the extra cost of coal (400 more tons per voyage at $7 
per ton, making $2,800) and the cost of repairs ($5,000 per voyage) that were 
needed for higher speeds.339
The speed certainly caused extra costs in coal consumption. It was 
calculated for the U.S. Congress that, given calm winds and smooth sea and a 
distance of 3,060 nautical miles westbound, a Collins steamer would consume 
850 tons during a ten-day voyage, 700 tons during an 11-day voyage, 590 
tons during 12 days, 500 tons during 13 days and 440 tons during 14 days. 
Thus, lengthening the voyage from ten to 12 days would have saved about 
30% in coal costs. It was argued by the Americans that the Cunard steamers 
saved costs by running at slower speeds, and, as they replenished their coal 
supply in Halifax, they could leave Liverpool with less coal on board and 
consequently take that much more freight, earning more revenues.340
The Cunard Line’s capital costs were obviously lower than the Collins 
Line’s. American shipbuilding was highly priced compared with their British 
counterparts, and, in contrast to the Cunard Line, Collins and his associates 
had borrowed two-thirds of their capital. The operating costs of the two 
companies also differed remarkably. In total, the cost of an average round trip 
by a Collins Line steamer was claimed to exceed $42,300, while a Cunard 
vessel made a similar trip for less than $13,300.341
The British Post Office received notable revenues from postage, 
compensating for the subsidy paid to the Cunard Line. According to the postal 
treaty signed in London in December 1848, the postage on mail between 
Britain and the U.S. was to be shared, depending on the nationality of the 
mail-carrying ship. The basic postage remained at one shilling, or 24 cents, 
per half-ounce. This was split into three parts: ocean postage 16 cents, the U.S. 
inland postage five cents and British inland postage three cents. Exchange 
338 Speech of Mr. Edson B. Olds..., 16.
339 Letter from Edward K. Collins, January 19, 1855. In Speech of Mr. Edson B. Olds..., 
26.
340 Statement of Daniel B. Martin, Engineer in Chief, United States Navy, 12.1.1855, 
included in Speech of Mr. Edson B. Olds..., 28. In fact, at that time the Cunard Line had 
not made a scheduled call at Halifax on the way to New York for over four years. On 
four occasions during 1851–1853, a Cunard vessel had put into Halifax for coal after an 
extra long voyage due to westerly gales. (See sailing lists of Arnell (1980), 310–312) 
– Regarding the Boston route, what was said was principally correct. – On the whole, 
these calculations regarding coal consumption should perhaps not be taken too literally. 
The Cunard Line’s Asia coaled 850 tons on average for a westward trip in 1851–1853, 
normally having an average 125 tons left from the eastbound passage. Thus a trip to 
New York was started with an average amount of 975 tons of coal. The Asia was 600 
tons smaller than the Collins vessels and made her westbound trips in about 12 days on 
average. (Calculated from Cunard Passage Book 1, years 1851–1853, in CP, GM 2/1, 
SJ)
341  Tyler, 209. The Collins Line’s own figures for the round trip cost were even higher, from 
$63,000 to over $65,000. (Speech of Mr. Edson B. Olds.., 16; Tyler, 209) – There is no 
evidence that the figures of the two companies are strictly comparable, but the Cunard 
Line could certainly manage their operations with less expense than the Collins Line.
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offices were established at the ports used by the liners of both countries, 
and letters were stamped with special postmarks denoting the postage due 
to either the U.S. or the British Post Office.342
Thus, from the one shilling paid on a single letter carried by a Cunarder, 
the British Post Office received ocean postage of 16 cents plus inland postage 
of three cents, making a total of 19 cents, and leaving the American inland 
postage of five cents to be credited to the U.S. Post Office. When carried 
by an American ship, the U.S. Post Office received 16 cents plus five cents, 
leaving three cents for the credit of the British Post Office. Double weight 
had double costs.343
Of this postage, the British Post Office received a total of $1,913,800, while 
the US Post Office received $1,279,400.344 In addition to this, there were the 
‘closed mails’, e.g. to Prussia by an American mail steamer. The mail bags 
containing these mails were guaranteed to be sealed and delivered directly 
to the Prussian Post Office. The postage on closed mails carried by Collins 
Line steamers amounted to $3,900 during the first year mentioned, $11,900 
during the second year, $30,700 during the third year and $33,600 during 
the last year mentioned. The newspapers are missing from the table above. 
The postage on newspapers carried by Collins Line steamers amounted to 
$4,500 during the first year mentioned above, $5,600 during the second year, 
$6,100 during the third year and $8,900 during the last year mentioned.345 
The Cunard Line’s respective figures are not included in the report.
It was claimed by the Americans that the British Post Office not only 
held letters over for the Cunard Line, but also arranged its schedules so that 
it could bring all letters from the continent to the Post Office just in time 
to meet the sailings of the Cunard steamers.346 Whether this was meant to 
be a restriction on competition or just wise logistics – or both – cannot be 
answered in this connection.
342 Staff, 82. For a detailed explanation of the rather complicated system of postage rates 
under different postal treaties, see Hargest, 27–39.
343 Staff, 82–83.
344 Calculated from the records published in Speech of Mr. Edson B. Olds.., 18–19.
345 Speech of Mr. Edson B. Olds..., 18–19. For the Prussian closed-mail, see Hargest, 85–98.
346 Speech of Mr. Edson B. Olds..., 21.
TABLE 19. Postal income from letters carried by the Cunard Line and the Collins 
Line 1851–1854.








Cunard $537,000 $565,600 $578,000 $589,200
Collins $205,800 $228,900 $233,300 $265,200
Source: ‘Revenue received by the United States under the Postal Treaty with Great 
Britain of the 15th of December, 1848’, in Speech of Edson B. Olds… 18–19.
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Another restriction on competition was carried out by the companies 
themselves. A modern-day discovery of key documents has proved that the 
two shipping lines had had a secret working arrangement for the pooling of 
earnings on the carriage of passengers and cargo from the beginning. The 
agreement did not obviate the competition in service between the companies, 
but it did help to maintain the levels of rates and to balance the fluctuations 
in earning capacity. The ‘grey eminences’ behind this arrangement were the 
two brothers – James Brown, the senior partner of Brown Brothers & Co. in 
New York and the most important investor in the Collins Line, and William 
Brown, the senior partner of Brown, Shipley & Co. in Liverpool and a major 
investor in the Cunard Line. After the loss of the Pacific, the agreement was 
not renewed in 1856, as Collins could not adhere to the terms before the new 
Adriatic would be ready for service.347
The cartel only included freight and passenger rates, while the postal 
agreements with the governments gave the economic frames for mail 
transmission. But what happened to the speed of information transmission 
during this colourful and historically strongly emphasized period? Did the 
contest between the two shipping lines improve the speed of the mail service 
on the North Atlantic? Actually, no.
347 For details of the arrangement and how it worked, see Hyde (1975), 39–45. For background, 
see Edward W. Sloan, ‘The First (and Very Secret) International Steamship Cartel, 1850–
1856’, in David J. Starkey & Gelina Harlaftis (ed.), Global Markets: the Internalization 
of the Sea Transport Industries since 1850. Research in Maritime History, No. 14 (St. 
John’s, 1998), 29–52. See also Fox, 121–123.
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 28–41, 98–108.
Diagram 17. Cunard vs. Collins, comparison of all westbound trips, 
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During the whole period of 1850–1857, the Collins ships clearly made 
faster westbound voyages than the Cunarders, as can be seen in Diagram 
17. The company made 43% of their westbound voyages in 11 days or less, 
while Cunard’s ships managed to do this on every fourth trip. The average 
westbound voyage by Collins ships took 12.4 days compared with the Cunard 
Line’s 12.7 days.
Eastbound, the Cunarders made the Atlantic crossing 33 times in ten 
days or less, while the Collins ships only made it 17 times. In other words, 
20% of Cunard’s trips were made in ten days or less, while the percentage 
of Collins trips was only nine. An average Collins trip took 11.5 days and a 
Cunard trip 11.2 days.
This makes the comparison of all Atlantic crossings look somewhat 
different from the common expectations. The percentage of the Cunard Line’s 
fast voyages to the company’s total number of sailings was larger than that of 
the Collins Line.348 But in the long run, their performance was rather similar. 
An average trip was made in 12 days by both companies. The weakened 
performance of the Collins Line during the last years of the company’s 
existence naturally negatively affected the statistics for the whole period.
348 Percentages are used in the comparison of crossings in 1850–1857 as the numbers of 
sailings were rather different. The Collins Line made 370 Atlantic crossings in total while 
the Cunard Line made 336 voyages between Liverpool and New York during this period. 
In 1855 the Cunard Line did not have a service to New York as several of the ships had 
been conscripted as troop carriers in the Crimean War. See the sailing lists of Hubbard 
& Winter, 28–41, 98–108.
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 28–41, 98–108.
Diagram 18. Cunard vs. Collins, comparison of all eastbound trips 














While in 1850–1851 the Collins ships had made more than 50% of their 
westbound trips in 11 days or less, in 1857 the figure dropped below 30%. 
The percentage of eastbound trips made in 11 days or less dropped from 
70–80% to about 50%.
Although the Cunard Line’s westbound performance was weaker in 
1857 than in 1850–1851, their eastbound performance was stronger. The 
improvement followed the entrance of the company’s new steamship Persia, 
which immediately made new speed records in both directions in 1856, 
keeping the Blue Riband for the next seven years.349
It can be said that the tight competition between the two shipping lines cost 
much extra money for the respective governments, and the lives of several 
hundred people who perished in disasters at sea, but caused no remarkable 
improvement in the general speed of communications. Even though the 
competition forced both companies to build larger and faster ships – the 
Persia for the Cunard Line and the Adriatic for the Collins Line – their 
specific influence cannot be noticed in the annual records. Actually, a much 
more important factor than the speed was that the number of mail sailings 
doubled, generating real benefit from a business information transmission 
point of view. And it should be noted that in the shadow of the struggle of 
the Titans, three other American steamship lines were also conducting a mail 
service to Europe under a U.S. Government contract.
Ocean Line and Havre Line – the forgotten contract companies
The Ocean Line, which was established in 1847, carried mail between New 
York and Bremen, via Southampton, monthly throughout the year.350 In 
the late 1840s Bremen was already the main continental port for the U.S. 
trade, handling about one third of German tobacco and one quarter of its 
rice, whaling oil and cotton imports. It had held a trade agreement with 
the United States since 1827, with an American consul in Bremen, and 
Bremen had established consulates in New York (1815), Baltimore (1818), 
Philadelphia (1827) and New Orleans (1840). Additionally, Bremen had 
become an important hub in the emigrant trade. The required capital for 
349 Kludas, 146, 148. – The Blue Riband holder was the record keeper of the fastest westbound 
Atlantic crossing.
350 Excluding the worst winter months during the first years, but since 1851 all the year round. 
See Hubbard & Winter, 82.
TABLE 20. Duration of all transatlantic voyages of the Cunard Line and the Collins 
Line, Liverpool–New York / New York–Liverpool, 1850–1857, (%).
Company 10 days or less 11 days 12–13 days 14 days or more
Cunard Line 13.4% 31.5% 43.6% 11.3%
Collins Line 9.5% 43.8% 31.9% 14.9%
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 28–41, 98–108.
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the new shipping company was collected with the help of some influential 
German-Americans, while Bremen and other German states offered to lower 
transit duties for American goods in Germany, improve navigation on the 
Weser, speed up railway construction in north-west Germany and build a 
new dock with a wider lock so that paddle steamers had access to the new 
harbour.351
When the mail contract with the U.S. Government had been signed and the 
traffic started, the Bremen City Post was named the U.S. Postal Agency on the 
continent, through which all mails on the New York–Bremen route, and later 
also the routes to and from Russia and Scandinavia, would be sent at postal rates 
below those via England. However, not all the German states were included, 
while Baden, Württemberg and the Thurn und Taxis posts did not join in with 
the transit rate reductions, requiring higher postal rates for them .352
The Ocean Line’s steamers, the Washington and the Hermann, built in the 
United States, were described as the ugliest (by the Americans as ‘the most 
beautiful’ and by the Germans as ‘the largest’) ships ever put to sea, and they 
were slower than the Cunard’s old Britannia. Despite the drawbacks, the service 
was conducted for two five-year periods until the U.S. Government changed 
their subsidies policy in 1857 along with the closing of the Collins Line.353
The first arrival of the Washington in Bremerhaven in June 1847 raised 
great excitement and interest, even though the ship could not bring her 
passengers or mails closer than that. Due to the inappropriateness of the 
port, everything had to be off-loaded onto auxiliary steamers for a 3.5-hour 
trip up the river Weser to the city of Bremen. On the way back home, the 
Washington had machinery problems and had to put back to Southampton. 
She finally arrived back from her maiden voyage 35 days after her departure 
from Bremerhaven.354
In Britain, the reception of the first American mail steamer arriving at 
Southampton was very cool, and the Government indeed took measures to 
protect the British Post Office services against competition. By direction of 
the Lords of the Treasury, all letters carried to England were charged as if 
they had been conveyed by British steamers, thus making the postage rate 
double. The discrimination against American mail steamers continued for 
several months and led to a counter-action by the U.S. Congress. The new 
law, generally known by postal historians as the ‘reprisal’ or ‘retaliatory’ 
act, led to a situation where all packet mail between the two countries 
351 See Edwin Drechsel, Norddeutscher Lloyd Bremen, 1857–1875, volume 1, (Vancouver, 
1994), 3–4; Lars U. Scholl, ‘New York’s German Suburb: The Creation of the Port of 
Bremerhaven, 1827–1918’ in Lewis R. Fischer & Adrian Jarvis, (ed.) Harbours and 
Havens: Essays in Port History in Honour of Gordon Jackson. Research of Maritime 
History No 16 (1999), 201–205; Butler, 99–101.
352 Drechsel, 5. Hubbard & Winter, 126.
353 Staff, 80; Tyler 154–156; Drechsel, 4. There was also a German company carrying mails 
between Bremen and New York during 1853–1857, W.A. Fritze & Company, with two 
wooden paddle steamers, Hansa and Germania. The vessels should have run alternately 
with the Ocean Line steamers to achieve semi-monthly trips throughout the year. However, 
only eight voyages were made during 1853–1854 and one final voyage in 1857 after the 
Crimean War. See Hubbard & Winter, 125–128.
354 Hubbard & Winter, 82–84; Butler, 100–101; Tyler, 155–156; Drechsel, 4.
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required double sea postage (see Fig. 14). After a period of strong reactions 
and protests, negotiations were opened and a postal treaty between the two 
countries was signed in December 1848.355
Although one could say that the Ocean Line’s performance did not warrant 
all the measures taken, the British government reacted as they did because 
they knew that more American competition would appear in the North Atlantic 
very soon. The service of the two Ocean Line ships was filled with engine 
problems, incidents and extra calls for coaling due to lengthened voyages. 
The line’s performance, especially westbound, was far from regular, and it 
was not satisfactory in the other direction, either. The average westbound 
trip took 15.9 days and the eastbound 14.6 days. Two to four days should be 
added for the trip between Southampton and Bremen, including the stay in 
Southampton, for the duration of the whole voyage.356
As Scholl has put it, Bremen in effect became America’s continental 
post office. In 1848 the Ocean Line ships carried 80,000 letters to Bremen, 
and five years later the number had risen to 350,000.357 Not all mails were 
carried by the line’s vessels however. From late 1849 the United States took 
355  Hargest, 23–28.
356 Hubbard & Winter, 84–90. The performance of W.A. Fritze & Company’s ships was 
even inferior. Their average sailing from Bremen to New York took 21.9 days and the 
return voyage took 19.9 days. Although the sailings were meant to be direct, the ships 
had to put in at other ports for coaling three times (once at Halifax, twice at Boston) and 
they also called at Southampton twice for reasons not given. See sailing lists of Hubbard 
& Winter, 127.
357 Scholl , ‘New York’s German Suburb…’, 206.
FIG. 14. The letter sent from Liverpool on 23.9.1848 was carried by the Cunard 
Line’s Cambria during the retaliatory period. She sailed from Liverpool on 23.9. 
and arrived in Boston on 6.10.1848. The letter was prepaid by a one shilling postage 
stamp, equivalent to 24 cents. Another 24 cents (note the handstamp) has been 
charged in Boston for the same letter due to the Reprisal Act.
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advantage of the U.S. British Postal Convention of 1848 to send closed mails 
via England to Bremen when regular Bremen packets were not available. In 
addition to the Bremen Closed Mail, there was also the Prussian Closed Mail 
carried by contract ships other than the Ocean Line’s. In 1849 and 1850 five 
closed mails were sent to Bremen by Cunard and Collins vessels; in 1851 
there were 11 extra mails, most of them carried by the Havre Line; and in 
1852 there were no less than 34 extra mails to Bremen by other mail ships 
– mainly by the American contract lines the Collins Line and the Havre Line
– while the Ocean Line only conducted 12 sailings during the year.358
The Havre Line started the transatlantic service between New York and
Havre via Southampton (Cowes) in October 1850. The company’s two 
original steamships, the Franklin and the Humboldt, were both wrecked in 
1853–1854. They were replaced by chartered vessels until the new ships, 
the 2,240-ton Arago and the 2,300-ton Fulton, were ready for service in 
June 1855 and February 1856. They both had berths for a total of 350 
passengers in first and second class, and they could also carry 800 tons 
of cargo.359
As Bonsor notes, the Arago and the Fulton were probably the most 
successful of the American transatlantic wooden paddle steamers. Even 
though they both lost one round voyage in 1859 due to machinery 
breakdowns, they normally sailed with commendable regularity until the 
358 See Hubbard & Winter, 409–414.
359 Hubbard & Winter, 110; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 213–214.
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 84–90. – The profile of the Ocean 
Line’s westbound sailings clearly illustrates the unpredictability of the company’s 
service.
Diagram 19. Ocean Line, duration of westbound trips 












end of 1861, when the U.S. War Department took them up during the Civil 
War. They were returned to the North Atlantic in late 1865.360
In 1866, the company restarted its service between New York and Havre 
via Falmouth, but gave up in 1867 due to several reasons, ‘not the least of 
which’ was ‘the bad commercial policy of the United States Government, 
which has already caused so much American tonnage to slip into foreign 
hands’.361 Of the three ocean steamship lines established under the U.S. 
Government subsidy in the late 1840s, the Havre Line was the only one to 
survive ten years after the subsidies were removed, thus showing that the 
service was not impossible without it, if the company’s business was on 
somewhat healthy grounds.362
Compared with all the prestige and publicity that followed the Collins 
Line from beginning to end, the Havre Line has certainly not received all the 
attention it would have deserved. It was owned by Messrs. Fox & Livingston, 
who had extensive experience with sailing packets running between New 
York and Havre as owners of the Old Line, one of the Havre sailing packet 
pioneers from the early 1820s.363
360 Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 214.
361 The Times 3.1.1867, cited by Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 214.
362 Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 213–214. Hubbard & Winter, 109–110.
363 About their sailing packet business, see Albion (1938), 126–127, and Cutler (1967), 
394–396. For a list of their ships, see Albion (1938), 284; Staff, 125–126.
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 84–90, 111–120.
Diagram 20. Westbound trips of Havre Line and Ocean Line, 


















As can be seen in Diagram 20, the Havre Line’s performance was very different 
from the Ocean Line’s. The company made most of their westbound sailings in 
12 or 13 days, some even faster. The spread of the duration of sailings was broad, 
however, so that the service could not be called regular by any means.
The Havre Line had originally received half of the Government contract 
originally meant for the Ocean Line, which was not able to organize the 
alternate trips to Havre. Of the original contract of $350,000 per year, the line 
to Bremen received $200,000 and $150,000 was left for the Havre Line.364 
In June 1857, when the contracts for these two lines expired, only temporary 
one-year contracts were offered by the Postmaster General, based on the 
compensation for sea postage only.365
The Ocean Line’s ships were in service from June 1847 to July 1857 and the 
Havre Line’s from October 1850 to December 1861, and again from November 
1865 to December 1867. After the American Civil War, the Havre Line’s ships 
called at Falmouth instead of Southampton in 1866–1867. In 1867 the company 
sailed in a joint venture with the New York Mail Steamship Company.366 In 
total, the Havre Line made 161 and the Ocean Line 100 westbound trips.
The quantity of mail carried by the Havre Line steamers was rather humble 
compared with the big contract mail lines. The published figures are from the 
early 1850s. In 1851, the Cunard Line carried 2,613,000 letters, the Collins 
Line 843,000 letters, the Ocean Line 313,000 letters and the Havre Line 
139,000 letters.367 From that year on, postage for mail carried by the Havre 
Line varied as follows:
During 1852–1854, the Havre Line and the Ocean Line carried almost 
similar quantities of mails. The postage on mails carried by the two companies 
decreased in 1853 compared with 1852, and did not return to that level even 
in 1854, while the postage for the Cunard Line and the Collins Line steadily 
364 Bonsor (1975), vol.1, 212.
365 Hubbard & Winter, 110.
366 Hubbard & Winter, 120.
367 Albion (1939), 328.









Postage $37,300 $80,800 $53,400 $63,300
Closed mails $1,100 $6,500 $5,400 $10,600
Newspapers $80 $100 $100 $2,200
Total $38,420 $87,400 $58,900 $76,100
Source: ‘Revenue received by the United States under the Postal Treaty with Great 
Britain of the 15th of December, 1848’ in  Speech of Mr. Edson B. Olds...18–19.
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increased.368 Undoubtedly, the mails arrived faster in Havre or Bremen by 
the more frequent ships via Liverpool and from there by railway than if they 
had waited in New York for the next direct shipping to those countries.
Competition and business information transmission
The frequency of steamship mail sailings from New York and Boston to 
Europe was now really satisfactory compared with anything earlier. There 
were two weekly departures by steamers, which normally made the trip in 
less than two weeks, even in ten days.
As can be seen in Table 22, the American contract mail sailings departed 
from New York each Saturday and the Cunarders every Wednesday from 
New York or Boston alternately. The eastbound sailings in April–May 
1853 mostly took about 11 days, with the exception of the Ocean Line’s 
Washington, which sailed to Southampton (Cowes) in 14 days.
368 Speech of Mr. Edson B. Olds…, 19.
Ship Shipping line Departure Arrival 
Baltic Collins Line April 2 Saturday April 14, Liverpool
Asia1 Cunard Line April 6 Wednesday April 17, Liverpool
Franklin Havre Line April 9 Saturday April 20, Cowes
April 21, Havre
Niagara Cunard Line April 13 Wednesday  (B) April 25, Liverpool
Atlantic Collins Line April 16 Saturday April 27, Liverpool
Europa Cunard Line April 20 Wednesday May 1, Liverpool
Washington Ocean Line April 23 Saturday May 7, Cowes
May 10, Bremen
America Cunard Line April 27 Wednesday  (B) May 9, Liverpool
Arctic Collins Line April 30 Saturday May 11, Liverpool
Arabia Cunard Line May 4 Wednesday May 14, Liverpool
Humboldt Havre Line May 7 Saturday May 18, Cowes
May 19, Havre
Canada Cunard Line May 11 Wednesday  (B) May 22, Liverpool
Pacific Collins Line May 14 Saturday May 24, Liverpool
Asia Cunard Line May 18 Wednesday May 29, Liverpool
Hermann Ocean Line May 21 Saturday June 2, Cowes
June 4, Bremen
Cambria Cunard Line May 25 Wednesday  (B) June 6, Liverpool
Baltic Collins Line May 28 Saturday June 7, Liverpool
TABLE 22. Frequency of mail steamship sailings from New York and Boston (B) 
to Europe, April–May 1853.
Source: Hubbard & Winter, 33, 87, 101, 113, 383. – Within a few years the sailings 




How did the sailings serve business? One of the companies that could 
really benefit from fast business communications was Rathbone Bros & Co. 
which had the advantage of being located at both ends of the best working 
sea connections of the time. The correspondence between Rathbones in 
Liverpool and their New York agency, opened in 1851,369 was very active. 
A sample of 113 incoming letters from Henry Wainright Gair, an agent and 
partner in Rathbone Bros & Co. in New York in 1853370, shows that national 
priorities had very little influence when choosing the mail-carrying ship. 
Instead, reputation and the expected speed of the carrier seem to have most 
affected the choice.
Of the letters, 77 were sent by the Cunard Line’s ships, 44 via Boston and 
33 directly from New York, while 31 of the letters were sent by the Collins 
Line’s vessels. Only three letters were sent by the Havre Line and two letters 
by the Ocean Line, which both operated via Southampton.
 The average delivery time from the date of the letter to its arrival in 
Liverpool was 12.3 days from New York, independent of the mail-carrying 
company – the Cunard Line or the Collins Line. The inland journey via 
Boston or via Southampton added an extra day to the delivery time. Thus the 
trips via Boston by the Cunard Line and via Southampton by the Havre Line 
or the Ocean Line took 13.3 to 13.5 days on average.371 All the letters were 
carried on eastbound trips, which were less challenging for seafaring; more 
differences would probably have been seen on the westbound run.
Some details from the sample can be selected for further examination. Six 
letters written between 24 February and 4 March, 1853 were sent by two different 
steamers, the America of the Cunard Line from Boston on 2 March and the Arctic 
of the Collins Line on 5 March directly from New York. The letters, which 
were written between 24 February and 1 March, were dispatched in Liverpool 
12 days after the America had departed from Boston. Their total delivery time 
from writer to recipient varied between 13 and 18 days due to different waiting 
times at port, without the shipping line having anything to do with it.
Two letters, dated 1 and 4 March, were sent by the Arctic, which sailed 
from New York on 5 March and arrived in Liverpool on the 16th. The total 
delivery time of the letters varied between 12 and 15 days, showing that the 
whole duration of information transmission still depended on the sender as 
well, not only the mail-carrying vessel.
The Rathbone practice shows that letters were regularly written to be sent 
by the next day’s ship and last-minute information was sent on the sailing 
day. Of the 113 letters, 68 were written the day before ship departure – 21 
of them via Boston – and ten letters were written on the same day as the ship 
departed. An express service took care of the urgent letters to the Boston 
369 See Sheila Marriner, Rathbones of Liverpool, 1845–73 (Liverpool, 1961), 14.
370  Letters to Rathbone Bros & Co., Liverpool, 1853.  In Rathbone Collection, RP XXIV.2. 
(SJ). – H.W. Gair was related to Rathbones by marriage. (Marriner, 6).
371 The averages of the Havre Line and the Ocean Line may be somewhat too positive due 
to the small number of cases and the fact that all the letters involved were written on the 
day before or even on the same day as the ship departed, while the averages of the Cunard 
Line and the Collins Line include cases where the letters had been written earlier and 
stayed in port for several days before the actual sailing.
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steamer, and indeed, one of the letters was written on the same day as the 
ship departed from Boston.372
Changes in the transatlantic mail services in the late 1850s
During the Crimean War, while the Cunard Line was withdrawn from the New 
York route, ‘Commodore’ Cornelius Vanderbilt, a well-known shipowner 
in the New York region, submitted a low bid to the Postmaster General. His 
ships would carry mail between New York and Liverpool semi-monthly, 
alternating with the Collins Line, to form a weekly communication. His 
company would conduct the service for $15,000 each round trip, with a 
contract to exist for five years. No contract was made, but Vanderbilt started 
the traffic at his own expense. His steamers North Star and Ariel served the 
route between New York and Havre, including a call at Southampton, with 
departures every third week, starting from April 1855.373
Although Vanderbilt’s service was not really regular when examined in 
the sailing lists, it easily beat the Ocean Line in both directions.374 In June 
1857, when the second five-year contract with the Ocean Line for monthly 
voyages to Bremen expired, the Postmaster General awarded a temporary 
contract to Vanderbilt for service on the Bremen route for one year, 13 
372  One of the urgent letters for a next-day departure had been marked ‘Express New York’ 
to Boston. Letter to Rathbone Bros Co. 20.12.1853. (Rathbone Collection, RP XXIV.2., 
SJ).
373 Hubbard & Winter, 161–162; Butler, 211. – The line was called the Vanderbilt European 
Line to differentiate it from the Vanderbilt Line on the Nicaragua route, see Chapter VI.3. 
– For details of Vanderbilt’s earlier life and career, see Butler, 121–134.
374 An average Vanderbilt voyage between New York and Southampton took 13.1 days 
westbound and 12.5 days eastbound during 1855 and 1857, while the corresponding 
figures for the Ocean Line were 15.1 days and 14.5 days respectively. Calculated from 
the sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 89–90, 163–165.
TABLE 23. Examples of differences in total delivery time depending on the sender, 
letters from New York to Liverpool, 1853.




America Cunard 24.2. Boston 2.3. 14.3.
America Cunard 28.2. Boston 2.3. 14.3.
America Cunard 28.2. Boston 2.3. 14.3.
America Cunard 1.3. Boston 2.3. 14.3.
Arctic Collins 1.3. 5.3. 16.3.
Arctic Collins 4.3. 5.3. 16.3.
Source: Letters to Rathbone Bros & Co. in Rathbone Collection, RP XXIV.2. (SJ)
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round voyages. Compensation was U.S. inland and sea postage on the mails 
carried. Temporary contracts were continued after the Collins Line suspended 
operations.375
The Ocean Line declined this type of compensation, which was 
considerably less than it had received under the previous contract, and desired 
continuation of the former subsidy. When this was rejected, the company 
suspended operations in July 1857.376 The vessels were sold for what was 
said to be about a tenth of their original value for use on the Pacific coast, and 
the stockholders only received about a third of their investment. However, 
in contrast to the Collins Line, the company had at least paid dividends in 
1853 and 1854 of 7% and 10% respectively.377
The Vanderbilt Line continued with temporary contracts in 1858, 
when also the Collins Line had suspended operations. From May 1858 
Cornelius Vanderbilt was awarded temporary contracts for single trips 
for the Havre route as well.378 At the end of 1858 an Act was passed that 
foreign overseas mails should be carried for the postage – i.e. the inland 
and sea postage if by an American ship, or the sea postage only, if by a 
foreign ship.379
The Vanderbilt Line would hardly be remembered in maritime history 
without their steamer Vanderbilt, which entered the traffic in May 1857, 
immediately challenging the Collins Line’s Atlantic and the Cunard Line’s new 
iron paddle wheeler Persia. The Vanderbilt could accommodate 400 first and 
second class passengers, and carry 1,200 tons of cargo and 1,400 tons of coal, 
her consumption of which was 100 tons per day.380
The Vanderbilt created a sensation on her third eastbound voyage by 
steaming from New York to the Needles (on the Isle of Wight) in nine days 
and eight hours at an average speed of 13.87 knots. The company claimed 
that this was faster than the Persia’s record trip, but due to claimed errors in 
the method of comparison, the Vanderbilt could not obtain the Blue Riband 
from the Persia. This was one of the three voyages which the Vanderbilt 
ran in head-on competition with the Collins Line’s Atlantic, leaving New 
York on the same day. During all these three trips, the Vanderbilt called at 
Southampton and arrived at Havre on the same day as the Atlantic arrived 
at Liverpool. According to Hargest, the U.S. Postmaster General ‘appears 
to have been extremely co-operative with Vanderbilt, for despite the fact 
that a heavy subsidy was being paid to the Collins line for carrying the 
mail, nevertheless, mails were sent to Southampton and Havre by the 
Vanderbilt.’381
The speed of the Vanderbilt was equal to the Cunard Line’s new 
Persia while in service during 1857–1859, calculated from May 1857, 
375 Hubbard & Winter, 161–162. For the change from subsidized mail steamship lines to 
compensation in the form of sea postage only, see Hargest, 113–115.
376 Hubbard & Winter, 83, 161.
377 Tyler, 242.
378 Hubbard & Winter, 161.
379 Robinson (1964), 141.
380 Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 330.
381 See Hargest, 117.
North Atlantic
143
when the latter entered the traffic. The Persia’s average westbound 
trip took 11.4 days, while the Vanderbilt’s average was 11.0 days. 
Eastbound, the figures were 10.1 and 10.5 days respectively. Again, 
both vessels steamed homewards faster than their competitors in the 
same direction.
Diagram 21. Vanderbilt vs. Persia, duration of westbound trips, 















Source: Sailing lists in Hubbard & Winter, 38–44, 163–165.
Source: Sailing lists in Hubbard & Winter, 38–44, 163–165.
Diagram 22. Vanderbilt vs. Persia, duration of eastbound trips, 














As can be noticed in the diagrams, the performance of the two vessels was 
clearly better than any other ships before that date. The Persia even made 
three nine-day crossings eastbound, from port to port. The regularity of the 
ships was excellent compared with anything ever seen on the Atlantic. During 
her career as a mail steamer, the Vanderbilt never took more than 12 days 
for an Atlantic crossing. It should be noticed, however, that she was out of 
traffic during the worst winter months.382
Cornelius Vanderbilt showed that it was possible to run a mail service 
without government subsidies and even conquer the best performance of a 
subsidized vessel. The competition between the Vanderbilt and the Cunard 
Line service was parallel with the contest between the Great Western and 
the Cunarders ten years earlier. But one speedy vessel was not sufficient for 
a regular and reliable mail service if the other ships of the company did not 
meet the expectations. As can be noticed from Diagram 23, the Vanderbilt 
Line’s performance varied a great deal depending on which ship made the 
journey.383
382 The remark also includes the Vanderbilt’s performance in 1860. See the sailing lists of 
Hubbard & Winter, 165.
383 The company’s service was ceased in 1858 for months due to problems with two vessels, 
the Ariel and the North Star. Two mail sailings were cancelled and a third was taken care 
of by the Inman Line. (Hargest, 116; Hubbard & Winter, 163–164.)
Diagram 23. Vanderbilt Line, duration of westbound trips 







1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64
Trips
Days
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 163–165. – The profile of the westbound 
sailings of the Vanderbilt Line looks very different to the flagship’s performance.
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With the outbreak of the American Civil War, Vanderbilt’s steamships 
were taken for charter by the Federal Government, and the Vanderbilt 
European Line’s service was never started up again. Commodore Vanderbilt 
transferred his capital and interest to the railway business .384
Within about ten years, between 1857 and 1867, the American mail 
steamship companies disappeared from the North Atlantic service. Two of 
the original contract lines, the Ocean Line and the Collins Line, had to close 
down for lack of sufficient government subsidies, accompanied by poor 
management of ships and finances.
It has often been pointed out that the main reason for the collapse of the 
Collins Line was the cut in subsidy at a time when the company had just lost 
two of its four vessels. However, the Havre Line lost both its original vessels 
but could still continue in traffic, even after the Civil War. The line also lost 
its subsidies at the same time as all the other American shipping companies, 
only receiving compensation based on postage on the mails carried.
When comparing the Collins ships’ and the Vanderbilt’s performance, 
it can also be noticed that a fast, regular service did not necessarily mean 
continuous, long-lasting and expensive repairs. The Vanderbilt regularly 
stayed in New York for only seven to 14 days between her voyages, with the 
exception that the company had no service during the worst winter months, 
mainly January–February, even March, when all the line’s ships stayed in 
the home port.385
The 3,350-ton Vanderbilt was somewhat larger than the Atlantic and her 
sisters, which were 2,850 tons each. The Persia was 3,300 tons. They were 
all wooden paddle steamers, except the Persia, which was Cunard’s first iron 
ship built for the Atlantic service. The Collins ships and the Persia had two 
side-lever engines each, while the Vanderbilt had two beam engines. The 
American ships were built in their home country, the Persia in Britain.
The engines of the Collins ships (built in 1850) could produce 2,000 
ihp, while those of the Persia (built in 1856) were already producing 3,600 
ihp.386 It seems that, among several other things that caused the collapse of 
the Collins Line, Edward Collins was somewhat ahead of his time and failed 
partly due to the same reason as the builders of the Great Eastern did on 
a larger scale.387 The technology was not yet advanced enough to meet the 
expectations of the shipowners. Technological improvements would not only 
enable a faster service speed but would also reduce the machinery problems 
384 Hubbard & Winter, 162; Butler, 241.
385 Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 163–165.
386 Kludas, 45, 49.
387 The Great Eastern, of 18,915 tons, was Isambard Brunel’s masterpiece, originally built 
for the Eastern route in 1860 but transformed for the North Atlantic service. She was 
about five times larger than any other ship in the world but never became an economic 
success. The technology of the time could not meet the challenges caused by the enormous 
size of the vessel – she was the largest ship in the world for the next four decades. The 
Great Eastern is best remembered for laying the Atlantic cable. See N.R.P. Bonsor, North 
Atlantic Seaway (New York, 1978), vol. 2, 579–585; John Steele Gordon, A Thread Across 
the Ocean. The Heroic Story of the Transatlantic Cable (London, 2002), 153–208. The 
Great Eastern never had a mail contract, although she may have carried letters privately 
like any merchant ship.
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at sea. It did not seem possible, however, to speed up development too much. 
Neither the size and capacity, nor the speed of the vessels, could be increased 
before the technical solutions were in place, and that always took years, even 
though the engineers were working full days for further improvements.
Tyler has collected some interesting figures about technical efficiency 
development in steamships over 16 years, comparing the Cunard Line’s first 
mail steamer Britannia with the Persia:
TABLE 24. Comparison of technical development, the Britannia and the Persia of 
the Cunard Line.
What then did the Havre Line mean when it stated that the company closed 
down in 1867 for reasons ‘not the least of which is the bad commercial policy 
of the U.S. Government, which has already caused so much American tonnage 
to slip into foreign hands’?388 The company’s steamers Arago and Fulton, built 
in 1855 and used in war service for several years, should have been replaced 
with new ones at the end of the 1860s. Why did the company not invest in new 
vessels? A major reason for the decline of the American merchant marine was 
the scarcity of capital. English investors considered American-built steamships 
inferior, and were reluctant to invest in them, while American investors put 
their money in sailing ships and, more often, in Western interior development 
– railways, telegraph, industrial enterprises and mines.389
American merchant shipping declined rapidly after the Civil War, a trend
that was to continue for decades. In 1860 two-thirds of all export and import 
tonnage was carried on American ships, in 1866 only 30% and nine years 
later 27%.390 When Britain passed the Navigation Laws of 1849 and opened 
its trade internationally, the Americans only moved to protect their shipyards, 
388 Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 214.
389 Safford, 72–73. Tyler, ix.
390 Later on, the figure was 16% in 1881 and less than 9% in 1910. See Safford, 53. Tyler 
gives different statistics, but a similar trend. See Tyler, 377.
Britannia Persia
Built 1840 1856
Consumption of coal to New York 750 tons 1,400 tons
Cargo carried 224 tons 750 tons
Passengers 90 250
Indicated horse power (ihp) 710 3,600
Pressure per sq. in. 9 lbs 33 lbs
Coal per ihp / hour 5.1 lbs 3.8 lbs




doing nothing to encourage their shipping. This was partly seen as a political 
question: the southern pro-slavery leaders were against giving support to the 
northern shipping, as it would have strengthened the economic superiority of 
the northern states. The withdrawal of the Collins subsidy can also, at least 
partly, be seen against this background.391
Due to the legislation, American shipping companies had to use vessels 
built in the United States. The American shipyards were superior in building 
wooden vessels but they did not have much experience of iron, which was 
also expensive in America compared with Britain. Additionally, British 
mechanical skills and engineering were far beyond the American level.392 
The American steamship companies were left in the contest without support 
and in the new market situation the last American mail steamship companies 
closed down. In the view of regular business information transmission, this 
was not a problem however; several new European companies were eager 
to take the market share left by the Americans.
Emigrant lines take their share of mail transport
The Great Famine in Ireland, caused 
by several successive failed potato 
harvests in the mid-1840s, had started a 
new type of traffic across the Atlantic: 
mass transportation of emigrants 
fleeing from poverty to what they hoped 
would be a better life.393 Between 
1846 and 1875, more than 2.2 million 
Irishmen emigrated to the United States. 
The number of German emigrants was even larger, about 2.6 million, while 
the total number of English, Scottish and Welsh emigrants was 1.6 million 
during this period. The emigration of Scandinavians started later in the 
1860s, followed by Italians and Russians as the largest groups at the end of 
the century.394
During the first peak of this mass transportation, almost 2.7 million people 
were carried across the Atlantic by sailing vessels, the main emigrant port 
being Liverpool. As long as the American sailing packets had better cargo 
to carry – mail, fine freight, specie and bullion – they were not interested in 
the steerage business and left it to the various emigrant lines.395 Only after 
391 This is one of the main conclusions made by Tyler, 226–229. See also Safford, 64, 74. 
– Junius Smith, whose pioneering steamer Sirius made the first transatlantic crossing in 
1838, was mortally assaulted on his tea plantation in South Carolina in 1852 due to his 
anti-slavery opinions. See Pond, 266–279.
392 About the decline of the American merchant marine, see Safford, 53–81.
393 See Fox, 168–169; Kenwood & Lougheed, 63–64.
394 Maldwyn A. Jones: Destination America (New York, 1976), 16–17. – A useful analysis of 
the economic reasons for emigration and its effects on the labour markets on both sides of 
the Atlantic can be found in Kevin H. O’Rourke & Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization 
and History. The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy (Massachusetts, 
2000), 119–206. See also Kenwood & Lougheed, 66–69.
395 Several shipping lines were established for emigrant transport in the late 1840s. There 
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were more than a dozen of them operating between Britain and New York or Boston, often 
by chartered sailing ships of varying quality, in addition to the American sailing packets, 
which also started to carry emigrants at that time. See Cutler (1967), 371–392. – HAPAG 
was established for this purpose in 1847. The company carried German emigrants to 
America on sailing vessels for the first ten years and started their steamship service in 
1856. For the sailing packet period, see Kurt Himer, 75 Jahre Hamburg-Amerika Linie. 
I Teil: Adolph Godeffroy und Seine Nachfolger bis 1886. (Hamburg, 1922), 7–23.
FIG. 16. Emigrants departing from Liverpool. An illustration of the beginning of an 




















423 435 730 563 673 277 592 283
Ireland 1,288 416 535 487 537 345 277 123
Germany 971 537 1,063 1,170 891 285 302 200
Scandinavia 25 26 229 476 549 419 363 178
Russia – – 17 86 398 918 1,833 293
Italy – – 35 138 486 1,323 2,025 542
Total 2,707 1,414 2,601 2,919 3,534 3,567 5,391 1,620
Source: Jones, 16–17. – The figures of the five decades after 1875 are given to show 
how the early trends evolved over time. The American Civil War and WW1 caused 
a drastic reduction in the number of emigrants.




the steamers took over the best business did emigrants become an interesting 
option for the sailing packets.396
By that time, technical developments had made it possible for steamships 
to carry more freight or passengers than earlier. Iron-built steamers with 
revolutionary screw propellers were more cost-effective in use than wooden 
paddle steamers. Later on, the compound engine would cause even more 
savings in coal consumption.397
The first steamship line to really take advantage of the screw steamers 
and start carrying steerage passengers was the Liverpool & Philadelphia 
Steamship Company, better known as the Inman Line, after the founder 
William Inman of Liverpool. The Inman Line started transatlantic traffic 
between Liverpool and Philadelphia in 1850. Having purchased an iron 
screw steamer, the City of Glasgow, in 1852, Inman converted her to an 
emigrant ship by preparing 400 temporary berths for westbound voyages and 
adapting them for cargo space eastbound. Apart from the fact that steamship 
voyages were notably faster than those of sailing ships – which was naturally 
convenient for passengers travelling uncomfortably in steerage – Inman’s 
concept included cheap ticket prices compared with mail steamers and cooked 
meals on board for the less wealthy passengers as well.398
The Inman Line soon added two similar but larger steamers to its fleet, but 
it did not take long before the service was interrupted. The City of Glasgow 
sailed from Liverpool in March 1854 with 480 people on board, and was 
never heard of again. In September of the same year, the City of Philadelphia 
was lost near Cape Race. These misadventures made the public suspicious 
of the seaworthiness of screw steamers for several years.399
The only Inman ship remaining after the losses of 1854, together with the 
two replacements, were chartered to the British and French governments as 
troop carriers in the Crimean war. This saved the company financially, and 
the public had time to forget the disasters. After the war, the market situation 
on the North Atlantic route changed with the collapse of the Collins Line. 
Inman changed its American port from Philadelphia to New York and the 
company’s name to the Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia Steam Ship 
Company. To replace the ceased Collins Line mail operations, the U.S. 
Postmaster General made individual trip contracts with steamship companies 
carrying mail to Liverpool and other European ports, offering compensation 
of sea postage only for the letters carried. The Inman Line thus started as a 
mail carrier between Liverpool and New York from early 1857, with a bi-
monthly service.400
The Canadian Allan Line started a bi-monthly service on the Liverpool 
– Quebec route in 1856, sailing to Portland in the winter when navigation
396 Albion (1938), 247–251. – About the life on board, see Jones, 28–39.
397 About technical developments, see Fox, 140–167, 172–178.
398 The first iron screw steamer, the Great Britain, built in 1845, did not carry steerage 
passengers, but the second one, Sarah Sands, built in 1847, could carry 200. See Bonsor 
(1975), vol. 1, 63, 184–185. About William Inman and his business concept, see Fox, 
178–181.
399 Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 218–220; Fox, 182–185.
400 Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 218–221, 238–239; Fox 181–185; Hubbard & Winter, 195–198.
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up the St. Lawrence was impossible. Cornelius Vanderbilt started his line 
between New York and Bremen via Southampton in 1857, the same year as 
the Inman Line changed to the New York route. Additionally, two important 
German lines started their steamship service on the North Atlantic route: 
Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktien Gesellschaft, or Hamburg-
Amerika Linie (the Hamburg-American Line), usually shortened to HAPAG, 
between Hamburg and New York in 1856 and Norddeutscher Lloyd (the 
North German Lloyd), between Bremen and New York in 1858. Both German 
lines soon added a call at Southampton to their service.401
Of all these new lines, the Inman Line, HAPAG and the Norddeutscher 
Lloyd not only operated in the emigrant business, but also carried mail on 
behalf of the U.S. Post Office. The Allan Line started as a mail carrier under 
a Canadian government contract, but also carried emigrants from the very 
beginning. All these lines started their operations with iron screw steamers 
that had steerage accommodation for 300 to 400 passengers.402
Between 1860 and 1875 the traffic on the North Atlantic route grew 
enormously. In the early 1860s there were about two weekly sailings to 
New York from England, or from the German states via England. The slight 
growth during the American Civil War was mainly due to the increase in 
German sailings, especially those of the Norddeutscher Lloyd which replaced 
the Vanderbilt Line. In the late 1860s, the German companies grew strongly 
and during some years even took a larger market share on the route than the 
Liverpool companies. The unexpected and fast growth of the German lines 
is depicted in Diagram 24.
After the Civil War had swept all American competitors from the North 
Atlantic route, the market was divided between the two British and two 
German companies. The emigrant transports were the main reason for the 
remarkable growth in the number of sailings from the mid-1860s. The peak 
year of this period was 1873, when the four companies had a total of 279 
New York arrivals.403
In Diagram 25, the Cunard Line’s sailings to Boston and the Inman Line’s 
service to Halifax (1867–1871) are not included.
401 Hubbard & Winter, 129–130, 161–162, 167–168, 235–236; Arnell (1980), 159–161. For 
the mail conventions between the United States and Hamburg & Bremen, see Hargest, 
119–125.
402 There were also several other emigrant steamship lines established during these years: 
the Anchor Line between Glasgow and New York in 1856, the National Line between 
Liverpool and New York as well as London and New York in 1864, and the Guion Line 
between Liverpool & New York in 1866. These ships did not have mail contracts and 
are therefore excluded from this study. For these lines, see C.R. Vernon Gibbs, British 
Passenger Liners of the Five Oceans. (London, 1963), 222–232, 238–247; Bonsor (1975), 
vol. 1, 422–471; and Bonsor (1978), vol. 2, 599–615, 701–711.
403 Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 44–45, 53–54, 200–201, 209–210.
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Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 174–194, 242–262. – The number of 
German emigrants almost doubled in the mid-1860s, which correlates strongly with 
the growth in the number of sailings. See the emigrant records in Table 25.
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 44–80, 174–194, 200–224, 239–262.
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Effects on business information transmission
In addition to the leading shipping companies, there was the Irish Galway 
Line, established in 1858, which carried mails from Galway via Halifax, or 
alternatively via St. John’s, to New York. After some changes in the company’s 
mail contracts and continuous problems in meeting its commitments,404 the 
line had to close down in early 1864. It has been stated that the decline of 
the company was due to the withdrawal of the government subsidy in 1861. 
Nevertheless, the abolition of the mail contract had a clear reason: the line’s 
poor performance. Their westbound sailings took over 15 days on average. 
Half of the trips were conducted in 16 days or more, while the company’s 
new Adriatic – purchased from the Collins Line – could make the same route 
in eight or nine days.405
During its short existence, the Galway Line introduced some new ideas 
to business information transmission. The company’s contract included 
a plan that the ships would carry telegrams to St. John’s, from where 
they could be transmitted to Canada or the United States, thus saving 
some time in information transmission. The transatlantic cable was not 
yet in regular operation, but telegraphic communications already existed 
from Newfoundland.406 Due to the ships’ slow voyages, this means of 
communications was not successful however; it was speedier to send the 
information by a mail steamer directly to New York.
An immediate effect of the Galway Line’s service from Ireland was that 
the Inman Line started to make a call at Queenstown on the way to or from 
New York in 1859, thus ensuring its part of the lucrative Irish emigrant 
business. The Cunard Line, seeing the effect on the mail traffic, started the 
same practice later in the same year.407
In a way, the Inman Line actually did the Liverpool merchants a disservice 
by starting calls at Queenstown. From then on, the incoming mails were 
offloaded while the mail steamer was anchored off Queenstown, taken to 
Cork by auxiliary steamer and loaded onto the train for Dublin. Then a mail 
steamer conveyed the mails from Kingstown – the port city of Dublin – to 
Holyhead, England, from where they proceeded by train directly to London. 
Movements of mails and passengers in this manner saved about twelve hours 
of transit time. Meanwhile, the mails for Liverpool and the northern parts 
of England continued by the transatlantic mail steamer and were dispatched 
in Liverpool on the following day.408 Thus, Liverpool businessmen lost the 
advantage of getting the American mails one day earlier than London. As 
404 The company first had a contract with the government of the colony of Newfoundland, and 
then with the British government. See Hubbard & Winter, 263–264; Hargest 125–127.
405 See Timothy Collins, Transatlantic Triumph & Heroic Failure – The Galway Line (Cork, 
2002), 151; sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 265–270.
406 Hubbard & Winter, 263–264. – This ship-telegraph route had already been used several 
years earlier by the New York Associated Press in connection with the Cunard Line’s 
calls at Halifax. However, it had never been an official part of any mail contract. See 
Chapter V.4.
407 Hubbard & Winter, 44, 199–200; Collins, 149.
408 Hubbard & Winter, 14.
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the most important news could be transmitted by telegraph from the first 
port of arrival in any case, the difference was probably no longer considered 
crucial in the late 1850s.
Liverpool had already started to lose its control over the North Atlantic 
mail transmission earlier. Several American and German mail-carrying 
steamers – the Vanderbilt Line, the Havre Line, HAPAG, the Norddeutscher 
Lloyd – called at Southampton instead of Liverpool on their way to Havre or 
Bremen, as the competition in shipping was very hard on the Mersey. In the 
late 1840s, the American Chamber of Commerce in Liverpool wrote ‘to the 
Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury’ that ‘…whenever the (…) 
mails arrive late in the afternoon at Southampton, the letters for Liverpool are 
delayed twelve hours in London, always affording to the London Merchant 
decided advantage in all transactions – and moreover upon occasions when 
the arrival at Southampton happens to be late on a Saturday, the letters are 
not available in Liverpool until Tuesday morning as they do not arrive for 
delivery till after business hours on the previous Monday evening.’ Therefore, 
the merchants ‘humbly submitted’ that the mails would be directly distributed 
to the country.409
There may have been some relevance in the claims of the Liverpool 
merchants, as the plan to abolish the mail contracts with the shipping 
lines carrying mails to Southampton was ‘vigorously opposed’ by London 
merchants in the 1860s,410 even though they would have received their mails 
rapidly by train from Queenstown as well. It was not only important to get 
the news fast; it was also important to get it faster than the competitors.
Although all the mentioned shipping lines carried mails to and from 
England, it seems that British businessmen preferred ships with a reputation 
for being fast, and they also preferred short inland connections. The 
correspondence of Rathbone Bros & Co. lends some weight to this claim, 
even if it naturally represents only one company’s aims, and especially one 
that was located in Liverpool.
A sample of letters from Rathbone & Bros Co.’s correspondence in 
1864411 shows that the company received mail from New York by almost 
every British mail steamer that arrived in Liverpool during the year. Of the 
146 received letters, 77 had arrived by the Cunard Line and 64 by the Inman 
Line ships directly to Liverpool. Of the letters carried by the Cunard Line, 
34 had arrived via Boston while 43 were sent directly from New York. Five 
letters had arrived by the German lines via Southampton.412
409 A Memorial to the Right Honorable the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury, 
resolved in a meeting of the ACC in Liverpool on 14.4.1849. (LRO, 380 AME/2). The 
memorial was written in cooperation with the West Indian Association, especially due 
to delays in the West Indies mails, but the problem was naturally the same whenever 
overseas mails arrived at Southampton.
410 Tyler, 341.
411 Rathbone Collection, RP XXIV.2.20, (SJ).
412 The Cunard Line had 27 arrivals from New York and 26 from Boston to Liverpool that 
year, the Inman Line had 54 arrivals from New York to Liverpool, the Norddeutscher 
Lloyd had 22 arrivals and HAPAG 23 arrivals from New York to Southampton. See the 
sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 50–52, 177–178, 241–242, 206–207.
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All the Liverpool ships sailed via Queenstown. According to Hubbard 
& Winter, the Cunard Line’s ships only stopped there for a short while, 
sometimes only for ten minutes, to dispatch the mail.413 Especially westbound, 
the Inman Line must have used much more time getting all the hundreds of 
Irish steerage passengers on board.
It seems that by far the fastest alternative to sending business information 
from New York to Liverpool in 1864 was by a direct Cunarder. Cunard’s 
ships sailed from New York to Queenstown in 10.5 days, while it took 11.1 
days for the Boston vessels to arrive, even though the trip was about eight 
hours shorter. This was because, on the New York route, the Cunard Line had 
their newest and fastest vessels which sailed most of the voyages in nine or 
ten days. The Inman ships made the trip from New York to Queenstown in 
11.7 days. About one day must be added to all these averages for the final trip 
to Liverpool. It was possible for a ship that had arrived at Queenstown early 
in the morning to reach Liverpool by the evening, but this did not happen 
very often. Even in these cases, it was too late to get the mails dispatched 
before the following morning.
Rathbone Bros & Co.’s agency in New York seemed to carefully follow 
the ship schedules. Most of the letters were written on the day before the 
ship’s departure (68 cases) or on the same day (also 68 cases), while in only 
ten cases was a letter written two or three days – once even four days – before 
departure. Since 1853 there had been a supplementary service in New York 
for businessmen under pressure who wanted to get the latest information on 
board a ship that was departing on the same day. The arrangement consisted 
of a clerk stationed on the steamer’s wharf after the official closing of the 
mails in the post office to receive the postage due and take care of the letters 
until ten minutes before the ship’s departure. This service was advertised in 
commercial newspapers when available.414 Several letters in the Rathbone 
correspondence of 1864 carry the handstamp ‘Supplementary Mail’.415 
Although most of these letters were carried by the Cunard Line, the other 
lines were also included, which shows that the service did not depend on 
which flag the mail was carried under.
Due to the good business practices of the Rathbone agency, no unnecessary 
days were normally used in sending letters from New York. One extra day 
was normally needed for the inland transport of mails to Boston, however. 
Due to the Cunard Line’s sailing schedule – Wednesday sailings from New 
York and Boston – the ship also quite often arrived in Liverpool on a Sunday. 
This happened 20 times in 1864, and it caused one day’s extra delay for 35 
Rathbone letters, as they were not dispatched before Monday. While the 
Inman Line sailed on Saturdays, this was not normally a problem for their 
ships, and it happened only twice during that year that the arrival occurred 
on a Sunday, causing an extra delay to three Rathbone letters.
All these details included, the duration of information transmission from 
the writer to the recipient was 12.2 days on average, if the letter was sent by 
413 Hubbard & Winter, 14.
414 Hubbard & Winter, 7.
415 Rathbone Collection, RP XXIV.2.20, SJ.
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a Cunarder directly from New York, and 13.6 days if it was sent via Boston. 
A letter sent by an Inman Line ship took 13.8 days on average – which made 
it a good alternative to Cunard’s Boston sailings, but not to those from New 
York.
The sample of letters sent by the German lines, the Norddeutscher Lloyd 
or HAPAG, was so small (only five letters) that no conclusions can be drawn. 
However, all these sailings were made in 11 or 13 days, giving an average 
of 11.8 days. The letters were in Liverpool 13.6 days from the date of the 
letter on average. Even if the performance of the German ships seems to 
have been equal to the Inman Line’s, they were only used in cases where the 
Inman Line ships that departed on the same day were only carrying mails 
to Ireland. Such arrangements were made by the Postmaster General for the 
Saturday sailings from New York; the U.S. mails were dispatched by more 
than one steamer each Saturday. Thus there could be two or even three mail 
ships leaving on the same day, one carrying the mails for Ireland, one for 
France and one for the rest of Europe.416
In light of the Rathbone correspondence, it seems that letters were not 
sent via Southampton and London if it could be avoided. In all the cases 
where a letter was sent by a German steamer, it arrived in Liverpool sooner 
than if it had been sent by the next Cunarder. The difference varied between 
three and five days. Three of the letters sent by the German steamers were 
forwarded by the supplementary service, indicating that something really 
important had to be communicated.
When comparing the services of the Cunard Line and the Inman Line, it 
was not exceptional that a Cunard ship that had departed from New York 
four days later than Inman Line’s, arrived at Queenstown on the very same 
day, and their mails were dispatched in Liverpool simultaneously on the 
following day. Incidents like this naturally strengthened the Cunard Line’s 
reputation as a reliable mail carrier, even if the Inman Line could also make 
fast voyages occasionally.
Sir Samuel Cunard – he had been knighted in 1859 – still insisted that the 
only safe means of mail transmission was by paddle-wheeler, and he kept 
this standard on the North Atlantic service until the 1860s.417 The Scotia, 
built in 1862, was the last paddle-wheeler of the Cunard fleet sailing up to 
1876. Samuel Cunard died in 1865, a few years after the launching of the 
China, the company’s first iron screw steamer for the North Atlantic mail 
route, in 1862. This vessel adapted to the changed circumstances in many 
ways – in addition to 268 cabin passengers, she carried 771 in steerage. 
Until that date, Cunard had considered it inconsistent with the safety of the 
mails to carry emigrants, and therefore had refused to carry them. But times 
were changing.418
416 See Hubbard & Winter, 391–407.
417 The Cunard Line’s Mediterranean service had used iron screw steamers since 1852. See 
Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 78–79.
418 See Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 142–147; Fox, 186–191.
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Open competition – the new deal on mail contracts
By the late 1850s, the Inman Line, HAPAG and the Norddeutscher Lloyd 
were already sailing with iron screw steamers, which used less coal and 
were able to carry hundreds of emigrants. Although the Cunard Line had 
started to operate emigrant ships in their Mediterranean service,419 they were 
still reluctant to use them on the North Atlantic service. As late as 1867, the 
company built the Russia, a fast iron screw mail steamer that carried 235 
cabin passengers, but no steerage passengers. While the ship was under 
construction, the company learned that the British Post Office was not going to 
renegotiate their mail contract, which would expire at the end of 1867.420
The reason for this decision was clear. The British and American Post 
Offices were planning to reduce the existing postal rates by half, which 
would most probably increase the number of letters sent but decrease the 
postage revenues. Additionally, the British Post Office considered that the 
old kind of arrangement was not the most advantageous for its purposes. A 
reliable steamship service was now being conducted by several different 
companies. There would be a more frequent mail service to the United States 
if the steamship companies only had short, separate contracts. If the United 
States could make similar arrangements, communications between the two 
countries would be greatly improved.421
As the time for a new contract approached, the British Postmaster General 
advertised for offers to take the mails for the ocean postage alone – a practice 
that had already been in use in the United States for a long time. The Cunard 
Line refused to make any such offer and talked about retiring from the business. 
The Inman Line agreed to take the mails from New York to Queenstown and 
the German lines to Southampton at the rate of 1s. per ounce for letters and 
3d. per pound for newspapers. In order to exclude the Cunard Line, Inman 
agreed to take the mails to Halifax as well as to New York.422
The Post Office had not expected the Cunard Line’s refusal to tender and 
was caught in a difficult situation. There were four regular mails each week 
between Britain and the United States: Tuesday outwards from Southampton 
by the Norddeutscher Lloyd or HAPAG alternately; Thursday outwards from 
Queenstown by the Inman Line, sailing from Liverpool on Wednesday; and 
Sunday outwards from Queenstown by the Cunard Line, sailing from Liverpool 
on Saturday. The homeward mails from New York were carried by the Cunard 
Line on Wednesdays, by the German ships on Tuesdays, and by the Inman Line 
on Saturdays. Additionally, there were the weekly Allan Line mails to and from 
419 The Mediterranean service was started in the early 1850s with traffic between Britain and 
the Mediterranean, and was separated from the North Atlantic business when a company 
named the British and Foreign Steam Navigation Company was formed in 1855. Both 
companies had the same owner families. Other prospects for a geographical enlargement 
of services were also considered at that time as the competition with the Collins Line was 
very tight. These considerations included a plan to start a steamship line to Australia. See 
Hyde (1975), 16–26.
420 See Bonsor (1975), 149; Hyde (1975), 51.
421 Tyler, 339; Hubbard & Winter, 14.
422 Tyler, 339; Hubbard & Winter, 225.
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Canada. It was obvious that if Cunard withdrew from this pattern of services, the 
balance of regular mail deliveries would be greatly disturbed. Representations 
were accordingly made to John Burns423 that the company should tender on the 
basis of a subvention rather than payment for sea postage.424
As always, the Cunard mail contract was also a political question. Before 
the new contracts with the Inman Line and the German companies had reached 
the Treasury, the Liberal government was replaced by a Conservative one. The 
new Postmaster General favoured acceptance of the Cunard Line’s belated 
offer to take the New York mails for £95,000, or £120,000 if Halifax calls 
were required, in addition to the contracts of the Inman Line and the German 
lines. The Conservatives related positively to the Cunard Line and upheld 
the policy of subsidizing steamship lines. They had granted an increase to 
the Cunard contract in 1846 and an extension in 1858. On this occasion the 
Government made a compromise with the Cunard Line, permitting them to 
take the mails for a year and paying £80,000 for it.425
New arrangements were needed almost immediately as the United States 
had agreed to a convention that reduced the ocean postage by half.426 The 
Postmaster General had to advertise for new bids. The National Line made 
the best offer, but was not given a contract due to its slowness – 14-day trips 
compared with less than ten by the fastest ones. By this time the Cunard 
Line had come to the conclusion that half a loaf was better than no bread 
and negotiated with Inman. The result was a private agreement whereby 
John Burns, speaking for both companies, confronted the Government with 
a request for £100,000 for the Cunard Line and £50,000 for the Inman Line. 
In a series of negotiations, these demands were reduced to £70,000 and 
£35,000 respectively, and the life of the contracts from ten to seven years. 
When these contracts expired, they were never renegotiated.427
From early 1869, the Cunard Line carried the British mails to New York, 
sailing from Liverpool each Saturday, and to Boston each Tuesday, via 
Queenstown. The Inman Line sailed to New York each Wednesday, also via 
Queenstown. Additionally, the German lines carried the Southampton mails 
for the postage only, as before.428
The postage rates for ocean letters were again reduced at the beginning of 
1870. Instead of one shilling per letter in 1867 and six pence in 1868–1869, 
the postage rate for a transatlantic letter was only three pence in 1870. 
423 After the death or retirement of the founders, the management of the Cunard Line was 
transferred to their sons, John & James Cleland Burns, Edward & William Cunard; and 
David & John MacIver. For the new capital structure and control of the company, see 
Hyde (1975), 12–23.
424 Hyde (1975), 52; Hubbard & Winter, 56–57, 149–150, 181–182, 212–213, 244–245.
425 Tyler, 339–340.
426 Tyler, 340. For the negotiations and details of the convention, see Hargest, 149–150.
427 Tyler, 340–341. – Milne gives a different view of the new contracts: ‘Inman’s co-operation 
with Cunard in 1868 was a subtle maneuver, gaining a new source of revenue for his 
own operation while greatly reducing the subsidy available to his key competitor. Cunard 
in turn had to co-operate because the alternative might have been worse: with official 
thinking turning in the direction of reduced subsidies, Cunard had to appear reasonable.’ 
(Milne 2000, 174)
428 Hubbard & Winter, 15, 58–61, 212–213.
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Simultaneously, the number of letters carried increased from 3.9 million in 
1867 to 6.7 million in 1870. Despite the considerable growth in information 
transmission, the income for the Post Office declined markedly.429
After this, carrying mail was no longer a business for any steamship 
company. The British mail contracts with the Cunard Line and the Inman 
Line were far from the level the Cunard Line had started with. The United 
States held to its policy of paying only the sea postage. The steamship 
lines took the mails when convenient, on a weekly basis. In 1868 it twice 
happened that they did not bother to take the mails at all. When a further 
reduction in postage rates took place in 1870, the British lines refused to 
carry American mails and arrangements were made with the Guion Line and 
the Norddeutscher Lloyd.430
A couple of developments occurred on the North Atlantic route 
simultaneously – the traffic became more frequent and the sailings faster than 
ever. These two trends, combined with the drastic reduction in postage rates, 
increased the amounts of transmitted information markedly. Even if this must 
have been good for business on both sides of the Atlantic, it was not good 
for the shipping companies. Not only did the revenues from mails decline, 
but, due to the rapid increase in capacity, freight rates were also on the wane. 
Even the passenger rates were reduced due to the hard competition.431
In this business environment the transport of emigrants became an 
important part of shipping functions. The emigrant business was neither 
easy nor highly profitable,432 but it added a considerable amount of income 
to the shipping companies during the good years. For example, the Cunard 
Line received £70,000 in mail subsidies from the British Government for 104 
voyages during a year and an additional £16,000 for American mail postage 
carried from New York.433 Leaving out the Boston route, it can be calculated 
that the income from the mails was £980 per round trip on average. If each 
emigrant paid the company £6 6s. for a trip from Liverpool to New York,434 
the additional income for 500 emigrants added £3,250 to the company’s 
revenues on each round trip.
In 1870 the Inman Line carried 40,500 steerage passengers, the National 
Line 33,500 and the Guion Line 27,500. Although the Cunard Line carried 
fewer than 17,000 passengers in steerage, they carried an additional 7,500 
cabin passengers, which was more than all the others together.435 The effects 
429 Tyler, 342.
430 Tyler, 343; Hubbard & Winter 169, 237. The Norddeutscher Lloyd did not always carry 
British mails westbound from Southampton, even if they carried German mails. (Hubbard 
& Winter, 248) HAPAG did not reapply for the British mail contract, but continued to 
carry U.S. mails. The company changed their port of call from Southampton to Havre, 
with some other adjustments included. See Hubbard & Winter, 169.
431 See Kenwood & Lougheed, 27; Tyler 197.
432 See Hyde (1975), 58–66.
433 Tyler, 355.
434 Hyde (1975), 64.
435 Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 228. – Bonsor’s statistics are based on a different logic and the 
number of voyages does not match with the lists of mail sailings by Hubbard & Winter. 
There may be other than Liverpool (– Queenstown) – New York mail sailings included in 
Bonsor’s figures, e.g. the Inman Line’s sailings via Halifax or the Cunard Line’s sailings 
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of the Cunard Line’s rethinking after the new deal on mail contracts can be 
seen in Diagram 26.
Until the end of 1868, the Cunard Line had 26 annual sailings to New York 
and as many to Boston. The new mail contracts required 52 sailings to both 
ports. But in the next few years, when emigrants were streaming over the 
Atlantic, the number of New York sailings was increased to 86. This meant 
heavy investments in new ships. The 2,500-ton Siberia and Samaria, with 
accommodation for 130 cabin passengers and 800 in steerage, were followed 
by a series of larger steamers in the late 1860s.436
Based on the claims of William Inman in the Parliamentary hearings, 
it has been assumed by historians that the two shipping lines had become 
essentially identical in both speed and service by the late 1860s.437 However, 
in 1870 – even though the government subsidies were already being shared 
by these two companies – this was not yet true.438
from the Mediterranean.
436 The Batavia, the Abyssinia, the Algeria and the Parthia, all between 2,500 and 3,500 
tons and with accommodation for 800 to 1,000 steerage passengers, were launched in 
1870. Three more ships – the Atlas of about 2,500 tons and 800 in steerage, as well as the 
Bothnia and the Scythia, both of 4,500 tons and carrying 1,100 in steerage – were built for 
the North Atlantic route between 1873 and 1875. See Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 150–152.
437 Fox, 192; Tyler 340; and Milne (2000), 173.
438 But the companies had had an agreement about fixed freight rates and minimum passenger 
rates to protect the British shipping lines against foreign competition since 1867 or early 
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 44–80, 200–224. – The Cunard Line 
service to Boston and the Inman Line service to Halifax are excluded.

















As shown in Diagram 27, the Cunard Line made 21, or 34%, of its 
westbound trips in nine days or less, while the Inman Line made only five, 
or 10%. An average Cunard voyage took 10.2 days while an average Inman 
voyage took 10.6 days.
Eastbound the difference was even greater. While the Cunard Line made 
43, or 70%, of their eastbound voyages in nine days or less, the corresponding 
figure for the Inman Line was only 20 voyages, or 38%. Additionally, the 
company had bad luck and two voyages were lengthened to 17 and 27 days.439 
An average Cunard voyage took 9.3 days while an average Inman voyage 
took 9.9 days.
The situation was quickly changing however. Instead of increasing the 
number of voyages like Cunard did, William Inman invested in larger and 
1868. The National, Guion, Allan and Anchor lines also joined this agreement. See Hyde 
(1975), 94.
439 The length of the two unlucky voyages was originally given to Liverpool. To be comparable 
with the rest of the figures, these voyages have been calculated in the table as 16 and 26 
days to Queenstown, even though the ships proceeded directly to Liverpool. One day 
has also been subtracted from the duration of the voyage in those cases where Hubbard 
& Winter only record the date of arrival at Liverpool. (In these cases, the ships have 
probably not been able to call at Queenstown due to bad weather or other reasons.) There 
was one such case in the Cunard Line’s operations on the New York run that year (and 
five on the Boston run), and eight cases in the Inman Line’s performance, including the 
two long voyages.
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 61–64, 215–217. – The total number of 
Cunard and Inman voyages was 61 and 52 respectively.
Diagram 27. Cunard vs. Inman, westbound trips 














faster vessels. After launching two new 3,000-ton vessels, the City of Brooklyn 
and the City of Brussels, with accommodation for 200 cabin and 600 steerage 
passengers, in 1869 the company launched three 4,500-ton vessels, each one 
able to carry 120 to 200 cabin passengers and 1,200 to 1,300 in steerage. The 
City of Berlin, launched in 1875, was a 5,500-ton steamer that could carry 
170 first class, 200 second class, and 1,500 steerage passengers. She made 
a record passage in both directions on the North Atlantic route, steaming 
from Queenstown to New York in seven days, 18 hours and two minutes, 
and back home in 2.5 hours less.440 The new ships were not only larger, but 
also faster than the Cunard Line’s.
At this point two new mail-carrying steamship companies still need to be 
presented, one British and one French.441 The transatlantic shipping boom 
440  Bonsor (1975) vol. 1,  230–231.
441 These two were not the only important transatlantic steamship lines established in the 
early 1870s. The Holland-America Line (Nederlandsche-Amerikaanische Stoomvart 
Maatschappijj) established in 1872 and sailing between Hellevoetsluis and New York, 
the Red Star Line (International Navigation Company of Philadelphia) established in 
1873 and sailing mainly between Philadelphia and Antwerp, and the American Line 
(American Steamship Company) established in 1873 and sailing between Philadelphia 
and Queenstown–Liverpool need to be mentioned. As they all served on different routes 
and in only a few years covered by this study, they are not examined here. Their sailing 
lists up to 1875 are available in Hubbard & Winter, 335–346. The history of the Red Star 
Line and the American Line, later merged with the Inman Line, is well covered by William 
Henry Flayhart III in The American Line (1871–1902) (New York, London, 2000). See 
also Bonsor (1979), vol. 3, 885–887 for the early years of the Holland-America Line, 
Bonsor (1975), vol. 2, 829–835 for the Red Star Line, and N.R.P. Bonsor, North Atlantic 
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 61–64, 215–217. – The total number of 
Cunard and Inman voyages was 61 and 52 respectively.
Diagram 28. Cunard vs. Inman, eastbound trips 

















of the early 1870s saw the establishment of a particularly important British 
mail-carrying steamship company: the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company 
Limited, better known as the White Star Line. The company name had been 
well known for conducting an emigrant service to Australia by sailing ships 
since the start of the gold rushes in the early 1850s. The line was not only 
remembered for carrying masses of emigrants to Melbourne but also because 
of the worst shipwreck to date, and the bankruptcy of the company in the late 
1860s. The financial failure was caused not by unsuccessful trade, but by 
the collapse of the Royal Bank of Liverpool, where the company had heavy 
debts due to ship investments. When the vessels were sold, the company 
name remained and was purchased by a man called Thomas Henry Ismay.442 
After restarting the Australian emigrant business, Ismay turned his attention 
to the North Atlantic service.
Within less than a year from March 1871, the White Star Line brought 
five new large steamships to the Liverpool – Queenstown – New York route. 
The Oceanic, Atlantic, Baltic, Republic and Adriatic were all about 3,700 
tons and carried 166 cabin and 1,000 steerage passengers. Ismay not only 
copied the names of his ships from the famous Collins Line of the 1850s, 
but also copied the business idea. His ships would not only be the fastest on 
the North Atlantic run, but also the most comfortable for passengers, with 
several new innovations – which would naturally soon be copied by other 
companies.443
Another long-lived shipping line to be mentioned here was the Compagnie 
Générale Transatlantique, or the French Line, which started a contract mail 
service for the French government between Havre and New York in June 
1864. It was the first French mail line since the unsuccessful Herout & de 
Handel Line of 1847.444 Contrary to the British government-subsidised mail 
system with different lines for the North Atlantic (the Cunard Line), the 
West Indies & South America (the Royal Mail Line), and the East India 
and Australasian routes (P&O), the French model was as follows: the North 
Atlantic and West Indies mails were taken care of by one shipping line (the 
French Line), while the South American and Asian routes were taken care of 
Seaway (New York, 1979), vol. 3, 920–924 for the American Line.
442 See Robin Gardiner, The History of the White Star Line (Surrey, 2001), 25–66. – The 
emigrant ship Tayleur, chartered by the White Star Line for a trip to Australia, was wrecked 
off Ireland with the loss of 420 lives on her first voyage in 1854. See Gardiner, 26–28.
443 The ship names Arctic and Pacific were changed to Republic and Celtic (launched in 1872) 
due to the tragic associations the company believed the names might invoke among the 
public. See Fox, 241; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 733. – As if to continue the Collins traditions, 
the White Star Line’s Atlantic was wrecked in April 1873 with the loss of 585 hands, 
thus adding new sad figures to the company’s own record of worst disasters at sea – to be 
continued 39 years later when the White Star flagship Titanic sank with the well known 
consequences. For descriptions of the loss of the Atlantic, see Gardiner 86–89; Flayhart 
(2003), 39–55.
444 The company’s early operations under the name Compagnie Général Maritime were 
affected by financial problems and the Crimean War. See Barbance, 31–48; and Bonsor 
(1978) vol. 2, 619–620. A short English résumé of the company’s first years can also 
be found in Duncan Haws, French Line. Compagnie Générale Transatlantic. Merchant 




by another company, best known by the name Compagnie des Messageries 
Maritimes, or Messageries Impériales during the Imperial period.445
The French Line started its North Atlantic mail service between Havre and 
New York in 1864. The company’s ships were built following the model of 
the fastest Cunarders, while the paddle-wheelers were already doomed to be 
outdated by other transatlantic shipping lines. The French Line did not carry 
steerage passengers either.446
In 1865,447 after a railway service had been established from Brest to 
Paris, the company’s ships started to make a call at Brest en route448 – a 
very similar arrangement to the Liverpool ships calling at Queenstown to 
pick up the latest mails from London. This probably gave some competitive 
advantage to the French Line against HAPAG, whose ships called at Havre 
on their way from Hamburg to New York. The sailings of the French Line 
were also transformed to a bi-monthly basis in 1866. HAPAG had changed 
Southampton to Havre as a port of call in 1869, but the arrangement saw 
several changes due to the Franco-Prussian war in 1870–1871. From 1872 
445 For these companies’ operations on the West Indian, South American and Asian routes, 
see the following chapters.
446 Considerable savings in fuel and increased cargo space made the company change this 
policy later, and they built new screw steamers and rebuilt the old paddle-wheelers. See 
Bonsor (1978), vol. 2, 619–625.
447 In the 1860s, the French Line services were limited by a series of wars: the American 
Civil war, the Mexican war and the Franco-Prussian war. See Barbance, 73–84; Haws, 
8–9.
448 See Hubbard & Winter, 275–277.
FIG. 17. The Lafayette of the French Line was one of the two vessels which started 
the French mail service after a 16 years pause on the North Atlantic route in 1864. 
(Barbance: Histoire de la Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 1955).
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the company had a weekly service from Havre on the way to and from New 
York.449
In January–June 1875 the average westbound voyage by a French Line 
ship from Havre to New York took 11.5 days, the same as the voyage by a 
HAPAG ship. For the whole year, the HAPAG average was 11.3 days.450
Thus the North Atlantic mail route to New York in the mid-1870s was 
dominated by three major British shipping lines, two German lines and one 
French line, in addition to a varying number of other major and minor shipping 
lines without a mail service. While the British and German companies’ ships 
of the 1870s always had a large steerage capacity, the French Line ships 
typically did not have that kind of accommodation.451 A comparison between 
the performance of different companies indicates that the number of people 
on board did not necessarily affect the speed after it had been accepted that 
emigrants could be carried in good new ships instead of those which no 
longer suited any better purpose. Bigger size and more effective machinery 
made it possible to keep the speed up – if preferred.
In search of glory – reputation and real life
The competition on the North Atlantic route was very hard during the whole 
period from the start of steamship traffic in 1838 to 1875, and did not decline 
after that. The public image of the shipping lines was largely based on the 
passenger comfort and record journeys, always highlighted by the press. 
They were also the most tangible advantages from the public’s point of 
view. Even if the individual decision on travelling might have been based 
on current prices, the reputation of the shipping company played an essential 
role in decision making.452
Even though speed was probably not the most important element for 
passengers in practice, it was critical for mails and freight. The speed of 
mail steamers on the North Atlantic route increased steadily throughout the 
whole steamship era. The Sirius made her first voyage in 18.5 days, with an 
average speed of only eight knots. In the 1870s the Germanic of the White 
449 See Hubbard & Winter, 169,180–189, 277. – The calls at Brest ceased in 1874 due to the 
continuous difficulty in navigating the approaches to the harbour. See Hubbard & Winter, 
286.
450 Hubbard & Winter, 193–194, 286. The French Line records for July–December 1875 are 
not available.
451 Bonsor assumes that the company was not authorized to carry steerage passengers on 
board the New York mail steamers between 1871 and 1879. See Bonsor (1978), vol. 2, 
628. – Additionally, the number of emigrants from France was rather low on the whole,
compared with several other countries. See O’Rourke & Williamson, 155; Kenwood &
Lougheed, 57–61; and Tyler, 362.
452 After a tolerable duration of a voyage had been ensured, the speed was not necessarily the 
most important aspect for the passengers. A passenger survey carried on Liverpool ships 
in 1882 and 1883 showed that faster ships attracted no more bookings than slower ones 
of the same line. In fact, the fastest express liners were not usually the most comfortable 
ships for travelling. Such White Star liners as Oceanic and Celtic, or later Olympic and 
Titanic, the HAPAG steamers Amerika and Kaiserin Auguste Victoria, or the French 
liners France and Paris are examples of luxurious ships that were not even built to be 
the fastest vessels on the route. See Hyde (1975), 74; and Kludas, 25–26.
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Star Line doubled that speed to almost 16 knots. The speed record was 
improved 17 times from the Sirius’ first trip to the end of 1875. The figure 
includes cases where a vessel was able to improve her own speed record, as 
the Great Western did several times during 1838–1843.453
As Samuel Cunard stated in his letter to Viscount Canning, the General 
Postmaster, in 1853, the mails could have been carried across the Atlantic by 
safe and good vessels of 400 hp, but ‘effective and immediate measures [had 
to be taken] to meet our powerful opponents’.454 These measures repeatedly 
meant larger and faster vessels to beat the competitors, not only for the public 
image of the company, but also for the prestige of the whole country.
The Blue Riband was an entirely unofficial contest for the fastest sea crossing 
of the North Atlantic. No one ever organized it, and in fact a physical emblem 
or trophy did not even exist at that time.455 There were no official, written rules 
for the competition. The existing rules had been formulated over the decades, 
and maritime history has seen many kinds of interpretations of the records. As 
the contest for the Blue Riband was not organized by any authority, no official 
archive material has been left for historians. The information is mostly based on 
newspapers that enthusiastically followed the ship arrivals, as well as company 
records based on ships’ logbooks and other corresponding material.456
In later historical research, the following rules have been accepted as 
putting an end to the confusion regarding the speed records of each time: 
The vessel should be in regular line traffic, westbound from Europe to North 
America. The eastbound records were considered to be of ‘second class’. As 
the routes were different, only the average speed was calculated. The record 
sailing from coast to coast did not mean from port to port. In earlier times 
it was often measured between Daunt’s Rock off Queenstown and Sandy 
Hook lighthouse off New York.457
There was typically a correlation between the size of the vessel and its 
speed. From 1838 until the end of the century almost all Blue Riband holders 
were also the largest ships in the world, excluding the Great Eastern.458 She 
was never a Blue Riband holder but was definitely the largest passenger ship 
ever built until the 20th century.
Diagram 29 shows the development in size and speed of the fastest vessels 
on the North Atlantic mail route between 1840 and 1880. In the 1870s the 
size of vessels grew faster than the speed was improving, mainly due to the 
growing stream of emigrants. In the long run, these two elements – size and 
speed – would be tightly combined, as will be shown in the Epilogue.
453 The Germanic made the westbound trip at an average speed of 14.65 knots in 1875 and 
improved her record to 15.76 knots in 1877. See Kludas, 146–147.
454 Samuel Cunard’s letter to Viscount Canning 11.3.1853, published by Staff, 140–142.
455 The ‘Hales Trophy’ was introduced as late as 1935. See Kludas, 16–18.
456 For a detailed analysis of the source material used in these calculations, see Bonsor (1980), 
vol. 5, 1867–1871.
457 Kludas, 10–16. Kludas’ study of the Blue Riband contest is based on Bonsor’s revised 
list of the record crossings. Bonsor was the first to provide separate lists for west- and 
eastbound record voyages, and he corrected many errors and omissions in press reports 
and company statements regarding the duration of the crossings.  For these arguments, 
see Bonsor (1980), vol. 5, 1866–1887.
458 Kludas, 25; Staff, 103.
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Maritime historians sometimes forget that one successful record crossing 
did not mean that all the North Atlantic traffic was conducted at the same 
speed. The newest, largest and fastest vessels were not at all representative 
compared with the rest of the Atlantic fleet. This dilemma characterized the 
transatlantic service during the whole steamship era, as can be seen in the 
following diagrams.459
In late 1850 (see Diagram 30), the fastest ship on the North Atlantic route 
was the Collins Line’s Pacific. She made her record westbound, crossing 
with an average speed of 12.46 knots. Being one of Collins’ four brand new 
liners, she represented an average vessel of that company but certainly not 
the rest of the North Atlantic shipping lines.460 The Pacific was more than 
1,000 tons larger than an average Cunarder, and more than three times bigger 
than the smallest ships in this traffic. The average size of vessels in the North 
Atlantic mail service was 1,946 tons.461
In 1860, however, the fastest ship in the North Atlantic mail service was 
not the largest one. As can be seen in Diagram 31, the short-lived American 
459 Only companies with mail contracts are included in the diagrams. One major shipping line 
excluded for this reason is the Anchor Line, which had three ships on the North Atlantic 
route in 1860, 18 ships in 1870 and 25 ships in 1880 (Staff, 135). Chartered ships with 
only one to three round trips for the mail-carrying companies are also excluded from the 
figures.
460 See Staff, 130–132; Kludas, 45, 146.
461 The general average is weighted according to the number of ships in traffic by each 
company.
Source: Kludas, 36, 45, 49, 58, 60, 148. – The record ships were the following: Great 
Western (1840), the Europa of the Cunard Line (1850), the Pacific of the Collins 
Line (1850b), the Persia of the Cunard Line (1860), the Scotia of the Cunard Line 
(1870) and the Germanic, built in 1875, of the White Star Line (1880).
Diagram 29. Development of size and speed of the fastest mail 
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North Atlantic Steamship Company, which tried to start a regular mail service 
with the former Collins liners Atlantic and Adriatic, was statistically strong 
when measured by average ship size in tons. The company’s Adriatic was 
clearly bigger than any other ship in traffic at the time, but she was never a 
Blue Riband holder.462
The average size of all ships in the North Atlantic mail service in 1860 
was 2,225 tons, while the size of the fastest ship, the Cunard Line’s Persia, 
was 3,300 tons. She was not a typical Cunarder of the time, but nearly 50% 
larger than the company’s fleet on average, which was 2,260 tons.
In 1870, the fastest ship on the North Atlantic route was clearly larger 
than any company’s average fleet. The Blue Riband holder was the Cunard 
Line’s famous s/s Scotia, the company’s last paddle-wheeler. Her size was 
3,870 tons, while Cunard’s fleet was only 2,670 tons on average.
At the beginning of the following decade the fastest ship on the North 
Atlantic route differed even more visibly from her average competitors. 
The White Star Line’s 5,000-ton Germanic was 800 tons larger than the 
company’s fleet on average, and 1,900 tons larger than an average vessel in 
the mail service.
462 The Adriatic made only one trip for the Collins Line before the collapse of the company. 
She was later owned and chartered by different shipping companies. She carried U.S. mail 
on five round voyages for the North Atlantic Steamship Company, which closed down 
in early 1861. During the Civil War she was used as a troop carrier. See Staff, 129–137; 
Hubbard & Winter, 271.
  Sources: Staff, 129–132; Kludas, 45, 146.
Diagram 30. Average size of vessels per shipping line 1850, 






















Thus the Blue Riband holders were extraordinary, brand new and fast ships, 
not representing average vessels in the traffic. When talking about speed 
in this context, it should be remembered that there was a major difference
Sources: Staff, 129–137; Kludas, 49, 146.
Diagram 31. Average size of vessels per shipping line 1860, 






















Sources: Staff, 129–139; Kludas, 49, 146.
Diagram 32. Average size of vessels per shipping line 1870, 























between the record voyages and the bulk of the sailings. The reality was not 
the same as the best possible performance.
Different strategies led to varying performance between the major mail-
carrying companies in 1875. The durations of westbound journeys between 
Queenstown and New York by the three major British mail-carrying 
companies are compared in Diagrams 33, 34 and 35.
While investing in middle-size steamers for frequent emigrant sailings, 
the Cunard Line lost their former superiority on the North Atlantic mail run. 
In 1875, their journeys lasted from nine to 13 days, and two winter trips 
were even longer, taking 14 and 16 days. The average duration of the line’s 
voyages was 10.8 days. This was not very impressive, remembering that the 
company’s steamer Asia made an average westbound voyage on the one-day-
longer route from Liverpool to New York in 11.4 days in 1850. In addition 
to the long average duration of the trips, the length of a single journey was 
quite unpredictable.463
As we have already seen, regularity was quite an inaccurate concept in the 
19th century and the world was used to irregularities, especially regarding 
463 This unfortunate period ended in the 1880s after long internal discussions and, finally, a 
change in the company’s policy. To start a major shipbuilding programme for larger and 
faster vessels able to compete in the North Atlantic business, the company was publicly 
listed in 1880 with the name Cunard Steam Ship Co Ltd. See Hyde (1975), 24.
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 78–80. – Sailings after 12 December are 
missing from the records. – The profile of the Cunard Line sailings in 1875 clearly shows 
that fast and regular mail sailings were no longer the company’s main priorities.
Diagram 33. Cunard Line's westbound service 
















ship arrivals. The vessels were not expected to arrive punctually, as it was 
considered almost impossible. However, Diagrams 33 and 34 illustrate 
very clearly that both official British mail carriers had serious problems in 
meeting any expectations of regularity. After 35 years of steamship line 
service in the North Atlantic, forecasting the duration of the journey was 
still difficult.
Once again it was shown that a fleet with various kinds of vessels, old and 
new, large and small, was not ideal for a regular mail service. And history 
repeated itself – the performance of a newcomer with a fleet of similar, newly 
launched, effective vessels was superior. Diagram 35 shows the White Star 
Line’s performance on the same route.
After divesting their oldest vessel, the Oceanic, and getting the new 
Germanic into traffic instead of the chartered Belgic,464 the White Star Line 
had a fleet which could make the North Atlantic run in eight to ten days 
without a single exception during the whole year. Compared with Cunard 
and Inman, the difference was notable. The average duration of the Inman 
Line’s westbound voyages was 10.8 days – exactly the same as Cunard’s, 
464 Trip one in Diagram 35 was the Oceanic’s last voyage, and trip four was the Belgic’s last 
voyage.
Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 223–224. – Sailings after 10 December 
are missing from the records. The sailing from Queenstown 2.1.1875 is not included 
in the diagram due to scale problems. The 23-day-long voyage has been included 
in the average sailing figure, however. – The profile of the Inman Line’s sailings 
in 1875 clearly shows the problem of having a mixture of different vessels on the 
same route. Some of the ships were really fast, but the company’s performance as 
a whole was not balanced.
Diagram 34. Inman Line's westbound service 
















even if some of their ships were clearly faster. The White Star Line had taken 
the leading role; their average westbound trips took only 9.3 days during the 
whole year.
Although the White Star Line’s regularity – only two days margin in 
arrivals – was very good compared with the competitors of the time, their 
sailings were still far from punctual. The Vanderbilt had already been able 
to operate with similar margins 18 years earlier.465
A shipping line’s reputation did not consist of just passenger comfort, 
speed and regularity, but of safety as well. In view of the fact that safety 
was critical for the shipping business, one would have expected the shipping 
lines to pay more attention to the losses and different delays caused by 
continuous mishaps. But even if safety regulations were included in the rules 
of all steamship companies, only the Cunard Line really extracted routine 
obedience to these regulations.466
465 See Diagrams 21 and 22.
466 See Fox, 106–109. – The companies generally paid more attention to regularity than safety, 
as the mail contracts often included monetary sanctions in case of delays. For concrete 
examples, see e.g. Arnell (1980), 181–182. – The passengers were naturally worried 
about their safety and some measures were taken to calm them. ‘These steamers carry 
Phillip’s Patent Fire Annihilators. An experienced Surgeon is attached to each steamer’, 
announced the Inman Line in an advertisement in the Liverpool Mercury 13.10.1854. In 
1874, after several fatal shipwrecks in the Atlantic within a short period, the American 
Line announced: ‘All steamers are fitted with Life Rafts, in addition to the extra number 
Diagram 35. White Star Line's westbound service 
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Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 331–333. – Departures after 3 December 
are missing from the records. – As can be noticed, the White Star Line’s performance 
clearly beat the competitors in speed and regularity of sailings.
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In fact, it was considered that a certain number of shipwrecks each year 
were natural and unavoidable. Even if disasters at sea caused unwanted 
negative publicity for the companies, the incidents were soon forgotten. For 
a historian of our time, it is somewhat difficult to understand how a shipping 
company could continue their business after losing nine steamships in mail 
service over eight years, with a total loss of 556 lives.467
During 1838–1875, more than 50 mail-carrying steamships were lost on the 
North Atlantic run, many of them with all mails and sometimes with considerable 
loss of human lives.468 In addition to these ill-fated voyages, a great number of 
trips were interrupted by mechanical problems, as well as damage caused by 
gales or collisions with other ships. The steamship machinery was not advanced 
enough to withstand heavy weather and hard driving: broken shafts, rudders, side-
levers and cylinders, as well as lost screw blades, were among the troubles most 
often mentioned.469 All steamships were equipped with canvas until the 1880s, 
and, especially in the early years, the sails were often used to give additional 
speed or prevent rolling. Moreover, if a steamer lost its rudder or screw, or broke 
a shaft, she lost steerage and could only be saved by proceeding under sail.470
Hargest has collected a notable list of irregularities in the mail sailings, 
caused by different problems.471 Hubbard’s & Winter’s sailing lists, covering 
the years 1840–1875, are even more informative, although no records are 
complete in this regard. According to the notes of the latter source, not 
counting the trips where vessels were lost, more than 90 trips were interrupted 
due to machinery problems and 16 due to storm damage. Additionally, 
ships ran aground more than 20 times, needing repairs in half of the cases. 
Collisions caused damage in 12 cases – often to both parties involved in the 
incident. In a few cases the ship struck something – an iceberg, a whale or 
a reef. One ship caught fire.472
of Life Boats and Life Preservers.’ See Lloyd’s List 9.10.1874.
467 The Allan Line lost the following vessels in shipwrecks on the Liverpool – Quebec/Portland 
mail route: Canadian (I) 1857, Indian 1859, Hungarian 1860, Canadian (II) 1861, North 
Briton 1861, Anglo-Saxon 1863, Norwegian 1863, Bohemian 1864 and Jura 1864. Most of 
the disasters took place off the rocky and foggy Canadian coast, but the line even managed 
to lose one of their vessels as a result of a mishap in the River Mersey at Liverpool. See 
Bonsor (1980), vol. 5, 1888–1889; and Hubbard & Winter, 131–144.
468 The total number of lost passenger steamers was 65. Of these, 36 were lost while carrying 
mails under government contract. In addition, 14 of these ships carried mail occasionally. For 
example, the Anchor Line, not listed by Hubbard & Winter but mentioned as a potential mail 
carrier by Staff, lost 11 passenger ships on the North Atlantic run during that period. The Inman 
Line lost six ships during the period, but two of the disasters took place before the company 
had a mail contract. The loss of the pioneering steamer President in 1841 has been added to the 
figure as she carried American mails. See Bonsor (1980), vol. 5, 1888–1890; Hubbard & Winter, 
195–196; and Staff, 135. Hubbard and Winter have listed all the sailings of steamship lines 
with a mail contract. Staff has also listed a few other lines that carried mails occasionally.
469 Hubbard & Winter, passim.
470 There are several examples of mail sailings that ended in returning to port under canvas. The 
sails were used in these kinds of situations as late as the 1870s, 40 years after the invention 
of ocean steam power. See Hubbard & Winter, 18, 49, 62, 80, 98, 113; 277, 278, etc.
471 Hargest, 127–133.
472 Total wrecks, caused by any of these problems, are not included in these statistics. Of 
all the passenger steamship losses between 1841–1875, no less than 41 were wrecked, 
mainly off the coasts of North America and Ireland, two were abandoned, four destroyed 
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In addition to machinery troubles and problems caused by stranding or 
collisions, more than 50 voyages were lengthened due to the need for coal. 
Even though ships normally carried extra coal to manage delays caused by 
heavy weather, it sometimes happened that they had to call at Halifax – or 
the German and French ships in England – for coal before the end of the trip. 
Delays due to fog, ice and snowstorms were common on the North Atlantic 
route as well: Hubbard & Winter report about 80 cases.473
The management of all companies could have done much to prevent 
unnecessary delays, problems and loss of money, as well as loss of vessels 
and human lives. It was not by chance that some companies were continuously 
in trouble and had to cease their operations within a few years, or even 
less, due to general mismanagement. Typically, the shipping lines that had 
introduced the latest technology first, especially the screw steamers, had more 
engine troubles than the more conservative Cunard, which was accused by 
competitors of letting others do the expensive experiments and just collecting 
the benefits.474 The cautious attitude of the company can also been seen in 
the number of delays caused by fog or ice. Even though the Cunard Line’s 
vessels ran aground or collided, and even though they were not immune to 
mechanical trouble, almost half of their ships’ recorded delays were caused 
by cautious waiting in bad weather.475
On the whole it can be said that the speed of mail steamers improved 
notably during the period 1838–1875. The frequency of the mail service 
grew from a monthly or bi-monthly service to almost daily traffic from 
England and at least bi-weekly sailings from the German and French ports. 
The regularity of the departures did not really improve on the early days of 
contract mail sailings, as the departures were generally regular from 1840 
onwards. Bad weather, mechanical problems and other misfortunes caused 
delays and heavy losses in the service throughout the period. The size of the 
ships was steadily growing, and so was the speed. Yet the record holders 
were lonely examples of the latest technology. The bulk of the mail steamers 
in everyday service consisted of smaller and slower vessels as the fleets were 
only gradually modernized in the most economic way.
by fire, five lost in collision, three foundered, one collided with an iceberg, and nine went 
missing without trace. See Bonsor (1980), vol. 5, 1888–1890.
473 Hubbard & Winter, passim.
474 Hyde (1975), 33. – A lively discussion about the technological progress versus government 
mail subsidies has been published in Holt, Review of the Progress… Institute of Civil 
Engineers. Minutes of Proceedings, 2–94.
475 During 36 years, Cunard Line’s ships ran aground at least eight times in addition to the 
two shipwrecks. However, no repairs were needed in four of the eight times. The ships 
were involved in at least two collisions and once struck a submerged object, thought to be 
a whale. Two delays were caused by non-detailed storm damage and ten delays by broken 
machinery. At least 23 major delays were caused by fog, ice or snowstorms. Additionally, 
Cunard ships were reported to have passed Queenstown without calling in due to heavy 
weather at least five times during the period. See Hubbard & Winter, 17–80. – Even if 
these lists are far from perfect, they give an overall picture of the reasons for delays in 
the mail service and the different shipping company profiles. During the first 75 years 
of its existence, Cunard Line made thousands of round trips across the Atlantic and lost 
only three ships, no passengers, and almost no mail.
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What happened to the speed of business information transmission?
Although so many new speed records had been made and so many lives lost 
in an unnecessary speed contest during the two decades between the mid-
1850s and mid-1870s, it is surprising to notice how little the efforts to improve 
the speed of ships actually affected business information transmission after 
a certain level of performance had been achieved. This level was achieved 
during the contest between the Cunard Line and the Collins Line in 1851, 
as can be noticed in Diagram 36.
The diagram, even if somewhat artificial, shows that during the two 
decades, the duration of an average westbound crossing of mail steamers 
had only been reduced by one day.476 Simultaneously, the spread of the 
duration of all voyages was about the same. In 1875, the trip could still 
take anything between nine and 19 days, while about half of the journeys, 
or 53.6%, were conducted in ten to 11 days. In 1850–1857 the duration of 
Collins Line trips varied between nine and 21 days, and 55.4% were made 
in 11 to 12 days.
476 An average Collins Line trip westwards – including the ad hoc voyages by chartered 
steamers in 1857 – took 12.4 days, while an average westbound voyage of all contract 
mail steamers on that route in 1875 took 11.3 days.
Diagram 36. Westbound trips by Collins Line 1850-1857 
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Source: Hubbard & Winter, 78–80, 98–108, 223–224, 315–316, 331–333. – ‘All 
mail lines’ include all the contract mail steamers on the Liverpool–New York run 
in 1875: the Cunard, Inman, White Star and Guion Lines. The number of Collins 




Table 26 shows the information circulation between Liverpool and New 
York enabled by the mail contract lines in 1875. The starting point is a letter 
sent from Liverpool on 1.1.1875.
As already noted, the westbound trips were shortened by approximately 
one day (0.9) on average between 1851 and 1875. The mail contract lines 
made 296 round trips on the North Atlantic run in 1875. Additionally, there 
were 49 eastbound trips by HAPAG, which did not call at the English ports 
westbound. Nevertheless, this large network could not enable more than 14 
consecutive information circles within a year. The improvement was not 
impressive, compared with the 12 information circles made by the Cunard 
Line and Collins Line ships during 70 round trips in 1851. The duration of 
one information circle had been reduced somewhat more. While it had taken 
27.3 days on average to get an answer to a letter from Liverpool to New York 
in 1851, the figure was 26.1 days in 1875.
The ships had been technologically improved since the early 1850s, which 
enabled more efficient use of the vessels in service. For example, the Cunard 
Line’s China made ten round trips in 1875 and her average westbound trip 
from Liverpool to New York took 10.9 days.477 The White Star Line’s new 
Adriatic made ten round trips in 1875 as well. Her average westbound trip 
from Liverpool to New York took ten days. Compared with the 1850s, the 
Cunard Line’s Asia made seven to nine annual round trips during her best 
years.478
Since there were almost 300 annual round trips conducted in 1875 by 
ships that were more efficient than ever before, why did the information 
circulation not reach the maximum, which would have been 17 consecutive 
circles per year instead of 14?479 The answer is that there was no need for it. 
Since the final introduction of the Atlantic cable in 1866, the mail steamers 
had lost their important role as the first news bringers, just like the American 
sailing packets in 1838. It was not considered necessary to organize ship 
departures in the most efficient way from the mail system’s point of view. 
The transmission of the bulk of the mails – even if still very important – was 
not so urgent any more. This was probably one of the ideas behind the radical 
changing of the mail contracts that occurred at the end of the 1860s, even 
though it has not been clearly pointed out by postal historians.
If the sailing dates, especially from New York, had been organized more 
evenly, there would have been a mail ship departure from that port almost 
every day of the year. Instead, four lines organized their departures on 
Saturdays, while there were no departures at all on several days of the week.480 
477 Between 5.1.1875 and 9.1.1876, both dates from Liverpool. (Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 
78–80) She served mainly on the Liverpool–Boston route. Built in 1862, she was one of the 
oldest ships the company had in transatlantic service. See Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 146–147.
478 Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 28–41.
479 The estimate of the maximum is based on an average ten-day westbound and nine-day 
eastbound crossing, allowing one day for the writer at both ends of the journey.
480  In 1875, the Inman Line, the White Star Line and Norddeutscher Lloyd all sailed from 
New York on Saturdays, which was also the departure day of the Cunard Line’s ships 




















































































































Sources: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 78–80, 193–194, 223–224, 260–262, 
315–316, 331–333. CL = Cunard Line, GL = Guion Line, HPG = HAPAG, IL = 
Inman Line, NDL = Norddeutscher Lloyd, WSL = White Star Line. – Although the 
home port of most vessels was still Liverpool, Hubbard & Winter only give records 
as far as Queenstown for the year 1875.  The average duration from Queenstown or 
Southampton to New York was 10.9 days, and if calculated from Liverpool, it was 11.4 
days. The respective averages of eastbound voyages were 9.4 days and 10.3 days.
TABLE 26. Consecutive information circles enabled by transatlantic mail steamers 
in 1875, an example.
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As can be seen in Table 26, there were sometimes four-day intervals between 
arrivals and departures, while there could also be a mail steamship departure 
on the very next day after a letter’s arrival.481
The date of arrivals at the destination was still unpredictable. A few 
examples of the variation in length of the Saturday sailings give an idea of 
the problem.
As shown in Tables 27a–c, the duration of information transmission by 
the Saturday sailings could last anything between ten and 15 days. One extra 
day has been added to the examples for the inland trips between New York 
and Boston, as well as from Queenstown or Southampton to Liverpool. 
In practice, a letter could sometimes reach the Boston departure, even if 
written in New York on the same day as the ship was sailing. The improved 
inland connections, especially railways, had streamlined the whole chain 
of communications, giving more equal opportunities to the cities outside 
New York.
481 In the example, 13.3.–17.3.1875, 10.4.–14.4.1875 and 8.5.–12.5.1875; and 23.7.–
24.7.1875, 10.9.–11.9.1875 and 26.11.–27.11.1875.
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Source: Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 78, 223–224, 261, 332.  CL = Cunard 
Line, IL = Inman Line, NDL = Norddeutscher Lloyd, WS = White Star Line.
Table 28 shows the main changes in business information transmission 
by sail and steam on the North Atlantic route 1815–1875, starting from the 
Falmouth packets and ending with the international steamship companies. In 
addition to giving some rough estimates of changes in speed and regularity, 
the table shows the number of round trips conducted by vessels with a mail 
contract and the number of consecutive information circles their services 
enabled each year in question. Additionally, there are a few comments on 
the reasons for improvement or stagnation of services.
TABLE 27 A–C. Duration of some Saturday mail sailings from New York, 1875.
Ship, line Departure date from 
New York / Boston 
(B)
Arrival date in 
Queenstown 
/Southampton (S)
Duration of journey 
from New York  to 
Liverpool, days
Mosel, NDL 6.3.1875 17.3.1875 (S) 12  (11 + 1)
China, CL 6.3.1875 (B) 15.3.1875 11  (1 + 9 + 1)
Celtic, WS 6.3.1875 16.3.1875 11  (10 + 1)
City of New York, IL 6.3.1875 20.3.1875 15  (14 + 1)
Ship, line Departure date from 
New York / Boston 
(B)
Arrival date in 
Queenstown 
/Southampton (S)
Duration of journey 
from New York  to 
Liverpool, days
Oder, NDL 3.4.1875 14.4.1875 (S) 12  (11 + 1)
Atlas, CL 3.4.1875 (B) 13.4.1875 12  (1 + 10 + 1)
Adriatic, WS 3.4.1875 12.4.1875 10  (9 + 1)
City of Brooklyn, IL 3.4.1875 15.4.1875 13  (12 + 1)
Ship, line Departure date from 
New York / Boston 
(B)
Arrival date in 
Queenstown 
/Southampton (S)
Duration of journey 
from New York  to 
Liverpool, days
Rhein, NDL 15.5.1875 25.5.1875 (S) 11  (10 + 1)
Algeria, CL 15.5.1875 (B) 24.5.1875 11  (1 + 9 + 1)
Celtic, WS 15.5.1875 24.5.1875 10  (9 + 1)
City of Berlin, IL 15.5.1875 24.5.1875 10  (9 + 1)
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TABLE 28. Business information transmission by sail and steam on the North 
Atlantic route, 1815–1875.
– –   = very poor;  –  = poor;  +  = rather good; + +  = good
n.a. =  not applicable – this question has not been examined as merchant ships were 
not a primary or even a secondary means of information transmission on this route
during the period.
* An information circle is the time between sending a letter and getting an answer to 
it. For example, in 1826 it was possible to send a letter and get an answer to it, send
an answer to that letter and get an answer to it, etc. in three consecutive information 
circles per year by using the Falmouth packets. In 1875 fourteen such circles could
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Business Information and the Telegraph
It has generally been assumed that all overseas information transmission 
was slow and stable before the time of the telegraph, and that it was then 
suddenly catapulted into the modern age. As has already been shown in the 
earlier chapters of this study, the improvement in business communications 
by sea was continuous throughout the period from sail to steam, as was the 
development of the telegraph and its use in business information transmission. 
Instead of a fast jump from one era to another, the shift from information 
transmission by ship to telegraph took its time and included both progression 
and setbacks.
Throughout history there have been situations where it has been necessary 
to send messages faster than a man alone could move from one place to 
another. Messengers on horseback and carrier pigeons were used as early 
as Ancient Egyptian times. Early visual systems of communication, using 
smoke by day or the glow of fires by night to send signals from one hill to 
another, are well known in different parts of the world.482
The early methods of signaling messages from one place to another were 
generally used for military purposes, such as in the Roman Empire and by 
Napoleon during his many wars. The first really successful optical telegraph 
was developed by Claude Chappe, a French clergyman, during the years of 
the revolution. His invention was introduced in France in the 1790s and soon 
adapted in Sweden by Abraham Niclas Edelcrantz483 to be used for royal 
messages around Stockholm, and between Grisslehamn and Eckerö on the 
important mail route from Sweden to Finland. Contrary to Napoleon, who 
successfully used the optical telegraph during wartime, the Swedes neglected 
to maintain the system and it failed during the time of greatest need during 
the war between Sweden and Russia in 1808–1809. Finland was incorporated 
into Russia and the optical telegraph was forgotten for years. During the 
Crimean war, however, new optical lines were built by the Russians along 
the Finnish shores and successfully used for military purposes.484
Although the French optical telegraph system had aroused enthusiasm 
in the German states from the very beginning, it took 38 years before the 
invention was adapted by neighbours. The first line was erected in Prussia 
in 1832. The main reasons for the delay were related to decision making 
on the most practical system, as well as political problems between the 
states. The British developed their own system based on Chappe’s idea, 
and rather close to the one developed by Edelcrantz. Lord George Murray’s 
482 A general overview of early communications systems has been presented in several 
telegraph histories, independent of their more or less local focus. See e.g. Frank Large, 
Faster than the Wind. The Liverpool to Holyhead Telegraph (Great Britain, 1998), 
8–9; Einar Risberg, Suomen Lennätinlaitoksen historia 1855–1955 (The History of the 
Telegraph in Finland) (Helsinki, 1959), 15–22; and James D. Reid, The Telegraph in 
America. Morse Memorial. (New York, 1886), 2–6.
483  Despite being called a Swede in many history books, A.N. Edelcrantz was of Finnish origin. 
He was born and grown up in Turku, and moved to Stockholm for high administrative 
posts in his later years. (Risberg, 33)
484 Large, 10–11; Risberg, 23–27, 30–49.
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Content (photo) removed from the open access version of this book.
FIG. 18. Early pre-telegraph communications off Liverpool. The Bidston lighthouse 
was erected in 1771 as a navigational aid for vessels in the Rock Channel. Bidston 
Hill provided a fine point to spot vessels approaching the port and convey news of 
their arrival to their owners in town. The flag of the shipowner was raised when 
one of their vessels was identified. Additional signs informed how many ships were 
approaching, as well as whether they were snows, brigs or ships. A flag flying at 
half-mast indicated a vessel in distress. By 1825, there were some 50 flagpoles 
stretching both north and south of the lighthouse. © National Museums Liverpool 
(Merseyside Maritime Museum).
optical telegraph was used between London and Dover, Portsmouth and 
Great Yarmouth. Due to the usual fog and poor visibility at the coasts of 
England, the optical telegraph was never a great success on the Channel. 
The London – Portsmouth semaphore telegraph was in Admiralty use until 
1847, however.485
The optical telegraph was normally exclusively used by the authorities, 
especially for military purposes. In Sweden, exceptionally, it was suggested 
as far back as 1810 that the lines could be used for commercial purposes. The 
proposal seems to have been ahead of its time, as it did not arouse notable 
interest among either the administrative decision makers or the commercial 
associations. Nevertheless, private announcements and maritime intelligence 
were transmitted by the optical telegraph during later years, and from 1837 
this service was subject to a fee.486
The noteworthy exception to all the other optical systems in the world 
was the telegraph, which was introduced between Liverpool and Holyhead 
off the west coast of Wales in 1827 (for an earlier system, see Fig. 18). Built 





by private capital and operated by the Trustees of the Liverpool Docks, the 
system was especially planned for commercial use.487 In these circumstances, 
it could indeed shorten the duration of important information transmission 
by several days.
The system was developed and partly owned by Barnard L. Watson, 
probably a former lieutenant of the Royal Navy. It included 11 stations at 
Liverpool, Bidston, Hilbre Island, above Prestatyn, near Rhyl, above Colwyn 
Bay, on the Great Orme, Puffin Island, above Point Lynas, on the west side of 
Anglesey, and on Holyhead Mountain. It was originally a one-mast system, 
overhauled and improved in 1841 as a two-mast system, and was replaced 
by the electric telegraph as late as 1861.488
The stations were located within 3.3 to 12.5 miles, or about five to 20 
kilometres, distant from each other in places where there would be the fewest 
problems with visibility. Even if the duration of message transmission varied 
greatly depending on weather conditions, the system normally worked rather 
well and the signals were seldom stopped for a whole day. The message 
was generally transmitted through the whole chain of stations within a few 
minutes.489
The signal system was based on numbered codes covering the alphabet, 
compass signals, time signals, words and phrases, auxiliary verbs, merchant 
names, telegraph stations and gazetteers, ship names and signals between 
pilot boats. The words and phrases included e.g. lists of different kinds of 
hazards met at sea to be forwarded to the shipowner or Lloyds. There were 
also references to various cargoes – useful knowledge for the shipowners who 
could start selling the freight before it had physically arrived in port.490
The Liverpool–Holyhead telegraph was used in business information 
transmission from the very beginning. Its origins date back to the period, 
when the port of Liverpool had started to grow and was the most important 
destination for the American sailing packets. Once it was known that a vessel 
was approaching, arrangements could be made for the disposal of the cargo, 
and it was also possible to start planning the next voyage. They could also 
learn the state of the wind at Holyhead, and important political or commercial 
information from Ireland or America could be transmitted by the homeward 
bound vessels.491
487 Large, 3, 18–19, 109–111; Risberg, 30.
488 Large, 3, 19, 109–111, 115–117.
489 Large, 83–89, 97.
490 Large, 92–93, 99–100. In fact, there were two different code books. Large explains the 
differences, as well as the control codes used by Chappe and Edelcrantz, 90–107.
491 Large, 18. – Lloyd’s List commonly reported that ships were arriving ‘off Holyhead’ 
or ‘off Liverpool’. Especially after the railway had been opened for the whole distance 
between Liverpool and London, the news of a ship’s arrival off Holyhead was published 
in London before the vessel was in the port of Liverpool. Another news service speeded up 
by the telegraph was the ‘Vessels spoken with’ also published in Lloyd’s List. It included 
information about vessels met at sea: the name of the ship and her captain, port of origin 
and destination, as well as the longitude and latitude where met at sea. When comparing 
the contents of ‘Vessels spoken with’ and the published information on ship arrivals, it 
seems evident that many of the reports were sent by the optical telegraph system while 
the ship was still at sea.
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In a report in 1836, Barnard L. Watson gave a brief summary which shows 
the scale of operations: ‘In the year 1828 there were about 847 vessels reported 
by name inward and outward bound; in 1831 there were 1712; in the present 
year, up to 30th Nov., there were upwards 2440, besides several hundred 
without numbers, upwards of 500 reports respecting Pilot boats, about 200 
communications respecting wrecks, accidents and casualties, and the state 
of the wind and weather reported upwards of 700 different times. Telegraph 
Office, Liverpool, Dec 12, 1836.’492
On average, this meant that about eight ships were reported outwards or 
inwards each day, as well as one or two pilot boat movements. Additionally, 
there was news about problems at sea at least every second day. Weather 
conditions were reported twice every day. As there were naturally periods 
with less traffic at sea, especially in the winter, some days during the best 
sailing season must have been rather busy at the telegraph stations.
Thus, the semaphore telegraph was used in business communications 
in this particular area between merchants, their ships at sea, and Lloyd’s 
– and spread by these parties to other stakeholders when needed – from the
1820s.
In the 1830s, the electric telegraph was invented more or less simultaneously 
in several countries and developed into different forms. The needle telegraph, 
developed by the British W.F. Cooke and Charles Wheatstone from the 
original invention made by the Danish Hans Christian Oersted would be 
used especially on the railways. It appeared to be very important for safety 
reasons to have a warning system for approaching trains and the electric 
telegraph grew very fast especially in countries were the railway network 
was quickly built.493
In 1845, Cooke installed an electric telegraph between London and 
Portsmouth, soon rendering the semaphore obsolete. In the same year 
negotiations were begun with the government to lay a telegraph on the Chester 
to Holyhead railway line. The total length would be 300 miles linking London 
to Holyhead via Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool, and thus giving 
Lloyd’s ‘every facility for shipping purposes’.494 It remains somewhat unclear 
what happened to this plan. The electric telegraph between Holyhead and 
Liverpool seems to have been completed just fifteen years later, in December 
1860.495 Although much discussed, the Committee of the Liverpool Docks 
‘did not see any need to change the system’.496
492 Large, 19.
493 J. V. Kieve, Electric Telegraph. A Social and Economic History (Devon, 1973), 18–35. 
See also Risberg, 54–64; Reid, 71–75.
494 Large, 14; Kieve, 38.
495 Large, 116; Kieve, 55–56, 62, 64.
496 Large, 115. – According to Large, there were also many practical problems to be solved. 
Land owners were unhappy with the wires crossing their fields, and submarine cables 
caused constant difficulties even in the 1860s. Additionally, the communications between 
ships at sea and the telegraph on land was still based on flags and other good old-fashioned 
systems which needed eye-sight. The wireless telegraph later used by ships would be 
invented only at the end of the century. (Large, 115–117) The existing semaphore system 
probably also gave some advantage to the Liverpool merchants in receiving news from 
the sea before it was forwarded to London. This benefit was not long-lived, however. In 
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An experimental electric line was laid between Paris and Rouen in 
1845, and, as it was a success, the French government decided in 1846 
to replace all the optic lines with electric ones. Wheatstone & Cooke also 
built a telegraph between Brussels and Antwerp in 1846. The lines used to 
transmit marine news between Bremen and Bremerhaven in 1847, as well 
as between Hamburg and Cuxhaven in 1848, were similarly built by private 
entrepreneurs. In Sweden the optical telegraph stations were replaced by 
electrical stations one by one from 1853, and the line between Moscow and 
St. Petersburg was brought into use in 1858.497
the early 1850s, an electric telegraph line was built between Holyhead and Chester along 
the railway. In addition, a direct telegraph line existed between London and Liverpool 
from 1851. (Kieve, 49, 55, 82)
497  Large, 14; Risberg, 64. – According to Reid, the Hamburg–Cuxhaven telegraph line, built 
by two Americans, Charles Robinson and Charles L. Chapin by using relay technology, 
worked better than the Wheatstone system.  (Reid, 85)
FIG. 19. One of the early commercial uses of the electric telegraph was to inform 
the results of race courses to the betting rooms in town. The Electric & International 
Telegraph Company had their office at the race course in Newmarket from 1860.
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The early electric telegraph was mainly of state interest, and not even 
meant for commercial use (see Fig. 19). The lines were opened for public 
use in the late 1840s or early 1850s, or even later depending on the country 
in question. One of the first such companies was the Electric Telegraph 
Company in Britain in 1848. The costs of sending messages were very high 
at the beginning, but they reduced notably in the coming years. Connections 
between different countries were opened in the late 1840s.498
The number of messages sent by telegraphs increased fast during the first 
15 years in public use. The following comparison illustrates the progress 
made on the European continent, in Britain, France, Belgium and Austria.
TABLE 29. Number of electric telegraph messages sent, 1851–1866.
Due to differences in sources, the British figures cover only the messages 
sent by the Electric & International Telegraph Company, which held 
approximately 60% of the market share in Britain in 1868. The main 
competitor, the British & Irish Magnetic Telegraph Company was about 
half the size of its main rival, measured by miles of lines or sent messages, 
whether they were inland or including the Atlantic and continental cables. 
Together the ‘Electric’ and the ‘Magnetic’, as they were popularly called 
among the public, transferred 96% of the overseas telegrams to and from 
Britain in 1868.499
498 Risberg, 64–65.
499 Kieve, 68, 73. –The Electric Telegraph Company had been established in 1846 on the basis 
of Cooke’s and Wheatstone’s patents to build the telegraph in cooperation with the railway 
companies, while the English & Irish Magnetic Telegraph Company was established in 
1851 to provide links between England and Ireland by submarine telegraph. It was merged 
with the British Electric Telegraph Company in 1856, forming the British & Irish Magnetic 
Telegraph Company. Its technology was based on magnetic electricity. The company’s 
head office was in Liverpool, and there was a strong provincial and commercial interest 
among the local shareholders and directors. (Kieve, 43–44, 54, 269) – Britain nationalized 
the telegraph companies in 1868–1869 and the Post Office took over the businesses. See 
Kieve, 138–175. The new arrangements included a uniform one shilling rate for 20 words, 
independent of the distance, following the model of the uniform one penny postage rate. 
As a result, the number of sent telegrams increased in Britain from about 6,500,000 in 
1869 to 19,250,000 in 1875 (calculated from mid-1874 to mid-1875). Such expansion 
was not seen in any other country. See Kieve 162–163, 183. The maximum inland rates 
had been reduced from ten to four shillings in the early 1850s, and one shilling rates had 
Country 1851 1856 1861 1866
Austria 45,000 252,000 846,500 2,507,500
Belgium 14,000 99,000 269,000 1,128,000
France 9,000 360,000 920,000 2,842,500
Britain* 99,000 812,000 1,201,500 3,150,000
Sources: BPP, Transport and Communications, Posts and Telegraphs 3. Reports 
from Select Committees on the Electric Telegraphs Bill with the Proceedings, etc. 
1867–1868, Appendix 1, 17–18; Kieve, 68.
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While the Europeans were building their technologically different electric 
telegraphs, the Americans chose a further option. Samuel F.B. Morse, 
originally an American artist, invented an electro-magnetic telegraph, which 
was based on experiments by the German professor Georg Simon Ohm and 
the American engineer Joseph Henry. Morse introduced his system publicly 
in 1837 and after a few years of improvements it was brought into public use 
in the United States in 1845.500
As the U.S. Government refused Samuel Morse’s offer to sell his 
invention for the sum of $100,000, private capital was collected to establish 
the Magnetic Telegraph Company. In early November 1845 its first line 
was opened between Philadelphia and Norristown, Pa. As if to point out 
the basic difference between the European and the American systems, 
the office in Philadelphia opened on the second floor of the Merchants’ 
Exchange.501 It would become typical that the European telegraph companies 
were mainly state-owned, while the Americans were private. Between the 
late 1840s and the 1860s, the American continent saw tremendous growth 
of telegraph networks operated by local companies under the Morse patent, 
and cooperating with the railroad.502
The spread of the new technology met difficulties in most places. Several 
problems had to be solved – both technical and practical. None of the early 
lines could boast about their transmitting capacity, and therefore much 
business had to be done at night. There were also continuous breaks in the 
lines. During the first five months in public business, the Magnetic Telegraph 
Company’s lines were down for 36 entire days. The direct telegraph line 
between Philadelphia and New York was delayed for years due to the latter 
city’s geographical location; the gutta-percha that was needed for submarine 
cables had not been introduced yet, and the messages had to be sent to New 
York by ferry over the Hudson from Newark, where the telegraph line from 
Philadelphia ended. In the New Orleans and Ohio Company in 1854, the 
problems were manifold. Yellow fever swept through the south and almost 
every operator fell ill. The line was kept going with great difficulty and 
business almost stopped. When the winter set in, a storm ruined miles of the 
line, and business was again suspended for a long period. Creditors became 
alarmed. In fact, many of the local companies had to be merged or leased 
during the first decade of the telegraph.503
been introduced by minor competitors already in the early 1860s. (Kieve, 53, 64)
500 The technological solutions varied greatly in different countries. Instead of the different 
needle systems, the line opened between St. Petersburg and Helsinki in 1855 was based 
on Morse’s invention. (Risberg, 75–84). About Morse’s discoveries and the development 
of his electro-magnetic telegraph, see Reid, 48–111.
501 Reid, 112–117.
502 The main historical American telegraph companies are listed by Reid, vii–xiii. About the 
cooperation with the railway companies, see e.g. Reid 244–245, 479-–481. Reid’s book 
covers probably all the important telegraph companies in North America during the first 
four decades of commercial telegraph.
503 Reid, 120–121, 128–130, 139, 173–175, 207–209. – Gutta-percha was the coagulated 
latex of certain rubber trees growing in the Malay Peninsula. Even if known in Europe 
by the mid-17th century, its excellent insulating and underwater conductor qualities were 
only discovered in the late 1840s. It was used for the insulation of submarine cables for 
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Interestingly, New York was not very eager to get in touch with its 
neighbours by telegraph. The metropolitan city had its own interests and was 
mainly focused on overseas communications. Therefore the original line to 
that city was actually drawn from Springfield, Mass., to Buffalo, N.Y., via 
Albany and Utica. Springfield was designed to be the connecting point with 
the New York and Boston Company, the absurdity of which soon became 
apparent and the eastern terminus was changed to the city of New York. The 
first pole of this line was planted on the corner of Wall Street and Broadway 
in August 1845. The office of Poughkeepsie was opened in October 1846, 
almost a year later than the first line was opened in Philadelphia, while 
Hudson was opened at the end of the same month.504
The telegraph line between Boston and New York was completed 
somewhat earlier, in late June 1846. However, the line had been cheaply 
and carelessly constructed. As a storm was setting in, the wires broke in 
numerous places. In one of these, 170 breaks were reported in a section 
of 30 miles. The breaks occurred so often that during the first year of the 
company’s existence, the line did not work for half the time. Even if the wires 
did work, delays were the rule. Not even the passing trains could be reported 
perfectly.505 J. S. Brown and Paul Duguid hit the nail on the head when they 
claimed that the myth that the telegraph was the start of the information age 
(‘People travelled at the speed of the train. Information began to travel at 
the speed of light.’) was built on a merely technological approach. Instead 
of celebrating just the speed and separation, more attention should be paid 
to the way information and society was intertwined.506
The first to fully recognize the value of the telegraph for news purposes 
were the newspapermen in New York. In 1847–1848, the newly established 
New York Associated Press ran a steamer between Digby, N.S., and Portland, 
Me., to carry the news received by transatlantic steamers at Halifax. The 
European news was sent overland by express riders to Digby, 149 miles, 
to be dispatched from there by steamer to Portland and telegraphed to New 
York in advance of the arrival of the Cunard steamer at Boston. When the 
telegraph line was continued to St. John, N.B., the steamer took the shortest 
route from Digby to St. John, from where the news was telegraphed via 
Boston to New York.507
In 1851, it was possible to send messages by telegraph from Halifax to 
Portland, where they were re-telegraphed to New York. According to the 
almost a century until challenged by modern synthetic plastics based on polyethylene by 
1950.  See Garrett, 6; Kieve 101–102.
504 Reid, 300–304.
505 Reid, 358–359.
506 John Seely Brown & Paul Duguid, The Social Life of Information (Boston, 2000), 
17–18.
507 Reid, 343–346, 362–364.; Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 77. – In Europe, The Times in London 
had been the first newspaper to use ‘the electric telegraph’ already in 1844. See Oliver 
Woods & James Bishop, The Story of The Times (London, 1983), 90. This use must have 
been mainly experimental, however, as the telegraph lines were mainly built a few years 
later. – According to Kieve, it was Julius Reuter who was ‘probably the first man to see 
the immense advantages of the use of the telegraph for newspapers and had established 
an office in London 1851’. (Kieve, 71)
North Atlantic
188
Canadian postal historian J.C. Arnell, the system continued even after the 
Cunard steamers did not officially call at Halifax on their way to New York 
after 1850. They often heaved-to off Halifax to drop dispatches and mail to a 
waiting boat, so that the telegraphic news service could continue to operate. 
Thus, the Cunard steamers’ call at Halifax, combined with the gradual 
introduction of telegraphic communications between different areas in North 
America, enabled messages to reach Boston and New York considerably 
before the arrival of the steamers at their destination.508
In this way, the combination of mail steamers and telegraph could at least 
temporarily be used for speeding up the most important news on both sides 
of the Atlantic for more than 15 years – the semaphore telegraph between 
Holyhead and Liverpool even longer – before the Atlantic cable was in 
permanent use. Thus the telegraph was not born out of nothing, but was 
already a part of overseas communications. However, the steamships were 
still the most important part of the information chain, and the existing options 
of speeding up news transmission at the end of the journey by telegraph were 
quite marginal.
During the first ten years that the electric telegraph was in common use, the 
network of inland telegraph lines had been extended throughout the European 
continent and the British Isles, as far as the Western coasts of Ireland. On 
the other side of the Atlantic, telegraph lines had been extended throughout 
the Eastern states and provinces, and across Newfoundland, although there 
was a gap between the coasts of Newfoundland and the mainland. It was 
natural that dreams should arise of linking the Old and New Worlds by an 
Atlantic cable.
The first attempts to lay submarine cables in the 1840s failed due to 
problems in the insulation of the conducting wire. The first cable which was 
laid successfully in the English Channel in 1850 was cut by a fisherman’s 
anchor, and anchors were indeed a problem for submarine cables also in 
the following years, around the Merseyside in England as well as in the 
Mediterranean.509 However, permanent cables were established linking 
England with Ireland in 1853 and with the Continent, between Dover and 
Ostend, in the same year. Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-German cables were laid, 
and by 1857 there were electric communications with Holland, Germany, 
Austria and St. Petersburg. In the Mediterranean, several cables were laid 
for the French and Italian governments. Not all attempts were successful, 
however. Several costly failures were encountered in laying a cable in the 
deep waters between Sardinia and the coast of North Africa, as well as 
between Malta and Alexandria.510
The history of the Atlantic cable had its roots in the building of the electric 
telegraph in Newfoundland, a difficult task because the line traversed more 
than 400 miles of wild and desolate country. As the available capital became 
508 Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 77; Arnell (1986), 190. Arnell does not mention any source for his 
statement, however. This kind of arrangement may have been only temporary, as Cunard 
vessels hardly sailed that northern route all year round.
509 Robinson, 271; Garratt, 6–11; Large, 115–117; Kieve 103–104, 115.
510 Garratt, 13; Kieve, 105, 115.
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exhausted before the work was complete, the English engineer F.N. Gisborne 
who was mainly responsible for the project, traveled to New York for support. 
He was fortunate in meeting Cyrus W. Field, a wealthy merchant who had 
recently retired from commerce in his early thirties. Field soon took an 
active interest in the project, but was of the opinion from the outset in 1854 
that the Newfoundland project was just a link to a larger one, the Atlantic 
cable. During the next twelve years, Field would be the soul of the Atlantic 
project, a man of tireless energy and courage who never lost his faith in the 
undertaking. Samuel F.B. Morse was also originally involved in the project 
on the American side. But a great deal of the science, mechanical skills and 
capital came from Britain.511
The Atlantic cable was a huge project and included several risks. The 
problems were partly technical and practical, and partly financial. The depth 
of the Atlantic Ocean was unknown and a survey of the route had to be made 
by deep-sea soundings. No single ship was large enough to carry and lay 
the cable, which would be more than 2,500 nautical miles long and weigh 
107 lb. per mile. The elementary theory of electrical transmission was still 
in a very primitive state, causing costly mistakes. And the estimated capital 
needed was £350,000, of which about two thirds was for the production of 
the cable.512
The first attempt to lay the Atlantic cable in 1857 became a failure. The 
cable, laid by two vessels, the H.M.S. Agamemnon, lent by the British 
Government, and the frigate Niagara of the U.S. Navy, was technically ill-
suited to the deep waters of the Atlantic. The first expedition was not able to 
lay the cable at its whole length, as it was broken in heavy seas and several 
hundreds of miles of it was lost in the depth of the ocean. The ships had to 
return to Plymouth, and the rest of the cable was discharged and coiled on 
the wharf, where the gutta percha insulation then deteriorated in the sun 
while waiting for the following attempt. The next expedition in 1858 ended 
with equally poor results.513
In August of the same year, the third effort was successful, and 
congratulatory messages were exchanged between Queen Victoria and 
James Buchanan, the President of the United States, across the Atlantic by 
511 To get a good overall idea of the building of the first Atlantic cable, Garratt’s short history 
is very useful. See Garratt, 14–22. Two recent books give very different perspectives: 
Gordon’s A Thread Across the Ocean... highlights Cyrus W. Field’s role in the project, 
while Gillian Cookson’s The Cable. The Wire that Changed the World (Gloucestershire, 
2003) gives a more balanced picture of the development that led to the final breakthrough 
of fast Atlantic communications. See Gordon and Cookson, passim. See also Kieve, 
105–115. About Morse’s role in the project, see Cookson, 56–57, 60–63, 69–70, 72. Reid 
put it this way: ‘Faraday and Morse encouraged the American projector [Cyrus W. Field]. 
But scientific and practical men were so divided, that it was difficult to inspire the degree 
of confidence necessary to success.’ He continued: ‘In face of all these obstacles, Mr. 
Field went to London, and succeeded in 1856 in organizing the first Atlantic Telegraph 
Company, and raising the necessary money to carry out the project, subscribing himself 
for more than one-quarter of the entire capital.’ (Reid, 519) British sources give a rather 
different picture of Field’s role as an investor in the project. See Kieve 107, Cookson 
63.
512 Garratt, 14–15; Cookson, 23–24, 52–54, 62–63.
513 Garratt, 15–17. Cookson, 81–96.
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the new means of communications. Unfortunately, the cable – technically 
poor already from the beginning – was not in good condition after all the 
handling in difficult circumstances. Messages could be transmitted only at a 
very slow rate and with much unreliability and repetition. Within a few weeks, 
the signals became unintelligible and in October, the cable was completely 
dead. The failure of the cable was never fully explained. According to Garratt, 
there were so many contributory causes that the wonder is not that it failed, 
but that it ever worked at all.514
During its short existence, the first Atlantic cable had showed its usefulness. 
Although only a few hundred messages were sent through it, many were 
extremely important. For example, the British government saved an estimated 
£60,000 while being able to halt the mobilization of two British regiments 
in Canada, as an urgent message could be sent by telegraph that the Sepoy 
Mutiny in India had been put down.515
The failure of the cable – and the consequent loss of some £500,000 by 
the shareholders who had subscribed for it – discouraged any further attempt 
to lay an Atlantic telegraph connection for some years. The undertaking was 
further discouraged in 1859 by the failure of the Red Sea Cable, in which 
some £800,000 had been invested.516
A great part of the capital had come from British merchants in London, 
Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow. In the first meeting to raise money for 
the Atlantic cable, held in Liverpool in November 1856, Cyrus W. Field had 
put an outstanding argument to the investors: the information about changes 
in market prices, especially cotton, could be dispatched immediately by the 
electric telegraph. While it now took 40 days to send a letter and get an answer 
from New Orleans, a telegram would be in America – due to the time difference 
– before they had even sent it. In addition to the capital from American and 
British investors, national governments also took part in the project.517
When the project failed, the disappointment was intense. The need for a 
new cable was widely expressed, but investors were now more careful. The 
American Chamber of Commerce in Liverpool wrote a memorial to the Earl 
of Derby, the First Lord of Her Majesty’s Treasury:
‘…having witnessed and also to a certain extent experienced the great 
national as well as individual importance of the temporary success 
of electric communications between this country and the continent 
of America, your memorialists have learned with deep regret that the 
communication by the present Atlantic cable has become inoperative 
and that considerable further capital will be required to restore it and lay 
such additional wires as may be requisite to render the communication 
514 Garratt, 18. Cookson, 96–105. – Kieve, referring to the report of the Joint Committee 
appointed by the government, explains that the faults were on the electrical side and also 
the core, and that especially the conductor was too small. See Kieve, 110–111.
515 According to Cookson, 271 messages were forwarded from Trinity Bay, Newfoundland 
to Valentia, Ireland and 129 telegrams passed in the other direction, at an average of ten 
words each. Unfortunately the author does not give any reference to the sources used. 
See Cookson, 102.
516 Garratt, 19.
517 Cookson, 62–63; Garratt, 15; Large, 14.
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certain; the impossibility of which is no longer doubted…
…that your memorialists are informed that the funds subscribed by the 
originators of this great undertaking have already been exhausted and 
they believe that it will be impossible to obtain the necessary capital for 
completing this great work without the aid of such guarantee as would 
secure a moderate return upon the investment to those subscribing…
… that your memorialists would submit that looking at the magnitude of 
the work, its vast national importance, consolidating as it will when the 
chain is properly completed the various colonies and dependencies of 
this country into one vast Empire; that considering the entire capital and 
labour already expended without any return, and that without extraneous 
aid the work can never be accomplished, as it would tend much to the 
national welfare, if Her Majesty’s government were to extend their aid in 
such form and manner as they may feel justified by precedent and would 
enable the Atlantic Telegraph Company to obtain the requisite capital to 
complete their vast and noble undertaking.’518
A few years passed before the capital was again raised for a new attempt. 
Meanwhile, technical progress and new arrangements in cable production 
improved the prospects of success. In the maritime historical context, the 
first enthusiastic attempts to lay an Atlantic cable in the late 1850s were 
contemporary with the collapse of the Collins Line and the entrance of several 
new steamship lines – the Vanderbilt Line, the Inman Line and the German 
lines – with only sea postage mail contracts. Even though the telegraph 
is seldom mentioned in this connection, the expectations of fast Atlantic 
communications in the near future must have affected the decisions to cut 
the American mail subsidies.
Nevertheless, the British government continued the Cunard contract for 
ten years in the summer of 1858, just a few weeks before the brief success 
and the failure of the first cable. The renewal of the contract was strongly 
opposed by competitors, especially the Inman Line, but even the British Post 
Office was in opposition. The Admiralty which still had the mail contracts 
under their control thought that the service had national importance and 
preferred the continuation.519
While the U.S. Congress had been suspicious about supporting a telegraph 
line which would start and end on British territories on both sides of the 
Atlantic, the American Civil War stimulated attempts to raise new capital 
to continue the project.520
In 1865, when the Civil War was finally close to its end, President Abraham 
Lincoln was assassinated in Washington. The news of the President’s death 
518 ‘Laying of the Atlantic Cable’. Memorial of Liverpool Merchants Trading with America 
and Associated as the American Chamber of Commerce, 2.12.1858. (LRO, 380 
AME/2)
519 Robinson (1964), 143–144. In 1860, a parliamentary committee saw so little need for 
these arrangements that it recommended the return of power to contract for sea-going mail 
services from the Admiralty to the Post Office. This happened by an Act of Parliament 
in the same year. See Robinson (1964), 144.
520 About the American discussion on the possibility of moving the western terminus of the 




on 15 April was rushed across the ocean by the steamship Nova Scotian, 
reaching a telegraph station in Londonderry on 26 April. The despatch 
arrived in London two hours later and appeared in the British newspapers 
on the following day, 12 days after the assassination. Julius Reuter, first 
with the news, was later accused of having personally profited on the stock 
market through holding back his early knowledge. The shock value of the 
report was somewhat muted as so much time had passed since the event, 
but the value of Reuter’s coup gives some perspective to the proposed costs 
of Atlantic telegrams.521
The case is a good example of coordination between ships and telegraph. 
The Allan Line ship Nova Scotian was on her winter route between Portland 
and Liverpool, which included a call at Londonderry in North Ireland instead 
of Queenstown used by other companies, due to her northern route. The Allan 
Line’s vessels did not usually make a call at Halifax or Newfoundland, but 
the captain of the Nova Scotian may have heard about the assassination, 
which took place already on 14 April, by telegraph in Portland before the 
ship departed, and thus heaved to at Halifax for the freshest news.
The Nova Scotian, leaving from Portland on 15 April, was ahead of her 
competitors, the Etna of the Inman Line and the Teutonia of HAPAG, which 
both departed from New York on 15 April, certainly carrying the same news. 
The importance of the news was well understood on board all the vessels. 
The Etna made an exception and did not call at Queenstown at all, but rushed 
directly to Liverpool, while the Teutonia headed to Southampton. They both 
arrived on 28 April – too late as the news had already been published in the 
newspapers on the day before.522
By the time of the next Atlantic cable expedition in July–August 1865, 
several improvements had been made both in the production arrangements 
and the technical qualities of the cable. The newly established telegraph 
construction and maintenance company also subscribed the remaining 
capital required. During the time that had passed, a suitable ship had also 
been constructed. The gigantic Great Eastern, built by the famous Isambard 
Brunel for passenger service on the Eastern route, had become an economic 
failure and was lacking employment. In her absence, it would have been 
necessary to employ three ships to lay the cable, and the hazards caused by 
521 Cookson, 140–141. – The news was published by The Times 27.4.1865 with the remark 
that the report had arrived ‘via Greencastle, per Nova Scotian’.
522 Sailing lists of Hubbard & Winter, 178, 208. – The Electric and the Magnetic had contracted 
with Reuter’s in January 1859 for the exclusive rights to supply foreign telegrams to 
all towns in the UK. Reuter’s retained the exclusive right of supplying commercial and 
shipping news within 15 miles of London (the former were prohibited from passing it on 
to newspapers or public rooms). In February 1865 the telegraph companies (including 
the minor United Kingdom Electric Telegraph Company) formed a combined news and 
intelligence department under the direction of a joint committee and managed by Charles 
Boys of the Electric. As the companies had a monopoly of the telegraph communications 
of the UK, newspapers requiring news by telegraph were compelled to resort to them for it, 
and take what they were willing to supply. The smaller newspapers were possibly satisfied, 
but the larger ones were not as they continually attacked the telegraph companies. This 




the participation of even two ships in the laying operation had been amply 
demonstrated in the late 1850s.523
After one more failed attempt, a working Atlantic cable was finally laid 
in late July 1866. A few weeks later, the lost end of the earlier cable was 
found in the mid-Atlantic and the second cable was safely landed at Trinity 
Bay, Newfoundland in September.524 The Old and the New World were now 
finally connected with electric telegraph, which had been in common use on 
both sides of the Atlantic already for two decades.
The commercial use of the Atlantic cable started immediately, although 
not without problems. Sheila Marriner describes Rathbone Bros & Co.’s 
experiences of the early Atlantic telegraph: ‘There were two serious 
disadvantages… the possibility of costly errors arising through genuine 
mistakes, since orders by cable could be fulfilled and shipped before they 
were confirmed by letter. The danger of loss arising from this was minimized 
by limiting the amount of orders entrusted to any one cable to £40,000. The 
other serious difficulty was that of deliberate fraud. This could be overcome 
by the use of cipher which would prevent ‘enterprising people connected 
with the telegraph all through this country’ from selling ‘the contents of your 
messages to your neighbours’.’525 The telegraph company refused at first to 
take messages in code because of the great advantages to be gained by being 
able to read any important message. Finally the company agreed to the use 
of cipher, but when it did, this became accepted practice.526
 A year after the opening of the Atlantic cable, Rathbone Bros & Co.’s 
agent in New York concluded desperately: ‘It seems almost impossible to 
get the cable honestly managed.’ The following month, the agent wished that 
the cable had never been laid. There was ‘not the slightest doubt’ that the 
news about corn prices was falsified in the interest of speculators who had 
combined to keep up the price of the article.527 Despite practical problems, 
the Rathbones were in almost daily telegraphic communication with New 
York, sending orders and keeping the agency advised on sales, of the market 
and of the reasons for anticipated price rises and falls.528
Graeme J. Milne has also examined the usual complaints by British 
merchants concerning the electric telegraph: only the briefest of messages 
523 See Garratt, 19–21.
524 See Garratt, 21–22; Kieve 114–115; Cookson, 142–150. – The success in laying the 
Atlantic cable ended another ambitious project, the building of the Russian-American 
overland route telegraph across the Siberia and via Alaska. The losses of this unfinished 
attempt reached $3,000,000, mainly to be paid by the American Western Union Telegraph 
Company. See Cookson, 150; Reid 508–517.
525 Marriner, 114.
526 Marriner, 114. Each company had their own code books, and the telegrams had to be 
interpreted on both sides of the Atlantic: first to the cipher language and then back to 
English again. Examples of telegrams with opened cipher codes can be found e.g. from 
C.K. Prioleau’s correspondence in the business records of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. at the 
MMM (B/FT, box 2). – The use of codes also caused confusion and delays: ‘What is 
penance in Charleston code. Telegraph at once. Orleans March April paid 91. Dufour.’ 
(Telegram from H. Dufour & Co. at Havre to C.K. Prioleau & Co. in London, 5.1.1875. 





could be sent and there was a great deal of suspicion about the reliability 
of foreign lines and the honesty of their operators. Technical problems 
were common. Even the greatest asset of the telegraph – speed – could not 
always be relied upon due to backlogs of messages piled up in the chain of 
telegraph offices. Larger documents, samples and the like had to go by sea 
in any case. Traders therefore needed reliable mail and telegraph services, 
which doubled the cost.529
The contents of the telegrams had to be very short, not only for security 
but due to the very high price of the transmission. The original rate was £20 
for the 20 first words plus £1 for each additional word. By 1872, the price 
had been drastically reduced to four shillings per word, and in 1888 further 
to one shilling.530
In fact, transatlantic communications became a mixture of steamship letters 
and telegraphs which complemented each other. Short orders were sent by 
the telegraph, but the explanations were written and documents sent in letters 
carried by the mail steamers.531 Rathbone’s New York agents Busk & Jevons 
wrote to Liverpool 6.1.1869 in a letter sent by the Cunard steamer Russia: 
‘Dear Sirs, on 31st Dec. we telegraphed you ‘write’ Schwinds Leed worth 
ten quarter encourage ‘shipment’, this you no doubt forwarded by Messrs 
Lamport & Holt’s steamer of 2nd Jan. The shipment of 2610 bags coffee 
p. Catharine Leed referred to above as being worth 10 ¼ *costs 9 ¼* &
consequently promises a fair profit. Thinking of the tone of Messrs Schwind,
McKinnel & Co.’s letter that they are likely to be somewhat backward in
shipping & facing ourselves a very good opinion of operations in coffee
this year, we added our message ‘encourage shipment’ which will we hope
induce them to act more boldly…’532
529 Milne (2000), 129–130. There were similar problems in the United States, see Reid 
136–137, 308, 327–328, 357–358. To reduce costs, the operators sometimes employed 
young girls with small salaries. They made free translations and left out what they could 
not read. Commercial terms were unknown to them and they gave new terms to trade. 
(Reid, 780)
530 Garratt, 38. – JoAnne Yates has compared the information costs by ordinary mail and 
telegraph in American companies. According to her, the companies could exert more 
central authority over their agents by insisting e.g. that no unauthorized price cuts should 
be made or that rush orders had to be confirmed with the headquarters. In such cases, the 
high cost of sending a telegram was justified as the use of the telegraph led to savings in 
the company’s business. The study does not cover overseas information transmission. 
See JoAnne Yates, ‘Investing in Information: Supply and Demand Forces in the Use of 
Information in American Firms, 1850–1920’ in Peter Temin (ed.) Inside the Business 
Enterprise. Historical Perspective on the Use of Information. (Chicago, 1991).
531 Richard B. Kielbowicz has noticed the same in the inland news-gathering of American 
newspapers: only hard facts were transmitted by telegraph while the rest was sent by 
ordinary mail. Also the U. S. newspaper exchange system needed physical transmission 
of documents. See Richard B. Kielbowicz, ‘News Gathering by Mail in the Age of the 
Telegraph: Adapting to a New Technology’ in Technology and Culture, Vol. 28, No. 1, 
Jan. 1987, 26–41.  
532 Busk & Jevons in New York to Rathbone Bros & Co. in Liverpool 6.1.1869. In the 
Rathbone Collection, RP XXIV.2.28. (SJ). – Schwind, McKinnell & Co. was a Rio 




As the quote describes, the tones of ordinary letters could also express 
feelings which could not be caught in a short telegraph message. And 
important documents should naturally be sent only by mail: ‘Dear Sirs, we 
have balanced the books & closed our accounts for the year but we have not 
time to dissect them for this mail. As we know you are anxious to receive 
them at the earliest moment possible we send you now the only essential 
documents, viz. Balance Sheet and Agency Assets… By next mail we will 
hand you our customary statements of the year’s business…’533
The growing use of the telegraph and speedier carriage of cargoes by 
steamship had fundamental effects on the organization of the produce markets 
in Britain. It reduced the need for carrying stocks, since fresh supplies in 
producing centres could be quickly conveyed to the markets and the level 
of prices in the markets could be made known in the producing areas so that 
it was no longer necessary to try to forecast conditions months ahead on 
inadequate information. Fluctuations in prices tended to narrow as up-to-date 
information about current business conditions and markets in all parts of the 
world became more readily available. Consequently, operations in produce 
markets became subject to international rather than to local and national 
influences. The spread of the telegraph killed the consignment business in 
cotton and in grain, but instead inspired the futures market.534
From the 1840s, there was a growing tendency for people to buy and 
sell goods ‘to arrive’. The essence of the ‘arrivals’ business was that the 
news should travel faster than the goods, and with the development of 
fast mail steamers this became possible. The establishment of telegraphic 
communications from New York to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland further 
increased the disparity between the speed of news and cargoes. This led to the 
development of the arrivals business in the cotton trade. During the American 
Civil War, a good deal of speculative activity took place in cotton and in buying 
and selling ‘to arrive’. According to Nigel Hall, in this kind of forward market 
it was a common practice for specific lots of a commodity to be contracted 
for before they were available for delivery. The Liverpool cotton market was 
the first in Europe to develop further to a futures market, in which contracts 
were highly standardized and did not refer to a particular cargo. The quality 
and quantity of the product set was fixed, and the only negotiable part of the 
contract was the price. Arrival and future delivery markets were separated in 
the early 1870s, following the opening of the Atlantic cable.535
The development of the telegraph from the Napoleonic wars to the Atlantic 
cable is depicted in Table 30.
533 Busk & Jevons in New York to Rathbone Bros & Co. in Liverpool 7.1.1870. In the 
Rathbone Collection, RP XXIV.2.29. (SJ)
534 Marriner, 54, 115–116. Earlier, all cotton handled by a merchant, whether as owner or 
consignee, was sold through his selling broker to a buying broker who acted for the spinner. 
The few powerful spinners who imported cotton themselves employed brokers. The 
cables facilitated the spinner-importing, and also produced a fusion of broker-merchant, 
who both imported and sold, thus leaving the middlemen out. See J.H. Clapham, An 
Economic History of Modern Britain. Free Trade and Steel 1850–1886 (Cambridge, 
1932), 315–316.




















































































































































TABLE 30.  Development of business information transmission by telegraph.
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Wind vs. Wind
Choosing between private and public mail services, a micro case – Merchant 
ship communications between Britain and Guiana in 1840, a general view 
– The West Indian and South American mail services as parts of the whole
Falmouth packet system – The South American route – The Mexico route
– The last years of the Falmouth packet service, a conclusion.
While business information transmission in the North Atlantic was mainly 
taken care of by fast and regular sailing packets owned by commercial 
shipping lines from the early 1820s, the communications on two other 
important trade routes – the West Indies and South America – were dominated 
by merchant vessels. Additionally, the Falmouth packets were an important 
means of communications on both these routes.
The West Indian mail route followed the old sugar route between Britain and 
the colonies in the Caribbean including ports on the northern coast of South 
America. Over the years, other than British colonies were also included, and 
auxiliary ship services were started between several colonies and the British 
packet stations.536 In addition to the Caribbean islands, the Falmouth packets 
normally sailed to British Guiana and Mexico. The South American route 
consisted of sailings from Falmouth to Rio de Janeiro, and down to Buenos 
Aires and Montevideo either by the same packet or by an auxiliary ship.
Choosing between private and public mail services – a micro case
In view of the importance of the West Indian trade route in the early 19th 
century, surprisingly small numbers of merchant letters can be found in public 
collections, compared with the amount of correspondence kept in archives 
from other regions. One of the explanations given is that the descendants 
536 For different West Indian route descriptions and auxiliary ship services between 1820 and 
1842, see Britnor, 129–140, 149–154; and John L. L. DuBois, Jeremiah A. Farrington 
and Roger G. Schnell (eds), Danish West Indies Mails 1754–1917 (Snow Camp, USA, 
2000), 32–33.
VI  The West Indies and South America
The West Indies and South America
198
of merchants involved in the West Indian businesses did not preserve these 
documents because they wanted to forget the period of slave trade.
 A handful of letters from Demerara and Berbice, British Guiana, to the 
Liverpool merchant houses Sandbach, Tinne & Co. and Thomas and William 
Earle & Co. in 1825–1841, discovered in the Merseyside Maritime Museum 
Archive’s collections, give a very homogeneous picture of information 
transmission. These 15 letters were carried by merchant vessels. The average 
time between writing and receiving them was 51 days.537
In addition to these general letters, a more variable case can be found in 
the correspondence between Thomas and William Earle & Co. and their 
sugar plantation at Berbice in 1840.538 This interesting sample consists of ten 
letters from 1840, each of them carrying a monthly return of the plantation’s 
business activities. Written by the same person to the same recipient and sent 
by different means of communication by various routes from a minor colonial 
county across the Atlantic in the age of sail makes the sample extraordinary 
in postal historical research .539
The letters portray the practical options and choices made by an individual, 
giving a picture of how efficiently the different means of information 
transmission served the merchants conducting regular business with the 
colonies. Comparing the micro case with shipping records gives an idea of the 
effectiveness of merchant ships as mail carriers, as well as the effectiveness 
of the government mail service between Britain and Guiana in 1840.540
At that time the government service included a variety of British, Danish, 
Dutch, French and Spanish colonies – a difficult service as the ports of call 
were so widely spread and not easy to navigate. By 1810, six local West Indian 
mail boats had supplemented the sailing packets that crossed the Atlantic, 
and by 1840 there were a dozen. The communications from England were 
twice a month.541
Thomas and William Earle, a father and son who were merchants and 
shipowners of Liverpool, were former slave traders who well knew the 
opportunities of the Caribbean area and were familiar with the organization 
537 Bryson Collection, Records of Sandbach, Tinne & Co., D/B/176; Earle Family and 
Business Archive, correspondence of Thomas and William Earle & Co, D/Earle/5/2 
(MMM, Liverpool). Additionally, three letters to Sandbach, Tinne & Co. (dated 
26.11.1825, 6.2.1826 and 2.3.1836) are included in the calculation from a private philatelic 
collection: Heikki Hongisto, Sugar in the life of Mankind. (2005) (HHC). – Even though 
all the letters were carried by private ships, one of them was a duplicate of which the 
original had been sent by a government packet from Berbice to Thomas and William 
Earle & Co, dated 18.10.1841.
538 See the correspondence of Thomas and William Earle & Co, D/Earle 5/1–11 (MMM).
539 In 1837, the amount of postage charged by Postmasters in the colonies was only £410 
from Berbice for the whole year, while e.g. the figure from Canada was a hundred times 
greater, £38,977. BPP, Transport and Communications. Post and Telegraphs 2, (1838). 
Select Committee on Postage, Appendix E, 221.
540 For a more detailed description, see Seija-Riitta Laakso, ‘Managing the Distance: Business 
Information Transmission between Britain and Guiana, 1840’ in International Journal 
of Maritime History, XVI, No.2 (December 2004), 221–246.
541 See Robinson (1964), 93; and ‘A List of Packets at Present, Employed in the Service of 
the Post-Office’ in Lloyd’s Register 1840.
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of commerce there.542 In the 1830s, the company had acquired a plantation 
in Berbice, Guiana as a part of a bad debt.543 The Plantation Hanover, with 
‘Sugar, Rum, Molasses, Cane, Livestock and Negro Labour’,544 was run by 
a manager, J.M. Houston, whose preserved correspondence with Liverpool 
includes the ten monthly returns of Plantation Hanover in 1840, two reports 
apparently being missing.
This specific year was crucial from the owners’ point of view, due to the 
recent abolition of slavery, which after a few years’ transition period had 
given full freedom to the plantation workers in 1838. British Guiana, together 
with Jamaica and Trinidad, was one of the colonies that suffered most from 
the changes. Many estates, earlier prosperous and productive, were now 
cultivated at a considerable loss, and several were abandoned.545
J.M. Houston, the manager, calculated the return of the plantation’s
activities at the end of each month and sent the report by ship to the Earles 
of Liverpool. The letters, carrying the sender’s remarks on the means of 
transport as well as postal handstamps, enable us to follow the process of 
business information transmission in practice. What happened to the letters 
between writing and receiving them? Who took care of them, and how long 
did it take in each case to deliver the information?
The January report of Plantation Hanover was sent by the merchant ship 
Goshawk, which departed from Berbice on 13 February and arrived in Liverpool 
on 11 April.546 The report was dispatched to Thomas and William Earle & Co.’s 
office in Liverpool on the arrival day. The letter was carried fully privately, 
having no post office markings. The Earles learned about their plantation’s 
economic progress 71 days after the month in question had ended.
The February and March reports were sent by the British government’s 
packets, with postal markings by the Berbice Post Office respectively. The 
February report was sent from Berbice on 18 March and received by the 
Earles on 13 May. The report was carried either by the Ranger packet, which 
arrived at Falmouth on 10 May, or by the Penguin packet, which arrived 
on 8 May.547 As the letter was delivered in Liverpool on the 13th, the most 
probable arrival date at Falmouth was the 10th.548
542 For the changes in Liverpool merchants’ interests in the Caribbean area, see Williams, 
‘Abolition and the Re-Deployment…’1–17; Milne (2000), 51–53; and Dawn Littler, 
‘The Earle Collection: Records of a Liverpool Family of Merchants and Shipowners’, 
Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire & Cheshire, Vol. 146 (Liverpool, 
1996), 97–102.
543 Littler, 96.
544 J.M. Houston to Thomas and William Earle & Co in his Monthly Return of Plantation 
Hanover, Berbice, for January, 1840. Earle Correspondence, D/Earle 5/7/1 (MMM).
545 BPP, Colonies. West Indies 1, (1842), Report of Select Committee on West India Colonies, 
iii–v. – Some estate owners may have been better prepared for the changes than others. 
For example, John Gladstone of Liverpool, who had purchased several plantations in 
Demerara in the 1820s, sold his assets properly by 1849 without major losses. S.G. 
Checkland describes Gladstone’s business ideas and networks in the West Indies in his 
article ‘John Gladstone as Trader and Planter’ in Economic History Review, v. 7, 1954/55, 
222–228.
546 Lloyd’s List 13.4.1840.
547  Lloyd’s List 11.5.1840; 12.5.1840.
548 At that time, the mails were sent by coach from Falmouth via Exeter to London and from 
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The West Indian packets usually sailed directly from Falmouth to 
Barbados, from where the local mail boats (at this period mostly steamers) 
delivered the mails to the islands. On the way back home, the packet sailed 
via several of the islands collecting the mailbags for Britain. The system 
was slow and complicated, and the schedules often changed due to weather 
conditions or other reasons.
As the sources are not clear in this matter,549 we cannot know for certain 
to which island the mails from Berbice were forwarded in the spring of 1840. 
Table 31 shows the dates on which the two alternative packets stopped at the 
islands during their home voyage. As the monthly return of the plantation 
was sent from Berbice as late as 18 March, Barbados could not have been 
the place where the mails from Guiana were collected at the time. Tobago550 
was out of the question for the same reason. The local mail boat could have 
carried the letter to Trinidad, were it would have been taken to the Ranger, 
but the Penguin had already passed the island.
The Guiana mails could also have been sent by a separate local mail ship 
to the rather distant St. Thomas, which was the other main interchange point 
of mail, together with Barbados. Why this would have been done, when 
the Falmouth packets also sailed via Trinidad, Grenada etc. on their home 
voyage,551 remains unclear. None of the monthly returns bear transit markings 
from the West Indian Islands, but this was rather typical.552 Independent of 
whether the Guiana mails were carried to St. Thomas by a mail steamer or 
by the Falmouth packet, they had to be sent from Berbice and Demerara 
more than ten days before the packet would proceed from St. Thomas to 
Puerto Rico, Haiti and England. To use a fixed reference, it is assumed here 
that, at the latest, St. Thomas was the island where the Guiana mails were 
collected.
The table clearly depicts the problem of carrying the West Indian mails, 
and makes the complaints of merchants understandable. The Ranger packet 
had sailed from Falmouth on 5 February and arrived at Barbados on 13 
March – on the very same day as the Penguin packet, which had left from 
Falmouth on 17 February.553 The packets delivered the mails and proceeded 
to Tobago, the Ranger on the 14th and the Penguin one day later. There was 
a longer stay at Trinidad or Grenada before continuing the journey. Both 
ships departed from Grenada on the same day, as well as from several other 
islands, visiting different ports at Haiti, however. The ships’ inter-island 
journeys between Barbados and Cape Henry, or Cape Haitien alternatively, 
there by railway to Liverpool. It normally took a couple of days. See BPP, Transport and 
Communications. Post and Telegraphs 2, (1838). Appendix E, 227–232; and Clapham 
(1930), 387.
549 See Britnor, 150, 154; and DuBois (etc.), 32–33.
550 Tobago has been mentioned as one of the places where the Demerara and Berbice mails 
were forwarded. See e.g. Britnor, 154.
551 Lloyd’s List normally published the dates of departures of all the islands visited, as can 
be noticed from Table 31.
552 About the use of postal handstamps on the ‘loose packet letters’, see DuBois (etc.), 
34–36.
553 Lloyd’s List 7.2.1840; 19.2.1849; and 25.4.1840.
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had taken three weeks before they turned back to England, and the crossing 
of the Atlantic an additional five weeks.
The Ranger, carrying the February report, made the journey back home 
from St. Thomas two days slower than the Penguin, in 40 days. The report 
arrived in Liverpool on 12 May,554 and was received by Thomas and William 
Earle & Co. on the 13th, 74 days after the end of the financial reporting 
period.
The March report was sent on 9 April – rather soon after the end of the 
financial reporting month. It was carried by the Hope packet, which sailed 
from Falmouth on 4 March, arriving at Barbados on 4 April, and proceeding 
on the same day to Tobago and from there on 6 April to Trinidad, where 
she stayed for several days, then continuing as depicted in the note below.555 
The trip from Barbados to Falmouth with all the stops at the islands took 
52 days. The packet arrived on 26 May carrying a remarkable freight of 
150,000 dollars.556 The March report was delivered to the plantation owners 
in Liverpool a few days later, approximately 58 days after the end of the 
reporting period.557
554 Date of the Liverpool Post Office arrival handstamp on the letter.
555 The departure dates of the Hope from different ports were as follows: Falmouth 4.3.; 
Barbados 4.4.; Tobago 6.4.; Trinidad 12.4.; Grenada 14.4.; St. Kitts 18.4.; Tortola 19.4.; 
St. Thomas 20.4.; Puerto Rico 21.4.; Cape Haitien 26.4. and the arrival at Falmouth 
26.5.1840 (Lloyd’s List 28.5.1840).
556 Lloyd’s List 28.5.1840. It was not unusual for the armed Falmouth packets to carry 
high-value freights of bullion and specie when arriving from Mexico or the West Indies. 
Arrivals of treasury were usually reported by Lloyd’s List.
557  The exact date of the letter’s arrival in Liverpool is missing. It has been assumed here that 
it was 28 May, allowing two days for the mail transport from Falmouth to Liverpool.
TABLE 31. Departure dates of the Ranger and Penguin packets, of Falmouth, from 
the West Indian islands and arrival in England, February–May 1840.
Port Ranger packet Penguin packet
Falmouth 5.2. 17.2.




St. Kitts 29.3. 29.3.
Tortola 31.3. 31.3.
St. Thomas 1.4. 1.4.




Duration of the round trip 95 days 81 days
Source: Lloyd’s List 11.5.1840, 12.5.1840. 
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The April report was sent privately by the merchant ship Ann & Jane. 
The ship had arrived in Berbice on 30 March from Liverpool, but after 
some unexplained delays she departed on 20 May, having stayed 51 days at 
port. The report arrived in Liverpool by the Ann & Jane in 32 days, being 
dispatched to William and Thomas Earle & Co. on the next day after the 
ship’s arrival, 22 June.558 Despite the fast sea journey, it took the report 53 
days to reach the owners.
Another alternative for J.M. Houston would have been to send the report 
by the Lapwing packet, which sailed from St. Thomas on 6 June and arrived 
at Falmouth on 15 July. The letter would have been dispatched in Liverpool 
around 17 July – 25 days later than by the private vessel.
The May report was sent from Berbice by the merchant ship Laidmans, of 
Liverpool. No date of sending the letter is available, as J.M. Houston did not 
date these documents, and the letter is missing departure markings of any post 
office. According to Lloyd’s List, the Laidmans arrived ‘off Salcombe’ on 12 
August and entered Gravesend, London, on 16 August from Demerara.559
As the ship was not sailing for Liverpool, the captain dispatched the 
mailbag to a local boat off Salcombe, while the ship proceeded to London. 
The letter was posted from Kingsbridge, a small village in the inland, and 
marked by the post office handstamp used for private ship letters.560 It also 
bears the arrival handstamp of the Liverpool Post Office of 14 August, 
and the recipient’s note on 15 August. The postal markings, together with 
the information published by Lloyd’s List, prove clearly that the letter was 
carried by the Laidmans. As the vessel’s exact departure date from Demerara 
is unknown, it is not possible to calculate precisely the duration of the sea 
journey. However, the letter arrived in Liverpool two days before the ship 
entered London, and was received by Thomas and William Earle & Co. 76 
days after the end of the financial reporting period.
The use of the official mail service would have shortened the delay 
markedly. Even if J.M. Houston had not finalized his calculations quickly 
enough to get them on board the Star packet, which stopped at St. Thomas 
on 18 June and arrived at Falmouth as early as on 18 July, he could have 
had them ready for the Reindeer packet, which called at the island on 24 
June and arrived in Falmouth on 7 August.561 The first alternative would 
have shortened the waiting time by more than three weeks, and the latter by 
about one week.
The June report was sent by the merchant ship John Horrocks, of Liverpool. 
The new 294 tons vessel had arrived in Berbice on 12 April, probably on her 
first voyage as she was built in the same year.562 She departed for Liverpool 
on 30 July, carrying J.M. Houston’s calculations of the plantation’s financial 
results for June. When the ship left the port, more than four weeks had passed 
since the end of the financial period.
558 Lloyd’s List 22.6.1840. The letter bears no postal markings, only the recipient’s note about 
the arrival date.
559  Lloyd’s List 15.8.1840; 17.8.1840.
560 ‘SHIP LETTER KINGSBRIDGE’, see Tabeart (1997), 132.
561 Lloyd’s List 20.7.1840; 10.8.1840.
562 Lloyd’s Register, 1840.
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The vessel arrived in Liverpool on 10 September, and the letter was 
delivered to Thomas and William Earle & Co.’s office on the same day. The 
sea voyage took 42 days, and the letter was in the owners’ hands 72 days 
after the end of the financial month in question. No postage fees were paid 
for this direct, private service. If the official mail service had been used, the 
Mutine packet would have picked up the June report from St. Thomas on 
22 July and brought the letter to Falmouth on 21 August. By this means, 
the letter would have arrived at the Earles’ office about 18 days earlier than 
it did,563 taking into account the couple of days needed for the trip from 
Falmouth to Liverpool.
The July report was sent by government mail, and it bears the Berbice 
Post Office handstamp of 21 August. The mails were picked up by the Hope 
packet at the port of St. Thomas on 4 September, and the ship arrived in 
Falmouth on 23 October.564 The trip across the Atlantic alone took 44 days 
– the longest eastbound West Indian packet journey of the year. The July
report was 86 days old when received by the plantation owners in Liverpool
on 25 October.
What if J.M. Houston had sent the July report by a merchant ship instead 
of the government packet? There were several regular traders leaving from 
Demerara for Britain during the month of August: the Isabella (of Glasgow) 
for London on 13 August, arriving at Gravesend on 2 October, the Marquis of 
Chandos (of London), departing on the same day and arriving at Gravesend on 
17 October, the Sandbach (of Liverpool), also departing on the same day and 
arriving at Liverpool on 22 September, as well as the Thistle (of Glasgow), 
departing on 23 August and arriving at Clyde on 22 September.565 All these 
vessels would have carried the July report to the owners much faster than 
the mail packet. By the Sandbach, the report would have been in Liverpool 
33 days earlier than it was.
Common to the sailings above was that they all departed from Demerara. 
The only sailing566 from Berbice was that of the Richmond Hill on 1 August,567 
too early for the July report to be finalized by the plantation manager.
It would have been curious if no contacts had existed between Demerara 
and Berbice for private mail sending, although sailing between those two ports 
was rather difficult due to the prevailing winds and currents of the river.568 
An overland route existed and the Post Office planned to use it, according 
to a statement given in that specific year.569 How long and in what condition 
563  Lloyd’s List 23.8.1840.
564 The departure dates of the Hope from different ports during the trip were as follows: 
Falmouth 17.7.; Barbados 16.8.; Tobago 17.8.; Trinidad 26.8.; Grenada 29.8.; St. Kitts 
2.9.; Tortola 3.9.; St. Thomas 4.9.; Puerto Rico 5.9.; Cape Henry 9.9. and Falmouth 
23.10.1840 (Lloyd’s List 26.10.1840).
565 Lloyd’s List respectively.
566 The only sailing departure reported by Lloyd’s List, but the reports possibly did not include 
all of them.
567 Lloyd’s List 12.9.1840.
568 Britnor, 136. For the Atlantic and Caribbean winds and currents, see Map 1.
569 ‘Sketch of the New Arrangements for the Conveyance of Her Majesty’s Mails in the West 
Indies. To Commence in October, 1840’, Britnor, 153–154. During the steamship era, 
Berbice mails were often taken overland from Demerara. See Kenton & Parsons, 14. 
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the route was, is not known. As the manager’s reports generally consisted 
of formal remarks about the work at the plantation only, no evidence about 
such communications problems has been preserved.570
The August Report was sent by the merchant ship Guiana, of Liverpool. 
The ship had arrived at Berbice from Glasgow on 10 July,571 and was loading 
for London. There is no information about the departure date of the Guiana 
from Berbice, but she arrived at Deal on 9 November. The letter bears the 
private ship letter handstamp of London572 and a date handstamp of 10 
November. The report arrived in Liverpool on the 11th, being dispatched 
on the same day.573 It took the report 72 days after the end of the reporting 
period to reach the hands of the owners.
If not sent by the Guiana, the letter could have been picked up by the 
Pandora packet from St. Thomas on 18 September, arriving at Falmouth 
on 27 October – about two weeks earlier than by the Berbice–Liverpool 
merchantman.
The September report arrived in Liverpool on 1 December by the merchant 
ship Ann & Jane, the same vessel that carried the April Report. Ann & Jane 
was one of the regular traders between Liverpool and Berbice, making 2.5 
round trips during 1840. She had arrived at Berbice on 8 September, and 
departed for Liverpool on 25 October. Her home trip took 37 days, and the 
report entered Thomas and William Earle & Co.’s office on the date of the 
ship’s arrival, 62 days after the end of the reporting period. The letter bears 
no postal markings.
Even if this was a relatively fast delivery, the Peterel packet would have 
brought the report from St. Thomas, departing from there on 18 October, to 
Falmouth on 26 November. The report would have been in Liverpool a few 
days earlier than it was by the private ship.
Finally, the November report – the October and December reports are 
missing – was sent from Berbice by the merchant ship Camerons, of London. 
According to Lloyd’s List,574 the ship sailed for London on 13 November and 
arrived at Deal on 5 March and the letter, posted from Deal on the following 
day,575 arrived in Liverpool on 8 March, 1841 – 98 days after the end of the 
financial reporting period. It is clear that the ship did not sail on the date 
mentioned, with the November report on board. The departure must have 
570 However, J.M. Houston mentions in his June Report something that may describe the 
rural conditions: five sheep had been killed by a tiger on plantation Op Hoop Van Beter, 
a nearby coffee plantation earlier owned by the Earle family. J.M. Houston to Thomas 
and William Earle & Co in his Monthly Return for June, 1840. Earle Family and Business 
Archive, D/Earle 5/7/6, (MMM).
571 Lloyd’s List 25.8.1840.
572 The handstamp ‘SHIP-LETTER’ on the cover was used in London 1840–1857. Deal 
would have used the handstamp ‘DEAL SHIP LETTER’ and Gravesend ‘SHIP LETTER 
GRAVESEND’ in 1840. See Tabeart, 63–64, 102, 182.
573 Lloyd’s List 10.11.1840. Liverpool Post Office arrival handstamp and the recipient’s note 
on the letter.
574 Lloyd’s List 14.1.1841; 6.3.1841.
575 ‘DEAL SHIP LETTER’ and handstamp of Deal 6.3.1841, Liverpool Post Office arrival 
handstamp 8.3.1841. The recipient’s note 7 March 1841 cannot be correct, as the postal 
markings clearly indicate a later arrival.
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been several weeks delayed. The Camerons arrived at Deal on the same day 
as the Euterpe, which had sailed from Berbice on 6 January, 1841.
Why the manager did not choose another alternative, remains unclear. 
There were several vessels sailing directly from Berbice for Liverpool and 
Glasgow before the departure of the ships for London. The best choice would 
have been the Favorite for Glasgow on 7 December, arriving on 19 January, 
45 days before the November report was finally at Deal.576
Two Falmouth packets sailed home before the Camerons, both arriving on 
12 February, 1841. The Swift and Ranger packets had left St. Thomas on 30 
December and 1 January respectively, sailing again together, each of them 
carrying high-value freight, the Swift 100,000 dollars and the Ranger 80,000 
dollars.577 The packets would have taken the November report to England 
more than three weeks earlier than it actually arrived.
J.M. Houston used private merchantmen in seven cases out of ten to send
his monthly returns to Liverpool. In six cases out of the seven, the government 
mail would have been a faster alternative. Eight of the ten reports would have 
been quicker in Liverpool if sent by a Falmouth packet instead of a merchant 
ship. In two cases, a private vessel was faster than the official mail.
The figures in Table 32 give a 72 days’ average duration of information 
transmission between the end of the financial reporting period and the arrival 
of the results in Liverpool. The shortest time between the end of the reporting 
period and the arrival of the monthly return in Liverpool was 53 days, when 
sent by a merchantman, and the longest time 98 days. By government packets, 
the figures were 58 days and 86 days respectively.
Not all the time was spent at sea. By cutting the transmission of each 
letter into slices, it has been shown here that even several weeks could pass 
after the end of the reporting period before the merchantman chosen by the 
manager de facto departed with the letter on board. This waiting time varied 
from a couple of weeks to over a month, in some cases probably more, even 
though it cannot always be completely reconstructed.
The small sample of letters gives a clear and versatile picture of the 
communication conditions between the plantation and its owners on the 
two sides of the Atlantic. Compared with the on-line financial reporting and 
management systems and strict information obligations of today’s business 
life, the ownership and management of distant plantations in the early 19th 
century was not very systematic. The communications were not only slow, 
but entirely unpredictable.
In many cases, the letters from Berbice would have been in England much 
faster by a government packet than by a merchant ship, but sometimes it was 
vice versa – making it difficult for J.M. Houston to decide on the means of 
communications. He could have sent duplicates to ensure that at least one 
of them was carried by the fastest possible transport but none of the letters 
bear any markings indicating that.578
576  Lloyd’s List 20.1.1841; 15.2.1841.
577  Lloyd’s List 16.2.1841.
578 The other sample of letters from 1826–1841 show that both merchant houses, Sandbach, 
Tinne & Co. as well as Thomas and William Earle & Co., usually often received duplicates 
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By sending duplicates, the average time between the end of each reporting 
period and the fastest arrival of the information in Liverpool would have 
decreased from 72 days to 56 days without any changes in the transports. 
This would naturally have increased costs and the manager may have thought 
that the reports were not important enough for the extra expense. The owners 
may have thought that they were important, however, as most of the reports 
have been preserved among the company papers until this day.
from their plantations in Guiana. Seven of the 15 letters in this sample are duplicates, five 
of them in Sandbach’s correspondence and two in Earle’s. Interestingly, both duplicates 
in the latter collection are from 1841, as if the practice would then have been introduced 
at the plantation. Subsequently, at least three letters out of 11 in Earle’s correspondence 
from 1842 are duplicates. As the whole sample consists of only 36 letters from 1825–1842, 
they can naturally only give examples of business practices and can by no means be 
interpreted as full evidence of the companies’ policies in this question. See Records of 
Sandbach, Tinne & Co., D/B/176; Correspondence of Thomas and William Earle & Co, 
D/Earle/5/2. (MMM). – There could naturally also be other reasons for sending duplicates 
than just getting the message through as fast as possible. For instance, something new 
could have happened since the original letter was sent: ‘I have already written to you to this 
packet but since posting my letter, I have seen W.B. Chisholm. I had a long & interesting 
conversation with him…’ (William Carter to William Earle, Berbice 23.1.1842, ‘p. Packet’. 
Correspondence of Thomas and William Earle & Co, D/Earle/5/8/4b, MMM).
TABLE 32.  Monthly returns of Plantation Hanover, Berbice, in 1840. Duration 
before the information was available to the owners in Liverpool after the end of 
each financial period.
Monthly Return Days elapsed before 
information was available 







March 58 F *







The alternative options (private / government mail) were checked in each case. The 
best possible choice at the date has been marked in the table with an asterisk (*).
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When comparing the alternatives in sending the report each month, one 
can also ask whether J.M. Houston really did his best to finalize the figures 
as quickly as possible to get them shipped by the earliest possible means. The 
rhythm of life and business was not very busy at that time, and the overall 
economic situation in Guiana was hardly motivating either. Perhaps there 
were good reasons to delay sending bad news to the owners.
Complaints of slow communications were usual everywhere in the world, 
but as long as the transport was dependent on winds, not very much could 
be done to ensure a fast voyage. If the owners had comments or instructions 
regarding the financials or management of their overseas businesses, it would 
take another two to three months before the manager would have them in 
hand. Typically, the owners had to rely on their managers’ abilities to make 
decisions without specific advice, and he had to have authority, when needed. 
If things went wrong, the manager could be changed, of course.579
In the case of Plantation Hanover, the owners were clearly anxious about 
the plantation’s financial condition. The Earle correspondence includes 
several letters from John Ross, Attorney, written to the company management 
in Liverpool. According to him, Hanover had a reputation for being one of 
the most unproductive estates in the colony. He discussed the possible selling 
price and the balance of accounts. A couple of weeks later, in another letter, 
he points out errors in the accounts.580
Furthermore, the owners were not at all happy with the plantation’s 
management in Berbice. In addition to mentioning the problems that arose 
from the emancipation of the slaves and the subsequent discontent regarding 
notes to pay, John Ross also criticized the agent for running high expenses. 
In October he called it mismanagement and suggested some names of new 
possible managers for Hanover.581 And indeed, a few months later the manager 
had been changed to another person.582
In conclusion it can be noted that instead of the government mail 
service, the plantation manager preferred to send his financial reports to 
Liverpool by familiar merchant vessels. If possible, he chose a ship with 
Liverpool as the home port. He did not bother to send mail by vessels 
sailing from Demerara but preferred to wait until a ship was leaving from 
Berbice, even though it would take more time. He did not want to ensure 
579 Brown & Duguid have pointed out that it was finally the telegraph, linking the European 
capitals to their overseas colonies, which radically reduced the independence of the 
overseas administrators. With rapid communications, decision making could be centralized 
and the financial and executive autonomy of the overseas partners was quickly absorbed. 
See Brown & Duguid, 30.
580 John Ross of Inverness to Thomas and William Earle & Co., Liverpool, 30.12.1839; 
10.1.1840. He continues about the possible sale of the plantation 20.1.1840. D/Earle 
5/1–11, (MMM)
581 Ross to Thomas and William Earle & Co., Liverpool 16.8.1841; 30.10.1841. D/Earle 
5/1–11, (MMM)
582 The Earle correspondence includes a letter from Mr. Nash, Manager of Plantation 
Hanover, to William Carter, Attorney, in Liverpool, 12.4.1842. (D/Earle 5/1–11) Despite 
several attempts, the plantation was not sold in the 1840s but abandoned as unprofitable, 
and closed up decades later by William Earle’s descendants. Earle Family and Business 
Archive Records. Thomas Algernon Earle’s interview, September 1939. (MMM)
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the fastest possible transmission of the monthly returns, as he did not send 
duplicates.
The manager should have sent the mails by official mail as such a service 
existed, but this regulation was widely ignored. On arrival, letters were 
forwarded to the post office if inland transport was needed. A private ship 
letter arriving in Liverpool was dispatched directly to Thomas and William 
Earle & Co.’s office, not a single time to the Liverpool Post Office.583
Merchant ship communications between Britain and Guiana in 1840, 
a general view
As has been noted above, there were two different means of business 
information transmission in use between Britain and Guiana in 1840. Several 
questions remain open: How lively was the commercial traffic between the 
mother country and the colony at that time? Which British ports had the most 
traffic to Guiana? Was there a great difference in the number of sailings for 
Demerara and Berbice? How long did it normally take for a merchantman to 
sail from Guiana to Britain? How long did the ships stay at port? How well 
did the British government’s West Indian mail service work as a whole? This 
chapter will focus on the merchant shipping on the Guiana route.
The statistics of British Parliamentary Papers concerning the trade and 
commerce of the West Indies do not include a return of ships sailing to or 
from the West Indian ports in 1840. However, the existing figures for the 
years 1822–1830 show a great variety in annual sailings. The number of 
importing British merchant ships arriving at the port of Demerara varied 
between 128 in 1824 and 184 in 1829, while the number of exporting ships 
varied between 145 in 1826 and 212 in 1829. Respectively, the number of 
importing merchant ships arriving at the port of Berbice varied between 25 in 
1822 and 1826, and 33 in 1827, while the number of exporting ships varied 
between 20 in 1826 and 31 in 1822, 1824 and 1827.
Thus, during the ‘good old times’ before the abolition of slavery, an 
average of 162 importing British merchant ships arrived annually at the 
port of Demerara, while 180 sailed to Britain with exports. Another 28 ships 
arrived in Berbice, and 27 exported from that port. A large number of other 
vessels also used these ports, but despite their number, the average size was 
583 This practice was well known by the General Post Office and the Treasury, and became 
part of a lively parliamentary debate in 1838 in connection with the General Post Master’s 
plan to uniform the inland postage rates, which were based on miles carried, to one penny. 
Simultaneously with this reform in 1840, the rates of incoming private ship letters were 
uniformed to 8d per oz., covering the transmission from the exit port of the country of origin 
to the addressee anywhere on the British Isles. See Robertson, C2; and BPP, Transports 
and Communications, Posts and Telegraphs 1 and 2 (1838). Select Committee on Postage, 
passim. – In the sample of 1825–1841, six letters had arrived via the Post Office: two via 
Glasgow, two via Deal, one via Plymouth and one to Sandbach, Tinne & Co. through 
the Liverpool Post Office, carrying the ‘LIVERPOOL SHIP LETTER’ handstamp. Six 
letters were forwarded to the recipient by the captain, two duplicates privately, and one 
remained unknown as the cover was not included in the records. There were paid and 
non-paid letters in both companies’ correspondence. See D/B/176; D/Earle/5/2 (MMM) 
and HHC.
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small, usually less than 100 tons, indicating mainly transports between nearby 
colonial islands. The average size of British ships for Demerara was over 280 
tons, while that for Berbice was somewhat less than 240 tons.584
To find answers to the questions outside the statistics, the number and 
duration of commercial sailings between Britain and Guiana in 1840 were 
calculated using the maritime intelligence published by Lloyd’s List during 
that year. Irish ports and Channel Islands were left out, for work economic 
reasons. The number of these sailings was not remarkable. In practice, 
there were three British ports which dominated the Guiana trade: London, 
Liverpool and Glasgow.585
The calculation of merchant ship traffic between Britain and Guiana 
in 1840 gave somewhat confusing figures. Some 245 ships were reported 
by Lloyd’s List to have arrived at or departed from a port in either end of 
the route.586 The total includes all ships that sailed in at least one direction 
during the calendar year. Even though some of the vessels made two or three 
round trips during the year, only 184 sailings were reported by the ports of 
London, Liverpool and Glasgow for Demerara or Berbice, while these ports 
reported 177 arrivals from the British ports. Only 104 sailings from Guiana 
for London, Liverpool and Glasgow were reported, and 130 arrivals from 
Guiana at these ports.
Part of this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that not all ships made 
direct journeys between Britain and Guiana. Many vessels were tramp ships, 
proceeding from the West Indies to somewhere else, loading or unloading 
part of the cargo en route. In this case the ship could have been reported to 
sail for or from Barbados, Jamaica etc. – or not reported at all, as sometimes 
happened – instead of mentioning a British port. At the arrival port in Britain, 
however, the ship was reported as having arrived ‘from Demerara’, leaving it 
open when she actually sailed, and from where. Sometimes a ship could also 
arrive e.g. in Ireland and suddenly appear to be loading in London. However, 
the total figures for 1840 were close to the annual average of 1822–1830, 
and the shipping to and from Berbice had even increased.
Another and probably more interesting aspect from the business 
information transmission point of view is the remarkable difference between 
the numbers of reported sailings, regarding the home voyage vs. trips in 
the other direction. Only some 60% of the ships reported to have arrived in 
Demerara or Berbice (177) were reported to have ever sailed back for Britain 
(104). Even though the production volumes were low in Guiana that year, the 
ships must have sailed back home, or somewhere else, during the year.
584 The figures are calculated from the statistics in BPP. Colonies. West Indies 2 (1806–49), 
Select Committee Reports and Correspondence on the Trade and Commerce of the 
West Indies. Appendix, 306–307. For comparison, the largest vessels of the East India 
Company, trading with India and China, at that time were 1,200–1,300 tons, even 1,400 
tons. Lloyd’s Register 1826.
585 The total number of other British ship departures and arrivals was approximately 10% of 
the whole. Of these other ports, Bristol and Plymouth had the most traffic to Guiana but 
still less than 20 sailings in total.
586 An exact number of vessels cannot be given, as there were several ships by the same 
name and insufficient other details.
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An explanation for the missing intelligence might be that the sailing 
lists were published in Lloyd’s List basically to inform the underwriters, 
shipowners and other stakeholders about the safe arrival or departure of 
vessels at foreign ports. The long distance communications were so slow 
that the ship in question had often arrived in Britain before the news 
about her departure from Guiana had been published by Lloyd’s List in 
London. The maritime intelligence gives several examples of this kind of 
delay.587
Publishing out-dated news was in no-one’s interest. Stakeholders did not 
need the information about the ship’s departure from Guiana, if the vessel 
was already at the home port. Most probably Lloyd’s List normally just left 
out this information, which explains at least partly the difference mentioned 
above. This observation depicts an overall problem of business information 
from the colonies in the era of sailing ships: the information received could 
be totally out-dated when it finally arrived.
TABLE 33. Number of ships reported by Lloyd’s List to have sailed between the 
British ports London, Liverpool and Glasgow, and the Guianian ports Berbice and 
Demerara, 1840.
Of the 595 records included in Table 33 a great part is overlapping as the 
figures include both ends of a single trip. As the dates of arrivals or departures 
587 E.g. the Lady Campbell’s arrival in Liverpool 6.5.1840 was published by Lloyd’s List 
on 7.5.1840. Her departure from Demerara (14.3.1840) was published almost a week 
later, 13.5.1840. The Palmyra’s arrival in Liverpool 1.7.1840 was published by Lloyd’s 
List 2.7.1840 and her departure from Demerara (26.5.) a week later, 9.7.1840. It could 
also happen that the news of the ship’s departure from the colonial port and arrival at the 
homeport were published in the same issue, and even on the very same page, like when 
Lloyd’s List published the departure of the Thistle from Demerara (23.8.) and her arrival 
at Clyde 22.9.1840, on 23.9.1840. Quite often this problem has been avoided by a note 
in the arrivals: ‘sailed ...’ thus combining the two different news types.
Reported in
sailed for arrived from
Berbice Demerara B + D Berbice Demerara B + D
London 16 (15) 54 (43) 70 (58) 14  (8) 45 (24) 59 (32)
Liverpool 16 (16) 54 (53) 70 (68) 10 (12) 32 (37) 42 (49)
Glasgow 3  (3) 41 (47) 44 (50) 2  (4) 27 (19) 29 (23)
L + L + G 35 (34) 149 (143) 184 (177) 26 (24) 104 (80) 130 (104)
In brackets are the corresponding figures from the other side of the Atlantic. E.g. 
Lloyd’s List reported that 54 ships had sailed from London for Demerara during the 
year, and that 43 ships had arrived in Demerara from London.
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are missing from many journeys, it has only been possible to calculate the 
duration of 148 sea voyages.
London and Liverpool were the main British ports for the Guiana trade. 
Glasgow was the third important one, while the others played a minor role. 
About 20% of the sailings were for Berbice, while the majority was for 
Demerara. Glasgow’s trade was almost entirely focused on Demerara. Only 
three ships sailed from the Clyde for Berbice during the year.
Despite the well known difficulties in Guiana, it seems that a few more 
British merchant ships were sailing to or from its ports in 1840 than a decade 
earlier. This meant that, despite decreasing trade figures, the opportunities 
for information transmission had actually increased since the 1820s.
An average sailing from Britain to Guiana took some 43 days, and an 
average home voyage 51 days. The duration of sailings varied a lot, 30 to 
49 days being the most usual on the way to Guiana, and 40 to 59 days on 
the home voyage. The shortest sailing was from Glasgow to Demerara, 26 
days, and the longest from Demerara to London, 77 days.588
Source: Lloyd’s List, 1840. – The total number of westbound sailings included in 
the records was 83 and the number of eastbound sailings 65.
The rather big difference in duration of westbound and eastbound sailings 
may have been caused by the imbalance of trade between Britain and Guiana. 
The estimated value of imports from the mother country to Demerara was 
about £480,000 on average in 1822–1830, while the value of exports from 
588 Three trips with durations between 82 and 97 days have been left out of the calculation, 
as they most probably were not direct sailings.
Diagram 37. Duration of merchant ship sailings between 
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Demerara to Britain was about £1.4 million on average. The figures of 
Berbice were about £70,000 and £200,000 respectively.589 The imported 
British industrial products were typically of higher value than the exported 
colonial bulk products, thus causing even more difference in the weight of 
cargo inwards and outwards.
The port stays varied between 12 and 120 days, without any reasons given. 
The stays of more than two months may have included major ship repairs, or 
even a non-reported trip somewhere else in between. The large British ports 
worked more efficiently than the colonial ports, even though their functions 
were also still very labour intensive, as Sarah Palmer has shown in her studies 
of the economics of the 19th century port of London.590  In Liverpool, a 
dramatic dock planning and building process took place with the advent of 
steam in the 1840s and 1850s, but had not yet started by 1840.591
Regular Guiana traders normally spent roughly four weeks unloading and 
loading in London or Glasgow, and more than five weeks in Liverpool, on 
average. The port stays in Demerara and Berbice were longer, from six to 
seven weeks on average. It is not mentioned in the documents whether labour 
shortages in Guiana were just as problematic at the ports as they were at the 
plantations. However, the delays in production at the plantations alone must 
have also caused extra waiting time for the exporting ships at ports.592
Of the 245 merchant ships sailing between the ports in question during 
1840, about ten percent could be called regular traders. They made at least 
two round trips during the year, one of the ships being fast enough to make 
three. Of these vessels, 13 were on the London–Demerara route, five on the 
Liverpool–Demerara route and four on the Glasgow–Demerara route. One 
ship from Liverpool and London sailed regularly to Berbice. Unlike tramp 
ships, regular traders normally sailed directly between the two ports, being 
somewhat more reliable mail carriers.
Due to the slow and crowded passage up the River Thames, the merchant 
ships normally delivered their mailbags at Deal one or two days before their 
arrival in London. The Gravesend Post Office was also commonly used, as 
589 BPP, Colonies. West Indies 2 (1806–49), Select Committee Reports and Correspondence 
on the Trade and Commerce of the West Indies. Appendix, 307.
590 Sarah Palmer, ‘Port Economics in an Historical Context: The Nineteenth-Century Port 
of London’, International Journal of Maritime History. Vol. XV No. 1 (June 2003), 
27–67.
591 Jarvis (1991), 68–102; Graeme J. Milne, ‘Port Politics: Interest, Faction and Port 
Management in Mid-Victorian Liverpool’, in Lewis R. Fischer & Adrian Jarvis, Harbours 
and Havens Havens: Essays in Port History in Honour of Gordon Jackson. Research in 
Maritime History No. 16 (St. John’s, 1999), 35–62. 
592 The plantation owners claimed that after abolition, having been able to purchase their own 
land, the former slaves were not willing to work at the plantations for more than ‘three or 
four days in a week, and from five to seven hours in a day’. BPP, Colonies. West Indies 
1 (1842), Report of Select Committee on West India Colonies, iii–v. – Modern research 
has examined more critically the reasons for these problems. See e.g. Douglas Hall, ‘The 
Flight from the Estates Reconsidered: The British West Indies, 1838–1842’ and O. Nigel 
Bolland, ‘Systems of Domination After Slavery: The Control of Land and Labour in the 
British West Indies After 1838’ in Hilary Beckles & Verene Shepherd (eds): Caribbean 
Freedom. Economy and Society from Emancipation to the Present (Princeton, 1996), 
55–63, 107–123.
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well as places off the southern coast, e.g. Salcombe in the micro case of this 
study. The law required the incoming ship’s captain to forward the letters 
to the nearest post office at the first port of call in Britain. In many cases the 
first port of call depended on the weather, the need for water or stores, etc., 
and could be wherever it was most convenient to put in.593
While many of the other merchantmen on the Guiana route were rather small 
vessels – not much over 200 tons and some even below that – the regular traders 
were mostly bigger, near 400 tons or even above. However, the fastest vessel 
on the route was the 214 tons Thistle of Glasgow, making three full round trips 
despite suffering a heavy gale ‘with loss of boat, bulwarks, spars &c.’ during 
one of the journeys in January 1840.594 The Thistle was obviously a fast-sailing 
ship but, due to her smaller size, her loading and unloading were also faster 
than some larger vessels. Especially her port stays in Glasgow were rapid: 14, 
19 and 27 days.
Not many round trips can be fully reconstructed due to missing dates. One 
good example of a regular trader with almost three round trips is the Parker, 
with sailings and port stays as follows:
TABLE 34. Duration of sailings and port stays of the regular trader Parker on the 
Liverpool–Demerara route, 1840.
Source: Lloyd’s List, 1840. 
The example shows the great differences in the time spent at sea – or at port 
– even by the same vessel. It was rather impossible to forecast the duration 
of a voyage. On average, the Parker spent 34 days at sea and 32 days at port 
during the period. In other words, the first round trip from Liverpool included 
593 Robertson, A1, C5.
594 Lloyd’s List 22.1.1840.
Ship
Departure Arrival Duration, days
British port Guianian. port British port
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61 days at sea and 47 days at port in Demerara, i.e. 44% of the time spent 
at port. The second voyage included 78 days at sea and 48 days at port in 
Demerara, i.e. 38% of the time spent at port. The exceptional efficiency of 
the Parker becomes evident when comparing these figures with the general 
average of time spent at port during the period. It was usually 53–55%.595
The records, even if not so representative as one would hope, give an 
impression that the merchant ships between Liverpool and Demerara were 
the best options to send private mail from the colony to the mother country. 
There were four to five ships leaving for Liverpool from Demerara each 
month, on average, but only one or two from Berbice.
Due to the nature of the business, i.e. trading colonial plant products, more 
than 40% of the recorded ship departures from Guiana fell in November–
January. In addition, many ship captains most probably have wanted to 
avoid the hurricane season, which lasted from June to November, being 
worst from August to October.596 Thus, there were months when no ships 
departed for London or Glasgow, and only one or two for Liverpool. Even 
if there were ships loading at the port, the mail sender could never be certain 
of their schedules.
Due to the many missing dates in Lloyd’s List’s maritime intelligence, a 
perfect information circulation by using merchant ships as mail carriers on the 
Guiana route cannot easily be reconstructed. Table 35 depicts one example 
of how to send letters to and from Demerara, starting from Liverpool at the 
beginning of the year 1840.
TABLE 35. Consecutive information circles enabled by merchant ships between 
Liverpool and Demerara in 1840, an example.
Sources: Lloyd’s List 1840.
595 Ojala (1999), 238, 435.
596 Lloyd’s Maritime Atlas (London 1964), Map 1. This variation of voyages was also 
noticed by Steele, although he looks at it from the perspective of English ports. As he 
also remarked, the West Indian mail packets demonstrated that ships could safely sail on 
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* The exact arrival date has not been reported. In this table, 42 days are allowed for the
trip, compared to 39, 32 and 38 of the other westbound trips. – The duration of the last
round trip has not been calculated as it continues for a great part to the following year.
As can be noted from table 35, less than four consecutive information 
circles could be implemented on the West Indian route within a year, if only 
merchant ships were used as mail carriers. Guiana is naturally an example of 
a distant colony, compared to e.g. Jamaica, but the information transmission 
between the plantations and their owners in the mother country was of course 
equally as important for these owners as for any others having businesses 
in the colonies.
In two cases (7.4.1840 and 18.12.1840) the table gives a very tight schedule 
for answers to the letters. It could have been implemented only if the locals 
had frequent contacts with the Coffee House, or the Post Office service was 
quick enough with the dispatches. Good luck was sometimes needed for the 
most rapid information flows.
The West Indian and South American mail services as parts of the 
whole Falmouth packet system
Apart from the merchant ships, there was the official channel for sending 
business letters to Britain, or via Britain, to be forwarded to other places 
in Europe: the Falmouth packets. As already depicted in the micro case 
of Plantation Hanover, the government’s mail system was rather slow and 
complicated. However, it would still have been a better option for the plantation 
manager in most cases, compared with the private ship dispatches.
The mail packets sailed from Falmouth for the West Indies on the 3rd 
and 17th of each month.597 Although delays of one or two days due to heavy 
gales were not exceptional, most departures from England were made on 
time. The round trips of the packets consisted of three parts: the westbound 
Atlantic crossing, the inter-islands journey, and the eastbound crossing on 
the way back home. Each of these parts depended on the earlier one, and the 
duration of them all was rather unforeseeable.
In 1840,598 the packets’ westbound crossing of the Atlantic varied 
between 20 and 45 days, nine of the journeys being made in less than 30 
597 Lloyd’s List, 1840. The mails had earlier been sent on the first and third Wednesday of 
each month from London, the packets leaving from Falmouth on the following Saturday, 
but this somewhat confusing system had been adjusted in 1834. The mails were now made 
in the London Post Office on the 1st and 15th of each month. If these dates happened to 
be Sundays, the departure from Falmouth consequently took place on the 4th and 18th. 
See Britnor, 149–152.
598 To be consistent, this calculation is based on data concerning packets by which it was 
possible to send mail to Britain from the West Indies in 1840. Thus, the Tyrian was the 
first packet included. She departed from Falmouth on 4 December, 1839 and arrived at 
Barbados on 16 January, 1840. The Ranger was the last packet of the next 12 months, 
departing from Falmouth in November, 1840. She was back in Falmouth on 12 February, 
1841.






















MAP 3. Falmouth packet routes during the first half of the 19th century.
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days.599 The average westbound trip from Falmouth to Barbados took 31 
days.
The duration of the inter-islands journey between Barbados and Cape 
Henry or Cape Haitien at Haiti varied between 20 and 30 days, being 23 days 
on average. The inter-islands journey started within 24 hours of the packet’s 
arrival at Barbados. If one packet was delayed, arriving simultaneously with 
the following one, which had departed two weeks later from Falmouth, the 
two ships sailed together for virtually the rest of the voyage.
The eastbound trip from Haiti to Falmouth took 33 days on average. The 
shortest sailing took only 25 days, and the longest 44 days. The average 
eastbound sailing was thus considerably faster than an average merchant ship 
sailing. The packet ships were approximately the same size as the merchant 
ships, near 300 tons on average,600 and they sailed with no cargo. Without 
the time-consuming cruising among the islands, the mail packets could have 
constituted a really competitive means of communications.
Yet the duration of the West Indian mail packet sailings had not changed 
much since the pioneering times of Edmund Dummer. His packets sailed 
from Channel ports, mainly Falmouth or Plymouth, to Barbados during 
1702–1711 in 32.7 days on average, being only two days slower than the 
Falmouth packets of 1840.601 At the same time, however, it looks like the 
merchant ships would have sailed from British ports to Guiana clearly faster 
in 1840 than to Barbados in 1698–1700. According to Ian K. Steele, an 
average merchantman of the earlier period sailed from the Channel ports 
to Barbados in 62.9 days (20 cases) and from the west coast of England in 
80.2 days (26 cases).602
We should probably not assume that merchant shipping developed so much 
faster than mail sailings. It seems that the customs-to-customs calculation 
method used by Steele may have added a number of extra days to the duration 
of voyages. The ships did not always leave on the same day as they were 
cleared from the customs, due to bad weather conditions or other reasons.
Despite generally faster sailings, the West Indian mail transmission – even 
if conducted bi-monthly – was organized in a way that gave no advantage 
to the government mail service compared with the merchant ships in terms 
of business information circulation. Table 36 gives an example of the best 
options, starting from Liverpool at the beginning of the year 1840.
599 In three cases, the date of the stop at Barbados is missing, making it impossible to calculate 
the duration of the westbound and inter-islands journeys. Normally, the Falmouth packet 
departures and arrivals were well reported in Lloyd’s List compared to the merchant 
vessels.
600 ‘A List of Packets at Present Employed in the Service of the Post-Office’, Lloyd’s Register, 
1840.
601 Britnor, 9.
602 Steele (1986), 283.
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TABLE 36.  Consecutive information circles enabled by Falmouth packets for 
correspondence between Liverpool and Demerara in 1840, an example.
Source: Lloyd’s List 1840.
As can be seen in table 36, the information circulation enabled by the 
Falmouth packets on the West Indian mail route was not at all faster than 
what could be achieved by merchant ships (see table 35). The only good 
thing in the service was the regularity in sailing times from England. The 
arrivals at Barbados varied considerably, and there seems to have been no 
fixed departure dates from Haiti. From a Liverpool merchant’s perspective, at 
least four extra days had to be added for the inland connections to and from 
Falmouth. The mails were made in London two days before the departure 
of the packet, and they arrived via the London Post Office.
When looking at the West Indian route only, it seems strange that the 
Falmouth packets did not adopt the practice that had already been used by the 
American sailing packets in the North Atlantic for 20 years. The American 
packets made three round trips each year, not more or less, independent of 
contrary winds and other mishaps. Thus they could generally sail on the 
published date from both sides of the Atlantic. As already discussed, this 
punctuality made the North Atlantic business communications the best 
existing at the time.
The Falmouth packets made the West Indian round trip in 87 days on 
average. The longest round trip took 107 days and the shortest only 73 
days. Within these limits, it would have been rather easy to organize a 
better working system, similar to the North Atlantic line traffic model. As 
there was a packet leaving from England regularly bi-monthly, there could 
have been one leaving from the other end correspondingly. Now there was 
a packet leaving regularly from Falmouth, but the time between two packet 
departures from Haiti at the other end of the voyage could vary between two 
and 34 days, not to mention the two ships that departed on the same day in 
April 1840.
Unfortunately, the system was too complicated to allow simple solutions. 
The same packets that carried the Guiana mails to Barbados and the answers 
ome to England also carried mails for Halifax and Bermuda until mid-
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steamers.603  In addition, they sailed the long mail routes to Vera Cruz and 
Tampico as well as to Bahia, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro. The last 
mentioned route was so long and therefore unpopular among packet captains 
that the ships were not normally sent there twice in succession. The stormy 
Halifax route with its raw winter winds was a similar case. As the mail 
routes were not equally long, scheduled mixed round trips were not easy 
to organize.
Although the South American packet route was the longest, it was not actually 
very much longer than the route to Mexico. The average duration of the round 
trip to Rio de Janeiro was 133 days and to Vera Cruz 126 days in 1840.604
The South American route
The South American route had existed since 1808 as part of the good 
relationship between Britain and the Portuguese Royal family living in exile 
in Brazil during the war time. The sailings were originally only to Rio de 
Janeiro, with a call at Madeira and Tenerife on the way outwards, but as the 
trade developed between Britain and Brazil, demand arose for an additional 
port of call in South America. In April 1817, the ‘merchants of Liverpool and 
London’ represented to the Postmaster General that Pernambuco as well as 
Bahia should be included as ports of call ‘as it would be a great convenience 
to the Trade’. A committee of captains at Falmouth considered that the voyage 
out and home to Rio would not be lengthened by touching Pernambuco by 
more than a week to ten days.605
The service on that route was certainly not easy, and the customers were 
not happy either. The coast of Pernambuco was reported by packet captains 
to be dangerous in the extreme, having neither lighthouses to direct vessels 
by night nor a port in which a packet could take shelter by day, and not the 
smallest assistance could be rendered from the shore. Strong gales were not 
the only problems during the early packet voyages. Captures by privateers 
and pirates caused several serious losses, and sometimes the ships had such 
a lack of crew that they were not able to sail on schedule. Heavy loss of 
life was not only due to action on board during the wartime captures, but at 
least 99 men were killed by yellow fever between 1780 and 1828 on board 
the packets.606
603 See the sailing lists of Arnell & Ludington, 69.
604 The figures are calculated from the sailing lists of Howat, 81; and from Lloyd’s List 1840. 
– The official length of the round voyage Falmouth – Rio de Janeiro – Falmouth was 18 
weeks. See Howat, 5.
605 See Howat, 1–6. – In practice, the system was more complicated. On those journeys 
starting from Falmouth in January–June each year, the packets called at Bahia and 
Pernambuco on their homeward voyage. On the journeys commencing from Falmouth in 
the second half of the year, Bahia and Pernambuco were touched at the outward voyage. 
And in 1832, when the Post Office service to South America was totally taken over by the 
Admiralty, this was adjusted once more so that the respective months were February–July 
and August–January. See Howat, 65. The reason for the odd six-month arrangement 
was simply that the running order of the South American ports of call depended on the 
prevailing winds. See Pawlyn, 111.
606 Howat, 5, 10, 16–18; and Pawlyn, 54–56, 66–68.
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The merchants trading between Pernambuco and Britain complained a 
year or so after the arrangement had been made that the packets did not stay 
long enough to enable them to reply to the letters brought from Britain. In 
a number of instances, the packet had only remained a day or less. It was 
essential for the merchants to have sufficient time to receive their mail, absorb 
the contents and write replies to their trading contacts in Britain. As a result 
of the representation made, instructions were issued by the Secretary of the 
Post Office that packets should stay at Pernambuco for 48 hours, as they did 
at Bahia, unless it was detrimental to their safety.607
The sailing lists of Howat do not enable the calculation of all voyage 
lengths during the first years of packet service, as the arrival dates in Rio 
are not recorded. A comparison between the length of the home trips from 
Rio to Falmouth gives us the following results:
TABLE 37. Average duration of packet sailings from Rio de Janeiro to Falmouth, 
1820–1850.
Source: Sailing lists of Howat, 13, 77, 81, 86. – The packets called at Bahia and 
Pernambuco on six homeward voyages out of 12 each year. 
It is interesting to note that the average sailings shortened by about ten days 
from the 1820s to the 1850s even if the route arrangements remained the same 
and all these trips were conducted by government sailing packets.608 Here the 
difference was clearly in the technical improvements of the vessels.
As already described in connection with the Falmouth packet sailings 
to Halifax (see Chapter V.2.) the Admiralty took over the Post Office 
administration of the mail packets in 1823 as part of the post-war 
arrangements. The ships which the Admiralty introduced in packet service 
were slow ten-gun brigs and sloops, later packet brigs. The first category 
packets were small men-of-war, mainly 230–240 tons, and built for general 
naval purposes in the 1820s. The ships were modified and re-equipped for 
mail service, mostly including the reduction of the armament to six guns, 
but they were never really suitable for this duty. The later packet brigs were 
built in the 1830s especially for the mail service. They were larger, about 360 
607 Howat, 6.
608 In 1830, there was a double service to South America, conducted by both the Post Office 
and the Admiralty. The Post Office packet sailings covered the route Falmouth – Rio de 
Janeiro – Montevideo – Buenos Aires – Montevideo – Rio de Janeiro – Falmouth and did 
not make a call at Bahia or Pernambuco. Their average home voyage from Rio took 51.3 
days. (Howat, 61) In three cases, the mails were transferred from the packet to a man-of-
war in Rio, however. These changes caused serious protests among the local merchants 
as well as the Post Office in England due to confusion in sailing schedules and differences 
in postage rates.  See Howat, 54–55.
1820 1830 1840 1850
Days on 
average 62.2 60.1 58.7 51.9
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tons, and more seaworthy than the older ones. Before these rearrangements 
took place, nine of the 25 naval packets of the first category were lost at sea 
between 1827 and 1840. Several of them just disappeared.609
In table 37, the year 1840 happens to be in the middle of the shift period, 
when the Admiralty had already replaced part of the old men-of-wars with 
new-model packet brigs. Five of the monthly trips from Rio were conducted 
by the newer, purpose-built vessels. Their average sailing time was 51 days, 
while the trip by the old vessels took 64 days on average. In 1850, only 
newer ones were left in service, and the average sailings had reduced to less 
than 52 days.610
As mentioned, an average packet round trip between Falmouth and Rio 
de Janeiro took approximately 133 days. This was not the same as the 
information circle, however. By 1840, the packet system had been organized 
in a way which in four cases out of 12 made it possible to send an answer to 
a letter by the packet which was leaving from Rio earlier than the one which 
had carried the mails from England. Even this small arrangement reduced 
the length of an average information circle by eight days, from 133 to 125 
days, without any changes in the duration of sailings. Table 38 shows how 
this worked. For an example of the alternative Rio de Janeiro–Falmouth–Rio 
de Janeiro, see Fig. 20.
Despite the varying length of sailings, the information circulation could 
have been clearly faster during the period of Post Office sailing packets, if 
the arrivals and departures had been better coordinated. Only four times 
out of 12 were the merchants in Rio de Janeiro able to reply to their letters 
immediately, while in the rest of the cases, the earlier packet had already left 
the port when the next one arrived with the latest news. In these four cases, 
the information circulation enabled by the combined service of two packets 
was several weeks shorter than the single vessel’s round trip.
Calculating from the beginning of 1840, the Falmouth packet service could 
offer fewer than three consecutive information circles between England and 
Rio de Janeiro that year. The first circle started by the departure of the Alert 
on 10 January 1840, the second by the Delight on 5 June and the third by 
the Express on 9 October. As can be noticed in Table 38, two of the circles 
clearly benefited from the possibility to send the answer from Rio de Janeiro 
by an earlier packet.611
Even if the information circulation to Rio de Janeiro can be considered 
rather fast compared with e.g. the much nearer located Demerara, the situation 
609 Howat, 29, 32–35.
610 See the list of Admiralty packets in Howat, 32–35. It is a more complete list than the one 
in Lloyd’s Register 1840. – The longer route via Bahia and Pernambuco on homeward 
sailings half of the year did not explain the difference. There were new and old vessels 
on both routes, and the new ones were typically faster on both routes throughout the year. 
See the sailing lists of Howat, 81. – As an exception to the rule mentioned, the Seagull 
which was the last Falmouth packet in service was of middle-size, 280 tons.
611 This opportunity remained occasional even in 1850, when it was possible only three 
times out of 12 to send an answer to a letter by an earlier departing packet. Additionally, 
one packet left on the same day when the packet from England arrived, thus giving only 
a slight opportunity to somebody close to the port to send an answer to a letter by that 
vessel. See sailing lists of Howat, 85–86.
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was worse if the letters proceeded to Argentina or Uruguay. The mail sailings 
to Buenos Aires started in 1824, and as long as the Post Office packets served 
on the route, they continued from Rio to Montevideo and Buenos Aires on 
their trip from Falmouth. The long sailing seemed to be too much for the 
Navy officers, as the system was changed when the Admiralty gradually 
replaced the private contract packets. Starting from late 1832, there was a 
branch packet service between Rio and the southern ports.
In 1830, the Post Office packets made the round trip from Falmouth via 
Rio and Montevideo to Buenos Aires and back again in 170 days on average. 
In two cases it was possible to send the answers from Buenos Aires by an 
earlier packet. This reduced the length of one information circle by ten and 
another by 23 days. The average duration of one information circle was thus 
168 days.612 The system enabled two full information circles with Buenos 
Aires during that year, starting from Falmouth on 23 January and ending at 
the same port on 11 December 1830. The third circle started from Falmouth 
on 24 December; this packet arrived at Rio on 18 February, 1831. At least 
two days at both ends need to be added for inland transmission to and from 
Liverpool.
TABLE 38. Falmouth packet round trips and the length of information circles, 
Falmouth–Rio de Janeiro, 1840.
612 Calculated from the sailing lists of Howat, 61.




































Alert 10.1.40 28.2. 25.3. 13.5. 124* 124 126
Pandora 7.2. 31.3. 15.4. 1.6. 115* 115 134
Pigeon 6.3. 23.4. 31.5. 11.8. 158 158 147
Spey 10.4. 22.5. 21.6. 21.8. 133 > 123 126
Sheldrake 8.5. 26.6. 31.7. 26.9. 141 141 114
Delight 5.6. 29.7. 13.8. 17.10. 134 > 113 137
Alert 10.7. 27.8. 27.9. 20.11. 133 133 118
Magnet 7.8. 24.9. 18.10. 30.12. 145 > 105 etc.
Lapwing 4.9. 25.10. 26.11. 22.1.41 140 140
Express 9.10. 22.11. 15.12. 11.2. 125 > 105
Seagull 7.11. 28.12. 13.1.41 4.3. 117 117
Penguin 8.12. 23.1.41 2.3. 13.4. 126 126
Min.- 








days - - - - - - - - 133 125 129
Source: Calculated from the sailing lists of Howat, 81. 
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– The options to send replies to the letters with an earlier packet are marked in bold.
– An average sailing from Falmouth to Rio de Janeiro took 48 days, varying between
42 and 54 days. The sailing to the other direction took 57 days on average, varying
between 42 and 73 days.
* February had 29 days in 1840.
** Six trips of the year were conducted via Pernambuco and Bahia.
FIG. 20. The letter dated in Rio de Janeiro on 10.4.1843, was carried to England by 
the Swift packet, which departed from Rio on 23.4. and arrived in Falmouth on 10.6. 
The recipient, Frederick Huth Co. in London, has noted on the reverse that the letter 
was answered to on 4.7. Thus the answer must have been carried by the Penguin 
packet, which departed from Falmouth on 7.7. and arrived in Rio on 17.8. A concrete 
case, where we know that the letter from Rio received an answer in 129 days of the 
writing, or in 116 days after the mail-carrying packet had left the port of Rio.
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The Admiralty system for Bueros Aires was more complicated. Table 39 
(in the end of the book, p. 428) depicts how it worked in 1840. The route 
consisted actually of several parts. Firstly, the outward sailing from Falmouth 
to Rio de Janeiro took 48.5 days on average, varying between 42 and 54 days. 
The branch packet was ready to sail for Buenos Aires within three to five 
days after the Falmouth packet had arrived. The sailing took  about 12 days. 
The average waiting time in Buenos Aires was ten days, varying between 
seven and 22 days. The trip back to Rio was typically more difficult than the 
voyage down; it took 20 days on average. The next Falmouth packet took 
the mails and left within ten days on average. The delay varied between two 
and 19 days, however. The homeward trip from Rio to Falmouth took 57.3 
days on average, nine days more than in the other direction.
As can be noted in Table 39, the departures of the Falmouth packets from 
Rio de Janeiro were organized so that the mails from Buenos Aires could 
always proceed by the next packet after the one which had brought the mails 
from Europe. This was a major improvement compared with other Admiralty 
ruled routes where the next ship had often just left when the auxiliary service 
arrived with the mails, but the system itself was rather slow with changes of 
ships and waiting at ports. Even if some vessels were apparently better than 
ten years earlier, the length of an average information circle did not reduce 
very much within a decade, only from 168 to 162 days.613
The Falmouth packets stayed at Rio for approximately 27 days on average, 
while it took almost 43 days on average for the branch service to make the 
round trip to Montevideo and Buenos Aires. With respect to the mail service 
between England and Brazil, it was obviously wise to organize the sailings 
to Argentina and Uruguay as a separate branch service and thus speed up 
the information transmission to and from Rio de Janeiro. One could say, 
however, that some more efficiency at the ports could easily have reduced 
the length of the information circles by at least one week. Now, two weeks 
were used on average for taking the European mails to the branch packet at 
Rio, and the branch packet mails to the leaving Falmouth packet at the same 
port on the way back home.
The Mexico route
The packet route to Mexico was established in 1826, and taken over by the 
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company together with the West Indian route in 
1842.614 As far as the writer of this study has been able to find out, no postal 
613  Calculated from the sailing lists of Howat, 61, 81, 94.
614 See Howat, 27; Kenton & Parsons, 2–3, 8, 21. – There was also a French government 
mail packet line between Bordeaux and Vera Cruz in 1827–1835. The monthly service of 
the ‘Paquebots Réguliers aux frais du Gouvernement’ was ceased in mid-1835. The last 
ship was to sail from Bordeaux for Martinique, Haiti and Vera Cruz on 1.7.1835. A new 
service was started by Compagnie Général Transatlantique’s steamers as late as 1862. 
The early French sailing packet service enabled about the same information circulation 
from Bordeaux to Vera Cruz as the Falmouth packet service did from England. A round 
trip normally took about five months and two information circles could be carried out 
in 11 months. Salles gives the departure and arrival dates from Bordeaux but no arrivals 
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historical research has been published about the Falmouth packet sailings 
on the Mexico route during the period. From Britnor we learn the following 
about the sailings on this route in 1832: The departure from Falmouth was on 
the third Wednesday of each month, and the packet proceeded via Jacquemel 
(Haiti), Jamaica, Belize (Honduras), Vera Cruz and Tampico (both in Mexico), 
back to Vera Cruz, Havana (Cuba) and home to Falmouth. On the arrival of 
the Mexico packet at Jamaica, a branch packet was dispatched to Cartagena 
(Colombia) and that vessel also brought the replies to Jamaica in time for 
the homeward bound Jamaica packet.  A colonial boat conveyed the mails 
from Jamaica to Nassau (Bahamas), and took the replies to Crooked Island 
(Bahamas) to be picked up by the homeward bound Jamaica packet.615
As can be noticed from the list above, the Mexico route was actually a 
combined service for the North and West Caribbean islands, Central America 
and Mexico. In 1837, the Mexico packets, which had been calling at Belize, 
were ordered to sail directly from Havana to Vera Cruz and the Honduras 
mail had to be taken by a branch vessel from Jamaica.616
Several interesting details can be picked up from the Lloyd’s List maritime 
intelligence on the Falmouth packet sailings for Mexico in 1840 (see Table 
40). Probably the first thing to notice is that huge sums of bullion were 
carried by each of the packets from Mexico. During 1840, over $5 million 
arrived at Falmouth in the Mexico packets.617 Vera Cruz and Tampico seem 
to have been the places where the Bank of England’s bullion mainly came 
from, even if considerable amounts of money freight were also constantly 
arriving from the West Indies and other areas.618
Perhaps due to the importance of the Mexico route, the departures from 
Falmouth were strictly punctual throughout the year. That was where the 
punctuality ended, however. It is hard to find any logic in the departure 
dates at the other end of the trip.619 Due to the delay of the Opossum in 
and only a few departure dates from Vera Cruz, which makes it impossible to reconstruct 
the information circles enabled by the service on that route at the period. Apart from the 
possibility to send a message by an earlier leaving packet, which remains unknown, the 
missing intelligence makes it impossible to compare any options to send mail to Europe 
by the French or the British service. See Raymond Salles, La Poste Maritime Française, 
Tome IV, Les Paquebots de L’Atlantique Nord, Antilles – Amérique Centrale et Pacifique 
Sud, États-Unis (Limassol, 1992), 9–14.
615 Britnor, 150. – In 1840, the Falmouth packets for Mexico departed on the 17th of each 
month (Lloyd’s List 1840).
616 Britnor, 150. – As can be seen in table 40, several Falmouth packets called at Belize again 
in 1840. Continuous changes were typical on these routes.
617 In addition to the packets mentioned in this table, the Pigeon arrived from Vera Cruz at 
Falmouth on 15.1.1840 with $200,000; the Reindeer on 15.4.1840 with $580,000; and 
the Delight on 30.4.1840 with $250,000. (See Lloyd’s List 1840, respectively). They had 
all departed for their round trip in 1839.
618 For example, the American sailing packet Columbus arrived at Liverpool on 15.6.1840 
with $50,000 from New York; and the Philadelphia packet Monongahela with ‘upwards 
500,000 dollars’. (Lloyd’s List 17.6.1840)
619 For some more dates, the October, November and December 1839 sailings proceeded as 
follows: the Pigeon sailed from Vera Cruz on 28.11.1839, Tampico on 10.12. and Havana 
on 19.12. arriving at Falmouth on 15.1.1840; the Reindeer sailed from Vera Cruz on 11.2., 
Tampico on 17.2. and Havana on 6.3. arriving at Falmouth on 15.4.1840; and the Delight 
sailed from Vera Cruz on 6.3., from Tampico on 10.3. and Havana on 27.3. arriving at 
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Opossum a (17.1.) 29.1. 23.4. 30.4. 13.5.
12.6.
($760,000)
Linnet 17.2. 21.4. 2.5. 13.5. 11.6.($380,000)
Lyra 18.3. 19.4. 1.5. 20.5. 28.5. 15.6. 17.7.($230,000)
Tyrian 17.4. 7.7. 22.7. 21.8.($350,000)
Seagull 17.5. 24.7. 2.8. 19.8. 23.9.($808,650)






Crane 17.8. 2.10. ~12.10. 18.10. 29.10. 10.11. 7.12.($95,200)
Star 17.9. 13.12. 23.12. 5.1.41 12.2.41
 c
($800,000)
Spey d 17.10. – – – – – – –
Sheldrake 18.11. spring 1841
Pandora 17.12. spring1841
TABLE 40. Falmouth packet sailings for Mexico and consecutive information circles 
enabled by them, 1840.
Source: Lloyd’s List, 1840–1841.
a The Opossum departed from Falmouth already on 17.1. but put back on 28.1.
b The Skylark arrived at Cork already 28.11.1840. Her exact departure date from 
Falmouth in July is missing.
c On the same day as the Star arrived from Mexico with a considerable freight of 
$800,000, two other Falmouth packets arrived from the West Indies, the Swift with 
$100,000 and the Ranger with $80,000. Thus the mail coach from Falmouth to London 
was responsible for the safe transport of almost one million dollars on a single day. 
(Lloyd’s List 13.2. and 16.2.1841)
d Wrecked at the Bahamas Channel 24.11.1840; crew, passengers, mails and stores 
saved (Lloyd’s List 16.1.1841). The vessel was abandoned but later brought to Nassau 
by HMS Thunder. (Lloyd’s List 16.2.1841)
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January, the February packet Linnet was in Tampico before the January 
mails arrived, departed on the very same day from Havana as the Opossum 
and arrived at Falmouth one day earlier. These two ships shared a freight 
of $1.14 million and there may have been good reasons to sail together, but 
from the information transmission point of view this was naturally not an 
ideal arrangement.
The system gave the Vera Cruz merchants about two weeks time to 
answer their mails. During that time the English packet sailed for Tampico 
and returned. The departure from Havana to Falmouth was most often on 
a Wednesday, Thursday or Friday at around mid-month, although the date 
varied between the 5th and the 27th. The home trip was made in 32.6 days on 
average.620 As can be noted from table 40, only two full information circles 
were possible between the trade partners in Britain and Mexico in that year. 
The next packet for Mexico departed on 18 November and would be back 
in Falmouth sometime in April 1841.
The Admiralty seems to have preferred to send the Mexico packets from 
Falmouth exactly on schedule instead of enabling the British merchants to 
answer their arriving letters. The Skylark departed on 17 July, the same day as 
the Lyra arrived from Mexico, and the answers had to wait for the next vessel 
for a whole month. The Crane departed from Falmouth for Vera Cruz four 
days before the Tyrian arrived with the mails from Mexico, the Star departed 
six days before, and the Spey just one day before the mails arrived.
Even if it was naturally important to keep the timetables, it might have 
been useful to reconsider them as it frequently happened that the duration 
of the Mexico sailings – the length of an average round trip was 126 days 
– was such that the mails from Vera Cruz arrived just after the monthly packet
departure had taken place. If the service had been bi-monthly, this problem
would not have existed – something to keep in mind when comparing the
American sailing packets’ weekly service in the North Atlantic with anything
the Admiralty was able to do on any route.
The last years of the Falmouth packet service, a conclusion
In conclusion, it can be noted that the varying length and the complexity 
of the Falmouth packet routes as well as their auxiliary services made the 
organizing of the mail system a challenging task. The Admiralty had 24 packet 
vessels for four different routes and monthly services, except the West Indies, 
which was bi-monthly. Of the packets, 13 were small (about 230 tons) and 
rather unsuitable for the service, two were middle-size (280 and 320 tons) 
and only nine were purpose-built, around 360 tons vessels. Additionally, 
there were several branch services: between Halifax and Bermuda; widely 
at the Caribbean and the northern parts of South America; and between Rio 
de Janeiro and the southern ports. This puzzle was supposed to function 
perfectly during the age of sail, when prevailing winds and storms could 
ruin any plans, and often did.
620 Calculated from the dates of 11 arrivals in 1840, as the sailing date of the Skylark from 
Havana is missing. See  Lloyd’s List 1840–1841, respectively.
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Diagram 38 illustrates the sailings of the Falmouth packets on different 
mail routes in 1840. It starts from 1 January and shows on which routes and 
for how long each ship was sailing during the year. The service for Halifax 
ended in the summer of 1840, when the Cunard Line’s mail steamers started 
their operations. For this reason, three ships were left unemployed in the 
middle of the year. Additionally, the Spey packet struck on a coral reef in 
the Bahamas Channel and was lost in November 1840.621
Each of the packets could sail on any route, and no difference was made on 
the basis of their slowness or other disadvantages.622 Basically, as was noticed 
when examining the South American route, a great part of the differences 
in duration of voyages were due to the varying quality of the packet vessels. 
As already discussed in Chapter V, it caused a dilemma, even on the North 
Atlantic route, if the shipping companies used very different steamers, while 
it was a great advantage if the fleet consisted of similar types of vessels. 
Although the problem was obviously well known by the Admiralty, nothing 
was done about it – in addition to economic reasons, it was probably thought 
that the vessels would soon be replaced by steamers anyway.
The general popularity of the American sailing packets was based on the 
idea of regular departures from both ends. Their schedules were built so that 
the targets could usually be met without problems and even if the duration 
of sailings varied a lot, the departures were on fixed dates from both Europe 
and New York. This was rather easy to manage due to the frequency of 
sailings. The longest waiting time between a ship’s arrival and the next one’s 
departure was one week only and generally just a few days. The number of 
vessels in service enabled sufficient time for loading and unloading at ports 
at both ends of the voyage.
The regularity of the Falmouth packets was limited to the departures from 
England only, and the rules varied between the routes. In 1840, the West 
Indian packets departed quite regularly on the 3rd and 17th of each month; 
the Mexico packets very accurately on the 17th (with the exceptions caused 
by Sundays); the South American packets on a Friday nearest to the 10th of 
each month with a couple of exceptions; and the Halifax mails on the first 
or second Saturday of each month.623 As a whole, the departure dates from 
England can be called regular within their own logic.
The philosophy used for the departures from the other side of the ocean was 
different. The schedules were calculated from each arrival of the Falmouth 
packet from England – regardless of whether the trip had taken three or six 
weeks. Strict orders regulated how many days or hours after the ship had 
arrived at Barbados the auxiliary ships should depart for the colonial islands, 
and by which date the mails should be collected to Havana, Cape Haitien or 
some other place selected for the purpose during the years. The advantages 
621 Lloyd’s List 16.1.1841; 16.2.1841.
622 Leaving out the Lisbon packets that had already been replaced by steamers in 1840, the 
Falmouth packets took their turns for the various voyages according to the time of their 
arrival at the home port. See Robinson (1964), 111.
623 For the West Indies and Mexico routes, see Lloyd’s List 1840; for the South American 
route, see the sailing lists of Howat, 81; and for the Halifax route, see the sailing lists of 
Arnell & Ludington, 69.
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of this system were that the mails were carried home as fast as possible, and 
the vessels were back in England as soon as they could be.
Unfortunately the advantage of knowing in advance when the next mail 
ship would leave from Falmouth was in several cases cancelled out by the 
fact that the packet from abroad arrived shortly after another one for the 
Diagram 38. Falmouth packet sailings on different routes, 1840



























Source: Lloyd’s List 1840. – The small-size ships are marked with an asterisk*, 
and the medium-size ships with (*). The black parts of the pillars depict a trip to 
South America, and the grey parts a trip to the West Indies. The vertically striped 
parts of the pillars depict a trip to Halifax, and the diagonally striped parts a trip to 
Mexico. The white parts of the pillars depict the time each ship stayed at the home 
port between sailings.
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same place had left the port. Even at the risk of slowing down the arrival 
of letters from the colonies, it might have been useful from the information 
circulation point of view to adjust the sailing dates to avoid such incidences. 
This would have been a difficult task in the long run, however, in view of 
the requirement for regularity of sailings. There would also have been the 
risk that the expected ship might never arrive.
The era of the Falmouth sailing packets ended on the Halifax route in mid-
1840, when the Cunard Line started the steamship service from Liverpool via 
Halifax to Boston; and on the West Indian and Mexico routes in early 1842 
when the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company took over these routes with its 
new purpose-built steamers. Six sailing packets continued on the long South 
American run until the end of 1850, when the Seagull took home the last 
mails from Rio de Janeiro, arriving in Falmouth on 30 April 1851.624
Overnight Change from Sail to Steam
By Royal Mail to sixty ports – The long way to South America
By Royal Mail to sixty ports
While there was a ten-year-long shift period in the North Atlantic when mails 
were being sent by all possible means – American sailing packets, pioneering 
private steamers and government contract steamers – the complicated 
Falmouth packet system on the West Indian route was changed overnight 
to an even more complicated Royal Mail Line (Royal Mail Steam Packet 
Company, or RMSP) system. Even if the government subsidy was as huge 
as £240,000 (compared to the Cunard Line’s much discussed £81,000), no 
competitors were struggling for the contract. In fact, the government did 
not even ask for bids but just accepted the proposal made by a man called 
James MacQueen.625
MacQueen was a Scotsman who had spent years in the West Indies, 
working as a sugar plantation manager in Grenada, and travelling a great deal 
around the Caribbean area and the Spanish Main. He returned to Glasgow at 
the age of 35 and earned his living as a newspaperman and merchant, also 
showing much interest in topography and African geography. He was the 
first person to plot the exit of the Niger into the Bay of Benin. In identifying 
the Niger’s course he was helped by his slaves on Grenada, some of whom 
were Mandingos, who had once lived on the river banks.626
This background gave him the ability to plan a network of steamship 
communications, which would serve the merchants in Britain as well as 
the West Indies, and several other places. His ‘General Plan for a Mail 
Communication between Great Britain and the Western and Eastern parts 
624 See sailing list of Howat, 86.
625 See Gibbs, 322. 
626 Nicol, vol. 1, 33–35.
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of the world; also Canton and Sydney westward of the Pacific’ included 
operations around the world: from Falmouth to Halifax; North America, the 
West Indies and Brazil; to Canton in China and Sydney in New South Wales 
(Australia) via Panama; the Mediterranean and East India by the Red Sea; and 
the eastern world by the Cape of Good Hope.627  The distances from port to 
port and the days of departures and arrivals were all carefully calculated. As 
MacQueen believed that a canal through the Central American isthmus (he 
preferred the Nicaraguan route instead of Panama) would be opened ‘at no 
distant date’ he boldly planned some of his routes to take advantage of direct 
access to the Pacific by such a canal, being thus some eighty years ahead of 
his time. Also his proposals for rapid bunkering of the steamers would have 
been considered advanced even in later decades.628
The plan was obviously too much to be implemented by one company. 
Vernon Gibbs states in his book about British passenger liners that both 
the Cunard Line and P&O actually owed their birth to MacQueen’s 
627 MacQueen was also involved in the affairs of the Pacific coast of South America and 
worked towards a line of steamers for a service along the coast. This resulted in the 
formation of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company in 1840. The company became 
closely linked with the Royal Mail Line in the coming years. See Nicol, vol. 1, 39.
628 T.A. Bushell, Royal Mail. A Centenary History of the Royal Mail Line 1839–1939 (London, 
1939), 4; and Nicol, vol. 1, 37.
FIG. 21. The Royal Mail Line paddle steamer Dee was one of the 14 original vessels 
built for the West Indies service in 1841. They were all produced to the same basic 
design and were named after British rivers. The Dee remained in service until 1860. 
(Painting by William Clark, 1841.) © National Museums Liverpool (Merseyside 
Maritime Museum).
Content (photo) removed  from the open access version of this book.
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representations. His proposals to the British Government in June 1837, 
strongly supported by the West India Committee, led to the establishment 
of the Royal Mail Company in September 1839, and to the Caribbean mail 
contract in March 1840.629 The huge amount of capital needed – £1.5 million 
– was collected with the help of bankers involved in West Indian affairs,
including the well known Barings Bros in London. The first Chairman was
John Irving, MP and merchant, who was also the Chairman of the Colonial
Bank.630
MacQueen himself took on the role of an expert in Caribbean circumstances, 
which he undoubtedly was. His plan for the West Indian mail system was 
indeed very ambitious. While fourteen new steamers and three schooners 
were being built for the purpose, MacQueen set up a final tour to prepare the 
service. Over a period of eight months and covering a distance of over 18,000 
miles, he studied the best options for the mail services, including ports, routes 
and schedules. His final plans consisted of the transatlantic service and ten 
branch lines covering the area between Halifax in the north and Demerara in 
the south, Barbados in the east and Tampico in the west. The routes covered 
some sixty ports and required the steamers to travel over 547,000 miles a 
year.631 The routes are well covered in earlier studies and do not need to 
be repeated here in detail.632 The transatlantic passage started and ended at 
Southampton, which had just been connected with London by railway. The 
Admiralty, which was still responsible for mail transport at sea, insisted that 
the Royal Mail ships had to carry the mails via Falmouth even though the 
inland mail was much slower than it would have been from Southampton. 
The mails were made up in London and the ships left from Southampton on 
the 1st and 16th of each month, while the departure from Falmouth was on 
the 3rd and 18th. Falmouth was finally left out from the service in September 
1843.633 This was naturally a great disappointment to the port, which had 
been Britain’s main packet station for over 150 years.
The local routes between the Caribbean islands and Central America 
formed a complicated network where everything depended on something 
else. There were separate routes from Barbados to Guiana; from Grenada to 
Curacao; from Barbados to Turks’ Islands, by Antigua; from Turks’ Islands 
to the Jamaica district, to the Cartagena and Santa Martha district, and to 
the Havana and Honduras district; from Havana to the Mexico district, and 
to the North American stations; and to the Madeira district.634
The new traffic started on 1 January 1842, thus changing the West Indian 
mail system from sail to steam in a single night. By that date eight Royal 
Mail steamers had already sailed for the West Indies to take up stations. 
629 Gibbs, 323.
630 Nicol, vol..1, 40; and Bushell, 7–9.
631 M.H. Ludington & Geoffrey Osborn, The Royal Mail Steam Packets to Bermuda and the 
Bahamas 1842–1859 (London, 1971), Preface.
632 See especially Kenton & Parsons, 2–7, 80–81, 116–119, 222–226, 322–323; and Ludington 
& Osborn, 3–23.
633 Kenton & Parsons, 2, 36. For the early arrangements in Southampton, see Bushell, 
36–40.
634 For more details, see Kenton & Parsons, 2–3.
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The first vessels to leave from England were the sister ships Lee and Larne, 
which left from Southampton on 3 December 1841. These small vessels of 
250 and 300 tons would be used for the inter-island services. The first large 
Royal Mail vessel to cross the Atlantic was the Forth, 1,939 tons, which 
departed from Southampton on 17 December to be ready at St. Thomas for 
the mails carried by the Thames, which sailed from Falmouth on 3 January 
directly to Demerara, and the Tay, which left on the same day with the first 
regular mails for Barbados.635
The first sailings were fast compared with the earlier standards. The 
Thames arrived in Demerara from Falmouth in 20 days and the Tay at 
Barbados in 18 days. In 1840, the average westbound trip from Falmouth 
to Barbados by a sailing packet had taken 31 days, varying between 20 and 
45 days.636 During the first nine months of 1842, the average trip between 
Falmouth and Barbados by a Royal Mail steamer took 19.2 days, varying 
between 17 and 24 days. More than 70% of the trips were made within 18 
to 20 days. Not only were the steamers faster, but their arrivals were much 
more predictable. They also sailed punctually from Falmouth without 
exception.
There were problems, however. The service was not only to Barbados 
and back home. Cooperation between the network of different routes 
proved difficult, and this added too many days to the time required for mail 
transmission.
Thus, even if the mails were carried from England to Barbados in fewer 
than 20 days on average, the sailing back via St. Vincent, Grenada, St. Croix, 
St. Thomas, Turks’ Islands, Nassau, Bermuda and Fayal to Falmouth took 
about 38 days on average, varying between 33 and 45 days.637 And even worse 
than that, the ships arriving in Barbados from Falmouth often continued 
their journey on the same day, leaving no time for answers. The next packet 
would leave some two weeks later.
In practice the circulation of information to and from Demerara was as fast 
as to and from Barbados, even though the latter was several days closer to 
England, because the system served all the colonies during one West Indian 
round trip. The merchants at Barbados received their news from Europe 
earlier than those in Demerara, and their letters arrived somewhat faster in 
England than those from Guiana, but the information circulation was equally 
long from the British merchant’s point of view.
The duration of the homeward transport of mails was normally almost 
twice the length of the voyage westbound. The consecutive information 
circles enabled by the service between Liverpool and Demerara in 1842 are 
illustrated in table 41.
635 Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 10; and Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets. Royal Mail 
Line & Nelson Line (1982), 26–30.
636 See chapter VI.1.
637 Calculated from the voyages which started from Falmouth in January–September 1842. 
See the sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 10–12. Several dates are missing from the 
lists.
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TABLE 41. Consecutive information circles between Liverpool and Demerara 
enabled by the Royal Mail Line service in 1842.
Source: Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 10–14, 26–28.
* The ship was about ten days late. She called at Corunna on 1.10. due to strong
easterly gales.
** The station was changed to St. Thomas. Barbados was visited on the way to and
from Demerara.
As can be noticed, the system enabled only four information circles within 
a calendar year – not very impressive compared with the 3.5 information 
circles carried out by the Admiralty’s old sailing packets two years earlier. 
One of the Royal Mail steamers’ circles was even longer than the average 
Falmouth packet circle, which was 92 days.
The Royal Mail route system soon proved to be impractical and was 
changed for the first time in October 1842, after only nine months’ experience. 
As can be noticed from the table, the fourth circle was conducted via St. 
Thomas instead of Barbados. The trip homewards now included only calls 
at Bermuda and Fayal. This arrangement shortened the trip notably and the 
length of the information circle reduced from an average of 82 days during 










































22.2.  - -
















24.11. – – 20.12. 68
The West Indies and South America
235
The average trip from Falmouth to St. Thomas in 1842 took 22.7 days, 
compared to 19.2 days to Barbados. Additionally, the merchants of Barbados 
had to wait three to four days before the mails arrived from St. Thomas at their 
island. For these merchants, the route change was clearly a disadvantage, in 
terms of arriving news from England. However, they now had approximately 
six days time to answer their letters while the inter-island ship made her trip to 
Demerara. This was much better than answering on the same day or waiting 
two weeks for the next steamship – clearly an improvement.
While the businessmen in Demerara certainly felt that the new arrangement 
was an improvement in their communications, those in Berbice had an 
extremely busy schedule if they wanted to answer immediately to the letters 
received. The Royal Mail steamers usually went only as far as Demerara, 
while Berbice, Surinam and Paramaribo were served by local vessels or the 
mail was taken overland.638 Sometimes the ships stayed at Demerara only for 
one or two days, which made it rather impossible for the Berbice businessmen 
to write immediate answers to the arriving letters.639
A concrete example from early 1842 shows how the mail system worked 
via Barbados. A letter by William Earle from Liverpool to William Carter, 
Attorney, who was visiting Berbice at the time, was sent on 15 February by 
the Royal Mail steamer Teviot. She departed from Falmouth on 17 February 
and arrived at Barbados on 8 March. The letter proceeded by the City of 
Glasgow, which arrived in Demerara on 11 March, and was finally received by 
the Attorney in Berbice on 13 March, according to the handwritten marking. 
He wrote an answer on the same day and it was carried by the same steamer 
from Demerara on 15 March. The letter arrived at Barbados – the steamer 
had been damaged at Tobago but was able to continue – on 18 March. The 
Medway took then the letter from Barbados, departing on 4 April. She arrived 
at Nassau on 16 April. The Clyde sailed with the mails for Europe on 17 
April, arriving at Falmouth on 8 May. The mails arrived in London on 10 
May, and the letter was received by William Earle in Liverpool on the same 
day.640 The duration of this concrete information circle was 84 days.
The first letters from Liverpool to Berbice in January and February 1842 
arrived surprisingly quickly, in 24 and 26 days. A delay with the next mail 
caused immediate alarm. Carter wrote to Earle: ‘I waited in Berbice for the 
steamer from Barbados with the 1 March mail from England until the 28th, 
but nothing was heard of her. I determined to go down to Demerara, where 
I arrived in a small schooner with several other passengers to England… 
There I heard that the mail had not reached Barbados on the 26th, that the 
steamer I had been looking for was disabled! I immediately made inquiries 
for a vessel going to Barbados… From Barbados I shall go to St. Thomas 
where I hope to receive letters…’
Carter sent his letter on 7 April from Barbados by the merchant ship St. 
Vincent. The letter was received by William Earle in Liverpool on 21 May 
638 Kenton & Parsons, 14.
639 Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 28.
640 Earle Correspondence, D/Earle 5/8/8, 5/9/8. (MMM); and the sailing lists of Kenton & 
Parsons, 10–11, 14.
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in 44 days. Carter also sent a duplicate on the following day, on 8 April by 
official mail. The letter carries the handstamp of Barbados Post Office 18 
April, and it arrived in England by the Royal Mail steamer Solway on 28 
May.641 The steamship letter was on the way 50 days – almost a week longer 
than the letter by the traditional merchant ship.
William Carter sent one more letter from Barbados before the Royal Mail 
steamer departed. The merchant ship Alice took the letter, dated on 22 April, 
to Liverpool in 35 days.642
The huge difference between the West Indian and North Atlantic mail 
routes was concretely demonstrated in Carter’s following letters from his 
trip to the north. He continued from Barbados to St. Thomas, from where 
he sent a letter to William Earle on 28 April. It arrived in England by the 
same Royal Mail steamer than the duplicate sent from Barbados 20 days 
earlier. A letter from New York on 14 May was sent by the Cunard steamer 
Caledonia, which departed from Boston on 16 May and arrived in Liverpool 
on 29 May643 – on the same day as Earle received all the Royal Mail letters 
from the West Indies, the oldest of which had been sent 36 days before the 
letter from New York!
The shipping management of the Royal Mail Line – including routes, 
schedules, coaling, and repairs – was obviously much more challenging 
than the back and forth sailing between Liverpool and New York across the 
North Atlantic. The original routing via Barbados, which was reminiscent 
of the old system used by the Falmouth sailing packets, was changed in 
October 1842. St. Thomas in the Danish West Indies became the hub of all 
mail routes. The main reason for the change was that the route via Turks’ 
Islands was too dangerous and one of the Royal Mail steamers, the Medina, 
had already been lost there in May 1842.644 Figure 22 gives an example of 
how the new system worked.
641 William Carter to William Earle from Barbados 7.4. and 8.4.1842. Earle correspondence, 
D/Earle 5/8/8;10. (MMM); See also sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 10–12.
642 William Carter to William Earle from Barbados 22.4.1842. In Earle correspondence, 
D/Earle 5/8/11. (MMM)
643 William Carter to William Earle from St. Thomas 28.4.1842 and New York 14.5.1842. 
In Earle correspondence, D/Earle 5/8/12–13. (MMM)
644 Kenton & Parsons, 10. – Indifferent sea charts, uncertain compasses and unlit coral reefs 
were mentioned as reasons for a number of disasters during the first decade of Royal Mail 
services. For further descriptions, see Bushell, 41–53.
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FIG. 22. Royal Mail Line’s steamers at St. Thomas 23.11.1842.
     
On 23 November, there were five large Royal Mail Line’s steamers 
simultaneously at the port of Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas. The steamer 
Tay arrived with the European mails from Falmouth on 23 November. On 
the same day, the Dee arrived with the Jamaica mails, while the Thames was 
already there, having arrived from Havana, Nassau and Bermuda a few days 
earlier, and so was the Trent, which had arrived from Demerara on the 22nd. 
All the mails were quickly sorted and on the following day the Tay sailed 
for Jamaica, the Dee for Havana and the Thames for Demerara. The Tweed 
took all the mails which had been collected from the islands and proceeded 
for Falmouth, via Bermuda, on the same day.645
645 See the sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 26–32. The respective intelligence of Lloyd’s List 
varies somewhat from these lists. According to Lloyd’s List, the Thames arrived from Bermuda 
on the 19th and not the 18th. According to Kenton & Parsons, it was the Tay which sailed for 
Jamaica 24.11. while according to Lloyd’s List it was the Trent. Lloyd’s List does not report the 
Dee’s trip to Jamaica between 8.–23.11. None of the sources tell from where the Tweed arrived 
at St. Thomas on 23.11. or where the Trent proceeded after 23.11. Kenton & Parsons’ sailing 
lists are largely based on maritime intelligence published in Caribbean newspapers, which were 
nearer the scene but might be less reliable for other reasons – Lloyd’s List again was published 
far away in London and changes were possible after the intelligence was sent by the Lloyd’s 
agent. For the references, see Kenton & Parsons, 415–417. (Also Lloyd’s List, The Times and 
Illustrated London News are among their sources.) – Without knowing the original plans for 
sailings – if any – it is impossible to interpret from the sailing lists whether the inter-island 
vessels were on schedule or not. For example, Nicol mentions that the Clyde was at Nassau on 
17 February nine days behind schedule. (Nicol, vol. 2, 25) The sailing lists can only tell that 
the ship arrived at Nassau on 16 and departed on 20 February. Thus, we can only see from the 
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It is easy to imagine that everything did not always work that punctually. 
A few notes from Lloyd’s List as well as the sailing lists of Kenton & 
Parsons give some idea of the difficulties: The Tay grounded at Havana 
in February, but without major harm. The Medina was in quarantine in 
Nassau for ten days in March 1842. She was totally lost on a reef at Turks’ 
Island in May. Crew, passengers and mails were saved, however. The City 
of Glasgow was damaged in March. The Clyde struck a reef near Nevis and 
had to return to St. Thomas in July. There was a fire on board the Teviot in 
July. The Thames was damaged while striking a reef at Nevis (between St. 
Thomas and Antigua) in August, and had to proceed to London for repairs. 
The Solway lost sails and gib boom in a hurricane in September. In April 
of the following year she ran onto a reef off Corunna, Spain, and was lost. 
The Isis was damaged on a reef near Puerto Rico in September, and totally 
lost near Bermuda in October of the same year. All passengers and crew, 
except for a boy, were saved.646
In addition to the disasters at sea, many kinds of minor incidents followed 
each other. One of the often mentioned problems was coaling. The steamers 
required some two thousand tons of coal per week, and the whole supply 
had to be shipped to the depots in sailing vessels charted for the purpose. 
Bad weather in the Atlantic inevitably caused delays to the colliers and there 
were occasions when the local services had to be curtailed in consequence. 
In March 1842, the Medway and Tweed were reported to be delayed due to 
a shortage of coal. A report on the City of Glasgow noted further: ‘Negroes 
were on strike in Demerara which made coaling difficult – took 24 hours to 
ship 52 tons, which was all that was available. Chief Engineer and a coal 
trimmer suspended for ‘misbehaviour’.’ Also the Thames reported shortage 
of coal in April.647
The crews of the steamers were not always of the best quality. Another 
report on the City of Glasgow writes: ‘March 1842. The surgeon was sent 
home because he was insane. Ship’s crew described by Captain Boxer was 
‘absolutely very little short of savages’. The third engineer was imprisoned 
at Barbados for attacking the saloon cook – ‘he is a notorious character 
having been flogged and dismissed from Her Majesty’s service’.’ The 
Havana authorities complained about the Clyde’s crew’s ’rowdyism’; they 
wanted a stone wall built around the depot to keep them in. On the other 
hand, also the circumstances on the islands were primitive, and sometimes 
violent.648
For obvious reasons the mails did not always arrive ‘just in time’. The 
captains had to improvise, as a report on the Thames describes: ‘23 April. 
Captain Hast will attempt to complete Table 3 on schedule but doubts it will 
be possible – if it becomes evident the ship is falling behind, they will return 
via Trinidad, coal at Grenada and thus be ready to receive the mails for the 
646 Lloyd’s List 11.6.1842; 29.8.1842; 5.11.1842; and sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 
10–21, 26.
647 Bushell, 27; Nicol, vol.2, 26; Kenton & Parsons, 16, 19. – St. Thomas was probably the 
most reliable place for coaling. For example the Medway had to sail from Curaçao to St. 
Thomas for coaling, which made an extra ten days sailing. (Kenton & Parsons, 16)
648 Nicol, vol. 1, 54–56; Nicol vol. 2, 25–26.
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western area. If City of Glasgow is still disabled he will take the mails for 
Guiana.’649
All shipping companies with Admiralty contract also had to carry on 
board their vessels a Naval Agent who had complete jurisdiction over the 
mails ‘with full authority in all cases to require a due and strict execution of 
the contract… and to determine every question whenever raising relative to 
putting to sea, or putting into harbour, or to necessity of stopping to assist any 
vessel in distress, or to save human life…’ This officer was ‘to be provided 
with a first-class cabin and suitable accommodation for his servant and a 
properly equipped boat for his use.’ As Gisburn notes, this was not a bad 
appointment for an ex-Naval officer who (as frequently was the case) had 
been of decidedly second-rate calibre during his active service days.650
With two masters on board a vessel, the system led to inevitable friction. 
In March 1842, when the Forth and Tay of the Royal Mail Line were 
simultaneously at the port of Nassau, the two Naval Agents failed to agree 
on which of the two vessels should carry the homeward mails and which 
one would continue on the inter-island routes in the West Indies. They 
compromised by sharing the mailbags and both sailing home to England. The 
Forth won this unbelievable race, arriving at Falmouth on 20 April with six 
passengers and a few bags of mail. The company was already embarrassed 
by the non-delivery of two ships which were under construction at Bristol, 
and such occurrences just added to their difficulties.651
The sailing lists of 1842–1843 report at least 14 cases where the ships 
had arrived somewhere without the mails they should have had with them. 
Additionally, it frequently happened that the vessels did not call at all ports, 
which naturally ended with the same result. In several cases, the Navy vessels 
took care of the mails which had been left after.652
The reports published in England regarding the Royal Mail service were 
not encouraging. For example, at the end of April 1842 it was reported that no 
mails had arrived from Jamaica for two months. They were later brought by 
HMS Spitfire, a Navy vessel. In August, it was reported that while the Forth 
was on her way homewards, the ‘mails from Bermuda were forgotten and 
put ashore at Fayal’. In November, it was reported that the Trent proceeded 
to St. Thomas without Barbadian mails. They were forwarded by a hired 
sailing vessel. In May 1843, when the Thames arrived at Barbados with no 
English mails, a Barbadian newspaper wrote that this was the fourth time 
that had happened recently.653
649 Nicol, vol. 1, 54; Nicol, vol. 2, 27.
650 See Harold G.D. Gisburn, The Postage Stamps and Postal History of the Bahamas (London, 
1950), 22.
651 Gisburn, 22; Bushell, 27. – The Tay arrived on the following day. The Forth sailed back 
to the West Indies on 1 May taking a direct route to Demerara via Barbados, while the 
Tay departed on 16 May, also proceeding to the Demerara route. See the sailing lists of 
Kenton & Parsons, 10, 12.
652 See for example Kenton & Parsons, 13–17.
653 Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 13, 28. – The Jamaica mails in April should have 
been carried by one of the two steamers, Forth or Tay, which both decided to sail home 
instead.
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When examining the improvement in speed of communications between 
Europe and the Caribbean or Central American area, it must be noted that 
many advances were due to mail route adjustments rather than changes in 
the speed of vessels – even though technological improvements also took 
place during those years.
Between January 1842 and January 1875, the Royal Mail Line’s West 
Indian contract was changed four times and the routes 11 times. The scale 
of operations was continuously declining. The original 11 routes were 
decreased to five or six by the end of the 1840s. The original system included 
six different communications hubs: Barbados, St. Thomas, Curaçao, Turks’ 
Islands, Havana, and Nassau. All these ports were places where two to four 
different mail routes met. Already in October 1842, several routes and ports 
of call were omitted and the number of hubs was decreased to four or five. 
After the loss of the Medina at Turks’ Islands, the area was avoided and these 
routes were redirected via St. Thomas.654
The lessons from the practical experiences in the Caribbean and Central 
American area, as well as the inevitable financial problems meant continuous 
streamlining of the Royal Mail Line services. Systems were also changed 
back and forth. For example, Barbados was originally the station for incoming 
mails from Europe, while Nassau was the station on the way out. In October 
1842, it was changed so that all mails came in via St. Thomas and out via 
the same island, or alternatively via Havana–Nassau. In July 1843 the mails 
came in via Barbados and out via St. Thomas or Havana–Nassau. From 1850, 
St. Thomas was the main station both on the way in and out – until it was 
changed in 1872 so that St. Thomas and Barbados were the stations for both 
the incoming and outgoing mails alternatively.655
It is not possible here to go through the development of the speed of 
information transmission on all the different routes. Keeping the Guiana 
route still as an example, one can follow the improvement in mail transport 
by steamship up to the 1870s. As already noted from Table 41, the start of 
the steamship service in 1842 did not bring major changes to the information 
circulation compared to the sailing packet period. Ten years later, the 
654 From October 1842, the Royal Mail mail steamers would ‘no longer touch at New 
Orleans, Savannah, Charleston, New York, Halifax N.S., Curacoa, Paramaribo in Surinam, 
Maracaibo, Bahia Honda, San Juan de Nicaragua, Mayaquess in Porto Rico, Ponce in 
Porto Rico, Turks’ Island, Cape Nichola Mole in Haiti, or Santa Cruz’. The mails for 
Mexico, Honduras (Belize), Chagres and the Isthmus of Panama, Cartagena, Santa 
Martha, La Guayara and Puerto Cabello would be made only once in a month instead of 
a bi-monthly service. Mail transmission by schooner between Madeira and Fayal would 
also be omitted. (‘Notice to the Public and Instructions to all Postmasters... General 
Post Office 12th September, 1842’, reprinted by Kenton & Parsons, 24.) – In June 1843, 
the system was adjusted again. The packets would no longer touch at Cape Haitien, St. 
Domingo, but instead at Jacmel on the same island. On the home voyage, Bermuda and 
Fayal would be touched only alternatively. (‘Notice to the Public and Instructions to 
all Postmasters... General Post Office, June 1843’, reprinted by Kenton & Parsons, 34.) 
With these changes, the company managed to conduct the mail service until the end of 
the first contract in 1847, except for the several months of ‘emergency plans’ caused by 
the loss of the Tweed in February 1847, as there was no vessel to replace her. See Kenton 
& Parsons, 73–78.
655 See the route maps 1–12 in Kenton & Parson, passim.
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number of consecutive information circles between Liverpool and Demerara 
within a calendar year had increased from four to six. This happened at the 
same time as the Cunard Line and the Collins Line were competing on the 
North Atlantic route and the number of consecutive information circles there 
had increased to twelve, compared with six at the time of the pioneering 
steamers.
Between 1842 and 1852, the duration of an information circle between 
Liverpool and Demerara was reduced by some three weeks on average, from 
more than 70 to approximately 50 days. Apart from the confusion caused by 
the tragic loss of the Amazon in January 1852, a reliable information circle 
within two months could be counted on. The mails were made in London 
on the 1st and 16th of each month, and the Royal Mail steamers sailed from 
Southampton on the following day.
An average journey from Southampton to St. Thomas took 17.5 days and 
the trip homewards 16.9 days. The average round trip between St. Thomas and 
Demerara, via Barbados, took 11.4 days. A few days were lost in waiting at 
ports, but most arrangements worked fluently: the ships were ready to depart 
even on the same day once the mails had arrived. The problem was clearly 
in Guiana. The inter-island steamer – which normally was one of the large 
transatlantic vessels but not the same one which had just arrived from Europe 
– left from Demerara on the same or next day after arrival. The merchants in
Berbice had to wait about two weeks for the next steamer to send answers
to their letters. If they were in a hurry, they could of course take a trip to
Demerara in wait for the arriving mails, as William Carter did in the earlier
example in 1842. This was not very practical, however, as it was not known
beforehand which day the steamer would arrive.
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TABLE 42. Consecutive information circles between Liverpool and Demerara 
enabled by the Royal Mail Line service in 1852.
Source: Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 131, 136.  – The figures in ‘Information 
circle, days’’ include one extra day at both ends for the Liverpool – Southampton 
– Liverpool inland route.
* The Amazon caught fire at sea in the Bay of Biscay on her maiden voyage. She was 
lost with 115 lives and all mails. Until this disaster, the Admiralty had not approved 
iron steamers in the mail service, but preferred wood as it was thought it would be 
better in war service. Now the attitudes changed under the pressure of public opinion, 
and all mail steamers could be built of iron. See Bushell, 63–71; Nicol, vol.1, 45.
While the peak of the development in mail transmission by steamship was 
almost reached in the North Atlantic in the 1850s and only minor improvements 
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in the West Indian service. A decade later, information circulated between 
Liverpool and Demerara like this:
TABLE 43. Consecutive information circles between Liverpool and Demerara, 
enabled by the Royal Mail Line service in 1862.
Source: Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 209, 212. – The figures in ‘Information 

















































31.1. Atrato 14.2. 45
La Plata 17.2. 7.3.
7.3. 12.3.
13.3. 17.3.




























15.12. Shannon 29.12. 44
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Eight, rather than six, consecutive information circles could now be 
conducted within a year. The average duration of an information circle was 42 
days. The ships departed punctually from Southampton and rather regularly 
from St. Thomas, depending on the mail arrivals from the different inter-
island routes. The arrivals in Southampton were regular within one or two 
days margin only, and there was at least three days to reply to the letters – a 
tight schedule, but not impossible.
Merchants could keep contact with their trading partners in the West 
Indies within 1.5 months rather than two months. The schedules of the Royal 
Mail Line were nicely organized: the same vessel which took the mails from 
Southampton sailed back with the answers. While she stayed at St. Thomas, 
the inter-island vessels collected the mails from the other colonies. Those 
from Barbados and Demerara could be sent to England by the same vessel, 
while those from more distant places were sent by later arriving steamers.
The length of an average trip between Southampton and St. Thomas had 
been shortened by three days to 14.5 days. The duration of the voyage was 
approximately the same in the other direction. The inter-island trip was about 
as long as it had been a decade earlier, but the ship now stayed in Demerara 
for one to three nights, which was a clear improvement.
It can be said that this was the peak of the improvement in information 
transmission by steamship between Liverpool and Demerara, if measured by 
information circles. But as in the North Atlantic, some progress could perhaps 
still be seen in the early 1870s. The number of consecutive information circles 
did not increase, and in 1872 one sailing was missed in Southampton due to 
the late arrival of the ship from St. Thomas.656
An interesting change from the shipping management point of view took 
place in April 1872, when the Royal Mail decided to organize the sailings to 
and from the West Indies via St. Thomas and Barbados alternately. At that 
time there was no major difference in the length of sailings to these places, 
the trip outwards took 13.5 days and homewards less than 13 days on average. 
For those who lived on the islands, there was naturally a difference whether 
they received their mails directly or indirectly, which might have been a 
reason for this arrangement.657
For the business partners in Demerara and Berbice, the arrangement was 
good news. As can be seen in table 44, there was now finally enough time to 
answer their letters. The inter-island trip was lengthened by the arrangement 
but as the steamers were somewhat faster than a decade earlier, the duration 
of the information circle was approximately one day shorter than in 1862.
656 The next ship to the West Indies departed on the same day.
657 There were also other reasons to reduce the number of calls at St. Thomas. Despite 
its excellent harbour and ideal geographical situation, St. Thomas had some serious 
disadvantages. It was situated in the middle of the hurricane region. In 1867, when the 
Royal Mail Line used the island as the hub where its steamers entered simultaneously for 
the mails, several of the vessels with some 150 men were lost in a hurricane, which sank 
58 of the 60 vessels anchored at Charlotte Amalie that morning. An earthquake, followed 
by a huge tidal wave – tsunami – caused additional damage at the same port only a few 
weeks later. St. Thomas was furthermore avoided because of the frequent yellow fever 
and cholera epidemics. See Bushell, 115–124; Kenton & Parsons, 246–250.
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TABLE 44. Consecutive information circles between Liverpool and Demerara 
enabled by the Royal Mail Line service in 1872.
Source: Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 288–289, 295. – The figures in ‘Information 
circle, days’ include one extra day at both ends for the Liverpool–Southampton 
–Liverpool inland route.
* Plymouth became the arrival port of the mails in England from October 1867. 













































Moselle 2.1. (S) 17.1.
18.1. 23.1.
24.1. (S) 29.1.






20.3. Nile 2.4. 46
Nile 17.4. (B) 30.4.
30.4. 3.5.
8.5. (S) 14.5.
15.5. Tagus 27.5. 42
Moselle 3.6. (S) 16.6.
17.6. 23.6.
26.6. (B) 30.6.






14.8. Nile 27.8. 43
Tagus 2.9. (S) 15.9.
17.9. 23.9.
26.9.  (B) 29.9.
29.9. Moselle 12.10. 42






Nile 2.12. (S) 16.12.
17.12. 23.12.
26.12. (B) 29.12.
30.12. Tagus 13.1. 43
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A brief look at the merchant correspondence of Sandbach, Tinne & Co. 
and Thomas & William Earle & Co. in 1875–1876 tells that the Demerara 
letters were normally in Liverpool within 23 days on average, while those 
from Berbice took a few days longer. Of this small sample of 18 letters, all 
covers are missing. Not much more information than the dates of writing 
and the recipient’s markings are available. Most letters are from Demerara, 
and only two from Berbice. A few interesting details can be picked up, 
however.658
Firstly, it seems that the letters were not always written while the mail 
steamer was already waiting at port. Two of the letters were written three days 
before the steamer arrived, and one letter one day before. Most typical was 
that the letters were written on the same or the following day after the ship’s 
arrival, after incoming letters had been received. This happened in 11 cases. 
The rest of the letters were written just before the steamer departed. In one 
case the steamer did not stay at port overnight but the incoming letters had 
to be read and answered during the same day, which was done. And in three 
cases, the letter had been started on one day and continued on the following 
one or two days while waiting for the ship’s departure.
At that time, the inter-island service worked rather regularly. The senders 
in Demerara could know quite exactly when the next mail steamer would 
depart. The ship to St. Thomas normally departed on the 5th or 6th of each 
month, and the one for Barbados on the 25th or 26th. The arrivals were more 
varying. The ships from St. Thomas arrived between the 2nd and 6th, and the 
ones from Barbados between the 22nd and 26th of the month in question. This 
factor – as well as the length of each month – may at least partly explain the 
slight difference between the theoretical and practical information circles.
An interesting thing is that not all the letters arrived by the Royal Mail 
steamers. At least one of the letters was sent by a merchant steamship (‘per 
Annan’)659. The letter was written in Demerara on 2 February 1876, just three 
days before the Royal Mail inter-island steamer Corsica arrived, and departed 
on the following day. The letter was received by Sandbach, Tinne & Co. in 
Liverpool on 28 February and answered on the 29th – the same day as the 
Royal Mail transatlantic steamer Nile arrived at Plymouth. As the cover of 
the letter is not preserved, no information about the Annan’s arrival port is 
available but one could expect that she sailed directly to Liverpool or some 
other nearby port on the west coast of Britain.
There are three more cases where two almost simultaneously sent letters 
probably have been transmitted by different means. In one of them, the writer 
states: ‘We enclose copies of our letter yesterday by direct steamer…’660 
658 Bryson Collection, Records of Sandbach, Tinne & Co., D/B/176; Earle Family and Business 
Archive, correspondence of Thomas and William Earle & Co., D/Earle/5/11. (MMM)
659 The Annan was an iron screw steamer of 662 tons and 98 hp, built in 1872. She was owned 
by a Jacob Lohden, West Hartlepool, who had three ships in Lloyd’s Register in 1882. 
The ship represents an average merchant vessel among those mentioned in Sandbach, 
Tinne & Co. correspondence in the mid-1870s.
660 Letter to Sandbach, Tinne & Co. in Liverpool from Sandbach, Parker &c. dated in 
Demerara 25.3.1876. Bryson Collection, Records of Sandbach, Tinne & Co., D/B/174. 
(MMM)
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As there is no sender’s note about a ship’s name and the covers with postal 
markings are missing, these cases remain unsure. At least one can state that 
the British government mail was not the only means of communications from 
Guiana even in the mid-1870s.
One could assume that, as late as in the 1870s when the ships were so much 
faster than earlier, it would have been possible to organize the schedules to 
allow enough time to answer the letters at least in Britain. However, there are 
two cases in the sample of 1875–1876 where the letter arrived in Liverpool on 
the same day as the next ship departed for the West Indies from Southampton. 
Additionally, there was one case where the letter had not been answered at 
all, probably due to the tight schedule.
The phenomenon is familiar from the North Atlantic route. Carrying mail 
in the 1870s was not as important for the shipping companies as it had been 
when no other means of communications existed.
As a conclusive example of the development of business information 
transmission on the West Indian route, one can state that the number of 
information circles between Liverpool and Demerara, conducted mainly by 
the British mail services, grew as follows:
TABLE 45. Development of business information transmission by sail and steam 
between Liverpool and Demerara, 1840–1862.
– –  =  very poor     –   =  poor      +  =  rather good    + +  =  good
The international mail services in the Caribbean region, which started in 




































+ (+) +( +) + 24 1842: 4
1852: 6
1862: 8
In 1842: More 
regular; faster 
speed.




In 1862: Better 
coordination, 
faster speed.
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The long way to South America
Even if the Royal Mail Line had been ready to take care of the South 
American mail service in addition to the West Indian mail route right from 
the beginning, the Admiralty had been wise enough not to give everything 
to the company simultaneously. A new steamship route to Rio de Janeiro, 
Montevideo and Buenos Aires was finally included in the company’s mail 
contract in July 1850. Of the £270,000 government subsidy, £30,000 was 
related to the Brazil and River Plate route starting from the beginning of 1851. 
This was the final end of the Falmouth sailing packet service – a decade later 
than regular steamship service replaced the packets on the North Atlantic 
and the Caribbean routes.661
The Royal Mail Line had learnt a lot from its earlier experiences, and 
the technology had improved enough for new challenges. Most of the 
problems met in the Caribbean could be avoided, timetables could be kept 
and it frequently happened that the ships arrived at port several days before 
schedule. This was naturally due to the fact that the company had learnt how 
to plan the schedules so that the result was positive performance instead of 
bad reputation. The mail contract also included penalties for delays, which 
may explain the need for rather loose timetables. And even though the South 
American route was very long, the system of branch services was simple and 
easy to manage compared with the West Indian routes.
A Royal Mail steamer left from Southampton for South America on the 
9th of each month, or the 10th if the 9th fell on a Sunday. According to 
schedule, the ship arrived in Lisbon on the 14th or 15th, Madeira on the 18th, 
Tenerife on the 19th, St. Vincent at Cape Verde between the 23rd and 25th, 
Pernambuco on the 2nd or 3rd of the following month, Bahia on the 4th or 
the 5th, and Rio de Janiero on the 8th. She stayed at Rio for approximately 
four days, departing for the home voyage on the 12th, and was back in 
Southampton on the 12th of the following month.662 In real life, there were 
naturally differences in the performance.
661 For the contract, see Howat, 103–104.
662 Howat, 105.
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TABLE 46. Royal Mail steamship round trips and the length of information circles, 
Southampton–Rio de Janeiro 1851.
Source: Sailing lists of Howat, 129. – The consecutive information circles enabled 
by the Royal Mail sailings in 1851 are market in bold. An average outward trip took 
29 days, varying between 26 and 30 days, while the homeward trip took 30 days on 
average, varying between 27 and 32 days.
The improvement in the speed and regularity of the information 
transmission on the commercially important South America route was 
notable. While the average voyage from Rio de Janeiro to Southampton by 
a Falmouth packet had taken 52 days in 1850, the Royal Mail steamers made 
the same trip in 30 days on average in 1851.663 This was probably one of the 
most notable improvements in the speed of one-way information transmission 
during the shift period from sail to steam.
Instead of only three information circles enabled by the Admiralty packets 
in 1850, the Royal Mail steamers could facilitate 4.5 consecutive information 
circles between England and Rio de Janeiro in 1851. But this performance 
was still far from ideal. Even if the sailings were now organized so that the 
merchants in Rio de Janeiro could reply immediately to their letters, the system 
did not work in the same way at the other end. As can be seen in Table 46, the 






























Teviot 9.1. 7.2. 11.2. 14.3. 64 87
Tay 10.2. 11.3. 14.3. 15.4. 64 86
Medway 10.3. 6.4. 12.4. 14.5. 65 87
Teviot 9.4. 9.5. 12.5. 8.6. 60 87
Tay 9.5. 8.6. 11.6. 11.7. 63 89
Severn 9.6. 8.7. 15.7. 12.8. 64 84
Teviot 9.7. 7.8. 14.8. 10.9. 63 84
Tay 9.8. 8.9. 14.9. 14.10. 66 86
Severn 9.9. 7.10. 15.10. 13.11. 65 81
Teviot 9.10. 6.11. 14.11. 11.12. 63 etc.
Tay 10.11. 9.12. 15.12. 15.1.52 67
Severn 9.12. 4.1.52 14.1. 15.2. 68
Min. 
–max.
- - - - - - - - 60-68 81-89
Average - - - - - - - - 64 86
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Content (photo) removed from the open access version of this book.
FIG. 23. The paddle steamer Magdalena was one of the five new vessels built by the 
Royal Mail Line, when they extended their contract to South America. They were 
then the largest wooden vessels afloat. After the dramatic fire which destroyed the 
Magdalena’s sister ship Amazon in 1852 with heavy loss of life, the Admiralty finally 
admitted that iron hulls might be a safer option. © National Museums Liverpool 
(Merseyside Maritime Museum).
steamer to South America had usually just departed a few days before another 
steamer arrived from there. For this reason, the information circles were three 
weeks longer from the Brazilian perspective than from the English.
The duration of the voyage from Buenos Aires to Southampton was 
shortened by more than a month from 76 days in 1850 to 44 days in 1851. 
The whole round trip between Falmouth and Buenos Aires had taken 150 days 
by a Falmouth packet, while the average round trip between Southampton 
and Buenos Aires by the Royal Mail steamers took 95 days.664 A letter sent 
from England in the early January got now an answer from Argentina in 
mid-April instead of late May.
Why was the difference between the round trips by sail and by steam 
not more than 55 days, even though the duration of the homeward voyage 
alone had shortened by 32 days? Firstly, the prevailing winds and currents 
made the sailing homewards from Buenos Aires longer than in the other 
direction. By sailing ship the difference was nine days on average, as it had 
been in 1840, but it was only two days by a steamer. Thus the benefit of using 
steam instead of canvas was greater on the way homewards than in the other 
direction. Even if the difference was not as notable as on the North Atlantic 
route, it definitely was relevant.
The mails remained two or three days in Rio de Janeiro before the 
departure of the branch steamer to Buenos Aires. The ship stayed there one 
664 Calculated from the sailing lists of Howat, 85–86, 99–100, 129.
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or two weeks to give the merchants time to receive the letters and answer 
them.665 Back in Rio, there was an approximately four days’ wait before the 
transatlantic steamer departed with the mails for Europe.666 There were thus 
three major port stays in South America on the round trip to Buenos Aires 
(in Rio, in Buenos Aires and again in Rio) while there was only one on the 
round trip to Rio. The fewer port stays there were, the more efficiency could 
be achieved by using steam power. The benefits of steam could best be seen 
on the round trips to Rio de Janeiro. While an average Falmouth packet made 
a round voyage to Rio in 122 days, the same voyage took an average Royal 
Mail steamer only 64 days.667
The new route was an immediate success with steadily climbing passenger 
and freight figures already from the first year. The value of specie carried 
outwards between June and November 1851 reflected the trend: £35,000, 
£47,090, £88,000, £73,000, £115,000, and £232,000. In today’s terms, the 
figures were enormous. The November figure, for example, was four times 
greater than the value of the steamship carrying it. The valuable freights were 
mostly investment infusions supporting economic development in South 
America, in which British business was heavily involved. Nearly £200,000 
from the November figure was gold contributed by British business houses 
towards the foundation of a commercial bank in Rio de Janeiro.668
Although coal still took most of the space, general cargo was also carried 
from England, mainly in the form of manufactured goods. Homewards, the 
ships carried gold and silver in minor quantities, diamonds (often to the value 
of £20,000 to £30,000) as well as coffee and tropical fruits. The number of 
passengers was normally between 30 and 70 southwards, but rose steadily. In 
1855, the totals approached 200, which was close to the limits of the vessels. 
Already from the start, the homeward lists were better, about one hundred 
passengers or more. Many of them disembarked at Lisbon, all classes from 
ambassadors to deported slave-traders.669
665 The duration of the port stay was originally one week but it was lengthened already in 
mid-1851 to give more time for the answers. Due to poor inland connections the additional 
time was really needed and was not even enough in many cases. The change did not affect 
the schedule homewards from Rio de Janeiro. See the sailing lists of Howat, 129.
666 See Howat, 105, 129.
667 Calculated from the sailing lists of Howat, 85–86, 99–100, 129. – According to the 
official schedule, the round trip to Rio would take 62 days and sixteen hours. It should 
be remembered that calculations based on dates do not give exact figures. Nevertheless, 
one can say that the company kept the schedules admirably.
668 Nicol, vol. 1, 64.
669 Nicol, vol. 1, 64. – The trip was not too comfortable for the first years’ passengers. Apart 
from the normal disadvantages of being at sea during that time period, the South American 
port facilities were not in place yet. Bushell describes the conditions: ‘The well-planned 
Avenidas, the fine buildings, hotels, warehouses and quays which have made Rio de 
Janeiro into one of the fairest cities in the world, had not yet come into being. The ‘Esk’s’ 
[Royal Mail Line’s first steamer to arrive, she would become the branch steamer between 
Rio, Montevideo and Buenos Aires] passengers stepped ashore into a town of narrow, 
evil-smelling streets, of stagnant pools, rotting garbage and foul drains which are said to 
have repelled even the hard-bitten British seamen of those days. After a brief stay, the 
‘Esk’ set off again southward, called at Monte Video and entered the muddy waters of the 
River Plate... In the early days, the Royal Mail steamer anchored about 7 miles off the city 
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In addition to the lack of comfort, the South American ports suffered 
from political unrest between Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. In the early 
1860s, England and Brazil were close to war, and the port of Rio was 
blockaded for some time. But the economy of the South American countries 
grew with the help of foreign capital, mainly British and American, and 
also French to some extent. Both the ports and the railways were built by 
foreign funds.670
Some statistics exist on the number of letters carried during the first years. 
In April 1852, one mail outwards included 3,414 letters to the Brazilian ports 
(Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco and Bahia); 1,020 letters to Buenos Aires; 996 
letters to Montevideo; 925 letters to the ports on the European side of the 
Atlantic (Madeira, Cape Verde, Teneriffe, St. Vincent and Lisbon); and 833 
to the British Admiral in Rio. Homewards, there were 5,668 letters from the 
Brazilian ports; 1,794 from Buenos Aires; 1,136 from Montevideo; and 918 
from the other ports. In total, the mail steamer carried 7,188 letters on the 
way to South America and 9,516 letters on the way back home. As this was 
the only existing mail service to the eastern parts of South America, other 
countries than the British also used it constantly. In fact, 44.7% of the letters 
outwards were of foreign origin, and 56.9% of the letters on the home voyage 
were addressed to other countries than Britain.671
In 1856, the Royal Mail steamers carried 66,252 letters outwards and 
80,076 letters homewards on the South American route, as well as 123,408 
newspapers outwards and 60,084 homewards. The total number of letters 
carried via Britain was 146,328 in 1856, and it increased to 242,000 in 
1863.672
The Royal Mail steamship service was a great improvement in the 
communications between Europe and South America. How did the business 
connections work in practice then? In contrast to the mostly disappeared 
West Indian correspondence of the British merchant houses, several archives 
preserve business letters from South America. Eliminating those with no 
postal markings left, a sample of 253 transatlantic letters from Brazil, Uruguay 
and Argentina were examined for this purpose.
The letters come from three merchant houses of Liverpool. Daniel Williams 
was involved in shipping animal products such as salted hides, horsehair and 
meat from South America to Liverpool, as well as shipping outward cargoes 
of salt, coal and ironmongery. The letters from six different places in South 
America have been sent to the company’s office in Liverpool, or to the Artigas 
villa in Ormskirk, Lancashire, some 15 kilometres outside Liverpool. Most 
[Buenos Aires]. The passengers and mails were transferred to a tiny steamer which took 
them to a point about two miles off shore. Here a second transhipment took place into 
a whale boat which was sailed, or rowed, close in-shore. When about 200 yards off the 
beach, the long-suffering passengers were again transferred, this time to a horse-drawn cart 
which finally landed them at a tiny wooden jetty. If the weather were at all unpropitious, 
the landing at Buenos Aires must have been the most formidable experience of the whole 
passage.’  See Bushell, 58.
670 Pekka Valtonen, Latinalaisen Amerikan historia (Helsinki, 2001), 208–209, 617.
671 Howat refers to the Post Office statistics. (Howat, 150)
672 Howat refers to the Post Office statistics. (Howat, 116)
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letters of the sample, 211 in total, are from this correspondence between 
1854 and 1872.673
Of the other letters, 23 come from the Rathbone Bros & Co.’s 
correspondence already referred to in the North Atlantic connection. Even 
if most of the Rathbones’ businesses were connected with trade between 
Liverpool and New York, they were also involved in the coffee trade from 
South America to Europe and the United States, and tea shipments to Brazil. 
The letters are from Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo and Buenos Aires between 
1854 and 1872. The third merchant correspondence comes from Henry Eld 
Symons, of Kirkdale, who was concerned in general trading principally with 
South America and Australia. The sample includes 19 letters from Rio de 
Janeiro and Buenos Aires to Liverpool in 1857–1858. Henry Eld Symons died 
in March 1858, and the correspondence ends in the summer of that year.674
Due to some significant changes in the postal services on the South 
American route in the late 1850s and 1860, the material has been divided 
into two: 1854–1859 and 1860–1872. The following table shows the origins 
of the letters and the time period.
TABLE 47.  Origins of the merchant correspondence from South America 1854–
1872.
The total numbers of letters from different ports Buenos Aires 54, Montevideo 149 
and Rio de Janeiro.50. DW= Daniel Williams, HES = Henry Eld Symons, RB = 
Rathbone Bros & Co.
673 Correspondence of Daniel Williams, DB/175 (MMM). For the Williams records, see 
Dawn Littler, Guide to the Records of Merseyside Maritime Museum, Volume II  (St. 
John’s, 1999), 13.
674 Correspondence of Rathbone Bros & Co., RT XXIV.2.36. (SJ); Accounts and papers of 
Henry Eld Symons, 380 MD (LRO). For Rathbone’s businesses in South America at that 




















































of letters 54 20 27 102 21 29 253
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Of the 93 letters from 1854–1859 in the sample, 13 were sent from Buenos 
Aires, 20 from Herbidero via Montevideo, 25 from Montevideo, 21 from 
Rio Grande via Rio de Janeiro and 14 from Rio de Janeiro. 89 of them were 
sent by Royal Mail steamers and four by merchant ships.
This sample raises an interesting problem, not widely touched on by 
historical research. Instead of just concluding that communications was 
slow at that time, it should be noticed that it was much slower from some 
places than from others. Daniel Williams could receive several letters in the 
same day’s mail from South America: for example, one from Herbidero, 
Uruguay; one from Rio Grande, Brazil; one from Buenos Aires, Argentina; 
and perhaps one from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. All these letters had arrived 
by the same transatlantic steamer from Rio de Janeiro, but it had taken the 
letter from Herbidero 35 days to arrive in Rio via Montevideo by land and 
branch steamer, while it had taken the letter from Rio Grande 18 days to 
arrive in Rio by land, and the letter from Buenos Aires 13 days to arrive in 
Rio by branch steamer. The letter from Rio de Janeiro had been posted on 
the same day or the day before the transatlantic steamer departed and it was 
thus bringing the freshest news.675
In other words, the letters arriving by the same mail steamer could vary 
very much in age: the letter from Herbidero was more than two months old 
(in one case in 1855 it was 3.5 months old), the letters from Rio Grande and 
Buenos Aires were both about 1.5 months old, but the latter was at least a 
few days fresher; while the letter from Rio de Janeiro was received about 
one month after it had been written. And this was not the worst aspect of the 
issue. The letters which had travelled the longest times were answers to letters 
which had been on the way in the other direction equally long times. Thus, 
Daniel Williams would have received on 13 April 1856 from Rio de Janeiro 
an answer to a letter he had written on 10 February, but from Herbidero an 
answer to a letter he had written on 8 November of the year before.676
It must have been rather confusing to deal with different business partners 
with different time lags. One can also imagine that some merchants would 
675 These are average figures calculated from the sample. Additionally, it took 31 days 
on average for the letters to arrive by the transatlantic steamer from Rio de Janeiro in 
Liverpool.
676 This example is partly based on the Williams correspondence, partly on the sailing lists 
of Howat, 131. There are practically no outward letters at all preserved in the archives, 
and letter books are not useful as they lack all postal markings, as well as notes of arrival 
dates. – In fact, Daniel Williams did not receive on 13 April any of the letters which 
arrived in Southampton on the 12th although he should have received them if they had 
been addressed to Liverpool. His villa address in Ormskirk was a continuous problem 
for the local post offices. For instance the letter from Herbidero had circulated an extra 
three days in the surroundings before its final arrival. It bears the following post office 
handstamps and markings: arrival in London 13.4.; Liverpool 14.4.; Birkenhead 14.4.; 
New Brighton 15.4.; note by hand: ‘not known at New Brighton’; and finally the recipient’s 
note 15.4.1856. Another point to note is that all the mails were not handled in London 
on the same day. While the contents of the Montevideo mailbag – with the letter from 
Herbidero – had been handstamped there 13.4., the letter from Rio Grande, which was in 
the Rio de Janeiro mailbag, was handstamped in the London Post Office already 12.4. and 
in Liverpool 13.4. Daniel Williams received that letter in Ormskirk already on 14.4.1856. 
(Daniel Williams correspondence, D/B/176, MMM)
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have been in a clearly better position if they had carried on business with New 
York, for example, where they could have expected to get answers to their 
letters in about 25 days at that time. By speedier communications, also capital 
moved faster in the North Atlantic region than in the South American trade. No 
doubt, this made the contribution of agents in such places as Rio de Janeiro and 
Montevideo particularly valuable. They could deal with the inland producers and 
organize shipping while the letters were on their way to and from Europe.
Even if there was such an improvement in the speed of communications 
between Europe and South America in the early 1850s, the users of the 
postal services were not happy. The merchants and bankers from London and 
Merseyside wrote several memorials to the Post Office about the Royal Mail 
Line’s schedules. The problem was that, while the incoming letters arrived 
before mid-month, answers from Britain could be sent no sooner than the 
9th of the following month.677 This delayed the information flow by about 
three weeks. In fact, an information circle from Rio de Janeiro to London 
and back to Rio took three weeks more time than the circle from London 
to Rio and back to London despite the fact that the letters were carried by 
exactly the same vessels.678
The entrepreneurial Liverpool merchants soon made proposals to start a 
monthly packet service to South America directly from Liverpool. As the 
677 Howat, 147.
678 See Table 46.
FIG. 24. The letter from Montevideo, Uruguay, dated on 4.1.1857, departed on 5.1. 
by the Royal Mail Line branch steamer Prince to Rio de Janeiro, and from there on 
14.1. by their transatlantic steamer Avon, which arrived in Southampton on 13.2. The 
letter then continued via Calais and Paris to Bordeaux, arriving there on 16.2.1857 
(two of the French handstamps on the reverse). – The rate ‘GB 1F 60C’ was based 
on the British-French convention which came into force on 1.1.1857.
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Post Office was already paying a subsidy for one such service, it was not 
eager to make new mail contracts. However, the South American & General 
Steam Navigation Co. began its operations by four new iron screw steamers 
between Liverpool and the South American ports in August 1853. These 
vessels did not carry packet letters, but undoubtedly ship letters to Rio de 
Janeiro, Montevideo and Buenos Aires. One of the Rathbone letters of the 
sample of Liverpool correspondence was carried by a ‘Liverpool steamer’ 
in late 1854, but the service does not seem to have taken any greater role in 
the mail transport.679
   In the following summer, the Post Office finally made a contract with 
the South American & General Steam Navigation Co. for monthly mail 
sailings, which would depart from Liverpool on the 24th of each month to 
avoid conflict with the Royal Mail Line’s sailings. Only four round trips – and 
those with machine problems and other delays – were made under the mail 
contract before the company’s ships were chartered to the Crimean war for 
troop transports, and the service ended without ever starting again. In total, 
the company undertook only 12 sailings to South America. But as Bonsor 
puts it: ‘Perhaps this was just as well, however, as no fewer than eight other 
concerns established lines of iron screw steamers to Brazil between 1854 
and 1859 and not one of them remained in operation for more than a year 
or two.’680
By 1858, perhaps partly due to the pressure of potential competition, the 
Royal Mail Line could finally offer an accelerated service to the West Indies 
and South America in a new mail contract. The company agreed to introduce 
a faster service to Brazil from 9 May 1858 and to the West Indies no later 
than from 14 September 1859. It also agreed to provide four new iron paddle 
steamers, three to the West Indian and one to the South American route.681
The faster journeys to South America were achieved by leaving out the 
stops at Madeira and Tenerife, which were already being served by contract 
packets on their way from Plymouth to the west coast of Africa, and by 
increasing the average speed of the steamers to 9.5 mph on the transatlantic 
route, and to 9.0 mph on the branch route. The ships were now coaling in 
every port on the route except for Pernambuco and Buenos Aires, instead of 
679 Howat, 147–151. Correspondence of Rathbone Bros & Co., RT XXIV.2.36. (SJ) For the 
shipping company’s history, see N.R.P. Bonsor, South Atlantic Seaway (1983, Jersey, 
C.I.), 34–38.
680 Bonsor (1983), 36. – The list of these companies show the wide interest in the South 
American trade at that time: Compagnie de Navigation Mixte (French, 1853–1858); 
Companhia de Navegação a Vapor Luso-Brasileira (Portuguese, 1854–1857); Compagnie 
Franco-Américaine (French, 1856); Union Line (British, 1856–1857); Compagnia 
Transatlantica (Italian, 1856–1857); Hamburg-Brasilianische Packetschiffahrt Gesellschaft 
(German, 1856–1858); European & American Steam Shipping Company (British, 
1857); and Real Companhia de Navegação a Vapor Anglo-Luso-Brasileira (Portuguese, 
1859–1860). See Bonsor (1983), 39–63.
681 See Howat, 116. – On the West Indian route, matching arrivals and departures from 
England were not a reality before April 1860. The nicely working new schedule, which 
enabled eight consecutive information circles instead of six on that route, is presented in 
Table 48, the example being from 1862. For the change, see the sailing lists of Kenton 
& Parsons, 184, 193.
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carrying heavy loads of coal at the beginning of the journey, and they were 
thus able to proceed faster.682
One of the main reasons for accelerating the service to Brazil by seven days 
was to ensure that the correspondence from South America reached Britain 
in time for a reply to be sent by the Southampton steamer on the 9th of the 
same month. This improvement in the mail communications was effective for 
all dispatches for the following 137 months, except for only two occasions 
when the homeward steamer suffered an accident.683
Table 48 shows the effects on the information circulation in the early 
1860s, when the system had been taken fully into use. The duration of the 
one-way voyages was reduced by only four to five days from the early 1850s, 
but the number of consecutive information circles increased from four to six 
per year. The letters could now be replied to within a few days after arrival 
at both ends of the journey.
682 Howat, 117.























Oneida 9.1. 2.2. 8.2. 5.3. 55 54
Tyne 10.2. 7.3. 11.3. 6.4. 55 53
Magdalena 10.3. 3.4. 8.4. 4.5. 55 56
Oneida 9.4. 3.5. 9.5. 2.6. 54 60
Parana 9.5. 3.6. 8.6. 4.7. 56 55
Magdalena 9.6. 8.7. 11.7. 6.8. 58 53
Oneida 9.7. 2.8. 8.8. 2.9. 55 57
Tyne 9.8. 2.9. 9.9. 2.10. 54 53
Magdalena 9.9. 4.10. 9.10. 3.11. 55 55
Oneida 9.10. 1.11. 8.11. 2.12. 54 56
Tyne 10.11. 3.12. 9.12. 2.1.63 53 etc.
Magdalena 9.12. 3.1.63 9.1. 4.2. 57
Min.–max. - - - - - - - - 53–58 53–60
Average - - - - - - - - 55 55
TABLE 48.  Royal Mail Line steamship round trips and length of information circles, 
Southampton–Rio de Janeiro, 1862.
Source: Sailing lists of Howat, 134. – Royal Mail steamers sailed from Southampton 
on the 10th, if the 9th was a Sunday. An average outward trip took now 25 days, 
varying between 23 and 29 days, while the homeward trip took 25 days on average, 
varying between 23 and 26 days.
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Table 49 shows a conclusion of the development on the South America 
route, combining the information of Tables 38, 46 and 48.
One of the interesting details is that the change from sail to steam in 1851 
cut the duration of an average information circle by 61 days when looked at 
from England, but by only 43 days when looked at from Rio de Janeiro. In 
other words, the length of an average information circle by the very same 
Royal Mail steamers on the very same voyages was 64 days from England 
to Brazil and back to England, but more than three weeks longer from Brazil 
to England and back to Brazil. The problem was caused by poorly matching 
schedules in England.
By the early 1860s, the length of one information circle could finally 
be reduced to 55 days on average from the earlier 64 or 86 days. This was 
possible as the Royal Mail Line steamers could now make their round trips 
to South America in less than two months. This improvement enabled a 
system where the next ship for Brazil was still waiting in the port, when the 
one from there arrived.
This clear change is an extraordinary example of how information 
transmission could be speeded up without new technological innovations or 
increasing the frequency of sailings. The new arrangement of the existing 
schedules increased the number of consecutive information circles per year 
by no less than one-third.684
TABLE 49. Development of the speed of information transmission between England 
and Brazil, 1840–1862.
Diff. = Difference in days.


























































25 (–4) 25 (–5) 55 (–9) 55 (–31) 6.0
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The change can also easily be noticed in the Liverpool merchant 
correspondence. Instead of the average 31 days before May 1858, letters from 
Rio de Janeiro were arriving three or four days faster after that date. And the 
letters from Rio Grande, which had earlier been transmitted in 50 days on 
average, were delivered in 40 days. Most probably, the inland connections 
between Rio Grande and Rio de Janeiro had also been improved at that 
time.685
International Competition and the Influence of the 
Telegraph
The French postal services, the West Indies and the Spanish Main – The 
French postal services, South America – The Panama route – International 
competition and the introduction of the telegraph in the West Indies 
– International competition and the introduction of the telegraph in South
America
The French postal services, the West Indies and the Spanish Main
As was noted in the context of the North Atlantic mail services, the French 
model of a government-subsidised mail system was based on different 
geographical thinking from the British. Instead of one shipping line operating 
on the North Atlantic route (the Cunard Line), one on the West Indian & 
South American routes (the Royal Mail Line), and one on the East Indian 
and Australasian routes (P&O), the French model was the following: the 
North Atlantic and West Indian mails were taken care of by one and the same 
company, Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, or the French Line, and 
the South American and Far Eastern routes were taken care of by another, 
Compagnie des Services Maritimes des Messageries Impériales. Later, other 
companies also joined the system.
The French Line started their contract mail service for Vera Cruz in 
the early 1860s urged by the government during a military expedition to 
Mexico.686 The first French mail steamship service of 1862–1865 operated 
between St-Nazaire, close to Nantes on the western coast of France, Fort-
de-France at Martinique, Santiago de Cuba, and Vera Cruz.  The service 
was carried out once a month by a fleet of four iron screw steamers of 
1,700 to 1,900 tons. Two of them, the Tampico and the Vera Cruz, were 
purchased from the former South American & General Steam Navigation 
Co. of Liverpool.687
685 Correspondence of Daniel Williams, DB/175 (MMM). Correspondence of Rathbone 
Bros & Co., RT XXIV.2.36 (SJ); Accounts and papers of Henry Eld Symons, 380 MD 
(LRO).
686 The earlier French attempts to run a mail service between Bordeaux and Vera Cruz in the 
1830s have been explained in Chapter VI.1.
687 See the sailing lists of Salles, Tome IV, 25; and the fleet lists of Haws (1996), 23–24. 
– There was also a branch service between Martinique and Guadeloupe and further to St.
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Even though the French started their mail operations by steamship in the 
Caribbean 20 years later than the Royal Mail Line, they could not at once 
build a well working schedule for information transmission. A pick-up from 
the sailing lists of Salles gives us the following results for the first whole 
year of operations on the new route:
TABLE 50. Round trips and consecutive information circles on the St-Nazaire–
Martinique–Vera Cruz–St-Nazaire route enabled by the French Line service, 1863.
Source: Sailing lists of Salles, Tome IV, 25. – In most cases, the ship homewards had 
already departed from Martinique when the mail steamer from St-Nazaire arrived. 
* The Louisiane had departed from Martinique on 28.1.1863 and the answers for
the letters which arrived on 2.2. had to wait until 3.3. – if not sent by e.g. the Royal
Mail Line from some other island.
For military operations it was probably enough that a regular service was 
conducted by fixed monthly departure dates from both terminal ports. In 
fact, an average trip from Vera Cruz to St-Nazaire by the French Line – 29.4 
days – took just about two days longer than the trip from the same port to 
Southampton by the Royal Mail Line.688 As the average round trip to Vera 
Cruz by the French Line took almost exactly 60 days, the risk of missing the 
Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada and Trinidad in 1863–1865. See Salles, Tome IV, 27–29.
688 The sailing north to Southampton was somewhat longer than to St-Nazaire but the Royal 
Mail Line had a shorter route in the Caribbean, where they proceeded homewards from 


































Vera Cruz 16.1. 2.2. 16.2. 3.3. 20.3. 63* 63
Floride 16.2. 1.3. 16.3. 27.3. 12.4. 32 55
Louisiane 16.3. 30.3. 16.4. 27.4. 14.5. 59 59
Tampico 16.4. 2.5. 17.5. 30.5. 15.6. 59 59
Vera Cruz 16.5. 4.6. 17.6. 1.7. 17.7. 62 62
Floride 16.6. 2.7. 16.7. 28.7. 12.8. 57 57
Tampico 16.7. 5.8. 18.8. 1.9. 19.9. 65 65
Vera Cruz 18.8. 4.9. 18.9. 3.10. 20.10. 63 63
Louisiane 16.9. 1.10. 15.10. 26.10. 9.11. 34 54
Floride 16.10. 31.10. 14.11. 26.11. 15.12. 60 60
Tampico 16.11. 3.12. 15.12. 26.12. 14.1. 59 59
Vera Cruz 16.12. 3.1.64 15.1. 28.1. 14.2. 60 60
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opportunity to send an answer from France by the following steamer was 
great. In several cases the ship had already departed when the letters from 
Mexico arrived. The Royal Mail Line made the round trip to Vera Cruz in 
57.5 days on average, which allowed the merchants two to five days time to 
send their answers by the next steamer – a rather tight schedule, but obviously 
possible to manage during the time of the railways.689
Even though the difference in speed was not remarkable between the two 
shipping companies, the Royal Mail Line could afford six annual information 
circles to Vera Cruz, while the French Line enabled only five.
The merchants at Martinique – and those in France who traded with 
that colony – were in an underprivileged position. Even if the sailings to 
Martinique were made in 16.5 days on average in both directions, the answers 
had to wait for three to four weeks at the island and more than two weeks on 
average in France due to the schedules. The unpredictability of the service 
must have been even more irritating from the businessmen’s point of view. At 
Martinique, the average waiting time was 26.6 days. In two cases the earlier 
ship was delayed and the answers to France could be sent within two days 
of the mail’s arrival. In St-Nazaire, the time available for answers could be 
anything between one and 32 days – and it was.690
The information circles between Martinique and the mother country 
depended on the sailings from Vera Cruz, and most often the information 
circulation was equally slow to both places. The average length of an 
information circle to Vera Cruz was 59.7 days, and to Martinique 56.1 days, 
thanks to excessively delayed ship departures. The Royal Mail Line did not 
have sailings to Martinique at that time but the nearby Barbados could be 
reached almost as quickly, in 17.3. days on average. Due to the bi-monthly 
service and matching schedules, the Royal Mail Line could afford eight 
annual information circles to Barbados compared with the French Line’s 
five to Martinique. Even if the Royal Mail Line had had a monthly service 
only, it would have enabled six information circles between Britain and 
Barbados.691
What did the merchants on Martinique do in this situation? They sent their 
letters by the Royal Mail Line steamers, as they had done earlier. A letter in 
the writer’s collection was sent from St. Pierre, Martinique, on 10 September 
1863 to Agen, France by the Royal Mail steamer Tasmanian, which departed 
from St. Thomas on 13 September and arrived in Southampton on the 28th. 
It was carried by train from Paris to Bordeaux and from there to Toulouse 
on the 29th, and it arrived in Agen on 30 September – three days before the 
French mail ship would even have departed from Martinique.692
It did not take long, however, before the French rearranged their mail 
service. In August 1865, the system was thoroughly changed and the main 
problems solved. This was a similar overnight change to the Royal Mail 
Line’s a few years earlier. One can only wonder why the system was not 
689 Calculated from the sailing lists of Salles, Tome IV, 25; Kenton & Parsons, 215–216.
690 See Table 50.
691 Calculated from the sailing lists of Salles, Tome IV, 25; Kenton & Parsons, 215, 218.
692 SRLC; sailing lists of Salles, Tome IV, 25; Kenton & Parsons, 215.
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better organized from the very beginning. According to Salles, the mail route 
was improvised in a hurry to serve the military operations in Mexico.693 The 
new system included several mail routes. There were two monthly sailings 
from St-Nazaire: one for Vera Cruz and the other for Colon–Aspinwall. 
Additionally, there were several branch routes. At least the sailings to the 
terminal ports were now organized comme il faut.694
The new arrangements on the Mexico route included the transformation 
of the French mail centre from Martinique to St. Thomas, which was located 
further westwards and thus closer to Vera Cruz. All the three steamers were 
changed to new and larger ones. The Impératrice Éugenie and the Panama 
were iron paddle steamers of 3,400 tons each, and the France was an iron 
screw steamer of 3,200 tons.695 These changes shortened the sailing time 
in each direction by a couple of days and enabled earlier departures from 
Vera Cruz. The length of the round trip was thus reduced from 59.7 to 54.4 
days. The extra five days gave the French merchants time to answer their 
letters immediately and by this means increased the number of consecutive 
information circles between France and Vera Cruz from five to six per year. 
By these changes, the French mail service achieved the same efficiency and 
speed on the route as the British.
TABLE 51. Round trips and consecutive information circles on the St-Nazaire–Vera 
Cruz–St. Thomas–St-Nazaire route enabled by the French Line service, 1866.
693 Salles, Tome IV, 17.
694 The routes, their schedules, mail steamers, and postal handstamps used on the specific 
routes are explained by Salles, Tome IV, 30–223.



















Louisiane 16.1. 13.2. 22.2. 10.3. 53
Panama 16.2. 13.3. 24.3. 7.4. 50
Imp. Eugénie 16.3. 13.4. 28.4. 12.5. 57
France 16.4. 13.5. 22.5. 7.6. 52
Panama 16.5. 13.6. 26.6. 11.7. 56
Imp. Eugénie 16.6. 13.7. 24.7. 8.8. 53
France 16.7. 13.8. 24.8. 8.9. 54
Panama 16.8. 13.9. 25.9. 8.10. 53
Imp. Eugénie 16.9. 13.10. - - 13.11. 58
France 16.10. 13.11. 22.11. 10.12. 55
Panama 16.11. 13.12. 19.12. 9.1. 54
Imp. Eugénie 16.12. 13.1. - - 12.2. 58
Source: Sailing lists of Salles, Tome IV, 105. – The bold figures show an example of how 
the six consecutive information circles could be achieved during the calendar year.
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As the sailing date of the Royal Mail Line was on the 2nd of each month 
and the French Line’s on the 16th, the frequency of business communications 
with Mexico actually doubled. There were now 24 annual mail sailings in 
total from Britain and France. This did not increase the number of matching 
information circles, however. The voyage was so long, and the stays at 
port in Europe as well as Mexico so short, that the other shipping company 
could never offer a faster alternative to send a letter. An example: a Royal 
Mail steamer departed from Southampton on 2 April 1866, arriving at St. 
Thomas on the 16th. The branch steamer for Mexico left on the next day and 
arrived in Vera Cruz on 28 April. She departed with answers to the letters 
on the 30th. The fact that also a French Line steamer visited Vera Cruz in 
the mid-month and would be there again in mid-April did not affect the 
British communications in any way. The same was evident in the French 
communications respectively.696
Thus there were two simultaneous information circulation processes 
which never met each other. However, the positive effect of more frequent 
service was undoubtedly greater than the harm caused by the slow sailings. 
The concrete advantages of such a double system on a long mail route will 
be presented in connection with the introduction of the French services on 
the South Atlantic run, where a similar arrangement had taken place a few 
years earlier with good results.
The French branch services suffered from mismatching internal schedules 
just like the British services had done years ago. Martinique is a good example. 
The island was now served as part of the other long mail route from St-Nazaire 
to Colon–Aspinwall.697 Since the railway between Colon and Panama had 
been opened in 1855, several shipping companies had been willing to take 
their part of the business. The Panama mail route will be examined more 
closely later in this chapter. In this connection, it is probably enough to state 
that the round trip between St-Nazaire and Colon via Martinique took 50 
days on average, which was an appropriate time to enable six consecutive 
information circles per year. The ships called at Fort-de-France en route in 
both directions. And more than that, there was a branch steamer operating 
between St. Thomas and Fort-de-France to facilitate a bi-monthly service to 
Martinique. When the transatlantic steamer for Vera Cruz arrived from St-
696 Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 240–243; and Salles, Tome IV, 105.
697 The new route was called Ligne A, and the Mexico route Ligne B. The branch services had 
similar alphabetically organized names, which were also used in the postal handstamps on 
the mail carried by these services. Ligne C operated between Fort-de-France and Cayenne, 
French Guyane, Ligne D between St. Thomas and Kingston, Jamaica, Ligne E was the 
branch line between St. Thomas and Fort-de-France, Ligne F was a branch line between 
Vera Cruz, Tampico and Matamoros in Mexico, Ligne G was the branch line between 
Fort-de-France and Point-de-Pitre on Guadeloupe; and Ligne L was the line between Fort-
de-France and Venezuela. The missing letters between G and L and after L were used in 
other parts of the world: for example, Ligne H was the Havre – New York route, Ligne 
J and K were the South American routes, and Ligne Z was a Mediterranean branch line. 
This postal line system was developed by the French Post Office, and included several 
shipping companies’ operations. See Raymond Salles, La Poste Maritime Francaise, 
Tome VII, Index Alphabétique des Cachets Postaux et Marques Maritimes (Cyprus, 1993), 
98–102.
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Nazaire to St. Thomas, the mails were taken to Martinique and Guadeloupe 
by an auxiliary ship, and the answers were carried to St. Thomas two or three 
days before the main steamer’s return.698
The transatlantic steamers departed from St-Nazaire on the 8th and 16th 
of each month.699 According to the new schedule, Martinique received the 
mails from St-Nazaire on the 3rd as well as the 22nd or 23rd of each month, 
and the mail steamers left towards St-Nazaire from the island between the 
7th and 9th, as well as on the 18th of each month.700 This was somewhat 
impractical as there were now two incoming mails after each other without 
any outgoing, and vice versa. Table 52 shows the problem clearly.
Even if a bi-monthly service now existed for Martinique, it was only a 
partial improvement from the business information transmission point of 
view. The earlier 56 days long information circles were now reduced to 46 
days on average. But the length of the circles varied between 37 and 57 days, 
and even the average lengths of them varied from 41 to 50 days depending on 
the original departure date – the 8th or 16th. The letters sent from St-Nazaire 
on the 16th by the French Line steamer to Vera Cruz could be answered 
rather quickly at Martinique by sending the letters to France by the steamer 
which was on its return voyage from Colon. This did not work vice versa, 
however. The company made the needed changes in the schedules as late 
as 1872, thus finally enabling eight consecutive information circles by the 
French service between St-Nazaire and Martinique.701
The French mail services mainly overlapped with those of the British 
instead of complementing them. Yet the departure from St. Thomas for St-
Nazaire on about the 24th of each month was appropriately between two 
Royal Mail Line departures (which took place at about the middle and end 
of the month) thus speeding up the correspondence from St. Thomas to 
Europe by a few days.702
In 1872, the French Line changed its departure dates from St-Nazaire to 
Colon from the 16th to the 20th of each month. This also caused a change at 
the other end: the ships started to leave from St. Thomas later in the month, 
almost simultaneously with the Royal Mail Line.703 As a result, the French 
Post Office probably lost many of their British customers as the service was 
of no use for them any more. This was the price paid for getting the mail 
system to work better at Martinique. It was a never-ending problem in the 
Caribbean to keep everybody satisfied on the different islands.
698 See the sailing lists of Salles, Tome IV, 79, 168.
699 The earlier sailing date from St-Nazaire was originally the 6th but was changed to the 
8th from April 1866. See Salles, Tome IV, 79.
700 See Salles, Tome IV, 79, 105, 168.
701 Sailing lists of Salles, Tome IV, 80, 106, 168.
702 Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 240; and Salles, Tome IV, 105.
703 Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 289; and Salles, Tome IV, 106.



















6.1. 22/23.1. 9.2. 27.2. 52 52
16.1. 3.2. 18.2. 10.3. 53 42
6.2. 22/23.2. 16.3. 31.3. 53 53
16.2. 3.3. 18.3. 7.4. 50 43
6.3. 22/23.3. 10.4. 26.4. 51 51
16.3. 3.4. 18.4. 12.5. 57 41
8.4. 22/23.4. 9.5. 24.5. 46 46
16.4. 3.5. 18.5. 7.6. 52 38
8.5. 22/23.5. 9.6. 22.6. 45 45
16.5. 3.6. 18.6. 11.7. 56 37
8.6. 22/23.6. 9.7. 25.7. 47 47
16.6. 3.7. 18.7. 8.8. 53 39
8.7. 22/23.7. 10.8. 3.9.* 57 57
16.7. 3.8. 18.8. 8.9. 54 49
8.8. 22/23.8. 9.9. 24.9. 47 47
16.8. 3.9. 18.9. 8.10. 53 39
8.9. 22/23.9. 9.10. 26.10. 48 48
16.9. 3.10. 18.10. 13.11. 58 40
8.10. 22/23.10. 13.11. 2.12. 55 55
16.10. 3.11. 18.11. 10.12. 55 47
8.11. 22/23.11. 14.12. 28.12. 50 50
16.11. 3.12. 18.12. 9.1. 54 42
8.12. 22/23.12. 9.1. 25.1. 48 48
16.12. 3.1.1867 18.1. 12.2. 58 40
TABLE 52. Round trips and information circles enabled by the French Line service 
to Fort-de-France, Martinique, 1866.
Source: Sailing lists of Salles, Tome IV, 79, 105, 168. – All the arrival dates at Fort-
de-France (the 22nd /23rd & 3rd) as well as the departure dates of the 18th from the 
same port are scheduled dates published by Salles, not the implemented sailing dates. 
This has no relevance in the issue, however. The arrivals and departures printed in 
bold are those where a faster departure could have been of benefit: the letters which 
arrived on the 3rd could have been answered already on the 9th of that month by the 
other route’s service homewards.
* The delayed arrival was due to the Louisiane being quarantined in Corunna during
the home voyage. (Salles, Tome IV, 79)
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The French postal services, South America
On the South American route, the French Post Office’s invasion started 
already in 1860 – in reverse order compared with the British mail services 
which had started on the West Indian route a decade earlier than they entered 
South America. The contract was given to the well known French shipping 
company, Messageries Impériales, which already operated from Marseilles 
on the Mediterranean mail routes with no less than 57 ships. The new route 
to Rio de Janeiro, with a branch service to Montevideo and Buenos Aires, 
used Bordeaux as the terminal port instead of Marseilles, however. For this 
service, the company received an annual subsidy of 4,700,000 francs.704
The service started in May 1860 with no major problems. The first four 
steamers employed on the transatlantic route were all purpose-built and new: 
The Béarn, Estramadura, Guienne and Navarre were all 1,900 to 2,400 tons 
iron paddle steamers, later converted to screw. The branch steamer Saintonge 
carried the mails from Rio to Montevideo and Buenos Aires. The system was 
copied from the British, without unnecessarily repeating their mistakes, as 
the French Line had done in the Caribbean. From the first year, Messageries 
Impériales operated in a very proper way, departing from both Bordeaux and 
Rio on the 25th of each month, and arriving at the other port on about the 
20th of the following month. The departures were punctual, and the arrivals 
at Bordeaux were more often early than late.705
A comparison between the Royal Mail Line (see Table 48) and Messageries 
Impériales services to Rio de Janeiro, with the year 1862 taken as a random 
example, shows that there was no major difference in their operations.
It can easily be noticed that, by the early 1860s, technological development 
and the ability to set up effective logistic networks had reached a point where 
regular, relatively fast and reliable communications were the norm. Both 
companies made their round trips in 55 days on average, which was in line 
with their contracts.706
This did not mean that all uncertainties had been washed away. The 
arrival dates were not always as scheduled, but varied to some extent in 
both directions. For example, in 1862, the duration of the journey from Rio 
de Janeiro to the European terminal ports varied between 24 and 27 days if 
704 Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets. Messageries Maritimes (Pembroke, 1998), 3–4; 
Raymond Salles, La Poste Maritime Française, Tome III, Les Paquebots de l’Atlantique 
Sud; Brésil–Plata de 1860 á 1939, Cote Occidentale d’Afrique de 1889 à 1939 (Cyprus, 
1992), 9.  – The company’s name followed the political history of the country. Being 
originally Messageries Nationales it was changed to Messageries Impériales during the 
time of Napoleon III, carrying this name during 1853–1870. In 1871, at the beginning of 
the Third Republic, the company was renamed Messageries Maritimes. See Haws (1998), 
2–5. – The value of the subsidy was equivalent to about £190,000. In the mid-19th century, 
one pound was approximately 24 to 25 French francs. The estimate is calculated from 
the data given by Moubray & Moubray, 498; and Mario D. Kurchan, Argentine Maritime 
Postal History (Buenos Aires, 2002). 294.
705 Kurchan, 235; sailing lists of Salles, Tome III, 24.
706 About the Royal Mail Line contract effective in 1862, see Howat 116–117; about the 
Messageries Impériales fixed schedule of the same time period, see Salles, Tome III, 
24.
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made by Messageries Impériales, and 23 and 26 days if made by the Royal 
Mail Line.
Whereas many trips were made faster than scheduled, real delays were 
scarce. However, due to the long sea route across the stormy Atlantic and 
the fact that the average travel speed of the small vessels was still only nine 
or ten knots, variations obviously occurred.
Inland trips did not cause major delays to information transmission in 
Britain or Central Europe at that time, even if they certainly did in Uruguay or 
Brazil. The railways took the mails from Southampton to London or Liverpool 
on the same day, and from Bordeaux within two days. If the mail ship arrived 
in the evening, the dispatch of the letters took place on the following day.
Messageries Impériales organized their schedules from the beginning in 
the way that maximized the benefits of the doubled service from the users’ 
point of view. As the Royal Mail Line steamers departed from both ends 
of the voyage on the 9th, there was a good two weeks’ difference between 
the French and the British services. For business communications it was 
sensible to use both of them, and the French mail steamers soon carried a 
good proportion of mails also to Britain.
The Liverpool merchant correspondence gives concrete evidence for 
this. Of the 160 letters sent from South America between 1860 and 1872, 
84 were carried by the Royal Mail Line and 68 by Messageries Impériales. 
Source: Sailing lists of Salles, Tome III, 24–25. The arrival dates in Rio de Janeiro 
are scheduled, not necessarily applied arrivals. The normal variance can be seen 
















Bearn 25.1. (20.2.) 25.2. 21.3. 55
Navarre 25.2. (20.3.) 25.3. 19.4. 53
Estramadure 25.3. (20.4.) 25.4. 19.5. 55
Guienne 25.4. (20.5.) 25.5. 18.6. 54
Bearn 25.5. (20.6.) 25.6. 20.7. 56
Navarre 25.6. (20.7.) 25.7. 19.8. 55
Estramadure 25.7. (20.8.) 25.8. 18.9. 55
Guienne 25.8. (20.9.) 25.9. 19.10. 55
Bearn 25.9. (20.10.) 25.10. 21.11. 57
Navarre 25.10. (20.11.) 25.11. 20.12. 56
Estramadure 25.11. (20.12.) 25.12. 18.1. 54
Guienne 25.12. (20.1.1863) 25.1.1863 20.2. 57
TABLE 53.  Round trips and consecutive information circles enabled by Messageries 
Impériales service to Rio de Janeiro, 1862.
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In addition, eight letters were transmitted by two later established British 
mail contract lines.707
It seems that, although the business contacts of the British used the 
French services in all the South American ports, it was especially the mails 
from Montevideo that were often carried by the steamers of Messageries 
Impériales. The Uruguayan business partners of Daniel Williams used the 
French mail service for letters sent not only from Montevideo, but also 
frequently from Salto, a city located up the River Uruguay, about one week 
from Montevideo. Additionally, the Rathbone Bros Co. received letters from 
Montevideo by French steamers.
TABLE 55.  Merchant correspondence from South America by port of departure 
and mail-carrying shipping company, 1854–1872.
707 Correspondence of Daniel Williams, DB/175. (MMM). Correspondence of Rathbone 
Bros & Co., RT XXIV.2.36. (SJ).
RMSP CMI LH PSNC Merchant 
ships
Total
1854–1859 89 – – – 4 93
1860–1869 75 56 1 – – 132
1870–1872 9 12 2 5 – 28
Total 173 68 3 5 4 253
Source:  Correspondence of Daniel Williams, DB/175. (MMM); and Rathbone Bros 
& Co., RT XXIV.2.36. (SJ); Accounts and papers of Henry Eld Symons, 380 MD. 
(PRO). 
RMSP = Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., or Royal Mail Line; CMI = Compagnie 
Messageries Impériales; LH = Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation 
Co (better known as Lamport & Holt); PSNC = Pacific Steam Navigation Co.
RMSP CMI LH PSNC Merchant 
ship
Total
Buenos Aires 47 6 – – 1 54
Montevideo 85 55 3 5 1 149
Rio Janeiro 41 7 – – 2 50
Total 173 68 3 5 4 253
TABLE 54.  Merchant correspondence from South America by period and mail-
carrying shipping company, 1854–1872.
Source:  Correspondence of Daniel Williams, DB/175. (MMM); and Rathbone 
Bros & Co., RT XXIV.2.36. (SJ); Accounts and papers of Henry Eld Symons, 380 
MD. (PRO). 
RMSP = Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., or Royal Mail Line; CMI = Compagnie 
Messageries Impériales; LH = Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation 
Co. (better known as Lamport & Holt); PSNC = Pacific Steam Navigation Co.
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Due to the length of the journey, the double service did not improve the 
number of consecutive information circles within a calendar year. As on 
the Mexico route after 1865, the two mail services – even if working well 
separately and complementing each other in the best possible way – could 
not do more than they did.
During the years of the American Civil War, coastal services between 
South America and the United States were restricted and uncertain. The 
best way to send letters between e.g. Buenos Aires and New York was twice 
across the Atlantic.708 The writer’s collection includes two letters which have 
been sent by this means. A letter from Buenos Aires on 1 March 1862 to 
New York was late for the same day’s Royal Mail sailing to Southampton, 
and was carried by the Saintonge of Messageries Impériales, departing on 14 
March to Rio de Janeiro, and from there on 25 March by the same company’s 
Navarre, which arrived at Bordeaux on 19 March. The letter was taken via 
London to Queenstown and on 24 April by the Inman Line’s Edinburgh to 
New York, where it arrived on 6 May 1862.709
Another letter from Buenos Aires on 14 August 1862 to New York was 
carried by the Saintonge to Rio de Janeiro and from there on 25 August by the 
same company’s Estramadure, which arrived at Bordeaux on 18 September. 
The letter was carried from Queenstown on 21 September by the Cunard 
Line’s Europa to Boston and by railway to New York, where it arrived on 
the same day, 2 October 1862.710
The Panama route
The Panama route was a specific case from the very beginning. The interest in 
developing communications with the Pacific coast had arisen simultaneously 
with the recently achieved independence of the South American countries 
in the early 1820s. A six-month return of 1823 shows that 31 British and 
33 American ships visited the port of Valparaiso, Chile, during the period. 
Additionally, several other ships calling at the port were British owned and 
manned, even if operating under the Chilean flag. Of the British ships, no 
less than 18 came from or sailed to Liverpool, and only one was bound to 
London. This trend continued in the following years. All the ships sailed to 
Britain via Cape Horn. The home voyage took four months on average.711
708 This idea was also used when sending important mail or specie from California to New 
York.  Instead of loading them into a ship for New York in Colon at the Panama isthmus, 
they were taken by a Royal Mail steamer to Southampton, and then from Queenstown by a 
Cunarder to New York. Although slower, this was a safer route and the entire voyage was 
conducted under a neutral flag. See John Haskell Kemble, The Panama Route 1848–1869 
(Berkeley, 1943), 111.
709 SRLC; sailing lists of Howat, 134, and Salles, Tome III, 24, 29.
710 SRLC; sailing lists of Howat, 134, and Salles, Tome III, 25, 29.
711 A.R. Doublet, The Pacific Steam Navigation Company. Its maritime postal history 
1840–1853 with particular reference to Chile (London, 1983), 17–18. Doublet also states 
that there was a line of packets from Liverpool to Valparaiso organized by the South 
American merchants of Liverpool since 1836. These packets were advertised to sail from 
Liverpool as follows: to Valparaiso, Islay and Lima (Callao) every three weeks, to Arica, 
Islay and Lima every two months and to Lima direct every six weeks. The Vice Consul 
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Doublet records several options for mail routes in the 1820s or early 
1830s between the west coast of South America and Europe. Undoubtedly, 
all these routes were slow and the communications were unreliable. Letters 
from Chile in particular could be sent by the following ways:
- northwards by sea, usually by private ship, to Panama, taken over 
the isthmus to Chagres to connect with the West Indian service of the 
Falmouth packets
- southwards by private ship via Cape Horn to Buenos Aires and then 
by ship to Rio de Janeiro to connect with the South American service of 
the Falmouth packets
- by private ship all the way. If the ship was from the United States, the 
letters were usually transferred at an American port to a ship bound for 
Britain
- by British warships of the Pacific squadron returning to or coming from 
Britain. French and American naval vessels were used similarly by their 
own nationals.
- overland via Mendoza to Buenos Aires and then by private ship or 
packet to England.712
The connection with the Falmouth packets at the West Indies has not been 
examined by historians and very little is known about it. Pawlyn mentions 
that the Jamaica service was extended to include Cartagena ‘near Panama’ 
in 1825, and Britnor notes that in 1838 H.M.B. Hornet was employed as 
a branch packet boat between Jamaica and Chagres.713 Whether there was 
any other service between Cartagena and Chagres than private ships before 
1838 is not known.
The route via Panama was apparently not much used by the countries south 
of Callao (near Lima in Peru) due to the very long voyage and the strong 
Humboldt stream. The passage from Falmouth to Chagres took 45 days. No 
less than 23 days were counted for unloading the goods, procuring mules 
for the land journey to Panama, and the reloading and detention of vessels 
due to the dilatoriness of the Custom House officers and people. The voyage 
from Panama to Callao took 35 days and to Valparaiso against the monsoon 
22 more days – in total 125 days .714
The Panama overland route, although much shorter than its eastern 
counterpart between Alexandria and Suez, presented far greater difficulties. 
Instead of the flat country of a river delta, the Isthmus of Panama consisted 
of a rugged central mountain range with outlying hills, densely covered with 
at Tacna (Peru), referred to this service in a letter to Foreign Office in October 1842: ‘…I 
would recommend all the official despatches to be sent by the direct ships from Liverpool 
to Arica…’ Nothing more seems to be known about this service. See Doublet, 24. The 
ships must have been regular traders without government contract.  The timing matches 
with the overall increase of activity by the Liverpool merchant ships, e.g. in East India 
and Australasia (see Chapter VII.1.) The line model itself was a copy of the American 
sailing packets on the Liverpool – New York run.
712 Doublet, 18.
713 Pawlyn, 95, 111; Britnor, 150. Also Doublet states that there was a monthly mail service 
by British men-of-war between Jamaica and Chagres in the 1830s. (Doublet, 20)
714 Doublet, 24.
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tropical forest, gradually descending to sea level. Rivers were shallow and 
there were no roads. The ravines and luxuriant undergrowth were breeding 
grounds for fever-carrying mosquitoes. Mails, goods and travellers used 
dugout canoes on the waterways, and mules where the water courses were not 
available. The less than fifty miles passage over the isthmus took an average 
of four days from Chagres to Panama and two days in the reverse direction, 
but in the rainy season the journey could take much longer.715
The other existing connection with the official mail service was not 
much easier. The Falmouth packet branch route from Rio de Janeiro to 
Buenos Aires included a leg over the Andes to Chile and Peru from 1824, 
when Buenos Aires and Montevideo were included in the South American 
service. The route across the Andes would take 14 to 18 days from Buenos 
Aires to Santiago depending on the season. In early 1829, the service was 
totally closed following ‘clashes between conflicting parties and predatory 
Indians’. The route was not re-opened before 1832, and it was still reported 
to be ‘very irregular’ in 1837.716
In addition to these arrangements and the use of men-of-war, merchant 
ships were continuously used as mail carriers. As Doublet puts it, ‘merchants, 
private or persons in official positions used any available ship to convey 
mail to Europe’.717
In these circumstances the Pacific Steam Navigation Company started its 
operations between Panama and the young states on the west coast of South 
America. The aim was to arrange monthly communications between Panama 
and Valparaiso by two steamers, calling at the somewhat exotic intermediate 
ports of Coquimbo, Huasco, Copiapo, Arica, Islay, Pisco, Callao, Huanchaco, 
Lambayique, Payta, Guayaquil and Buenaventura. The company, established 
in London in 1838 and granted a Royal Charter in 1840, was given a mail 
contract by the British Post Office for five years in 1845, with a fixed annual 
subsidy of £20,000.718
This was the only mail contract in the history of the British Post Office for 
vessels which actually had nothing to do with Britain – they did not touch 
any British or imperial colonial port. The value of the postage was so small 
that it covered only a fifth of the subsidy. A Committee Report inspecting 
contract packets stated in 1853: ‘The extension of British influence and 
British commerce appears to have been the chief inducement for supporting 
this communication between the republics of New Grenada, Bolivia, Peru 
and Chile...’719
The mail service of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company was closely 
connected with the Royal Mail Line’s service to Chagres, which started 
in 1842 along with the other new West Indian routes. Cartagena, Chagres 
and San Juan de Nicaragua were served by the same branch steamer from 
715 Bushell, 87; Robinson (1964) 154; Doublet, 35. – Water ways could not be used in the 
same way in both directions due to currents etc., which may have been the reason for the 
different length of the inland voyage.
716 Doublet, 20; Howat, 48–50.
717 Doublet, 25.
718 Doublet, 25–33.
719 Robinson (1964), 154. – Panama belonged at that time to New Grenada (Columbia).
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Kingston, Jamaica. Cartagena was also a part of another branch line from 
Curaçao, which was served by a triangle line from Barbados–Grenada as 
well as St. Thomas. The mails for Chagres could thus arrive at Cartagena 
by two different routes, but as they all arrived from Europe by one and the 
same ship, this was no particular benefit. In October 1842, this overlapping 
service was deleted from the company’s route map.720
The published sailing lists do not enable any deeper examination of the 
early schedules of the Royal Mail Line’s service to the isthmus. One round 
voyage of early 1843 can be picked up as an example:
TABLE 56. Royal Mail Line, round trip Falmouth–Chagres, January–April 1843, 
an example.
The trip from Falmouth to Chagres by the Royal Mail steamers, using a 
combination of four different mail routes, took 39 days – six days less than 
by the Falmouth sailing packets. The journey from Chagres to England was 
even longer, taking 45 days. In addition to the transit ports named in the 
table there were several others where the ships called at briefly on the way. 
The following ports were called at during the round trip: (Southampton –) 
Falmouth – Madeira – St. Thomas – Jamaica – Santa Martha – Cartagena 
– Chagres  – Cartagena – Jamaica – Cape San Antonio – Havana – Bermuda
– Fayal – Falmouth ( – Southampton). The mails waited at different ports for
ten days in total, in addition to the four days stay at Chagres waiting for the
mails from the Pacific. Thus, of the 88-day-long round trip on the Atlantic
side of the voyage, 14 days were spent at port and 70 at sea.721
There is no published maritime intelligence on the Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company’s early sailings. A record from 1846 notes that the new Ecuador 
sailed from Panama on 25 May and arrived at Callao on 6 June, proceeding 
720 Kenton & Parsons, 9, 19, 25, 33.
721 Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 25–27, 31–33.
Port Arrival Departure Comments
Falmouth 4.1. Falmouth–St. Thomas (main route out)
St. Thomas 27.1. 27.1. St. Thomas–Kingston (route 6)
Kingston, 
Jamaica




28.2. 2.3. Kingston–Havana–Bermuda 




Bermuda 15.3. 18.3. Bermuda–Falmouth (main route return)
Falmouth 2.4.
Source: Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 25–27, 31–33.
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on 18 June and arriving at Valparaiso on 24 June. Thus the sailing down to 
Chile took no more than a month with the stops included.722 The Postmaster 
General’s announcement of the PSNC contract in 1846 informed the public 
that mails for the ports at New Grenada, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile 
would be made in London on the 17th of each month, and that the steamship 
from Panama would be ready to leave with the mails on the Pacific side 
approximately on the 23rd of the following month.723
At that time, it took the Royal Mail steamers 33 to 35 days to arrive at 
Chagres from Southampton. The Ecuador’s sailing matches well with the 
Postmaster General’s announcement. The Atlantic mails arrived at Chagres 
on 20 May and it seems that they were taken across the isthmus in five days 
– quite an improvement compared with the description of earlier times. 
Probably the explanation is that mails and passengers were easier to take 
across the isthmus than any normal cargo. Loading and unloading did not 
take much time and the customs officials had less to say. It was also easier 
to organize the inland trip on a regular basis.
To conclude, it seems that the steamships operating jointly on the Atlantic 
and Pacific mail routes managed to reduce the duration of information 
transmission from England from the earlier four months (or more) to 50 
days for Callao and 68 days for Valparaiso. Instead of the fewer than 1.5 
consecutive information circles that were possible earlier, two full circles 
could now be conducted each year with rather good regularity.
There was a growing interest in the isthmian route also in the United 
States. The west coast of North America had been part of the United States 
from the mid-1840s after the Oregon boundary dispute with Canada and 
the war against Mexico, and the gold rush to California started in 1849. As 
the transcontinental railway was not yet built, the easiest way to reach San 
Francisco was along the two water routes on both sides of the isthmus.724
The traffic across the isthmus increased rapidly, so much that in 1850 
a group of New York investors began the construction of a railway from 
Chagres to Panama City. According to Bushell, the Royal Mail Line also 
contributed with a remarkable sum. The railway was completed in 1855. 
Chagres was replaced by a more modern port slightly to the east, named 
Aspinwall by the company which built it, but later known as Colon.725
The American coastal services by steamship consisted of four principal 
routes: the Panama route to California from New York and New Orleans 
via Cuba or direct to the isthmus; the New Orleans and Vera Cruz route; the 
Charleston and Havana route; and the New York and Brazil route which was 
inaugurated as late as 1865.726
The service between New York and Chagres was started in December 
1848 by a U.S. Postmaster General mail contract. The purpose-built steamers 
entered the service in September 1849 and January 1850. The United States 
722 Doublet, 33.
723 The announcement is reprinted by Doublet, 34.
724 Robinson (1964), 154–155.
725 Robionson (1964), 155; Bushell, 88.
726 Wierenga, 73–81.
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Mail Steamship Company mail contract was for ten years and was extended 
for one year in 1858. At the conclusion of its contract, the company withdrew 
from the Panama route and it was taken over by the Pacific Mail Steamship 
Company and the Panama railroad, which formed the North Atlantic 
Steamship Company to operate a line between New York and Colon.727
The Pacific Mail Steamship Company – not to be confused with the British 
Pacific Steam Navigation Company which operated from Panama southwards 
– operated between Panama City and San Francisco, with various calls at
Acapulco, Manzanillo, San Blas, and Mazatlan in Mexico and San Diego
and Monterey in California. The service started in February 1849. After
1851, usually only one stop was made at either Acapulco or Manzanillo.
This speeded up the voyage.728
An interesting comparison can be made from the report of the U.S. 
Postmaster General in 1853. The different mail routes between New York 
and Colon, a distance of 2,000 miles with twice-a-month service, received 
a total annual subsidy of $290,000. The service between Panama City and 
San Francisco, a distance of 4,200 miles with a twice-a-month service in 
each direction, received $348,250. And the Panama railroad, even if not yet 
fully completed, received an annual subsidy of $95,335. Thus the whole 
service between New York and San Francisco cost the U.S. government 
$733,585 in total. This payment covered a twice-a-month (24 round trips) 
mail service along a route of no less than 6,200 miles by steamship plus the 
railway costs. In the same year, the Collins Line received $858,000 on the 
North Atlantic route for 26 round trips between New York and Liverpool, a 
distance of 3,100 miles.729 The extra cost for showing national pride on the 
North Atlantic route was high indeed.
How did the American mail service work between New York and San 
Francisco in the early 1850s? Table 57 shows the consecutive information 
circles enabled by the combined service in 1851.
TABLE 57. Consecutive information circles enabled by the American mail service 
from New York to San Francisco via Panama, 1851.
727 Wierenga, 74.
728 Wierenga, 74, 319–326. Pacific Mail Steamship Company operated also to Callao and 
Valparaiso in South America. (For some inadequate sailing lists, see Wierenga, 336–337.)

































11.1. 24.1. 2.2. 27.2. 5.3. 26.3. 29.3. ~9.4. 88
11.4. 24.4. 1.5. 20.5. 31.5. 19.6. 26.6. 6.7. 86
11.7. ~24.7. 1.8. 19.8. 1.9. 19.9. 24.9. 6.10. 87
7.10. ~22.10. 4.11. 16.11. 5.12. 18.12. 22.12. 6.1.52 91
Source: Sailing lists of Wierenga, 321–322, 341–342. ~ marked are estimates.
The West Indies and South America
278
The mail service between New York and San Francisco via Panama was 
quite efficiently organized in 1851, when taking into account that it was a 
combination of two different steamship services and a non-completed railway. 
It took 88 days on average to receive an answer from San Francisco to a 
letter written in New York. The schedule seems tight at the New York end, 
but it probably worked as the system was not changed.
Within a few years, business information transmission by this route 
improved in a most admirable way:
TABLE 58. Consecutive information circles enabled by the American mail service 
from New York to San Francisco via Panama, 1856.
Instead of 88 days in 1851, an information circle could now be accomplished 
in 53.5 days on average. The service enabled no less than six information 
circles per year instead of only four a few years later.
The length of the sailings had been shortened by reducing the number of 
the ports of call and by replacing old steamers with new ones. The completion 
of the Panama railway in 1855 was an important part of the achievement. The 
New York Herald noted on 17 April 1855 under the headline ‘Efficiency of 
the Panama Railroad’ that the captain of the steamer John L. Stephens, off San 
Francisco on 16 March, had sent the following message for Messrs. Forbes 
and Babcock, Agents Panama Mail Steamship Company, San Francisco: ‘I 
left Panama with my command at 7 30 P.M. of the 20th inst. With 266 (256?) 
mailbags, 421 passengers, 620 packages of freight, and three horses, all of 
which were on board and the ship under weigh in ten hours from Aspinwall. 
R.H. Pearson.’730
European letters to California could be sent by a Royal Mail steamer 
from Southampton via St. Thomas to Colon, across the isthmus and by the 


































5.1. 16.1. 16.1. 30.1. 5.2. ~19.2. 19.2. 27.2. 53
5.3. 13.3. 14.3. 28.3. ~5.4. - - 21.4. 30.4. 56
5.5. 13.5. - - 1.6. 5.6. 18.6. 19.6. 28.6. 54
5.7. - - - - 29.7. 5.8. 19.8. 20.8. 29.8. 55
5.9. - - 16.9. 29.9. 6.10. 20.10. 20.10. 28.10. 53
6.11. 18.11. - - 30.11. 5.12. 18.12. 19.12. 28.12. 52
Source: Sailing lists of Wierenga, 325–326, 352–354. ~ marked are estimates.
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letters across the North Atlantic by a Cunarder or by some other mail service, 
and then by the American coastal services via Panama.
Also the second alternative seems to have been in use. The writer’s collection 
includes a letter from Glasgow on 30 March 1858 to San Francisco (see Fig. 
25). It was carried across the Atlantic by the Inman Line’s City of Washington, 
which sailed from Liverpool on 31 March. The letter arrived in New York on 13 
April and proceeded for Colon on the 20th by the United States Mail Steamship 
Company’s Star of the West. It continued over the isthmus by railway and was 
carried from Panama by the John L. Stephens of the Pacific Mail Steamship 
Company, arriving in San Francisco on 15 May in 46 days.731
The letter could have been carried by the Royal Mail steamer Parana, 
which left Southampton on 2 April and arrived at St. Thomas on the 22nd. The 
steamer Trent departed on the next day and arrived at Colon on 28 April.732 
From Colon the letter would probably have been sent to San Francisco by the 
same ship as it was sent by, anyway. The British-American connection did 
not work in the best possible way. If a letter was sent via the North Atlantic 
route, it had to wait in New York almost a week, and if it was sent via the 
West Indies, it waited in Colon. It was obviously not in the British interests 
to change their schedules according to American needs, and vice versa.
The British services via Panama to the west coast of South America also 
naturally benefited from the Panama railway. Although there are no sailing 
731 The letter bears the 31.3.1858 transit handstamp of Liverpool port, used on outgoing North 
American mail. – no markings from London or Southampton. (SRLC; for this handstamp, 
see Tabeart, 165–166.)
732 Sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 176–177.
Fig. 25. The letter sent from Glasgow, Scotland, on 30.3.1858 to San Francisco, 
was carried via Liverpool and New York by three different mail steamers and across 
the Panama Isthmus by the newly established railway, from sender to recipient in 
46 days. (See the text.)
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lists available from the west coast traffic in the 1860s, a letter in the writer’s 
collection gives evidence of the improvement. The letter, sent on 15 January 
1866 from Havre was carried by four different steamships: first by a branch 
steamer across the English Channel to Southampton and from there on 17 
January by the Royal Mail steamer La Plata to St. Thomas, where she arrived 
on 2 February. The same company’s Tyne took the letter on the same day and 
sailed via Haiti and Jamaica to Colon, arriving on 8 February. From there the 
letter was taken by train across the isthmus to Panama on 9 February and by 
a Pacific Steam Navigation Company’s steamer to Callao, where it arrived 
on 17 February.733 The whole trip from Havre via England, the West Indies 
and Panama to Peru took only about a month – 33 days.
 Simultaneously with the rapidly developing steamship services and 
railways, large sailing ships reached the peak of their development in both 
size and speed. The California and South American routes, as well as the 
tea trade from China to England, saw the expansion of the most beautiful 
clippers – fine, sharp and fast vessels designed to carry very heavy cargoes 
– built in American or British shipyards for companies still preferring sail to 
steam on the longest sea routes.734 The clipper boom started in the late 1840s 
and continued until the depression of 1857, declining rapidly just before the 
American Civil War.
Even if very much admired for their speed, the clippers did not carry 
major amounts of mail to California or South America. The trip from New 
York via Cape Horn to San Francisco by the fastest clippers took at least 
three months, and an average sailing took 130 days.735 However, the rapidly 
growing number of clippers on the long routes must have stimulated a need 
for fast mail services to carry out the trade. While the clippers were sailing 
around Cape Horn from New York to California, the mails were sent by fast 
mail steamers via Panama.
During the peak year 1853, at least 150 clippers sailed from the east coast 
of North America via Cape Horn to California. The sailings took place rather 
evenly throughout the year without seasonal variations. In practice, at least 
two ships left for San Francisco each week, and sometimes even four or 
five.736 But the mail service by steamships via Panama was so much faster 
that there was no sense in sending letters by the clippers, even if the next 
steamer departure date was two weeks later.
The Panama route was not the only alternative for connecting the steamship 
traffic of the two oceans. In the early 1850s, there were strong opinions in 
the United States that the overland route should be drawn more north across 
733 SRLC; sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons, 240, 243.
734 For the American clippers, see e.g. Cutler (1961), passim.; Mc Kay, passim.; and for 
the British clippers MacGregor (1952), passim.  A recent paper by MacGregor gives a 
short and sharp analysis of the clipper period from the British point of view, see David 
R. MacGregor, ‘The Tea Clippers, 1849–1869’ in Richard Harding, Adrian Jarvis & 
Alston Kennerley, British Ships in China Seas, 1700 to the Present Day (Liverpool, 
2004), 217–224.
735 Sailing lists of Cutler (1961), 476–520, covering the years 1848–1860. The average is 
calculated by Cutler.
736 Sailing lists of Cutler (1961), 487–493.
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Nicaragua, thus shortening it by some 400 miles from New York, or 500 
miles from New Orleans. The crossing itself was much longer at Nicaragua, 
some 170 miles, but most of it could be made by water along the San Juan 
River and Lake Nicaragua. The journey across the Isthmus of Panama was 
about 55 miles.737
So important was the position of the new route that Britain and the United 
States came close to war over Nicaragua at the beginning of the gold rush, 
when plans for digging a canal through the isthmus were drafted for the first 
time, and each of the two nations was eager to take control of it. A crisis was 
averted by a treaty specifically binding Britain and the United States to the 
joint control of any canal at Nicaragua or elsewhere in Central America.738
These lucrative overland routes to California also caused exciting and 
ruinous competition between the shipping companies. The chief element in 
the contest was the opening of a route over Nicaragua to rival that of Panama. 
The Nicaragua route was vigorously promoted by Cornelius Vanderbilt, the 
‘Commodore’ who would later establish the Vanderbilt European Line for 
the North Atlantic service.739 As the government had subsidised the mail 
routes between New York and Colon, and as Panama and San Francisco 
had already been occupied, Vanderbilt started an ‘independent’ line via 
Nicaragua, stating that his ships were faster and the rates cheaper than 
those of the ‘monopolies’. While the Commodore and his associates were 
dominating the scene, several other competitors appeared, and the New York 
and San Francisco newspapers were often filled with lively descriptions and 
speculations concerning these businesses.740
Disregarding the financial ups and downs of the companies, caused 
by numerous rate wars and fluctuations in stock prices, which all led to 
uncertainties in operations, the competition had its positive sides as well. 
Low passenger rates attracted people to use the steamers when travelling to 
California, and, during the peak years, extra vessels were sent from New York 
so often that there actually was a weekly service to San Francisco.741 The 
mail ship service was bi-monthly, but most probably other steamships were 
also used to carry letters privately. This may have speeded up the information 
circulation during those years, but the services were rather unpredictable. 
Several cases were reported where, for example, the passengers were left 
on their own at Panama without a ship to take them to San Francisco even 
if they had tickets for the whole journey.742
737 Kemble, 58–60.
738 David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas. The Creation of the Panama Canal 
1870–1914 (New York, 1977), 38. The importance of the Nicaragua route can also be 
seen in the fact that San Juan de Nicaragua, or Greytown as the British had renamed it, 
was one of the ports the Royal Mail steamers called at throughout the period, except a 
few months in 1842–1843. See the route maps of Kenton & Parsons, passim.
739 See Chapter V.3.
740 For details, see Kemble, 58–115.
741 See Kemble, 89. – For the different steamship services between New York and Colon, 
see the sailing lists of Wierenga, 340–364, between New York and San Juan del Norte 
(Nicaragua), 365–372; between San Francisco and Panama, 320–329, and between San 
Francisco and San Juan del Sur (Nicaragua), 331–335.
742 Kemble, 62–63.
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The competition between the ‘humbug steamship companies’ was reflected 
in the popular ballads of the day. One of them began like this:
‘The greatest imposition that the public ever saw,
Are the Californian steamships that run to Panama.
They have opposition on the route, with cabins very nice,
And advertise to take you for half the usual price:
They get thousands from the mountains, and then deny their bills,
So you have to pay their prices, or go back into the hills.’743
The Vanderbilt Independent Line was closed in 1856 after being mixed with 
the Nicaraguan revolutionary war.744 The struggle between the different 
companies, also still involving Vanderbilt, continued on the Panama route 
until the late 1860s. When the mail contracts ended in 1859, new and 
different deals were made that resulted in the United States Mail Steamship 
Company, which had dominated the mail route between New York and Colon, 
discontinuing its operations. The company had never achieved the popularity 
of Pacific Mail and there were few regrets when it ceased its operations. 
The company was said to be in the hands of a ‘number of heartless banking 
speculators, knowing little about maritime affairs, and less anxious about the 
multitudes who entrust their lives to their keeping, than of the semi-annual 
dividends’. Nevertheless, during its eleven years of operation the company 
suffered only one serious disaster, the loss of the Central America with 423 
lives in a hurricane in September 1857.745
As this was the time when the American mail contracts on the North 
Atlantic route were transformed to cover only sea postage, the U.S. Postmaster 
General decided to invite bids for a new contract also on the Panama route. 
Both Vanderbilt and Pacific Mail bid on the contract, but it was awarded to 
a Daniel H. Johnson, who promised to carry out the service with $216,000 
instead of the earlier $741,200 per year. It appeared later that he was totally 
unable to fulfil the contract and only acted as a ‘broker’ while the whole 
business finally ended in Vanderbilt’s hands. The new ‘mail line’ Atlantic 
and Pacific Steamship Company started their operations in late 1859. The 
list of backers of the company showed that most of the old United States 
Mail organization had gone over to Vanderbilt as well.746
Thus the Vanderbilt steamers became the ‘mail steamers’ and the ships 
which carried the mails for more than a decade passed into the position of 
‘the opposition’. The Pacific Mail had carried the mails promptly and safely 
for a decade without losing a single mail. The new agreement again led to 
rate wars and hardly improved mail transmission – the sailing lists from the 
1860s are not published anywhere. The Civil War caused additional safety 
problems regarding specie – the treasure shipments consisted mainly of gold 
from California – and there were times when the mail ships were protected by 
Navy vessels. During 1848–1869, over 400,000 people travelled from New 
743 Kemble, 68.
744 For these events, see Kemble 74–76; Wierenga 368–372; and Valtonen, 326–328.
745 Kemble, 83, 86–88.
746 Kemble, 82–85.
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York to San Francisco and more than 230,000 people in the other direction 
via Panama. The corresponding figures via Nicaragua were over 70,000 and 
more than 60,000 respectively. The shipments of specie via Panama were 
worth more than 710 million dollars and those via Nicaragua some 46 million 
dollars – huge sums of money in those days. For instance the whole fleet of 
Pacific Mail in 1859, consisting of seven ocean-going steamers, was offered 
two million dollars by Vanderbilt during one of the negotiations.747
Pacific Mail continued on the route, however, and was still operating at 
Panama in the 1870s, while the transcontinental railway had taken the mails 
and specie, as well as most passengers, to the inland route. Foreseeing the 
coming competition with the railway, Pacific Mail spread their operations 
to the Japan and China routes in the mid-1860s.748
The transcontinental overland mail route had already existed since the late 
1850s. The letters were taken from the eastern coast of the United States to 
St. Louis in Missouri by railway, and then by mail coach via Fort Smith and 
El Paso to California. The latter service operated every second week under 
a very non-profitable mail contract from the government’s point of view: the 
annual subsidy was $600,000 while the annual return was only a little more 
than $27,000. In the midst of the Civil War, the service was renegotiated 
and the ‘Central Overland Route’ for the northern territories was organized 
as follows: the first leg ran from St. Joseph, Missouri to Salt Lake City by 
the Central Overland Company; the second from Salt Lake City to Virginia 
City, Nevada by the Butterfield Company; the third to Sacramento was sub-
let to the Pioneer Stage Company; and the final journey to San Francisco 
was completed by a river steamer service.749
The contract time was 35 days, but for example during the winter of 
1861–1862 snowfalls were so heavy that only a light mail could be carried, 
and in the spring coaches sank up to their axles in mud. Summer conditions 
brought the unwelcome attention of the Indians. The conflicts continued 
through the 1860s. The road between Omaha and Denver was one of the 
worst affected. The contractor complained that between April and mid-
August 1867, the Indians had robbed him of 350 head of stage stock, burned 
twelve of his stage stations, destroyed three coaches, severely wounding 
several passengers and killed 13 of his most reliable employees. The Indians 
also fought to prevent the railway from invading their land, and therefore 
attacked trains and destroyed railway property. During one attack in 1867, 
they derailed a train and scalped the people.750
Despite safety problems, the Panama route was rapidly superseded by the 
transcontinental railway after its opening in 1869. The difference in duration 
of information transmission was great, but not as huge as has been commonly 
supposed. Instead of comparing the several months trip around Cape Horn 
with the speedy railway, the right comparison would naturally be the three 
747 Kemble, 86–93, 110–113, 254–255.
748 Kemble, 101, 114–115.
749 Moubray & Moubray, 248–249.
750   Moubray & Moubray, 249; Rudolph Daniels, Trains Across the Continent. North American 
Railroad History (Indiana, 2000), 52–53.
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week journey via Panama by steamer and the one week journey by train. A 
few years later, an express train could make the trip from New York to San 
Francisco in less than four days.751
While the transcontinental stage coaches had been less efficient in news 
transmission than the Panama steamers, the Pony Express (between St. 
Joseph, Missouri, and San Francisco in 1860–1861), together with the 
partially built telegraph, carried news between the coasts faster than the 
ships. From 1861, the telegraph alone made the mail steamers carriers of 
documents and confirmatory details instead of bearers of the first news of 
great events. When the mails were taken to the rails, the great time of the 
Panama steamers was over. Being a cheaper alternative, the Panama route 
was still popular among the less wealthy. Service was slower than in the 
old days, as the ships now made frequent calls at Central American and 
Mexican ports. The Pacific Mail Company was putting its best efforts into 
the transpacific service, and the Panama steamers suffered as a result. They 
were described as ‘cheap and nasty’, their awnings full of holes, the furniture 
shabby and the food bad.752 Losing the mails and specie typically meant the 
loss of general interest. When the Panama Canal was finally opened on the 
same day as WW1 began in 1914, the benefits were in cargo shipping but 
not in information transmission.
TABLE 59. Duration of information transmission by different means of 
communication between New York and San Francisco, ca 1850–1870.
The duration of information transmission has been estimated on the basis 
of the sailing lists of Wierenga and Cutler (1960) and they are just for a 
rough comparison. The sailing times of the clippers varied a lot and there is 
no intelligence on their sailings back to New York – many of them probably 
751 After the opening of the transcontinental railway, also the Pacific mail steamship service 
from Australia and New Zealand was redirected via Honolulu to San Francisco to be carried 
by train to New York instead of using the Panama route. In the 1870s, the eastbound route 
enabled usually three consecutive information circles per year. For the sailing data, see 
Colin Tabeart, Australia New Zealand UK Mails to 1880. Rates Routes and Ships Out 
and Home (Fareham, 2004), 281–316. 
752 Kemble, 114–115.
Means of communication Time period New York – San Francisco
Sailing ship (clippers) 1850s ~ 4 months
Steamer via Panama, no railway – 1855 ~ 6 weeks 
Steamer via Panama, railway 1855– ~ 3.5 weeks
The Pony Express (152 westb. and 
146 easb. trips in total, 11,500 / 
23,500 letters in total)
1860–1861 ~ 2–3 weeks
(incl. 4 days for 
New York–St. Joseph)*
Transcontinental railway 1870s ~ 1 week
* Source: Richard C. Frajola, George J. Kramer and Steven C. Walske, The Pony
Express. A Postal History (New York, 2005), 84-100.
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sailed on to China across the Pacific. As the clippers were not actual mail 
carriers on this route, they are included in Table 59 just as examples of the 
best possible performance by sailing ships. For exact figures, the steamship 
traffic on the Panama route should also be compared with the Nicaragua route 
and all the different companies, which would not give much that is new from 
the research point of view. Railway schedules are not easily found, and the 
difference would be in days only.
As a conclusion, it can be stated that information transmission between 
the east and west coast of North America included a paradox: the journey 
by sailing ship, which was the slowest means of communication, was also 
the longest in terms of miles. The combination of two steamship lines and 
an overland crossing at Panama or Nicaragua caused a double effect: the 
length of the journey was shortened markedly, while the speed was also 
greatly improved due to the change from sail to steam. The railway across 
the Panama isthmus made that part of the trip shorter and easier to manage, 
thus again speeding it up. And finally, when the shortest possible route and 
fastest possible vehicles were brought into use, the duration of the journey 
was reduced to less than a week compared with the original four monthsor 
more. This process was one of the most remarkable improvements in the 
duration of information transmission anywhere by traditional means of 
communication, even the telegraph included.753
753 The building of the Siberian railway in 1891–1904 might be another good example.
FIG. 26. The letter sent from Rarotonga, Cook Islands, on 17.1.1874, to London was 
carried by a by-passing merchant ship to San Francisco, where it arrived on 9 April. 
The marking ‘E.b.’ down to the left indicates that the letter should be sent eastbound, 
i.e. via the United States and not via Australia and Suez. It took 82 days from the
writing of the letter before it was in San Francisco, but only a week to bring it to
New York by the newly opened transcontinental railway. The HAPAG’s mail steamer 
Holsatia took the letter to Plymouth in ten days and it was received in London on
27.4. in 100 days. – Cook Islands, in the mid-Pacific, were a seldom visited place,
where the only Europeans were missionaries and occasional ship crews.
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International competition and the introduction of the telegraph in the 
West Indies
The German Hamburg-Amerika Linie (HAPAG) started steamship operations 
between Hamburg and the West Indies, including inter-island services, in 
1871. The German Imperial Post Office authorized HAPAG to organize the 
mail transportation on these routes similarly to the Royal Mail Line, and 
these two companies became ‘friendly competitors’, often visiting the same 
ports of call. Both companies also published postage stamps of their own 
for local use on the inter-island voyages. The Royal Mail Line used them 
only for a short while during 1875, but HAPAG’s stamps were in use until 
the various countries wherein they provided mail services became members 
of the Universal Postal Union.754
Additionally, there were local steamship companies which took care of 
some branch routes. The most important was the company of Captain Robert 
Todd, who had an agreement with the Venezuelan government in the 1860s to 
carry out a mail service between La Guaira, Puerto Cabello and St. Thomas. 
This route was originally operated by the Royal Mail Line.755 
The Royal Mail Line also lost several other mail routes to competitors, 
like the northern route to the Bahamas to the Cunard Line in 1859.756 In early 
1865, the West India and Pacific Steam Ship Company of Liverpool started a 
monthly service for Haiti, Jamaica and Mexico; and another route for Jamaica 
and Belize. The contract with the government remained short-lived, however, 
due to several alterations in sailing dates and occasions where no vessel was 
available. In April 1866, the contract was terminated and the letters carried 
by the company were treated by the Post Office as normal ship letters. The 
company was given another chance in 1868 with routes to Mexico and the 
northern coast of South America, but the contract was for one year only and 
the compensation was limited to the weight of the mail carried.757
In January 1875, the new mail contracts of the Royal Mail Line came into 
force. The annual subsidy was reduced by about £120,000. However, the 
company had already made the necessary improvements and modifications 
to meet this change in its fortunes. For the West Indian service the annual 
subsidy was now £86,750 and for the South American service payment was 
754 Sigurd Ringström & H.E. Tester, The Private Ship Letter Stamps of the World. Part 1. The 
Caribbean. (Trelleborg, printing year missing), 126–128, 133–134; Bushell, 127–128. The 
Royal Mail Line histories by Bushell or Nicol do not comment on the German rival. – The 
Universal Postal Union (UPU) was established in 1875, but it was a few years before the 
countries involved in the West Indian mail services had joined. Letters with the HAPAG 
postage stamps of 1875–1877 are pictured in Ringström & Tester, 144–157.
755 See Ringström & Tester, 12–28.
756 See Gisburn, 23–25; Moubray & Moubray, 277–278. The Cunard Line had also had a 
service from Halifax to Bermuda from 1833 and further to St. Thomas from 1850. St. 
Thomas replaced by Kingston in 1880. This route was not much used for letters to or 
from Europe as it was slower than the Royal Mail Line connection. It mostly served the 
British administration at Bermuda. The Cunard service ended in 1886. See Arnell & 
Ludington, for introduction of the service x–xvi; for sailing lists between Halifax and 
Bermuda, 55–161. See also Moubray & Moubray, 280–281.
757 Moubray & Moubray, 276.
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according to the weight of the mails carried. Several of the ports served in 
the West Indies were in fact non-contract ports. While other companies took 
parts of the Royal Mail Line’s earlier routes, the opposite was also true. 
After Plymouth became the first port of call in England from October 1867, 
the West Indian ships started to call at Cherbourg on the French side before 
proceeding to Southampton from May 1869. In June 1873, a monthly service 
was inaugurated from Southampton to the West Indies calling at Bremen and 
Hamburg on the way home.758
Very little is known about the schedules conducted by the different mail 
lines during the 1870s, as no details have been published of them. It would 
be especially interesting to examine the ‘friendly competition’ between the 
Royal Mail Line and HAPAG on the West Indian route. That will remain 
for further examination by somebody else, however. From the business 
information transmission point of view, a detailed study of this time period 
is not crucial. The telegraph had already reached the Caribbean and the 
steamers were not urgent news carriers any more.
After a decade of negotiations, with several companies and governments 
being involved and numerous technical problems being solved, the first 
submarine telegraph was laid between Florida and Cuba in 1867 by the 
American International Ocean Telegraph Company. One of the difficult 
questions in developing the network was once again whether or not any 
country should have exclusive rights for communications via Panama, which 
would combine the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts by telegraph. As can be 
expected from the historical background, the British government was very 
adamant on this question. Although several countries and colonies were 
ready for grants and subsidies for the new telegraph network, International 
Ocean found it soon necessary to raise new capital under the name of a new 
company.759
West India and Panama Telegraph Company Ltd. was founded in London 
in 1869 and manned by directors mostly from Liverpool, which showed 
where the main interest in the area laid. By the early 1870s, a telegraph line 
had been opened between Santiago de Cuba and Kingston, Jamaica, while 
the one between Kingston and Panama was postponed due to technical 
difficulties. St. Thomas was combined with St. Kitts and onwards to Antigua, 
Guadeloupe, Dominica, Martinique, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Granada and 
Trinidad. In early 1872, the line was continued to Barbados, and via Trinidad 
to Demerara.760
Instead of one cable telegraph company, there were in fact four of them 
involved in the Caribbean area. Two were British, (the West India and 
Panama Telegraph Company and the Cuba Submarine Company) and two 
were American (the International Ocean Telegraph Company and the Central 
758 Bushell, 126–127; Ringström & Tester, 126. For the changes in the Royal Mail Line’s 
contracts, see Kenton & Parsons, 222–227 for the fourth contract effective 2.1.1864, and 
322–325 for the fifth contract effective 2.1.1875. The sailing lists of Kenton & Parsons 
cover the journeys only as far as Plymouth.
759 See Jorma Ahvenainen, The History of the Caribbean Telegraphs before the First World 
War (Helsinki, 1996), 9–22.
760 The Panama line was finally opened in 1875.  See Ahvenainen (1996), 22–30, 42.
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and South American Telegraph Company). Three of them formed an alliance 
and operated in competition with the Central and South American Telegraph 
Company, whose activities, as the name implies, were mainly in Central and 
South America. It did not operate in the West Indies and did not pose a threat 
to the monopoly of the Associated Companies.761
The companies soon found that things did not go according to their plans. 
The laying of cables and the initial establishment of services were much 
more arduous and expensive than had been calculated. As the original idea 
of extending activities to South America – the most lucrative part of the plan 
– did not come about, there was considerable unused capacity in the cable 
network. Another surprise was that demand for the telegraph remained much 
lower than had been estimated. The continuing depression in the sugar trade 
brought serious economic difficulties in most colonies, and the economic 
significance of the Caribbean area in world trade was on the decline. The 
social structure of the area was not favourable for the telegraph, as the large 
majority of the population was illiterate. The telegraph served members of 
the commercial community, manufacturers, plantation owners and various 
government officials, but beyond this it found little use. As the Caribbean 
islands belonged to different European powers, it was not surprising that the 
demand for traffic between the islands was not great.762
For the business in British Guiana, the telegraph seems to have been a 
useful tool, however. The Sandbach, Tinne & Co.’s correspondence gives 
several examples of how the combination of steamship letters and telegraph 
worked in practice:
- ‘We enclose copies of our letter yesterday by direct steamer… and 
have to acknowledge your telegram in answer to ours about the ‘Malvina 
Shutte’ for timber… We enclose a letter from Robert Smith about 
Ruimveld. It is of course what you would have anticipated when you 
did not send us a power of attr. Meanwhile we await your instructions 
– we do not wire ‘Rotterdam’ because it might mean so much we did not 
wish to say. The King Arthur is loading for London. Sugar is alongside 
@ 1s/9d…’
- ‘In your additions of 3 March you had the word ‘avaria’ – We substitute 
‘average’ for the second ‘avaria’.’
- ‘Dear Sirs. We have to acknowledge your P16 per mail with enclosures 
& your telegram 4/94… Harrisons. The reasons we telegraphed was… 
Glencorn. We will telegraph later on. We have heard from the owners.’
- ‘Dear John, the mail being late, we have ‘nowt’ to acknowledge, and 
little to say on our own account.’
- ‘Dear Sirs. We have your P38, 39, 40. Mexicans. Your telegram 4/119 
duly received but the Government Secretary has not replied yet to us… 
Enclosures: letter for Crosby, letter for Olivieira, 3 telegrams, P/copies 
last mail.’763
761 Ahvenainen (1996), 196–197.
762 Ahvenainen (1996), 197.
763 Letters to Sandbach, Tinne & Co. in Liverpool from Demerara (Georgetown) 25.3.1876, 
4.4.1876, 25.4.1876, 24.8.1876 and 5.9.1876. (Bryson Collection, Records of Sandbach, 
Tinne & Co., D/B/176, MMM)
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The mixture of business information received by telegrams and steamship 
letters made communications between the sugar plantation in Demerara 
and the owner company in Liverpool rather complicated. For an outsider, it 
is almost impossible to understand what it was all about. Cross-references 
were necessary to keep the partner on the other side of the ocean informed 
about the status of knowledge of the writer at the time when he was sending 
the letter. Numbered letters and telegraph codes illustrate fairly standardized 
business communications. And more than that, the degree of independence 
at the plantation had been notably reduced. The owners, thousands of miles 
away, now controlled the distant plantation much more strictly than a few 
decades earlier.
International competition and the introduction of the telegraph in 
South America
In the late 1860s, the business environment of the old players like the Royal 
Mail Line and Messagerie Impériales changed markedly on the South 
American route. The introduction of the compound engine made it possible 
to carry more freight and passengers than earlier, instead of filling the ship 
holds with coal. This was particularly important on the long sea routes. 
While the royal mail services of Britain and France had enjoyed notable 
subsidies for their operations, new competitors could now start on the same 
routes without government support. The increasing space for cargo and 
passengers made the voyages profitable anyway, and in fact steamers now 
finally overtook sailing ships as long distance carriers. It did not take long 
before the government policy changed on the South American route as it 
did everywhere else, and the shipping companies were paid only according 
to the weight of the mails carried.764
The Liverpool-based company generally known as Lamport & Holt started 
their steamship service for South America in 1863 under the name Liverpool, 
Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation Company. They sent two ships to 
South America in the first year, eight in 1864, 24 in 1865, and 41 in 1866. 
These vessels occasionally carried private ship letters for the Liverpool 
merchant houses.765 In 1868, the company started as an official mail carrier 
under government contract on the route Liverpool–Lisbon–Bahia–Rio de 
Janeiro–Montevideo–Buenos Aires. A short-lived contract was also made 
with the London-based Tait & Company (London, Belgium, Brazil and River 
Plate Royal Mail Steam Ship Company).766
764 See Bushell, 125–127; Howat 164, 166, 169, 180, 189–190, etc. – The compound engine 
does not seem to have considerably affected the service speed of the vessels. For example, 
the speed of the Royal Mail steamers with compound engines in the 1870s was 11 to 12 
knots, which was normal performance for ships with inverted engines, too. Technically, 
the 1860s were also the time when the old wooden paddle steamers were changed to iron 
screws. See the fleet list of the Royal Mail Line in Bonsor (1983), 21–24, Howat, 122.
765 Howat, 159. As an example of a private ship letter sent by a Lamport & Holt vessel, a 
letter from Montevideo 22.9.1863 to Rathbone Bros & Co. in Liverpool ‘p. Str Kepler’ 
(RT XXIV.2.36, SJ).
766 See Howat, 159–170, 175–181; Moubray & Moubray, 284–285.
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 An interesting phenomenon on the route was the entrance of the Pacific 
Steam Navigation Company on the east coast of South America. This was the 
same company that had been carrying mails under a British contract along 
the west coast from the mid-1840s. They now established a direct route from 
Liverpool via Bordeaux, Lisbon, Cape Verde, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo 
and Punta Arenas to Valparaiso. Instead of sailing down to Cape Horn the 
steamers took the shorter route via the Straits of Magellan.767
In 1870, there were five regular mail steamship lines operating between 
the main West European ports and South America. The mails for Buenos 
Aires were sent to the departure ports from London on the 2nd, 9th, 19th and 
23rd or 24th of each month, with Sundays sometimes changing the date by 
one day. The departure dates from Buenos Aires were on the 9th, 12th, 17th, 
and 27th of each month. The Pacific Steam Navigation Company, leaving on 
the 12th of each month from Liverpool, sailed via Montevideo to Valparaiso 
and Callao without going to Buenos Aires. Their ships departed homewards 
from Montevideo on the 26th.768
For natural commercial reasons, not all these companies operated on 
exactly the same routes. The Royal Mail Line, Lamport & Holt and Tait 
& Co. sailed to Buenos Aires from different British ports and Messageries 
Maritimes sailed to the same place from Bordeaux. The Pacific Steam 
Navigation Company sailed from Liverpool to Montevideo as mentioned 
above. The vessels also called at somewhat different ports during the voyage. 
As all shipping lines called at Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo, these ports 
actually kept more options for business communications than Buenos Aires. 
Communications with Uruguay benefited notably when Tait & Co. ceased 
its operations to Buenos Aires in 1870 and the Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company doubled its service to Montevideo and Valparaiso from July in 
the same year.769
767 See Howat, 185; Moubray & Moubray 285.
768 Howat, 187. – Additionally, the German Hamburg-Süd (Hamburg-Südamerikanischen 
Dampfschiffahrts Gesellschaft) started on the South American route two years later in 
1872. See Bonsor (1983), 189, 200–201.
769 Royal Mail Line sailed the route Southampton–Lisbon–St. Vincent (Cape Verde)–
Pernambuco–Bahia–Rio de Janeiro–Montevideo–Buenos Aires;  Lamport & Holt 
sailed Liverpool–Bahia–Rio de Janeiro–Montevideo–Buenos Aires; Tait & Company 
sailed Falmouth–Rio de Janeiro–Montevideo–Buenos Aires; Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company sailed Liverpool–Bordeaux–Lisbon–St. Vincent (Cape Verde)–Rio de 
Janeiro–Montevideo–Valparaiso; Messageries Maritimes sailed Bordeaux–Lisbon–
Dakar–Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro–Montevideo and Buenos Aires. See Howat, 
123, 163, 180, 189–190; Salles, Tome III, 89.
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TABLE 60.  Consecutive  information circles between Liverpool and Montevideo 
in 1870, an example.
As the distance between Montevideo and Buenos Aires was just one 
sailing day, we do not know whether the difference was very remarkable in 
real life, however. There may have been local steamboat services which took 
the mails to Buenos Aires, although it should be remembered that there was a 
national border between the two cities. Table 60 shows the flow of consecutive 
information circles between Liverpool (or any other major English port with 
inland rail connections) and Montevideo in 1870. For Buenos Aires, one or 
two days should be added to the duration of the voyage.
 By chance, the information circles starting from early January 1870 lead 
to a presentation without any Royal Mail sailings. Almost six consecutive 
information circles could be conducted on that route by using almost 
exclusively the newcomers, with one Messageries Maritimes sailing as an 
exception. An average information circle enabled by the service of the four 
companies took 67 days. As there were ships leaving rather often, the number 
of possible consecutive information circles rose to 5.5 per year. If the Royal 
Mail Line had sailed on the route alone, the length of an average information 
circle would have been almost the same, 68 days, but the monthly schedule 
would have enabled only four consecutive information circles within the 
calendar year.
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66
Sources: Sailing lists of Howat, 137, 171, 183, 211; Salles, Tome III, 89, 91.
* = information circles are calculated from the date of departure from the homeport
to the date of arrival at the homeport, using the fastest possible change in Montevideo 
(not including those departures which took place on the same day when the mail 
from Europe arrived, however)
** = two days have been added for the trip between Bordeaux and Liverpool. From 
the other ports, the mails were principally sent on the same day by railway.
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The services of the different shipping lines were not identical. Interestingly, 
the old mail lines – Royal Mail, Messageries Maritimes and Pacific Steam 
Navigation Company – made constantly faster journeys than the newcomers 
– Tait & Company and Lamport & Holt. The Royal Mail Line had also
finally abandoned the old branch service system between Rio de Janeiro and
Buenos Aires, and the direct service shortened the duration of the voyage
by a few days.770 A fair comparison between all companies is difficult due
to the different routes and the fact that not all the real dates are given in the
sailing lists, but sometimes only the administrative schedules. Additionally,
the sources sometimes disagree about the dates.771 With these reservations,
the average performance of the shipping lines was as follows:
TABLE 61. Average duration of journeys between English/French ports and 
Montevideo, 1870.
770 For the corresponding change in the Royal Mail Line’s mail contract, see Howat, 
122–123.
771 The factual dates of Messageries Impériales arrivals in South American ports are missing 
from the sailing lists of Salles, and the homeward sailing dates are given only from Buenos 
Aires. In a few cases, the comparison between the Daniel Williams correspondence 
(Bryson Collection, D/B 175, MMM) and the sailing lists give an unusually long transfer 
time between Bordeaux and Liverpool, four days instead of the normal two. This may 
indicate that the ship arrival dates in French newspapers could probably be incorrect, as 
the postal handstamps are to be considered more reliable. This is probable also because 
there is some non-correspondence between the sailing lists of Salles and Hubbard & Winter 
concerning the French Line sailings in the North Atlantic in the 1870s. Salles has used 
French newspapers and shipping company archives as sources, while Hubbard and Winter 
have used New York papers and Lloyd’s List (Salles, Tome III, 4; Salles, Tome IV, 8, 
238–239; Hubbard & Winter, 275, 284–286). But it is also possible that the sailing dates 
are right and the mail between Bordeaux and Liverpool has been delayed for some reason. 
In the Howat sailing lists, a few Tait & Co. and Lamport & Holt sailing dates are missing 
and estimates have been calculated by using Buenos Aires arrival or departure dates. In 
some cases, Howat has also used dates ‘due to arrive or depart’ instead of factual dates. 
Additionally, two Liverpool arrival dates have been corrected as the postal handstamps 
of letters in the Williams correspondence show clearly that the ship did not arrive on the 
day given. See Howat, 171, 183, 211.
Shipping company Average duration 
of the trip, home 
port – Montevideo 
Average duration 
of the trip, 
Montevideo 
– home port
Lamport & Holt 30 days 35 days
Messageries Maritimes 30 days 26–27 days
Pacific Steam Navigation Co. 28 days 32 days
Royal Mail Line 28 days 30 days
Tait & Co. 33 days 35 days
Sources: Sailing lists of Howat, 137, 171, 183, 211; and Salles Tome III, 89, 91.
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Naturally, the British Post Office closely examined the duration of mail 
sailings. When Tait & Company was not able to improve its performance but 
instead asked for the possibility to lengthen the voyage to 42 days in a new 
mail contract, the Post Office turned to Pacific Steam Navigation Company 
for a better offer. Thus the latter company took over the contract in July 1870 
while Tait & Company disappeared from the scene. Table 61 shows clearly 
the reason why Lamport & Holt was not asked to take the contract.772
In 1874, the Royal Mail Line started a bi-monthly service, thus following 
the example of Messageries Maritimes which had started a new commercial 
line in addition to their government mail service in 1872. The ‘rapid’ new 
line of Messageries Maritimes did not touch Bahia or Pernambuco, while 
the other line did. By 1875, the South American mail services by steamship 
had reached their peak in frequency and speed. In addition to the three mail-
carrying lines from England and one from Bordeaux, there was the German 
Hamburg-Süd operating from Hamburg, the French Société Générale de 
Transports Maritimes (SGTM) operating from Marseilles, and the Italian 
Lavarello Line, operating from Genoa.773
Contemporary statistics by the Argentina Director-General of Posts and 
Telegraphs give interesting information on the numbers of letters carried 
by the shipping lines from Buenos Aires to Europe in 1876. Messageries 
Maritimes was the market leader with 100,000 letters (31%), while the Royal 
Mail Line carried 88,000 letters (28%). The Mediterranean companies had 
taken a considerable share of the transports within a few years of starting 
the service: SGTM carried 46,000 letters (15%) and Lavarello 45,000 letters 
(14%). Lamport & Holt carried 10,000 letters (3%); and ‘various ships of 
the Pacific Steam Navigation Company and sundry German ships’ carried 
29,000 letters (9%). The total number of letters from Buenos Aires to Europe 
was 318,000.774 In addition, the ships carried the mails from Montevideo and 
the Brazilian ports.
772 For the discussion about the renewal of the mail contract, see Howat, 181–190. – The Post 
Office also took a survey of the amount of British postage collected on the correspondence 
carried by the mail lines between South America and Britain during the six months 
beginning from June 1869. It was noticed that the earnings of the Royal Mail Line, the 
only company with a fixed subsidy (Messageries Impériales received subsidies from the 
French government), had not been diminished by the establishment of additional mail 
lines. Another survey showed that the payments by the Post Office to Lamport & Holt 
were only £4,834 in 1869 and £5,418 in 1870, which did not indicate large amounts of 
mails carried. The Pacific Steam Navigation Company’s part was even somewhat smaller, 
but the company naturally had its role in the Pacific service. The actual earnings by the 
Royal Mail Line were still £33,100 in 1874, then declining rapidly to £20,828 in 1875, 
£16,976 in 1876 and being only £5,538 in 1880. See Howat, 128, 170, 181, 209.
773 See Howat, 123–126; Salles, Tome III, 91; Bonsor (1983), 102–105, 128–129, 135–136.. – 
No sailing lists exist of the operations of the German or the Mediterranean companies.
774 Howat, 126.
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TABLE 62.  Consecutive information circles between Liverpool and Montevideo 
in 1875, an example.
Table 62 gives an example of information circulation between the Atlantic 
mail ports and Montevideo, using Liverpool as the European terminal to 
be consistent – it could naturally be any major English port with railway 
connections.
There were no less than 86 mail sailings to and from Brazil and the River 
Plate ports in 1875, compared with 61 in 1870. However, the result from the 
business information circulation point of view was now poorer than earlier. 
Instead of 5.5, only five consecutive information circles could be carried out 
within the calendar year. The same result could have been achieved by using 
the Royal Mail Line’s bi-monthly service alone.
The main reason for this outcome was that sailings could not be really 
coordinated due to the different contracts of the shipping lines. While 
Messageries Maritimes and the Royal Mail Line sailed bi-monthly, and 
Lamport & Holt monthly always on the same days (except for Sundays for 
the British lines), the Pacific Steam Navigation Company sailed every second 
Wednesday, thus altering the dates continuously.
The departures from the European ports were not evenly split but varied 
greatly. Even if there were seven to eight departures each month, the system 
did not work well from the business information transmission point of view. 
While there were sometimes four departures within a week’s time, ten days 
could then pass without a single sailing.
The arrivals and departures were sometimes mismatched within the same 
shipping line, so that the next ship departed on the same day as, or one or two 





























































19.11. PSNC 24.11. 24.12. 67
Sources: Sailing lists of Howat, 140, 174, 217; Salles, Tome III, 94.  ~marked are 
estimates. – Two days have been added for the trip between Bordeaux and Liverpool. 
From the other ports, the mails could be sent on the same day by railway.
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days before the arrival of the company’s vessel from the other direction.775 
The Liverpool-based companies competed by sailing out on the same days 
as the old mail contract companies, or very close to them.776
For example in February 1875, Messageries Maritimes first sailed on 
the same day as their own vessel arrived at Bordeaux, so that no one could 
answer the arriving letters in Paris, to say nothing of England. The Pacific 
Steam Navigation Company then sailed out one day after the Royal Mail 
Line, which was not very useful for anyone. Lamport & Holt sailed a day 
after Messageries Maritimes had departed from Bordeaux, which meant that 
the mails for the sailings had to be sent from England almost simultaneously. 
And finally the Pacific Steam Navigation Company again sailed out on the 
same day as the Royal Mail Line. Instead of spreading the seven departures 
evenly on every fourth day, for example, three of the departures took place 
within six days between the 5th and 10th February, and four of them within 
five days between the 20th and 24th February. During the rest of the month, 
there were no sailings outwards at all.777
Additionally, answers to letters that arrived on a Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company ship on the same day as another of the company’s vessels departed 
normally had to wait up to ten days for the following departure, while letters 
by the Royal Mail Line had to wait five days. After 1.5 weeks without sailings, 
there were again two on the same day.778 Even if the sailings were somewhat 
faster in 1875 than five years earlier, the duration of specific voyages varied 
notably.
The Royal Mail Line’s homeward sailings from Montevideo took 29.5 
days (30.2 in 1870) on average, varying between 28 and 32 days. Lamport 
& Holt’s sailings took 31.1 days (35) during the whole year, and 30.3 days 
under the new contract which began in April 1875. The duration of sailings 
varied between 26 and 37 days. Pacific Steam Navigation Company’s sailings 
took 30.7 days (31.8) on average. The length of the sailings varied between 
29 and 33 days. The express mail line of Messageries Maritimes made the 
home voyage in 25.1 days (25.6) on average, varying between 24 and 27 
days, while the commercial line which visited several more ports used 30.3 
days for the home voyage, varying between 26 and 35 days.779
As in the concurrent North Atlantic service, the speed and frequency of 
sailings was not utilized in the most efficient way. When the companies 
competed by sailing on the same day or very close to each others’ sailing 
775 For example the Messagerie Maritimes arrivals in early January, February, July, August, 
October and December 1875. See Salles, Tome III, 94.
776 For example the Lamport & Holt sailings in January–April (the schedule was changed 
from May 1875) and Pacific Steam Navigation Company sailings in late February and 
March, early May and mid-October. See the sailing lists of Howat, 139–140, 173–174, 
216–217.
777 See the sailing lists of Howat, 139–140, 173–174, 216–217; and Salles, Tome III, 94.
778 See the sailing lists of Howat, 139–140, 173–174, 216–217; and Salles, Tome III, 94.
779 Sailing lists of Howat, 139–140, 173–174, 216–217; and Salles, Tome III, 94. The averages 
of 1870 are based on the sailing lists of Howat, 137, 171, 183, 211; and Salles, Tome III, 
89, 91. When calculating the duration of the trips by Messageries Maritimes and Lamport 
& Holt, it has been estimated that the departures from Montevideo took place one day 
later than the given dates from Buenos Aires.
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dates, the overlapping meant lost opportunities at least from the business 
information transmission point of view. When the transport of mails ceased 
to be the main purpose of the sailings and the needs of freight shipments and 
passenger traffic were preferred, information transmission was the loser.
From the mid-1870s, the British Post Office looked for economies in the 
overseas contract mail services. This led to a reduction in the sums paid to 
the companies per ounce of letters carried. The Post Office also wanted to 
economise by restricting the obligation to transport letters only to the outward 
mails from Britain. Overseas countries would then become responsible for 
making their own contracts with shipping companies for carrying the mails 
to Europe. Under these circumstances, Lamport & Holt’s mail contract was 
cancelled in 1876, while the contracts with the two other British companies 
on the South American route, the Royal Mail Line and the Pacific Steam 
Navigation Company, were accordingly curtailed.780
The British Postal Agency in Buenos Aires, established in 1824, was 
also suppressed in June 1873 by an Argentina government decree, together 
with the French Agency. For decades, the British and French communities 
had enjoyed the privilege of being able to take their letters for their home 
countries and intermediate ports to their Consulate Packet Office for direct 
transmission without incurring the handling of the letters by the local Buenos 
Aires postal authorities or paying their charges. The letters would now be sent 
by the Argentine Post Office and be pre-paid by Argentine postage stamps. 
The mailbags would be delivered to the mail agents on board the English and 
French steamers ‘on the day and hour fixed by the agents of those lines’.781
All the former privileges, subsidies and special arrangements were now 
removed from the information transmission services and no one coordinated 
the networks. This was undoubtedly cheaper for the governments and 
corresponded better with the principles of free competition, but it was 
definitely a step back from the business information transmission point of 
view. Even if the fastest messages could be sent by telegraph, the important 
bulk mails with documents, explanations to the telegrams and tone of voices in 
the letters were transported more slowly than earlier. Continuous improvement 
had been replaced by overlapping services, unhealthy competition which 
ruined tens of shipping lines, and the still rather unpredictable duration of 
information transmission.
The changes in the South American communications environment were also 
related to the introduction of the telegraph. But long and difficult distances, 
as well as the commercial and political interests of several countries involved 
in Europe, South America and the West Indies made the negotiations about 
laying the cables an extensive process. Several companies were established 
and capital collected, agreements were signed between governments and 
several thousand miles of gutta percha cables were manufactured for the 
purpose. Jorma Ahvenainen gives a detailed description of the early planning 
780 See Howat, 170.
781 Howat, 121–122. For the French Consulates and their services in Lisbon, Gorée, 
Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo and Buenos Aires, see Salles, Tome III, 
41–49.
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period in his excellent study of the European cable companies in South 
America.782
The first working cable was laid between Uruguay and Argentine in 
late 1866. The River Plate Telegraph Company had been set up by two 
British men: John Proudfoot, a Liverpool merchant, and Matthew Gray, a 
Glasgow engineer, who was the Managing Director of the India Rubber, 
Gutta Percha and Telegraph Company. Proudfoot was primarily interested 
in trade between Britain and South America, while Gray’s interest lay in the 
work these concessions would create for his company. The subscribers of 
the shares were mainly from Scotland and North West England, especially 
from Liverpool and Manchester.783
   From the very beginning, the company proved to be a sound enterprise. 
When the line was connected with the land line between Argentine and Chile, 
established by the Transandine Telegraph Company in 1872, the River Plate 
Telegraph Company took the initiative by presenting itself as a quick carrier 
of messages between the western coast of South America and Europe. That 
was not exactly correct, but it is true that the telegraph shortened the duration 
of information transmission by several days at both ends of the journey. 
An urgent message could be sent from England or France to Lisbon by 
telegraph, and taken from there by a steamer to Montevideo, to be forwarded 
to Valparaiso or Santiago de Chile again by telegraph.784 This was a similar 
system to the one used on the North Atlantic route in the earlier years, when 
the Atlantic cable did not yet work but there were telegraph lines from New 
York to Newfoundland and from Holyhead to Liverpool.785
The company advertised that 12 days could be saved in the duration 
of information transmission between Europe and Valparaiso by using its 
connections instead of the normal steamship service. In fact the effect of the 
combined services by mail steamers and telegraph was even greater. While 
the Pacific Steam Navigation Company sailed from Liverpool to Valparaiso 
in 42 days and in the other direction four days longer, the trip by their mail 
steamer between Lisbon and Montevideo took only 23 to 25 days. Thus the 
combined services shortened the duration of urgent information transmission 
by 19 to 21 days – even without the help of the Atlantic submarine telegraph 
cable, which was established between Portugal and Brazil by the Brazilian 
Submarine Telegraph Company in 1874.786
782 Jorma Ahvenainen, The European Cable Companies in South America before the First 
World War (Jyväskylä, 2004), 11–30. Also for further development of the international 
cable business in South America the book is highly recommended, passim.
783 Ahvenainen (2004) , 31–33.
784 Ahvenainen (2004), 35. – The inter-European lines were naturally used already in the 
1860s.
785 See Chapter V.4.
786 See Ahvenainen (2004), 35, 92–96. The Pacific Steam Navigation Company’s figures are 
factual average sailing times. The planned duration of sailings were 41 days to Valparaiso 
and 43 days back home. The planned duration of sailings between Lisbon and Montevideo 
were 23 and 24 days respectively. (Howat, 200) – The western coast of South America 
received telegraph connections between Valparaiso and Callao in 1875–1876, and the 
line between Panama and Callao was finally built by the Central and South American 
Telegraph Company in 1882. See Ahvenainen (2004), 111.
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The early South American telegrams were expensive, however, and could 
certainly be used for urgent information only. The rate between Montevideo 
and Buenos Aires for ten words was Frs. 15.75 at a time when the Anglo-
American company between Britain and the United States charged Frs. 50 
for ten words. The tariff between Montevideo and Valparaiso was Frs. 21 
for the first ten words and Frs. 13.10 for each further ten words. And the rate 
of a submarine telegram between Lisbon and Montevideo was Frs. 18,125 
– per word.787
Researchers who are fascinated by the technical development expressed
by the telegraph often overestimate its importance in overall information 
transmission. For example, Ahvenainen writes about the opening of the public 
cable between Europe and Buenos Aires in July 1875: ‘Before this date a 
message sent as surface mail from Europe had taken one month to reach 
Rio de Janeiro, and a few days longer to reach Buenos Aires. Now, with the 
opening of the telegraph line, it took less than a day. This was a very great 
change in the speed of global communication.’788
It was of course a huge change, if the news could be received on the same 
or following day after being sent, and the value of the telegraph in transmitting 
news can certainly not be overestimated. Also in particular businesses it was 
important to receive the news in brief, or to send a ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ order as 
quickly as possible.
Yet the difference in information transmission to South America before 
and after the direct submarine telegraph line was opened was not as much as 
one month, but only about two and a half weeks. The duration of information 
transmission between the British ports and Rio de Janeiro had reduced 
constantly from 60–70 days by the Falmouth packets in the 1820s to 22 
days by steamship from port to port in the 1870s.789 If the already existing 
telegraph line between Britain and Portugal was used for part of the trip, the 
duration of information transmission between London and Rio de Janeiro 
was no more than 18 days.
As time is always measured in days and hours, one cannot actually talk 
about the speed increase in relative terms. Even if the use of telegraph 
undoubtedly was 20 times faster than the steamship service, it could seldom 
be utilized to such a degree in business communications. It naturally depended 
on the size of the business, but most companies probably did not have daily 
use for such new and expensive information systems. The decision on the 
acceptability of information costs depended each time on the issue at hand. In 
many cases, it was good enough to send the information by ordinary mail as 
usual. As bulk mail and telegraph were often used to complement each other, 
it is difficult if not impossible to calculate precise consecutive information 
circles after the intercontinental telegraph had been introduced.
Table 63 shows the reasons for the most remarkable changes in information 
transmission between Britain and Brazil between the 1820s and the 1870s. 
787 Ahvenainen (2004), 33, 35, 122.
788 Ahvenainen (2004), 80. For a different view, see Kaukiainen (2001), 1–6, 21–23.
789 Royal Mail Line average between Southampton and Rio de Janeiro in 1875. Calculated 
from the sailing lists of Howat, 140.
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The first notable reduction in the length of sailings took place in the 1830s, 
when the Admiralty changed part of the old men-of-wars to purpose-built 
packets in the Falmouth service. This change from one sailing ship type to 
another reduced the length of the voyage by ten days on average.
TABLE 63. Duration of information transmission by sail, steam and telegraph 
between Rio de Janeiro and Falmouth / Southampton, 1820–1875.
The most striking change took place from the beginning of 1851, when the 
Royal Mail steamers replaced the Falmouth packets on the South American 
route. While the average packet sailing from Rio de Janeiro to Falmouth had 
taken 52 days, the steamers made the trip in less than 30 days. Calculated in 
days, this was an even more important overnight change than the opening 
of the submarine cable line in 1875.
The development in steamship technology did not reduce the length of the 
voyage remarkably between the early 1850s and 1870s. The duration of the 
trip was shortened by one week during that time, but it was caused by the 
streamlining of the route as much as by technological improvements. The 
reason for the humble progress in this respect is obviously that the Royal 
Mail Line started on the South American route 13 years later than the first 
pioneering steamers crossed the Atlantic. Most of the early problems in 
technology had already been solved, and the South American route could 
be served comparatively well from the very beginning.
The difference between the combined telegraph and mail steamship 
services, which had been in use for several years already, and the direct 
submarine telegraph line between Europe and Brazil was only 2.5 weeks. 








1820 Falmouth packet 62.2 Original packets
1850 Falmouth packet 51.9 Part of the packets changed to new purpose-
built vessels
1851 Royal Mail steamer 29.7 Change from sail to steam
1859 Royal Mail steamer 25.2 Streamlined route, new vessels 
1872 Royal Mail steamer 22.0 Competition leading to a streamlined schedule
1872 Telegraph from 
England to Lisbon, 
steamer to Rio
~18 Combination of services was possible 
since the international telegraph lines were 
established in Europe in the 1850s and 1860s.
1875 Telegraph ~1 Information transmission depart from physical 
transport
Sources: The average numbers of sailing days are calculated from the sailing lists 
of Howat, 12–13, 85–86, 129, 132–133, 137–139. 
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Naturally the fast telegraph service enabled numerous information circles 
per year – in theory perhaps a hundred or more. Nevertheless, there were the 
time differences, and all kinds of technical delays could occur when sending 
the messages through different stations. The rates were high, and there was of 
course no need to send messages all the time. Although the telegraph did not 
perhaps revolutionise the South American trade, it was undoubtedly the fastest 
tool for those cases where delivery of urgent information was essential.
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Breaking a Monopoly
Communications with the Asian trade ports by the East India Company – The 
development after the abolition of the EIC monopoly – Private merchantmen 
as mail carriers, the forgotten period in postal history – Merchant ships as 
news carriers – Steaming via the Cape of Good Hope vs. the Overland route 
– Fighting against the time of changes
Before the monopoly of the honourable East 
India Company (EIC) was abolished in 1813, 
nearly all information transmission between 
Britain and East India, or other Asian regions in 
which the British had trade interests, was carried 
by the East Indiamen. For China, this was the 
practice until 1833.790
It is not possible to describe here the whole story of the EIC. The archives 
of the India Record Office in the British Library in London keep 14 shelf 
kilometres of documents concerning the Company’s history during three 
and a half centuries. A brief overview may still be necessary to understand 
the historical context.
The EIC was established in 1600 to take a share of the East Indian spice 
and textile trade then dominated by Portugal. In the mid-18th century the 
Company was purely a commercial enterprise which imported and exported 
goods from its factories, having trading posts in Calcutta, Madras and 
Bombay. By 1815, after a long period of wars, the Company ran the most 
powerful army in India, including the Bombay Marine, and ruled their 
790 The EIC monopoly in the East India trade was modified by the British government in 
1793 and abolished in 1813, with the aim of improving trade between Britain and India 
during the wartime. The company’s commercial businesses ended with a further abolition 
of the China trade monopoly in 1833. The last trade vessels sailed back home in 1834. 
After that, up to the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, the EIC activities in India were focused on 
the governmental duties of the presidencies, and then ceased. See Cain & Hopkins, 97, 
282–288.
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three presidencies from Fort William (Calcutta), Fort St. George (Madras) 
and Bombay Castle (Bombay & Surat). The Company’s privileges in India 
included incomes from inland customs, tax on spirituous liquors, the salt 
and opium monopoly, administration of the Courts of Justice, police, etc. 
The EIC also had a trading post in Canton (Guangzhou), China, to trade tea 
for silver and later for Indian-grown opium. By the 1820s, when the British 
government had abolished the Company’s monopoly on the other routes, the 
opium-tea trade was the only lucrative part of the business.791
There were also East India Companies in the Netherlands, France, 
Denmark, Scotland, Spain, Austria and Sweden. None of them gained 
as much importance in the whole Indian Ocean region in the long run, 
however, and the last companies were dissolved by the end of the Napoleonic 
wars.792
Until the 19th century, there was no other means to send mails to India 
or other trading posts east of the Cape than by ships of the different East 
India companies, which held their national monopolies on the Asian routes. 
All companies most certainly carried mails, but not much is known about 
the numbers of letters or any postal details. As only the British East India 
Company survived after 1815, this study will focus on its mail services, as 
well as on the use of private merchantmen as mail carriers after the abolition 
of the monopoly, and on the start of a government subsidised steamship 
service (see Chapter VII.2).
791 Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (London, 2000), 24–26, 123, 
129–138; Robertson, B 26. – Two recently published volumes of conference papers relating 
to the EIC and the China trade are worth further examination: H.V. Bowen, Margarette 
Lincoln & Nigel Rigby (eds): The Worlds of the East India Company (Suffolk, 2004); 
and Harding, Richard, Jarvis, Adrian & Kennerley Alston (eds.): British Ships in China 
Seas: 1700 to the Present Day (Liverpool, 2004). – For the EIC’s privileges in India, 
mentioned above, see BPP, Colonies, East India 3 (1812). The Fifth Report from the 
Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company, 1812, 12. – The military 
aspects of EIC activities are not discussed here, but to understand the specific role of the 
Company it may be useful to mention that the EIC’s compensation for military expeditions 
at the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, Manila, Malacca and Molucca during the war was 
widely discussed in the Parliament. The Company wanted to get compensation for the 
shipowners for equipping the vessels with provision, wood, gun powder, and wages for 
the officers and seamen. Although the EIC played an important role in British expansion 
in Asia, the counterargument against compensation was that the company had also gained 
remarkable profits e.g. from the spice trade in Ceylon. See BPP, Colonies, East India 
2 (1810–1812). Third and Fourth Reports from the Select Committee of the Affairs of 
the East India Company. Appendix 47, 3–7. – The export of opium from India to China 
caused two Opium Wars between Britain and China, in 1839–1842 and 1856–1858. The 
importance of this trade can be verified from the export figures. Between 1848 and 1852, 
the earliest figures available, the export of opium from India was worth 61.5 million 
rupees on average, while the other exports were valued as follows: cotton 29.4 million, 
cotton manufactures 7.7 million, jute 1.3 million, jute manufactures 2.0 million, rice 7.6 
million, and tea 0.4 million rupees. For the Opium Wars, see James, 236–238; for the 
statistics, see B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics. Africa, Asia & Oceania 
1750–1988 (New York, 1995), 635.
792 The relationship between the British and Dutch East India Companies is well described 
by Femme S. Gaastra in ‘War, Competition and Collaboration: Relations between the 
English and Dutch East India Company in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, in 
Bowen, Lincoln & Rigby, 49–68.
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Between 1761 and 1834, no fewer than 570 vessels sailed from London 
to East India or China on behalf of the British EIC. Some of them made only 
one ‘double voyage’, as the round trip was called on the East India route, 
while the long-lived ones in the early 19th century were able to make ten 
or 11 double voyages, the record being 14. Some 30 of them, mainly small 
100–300-ton ships sailed as ‘packets’ for the company’s important mails. 
They were sent out only once or twice a year, and thus did not form any 
regular service. The total number of voyages during the last 73 years of the 
company’s commercial activities – the ‘packets’ excluded – was 2,451.793
The largest East Indiamen, built in the 1790s and early 19th century, were 
about 1,200 tons or even more. The vessels registered at 1,300 to 1,400 tons 
were mainly in service from 1817 until the disposal of the merchant fleet in 
1834. The number of crew of the largest ships was standardized to 130. All 
the vessels were heavily armed, resembling men-of-war and, if necessary, 
took offensive as well as defensive action. Traditions were of the highest 
order, and the Marine Service was essentially a corps d’elite.794
Most ships sailed from London for the eastern waters during the spring, 
and returned within one or two years. The Company stated in a Parliamentary 
hearing in 1810 that the favourable season was considered to be mid-
November to mid-March – no matter whether the voyage was from England 
or from India. As the homeward cargo was generally more valuable than the 
outward cargo, preference was given to sailing from India, rather than from 
England, in the favourable season.795 In practice this meant that the ships often 
stayed in India and especially in China for several months before starting 
their homeward voyages. As Jean Sutton points out in a recent study,796 the 
long stays in Canton were due not only to the monsoons, but also to the 
complicated and time-consuming trading system conducted by the Chinese 
authorities. There were consequent long delays in getting answers to mails 
sent from Europe.
The long passage normally started from England, with an East Indiaman 
being refitted and ‘coming afloat’ at her moorings in London. When the cargo 
793 The figures are calculated from the lists published by Robertson. The ‘packets’ made 
55 voyages to Asian ports, mainly to India, during 1761–1814. The lists originate from 
Hardy’s last edition of ‘Register of Ships Employed in the Service of the East India 
Company’. By extracting an analysis from many thousands of entries, Robertson has 
formed and published a very useful alphabetical list of all the East Indiamen that sailed 
during 1761–1834. See Robertson, B 31 – B 41.
794 See Robertson, B 29; Jean Sutton ‘Lords of the East: the ships of the East India Company’ in 
Harding, Jarvis & Kennerley, 25–31. A well known earlier study about the maritime service 
of the EIC, its ships, men and life on board, voyages and famous fights was published 
in the late 1940s by Sir Evan Cotton (ed. Sir Charles Fawcett): East Indiamen. The East 
India Company’s Maritime Service (London, 1949). The political connections between the 
Parliament and the EIC during the last fifty years of the Company’s commercial history are 
discussed by C.H. Philips in The East India Company 1784–1834 (Manchester, 1968).
795 BPP, Colonies, East India 2… Appendix 47, 140. – It has also been stated that there was 
real reluctance at Lloyds to insure vessels going to India between June and January. See 
Geoffrey Eibl-Kaye, ‘The Indian Mails 1814 to 1819. Negotiations between the Post 
Office and the East India Company’ in The London Philatelist, Volume 113, April 2004, 
113:86.
796 Sutton, 22–25.
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was stowed, she was taken down to Gravesend, where ‘goods in private 
trade’, supplies, water, livestock and finally most of the passengers were 
taken on board. In peace time she then proceeded to the Downs off Deal, to 
meet with the rest of the division of East Indiamen with which she was to 
sail. Passengers who had travelled by road to Deal embarked, and the convoy 
sailed on the first favourable wind. In times of war, the ships usually sailed to 
Portsmouth, assembled in convoy there and proceeded under the protection 
and orders of an escorting man-of-war.797
Before the Post Office Act of 1815, there was no packet mail service 
by the Post Office to the East. Letters were ‘handed in’ to the EIC ships 
– sometimes in Navy vessels – in bags sent from the Post Office or
Government Departments or the EIC Office mainly at Gravesend, or they
were brought on board by the passengers. Many senders, particularly the
merchant community, waited until the last opportunity and then dispatched
their letters to Deal or Portsmouth to be put on board there. The mails were
only subject to the normal ship letter charges levied by the Post Office, and
the inland postage. The EIC did not receive compensation for the service.
The free transit was a great benefit to the Post Office, as a normal packet
mail service on such a long route would have been very expensive. On the
other hand, the service was very slow (see Fig. 28). The East Indiamen
797 Robertson, B 29.
FIG. 28. The letter dated in Meerut, near Delhi in North India, on 22.4.1806 was 
handstamped (on the reverse) by the Bengal G. P. O. in Calcutta some five months 
later in September, to be carried to England by the Tigris, one of the East Indiamen. 
The Tigris was on her 2nd round trip (out of six) to India. After a rather normal five-
to-six months sailing around Africa, the letter was received in London on 14.4.1807 
– almost a year after being written.
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were not designed to be fast mail carriers and their main interest was in 
trade.798
The departing convoy of East Indiamen normally took the course to Madeira 
and then with the N.E. winds towards the coast of Brazil, endeavouring 
to cross the equator at between 20o and 25o W. After slow progress in the 
Variables the next objective was to gain a latitude between 30o and 40o S. 
and take advantage of the strong westerly winds. The ships then steered to 
run down their easting in the ‘roaring forties’, eventually approaching the 
Cape of Good Hope from S. or even S.E. Most convoys called at the Cape 
for water and provisions, usually essential after two or three months at sea. 
Letters for St. Helena were normally landed at the Cape, to be picked up and 
forwarded by homeward sailing vessels.799
The ships bound directly for China continued on the forties until nearing 
the west coast of Australia. Then they continued on that latitude turning 
northward up the east coast of Australia, via New Guinea and the east coast 
of the Philippine Islands, then N.W. to Canton. Alternatively, they sailed 
northward at about longitude 100 E. for the Timor Sea, via ‘Pitt’s passage’ and 
the Moluccas, then east of the Philippines to Canton. The convoys for India 
left the Cape on one of several routes depending on the season and prevailing 
monsoon, using the ‘inner passage’ by the Mozambique Channel, watering 
at Comoro Islands, and then the ‘eight degree’ or ‘nine degree’ passage to 
Bombay, or using the ‘middle passage’ to the east of Madagascar, watering 
at Mauritius. Ships for Madras and Calcutta sailed more N. or N.E., often 
calling at Ceylon before proceeding up the Coromandel Coast.800
Although navigation in the Indian Ocean offered its own problems, the 
critical part of any outward voyage from Europe was in the Atlantic. A ship 
which failed to make Cape Recife (in Brazil) could easily lose a further four 
or six weeks in making a second attempt, and would then need to water on 
the Brazilian coast before continuing. It was nearly impossible to sail directly 
from Europe to the Cape of Good Hope. Decisions regarding the three main 
turning points all had to be taken in the open ocean by the best means available: 
navigation by latitude, lead and lookout, lunar observations and later the 
chronometer. The effects of currents were especially difficult to calculate.801 It 
sometimes happened that an East Indiaman or several of them parted the fleet 
and were never heard of again. Stranding on an unknown shore could be as 
798 Robertson, B 30; Eibl-Kaye, April 2004, 113:78.
799 Robertson, B 29–30. Due to the prevailing winds and currents, sailing ships normally 
called at Madeira on the way outward and at St. Helena on the way home. Thus, letters 
from London to St. Helena were first carried twice across the Atlantic, via the coast of 
Brazil to South Africa and from there, after a varying delay at port, by another ship to 
St. Helena. This took at least four months, but if there were no homeward sailing ships 
available at the Cape, as often was the case, there could be a further delay of several 
weeks or even months. On the other hand, letters from St. Helena to London were carried 
directly in about two months. (Calculated from the maritime intelligence in Lloyd’s List 
1812–1813 and 1832–1833.)
800 Robertson, B 30.
801 For details of the development of navigation and knowledge of sea routes, see Andrew 
S. Cook, ‘Establishing the Sea Routes to India and China: Stages in the Development of
Hydrographical Knowledge’ in Bowen, Lincoln & Rigby, 119–136.
East India and Australasia
308
fateful as a hurricane or an attack by the enemy. Due to the many uncertainties 
at sea, it was common to write duplicates and triplicates of letters to ensure 
that at least one of them arrived safely at the destination port.802
Before focusing on the time period after the Napoleonic wars, it may be 
useful to shortly examine the EIC’s performance as a mail carrier in 1812, 
the last year before the abandonment of the monopoly in India. Table 64 
shows the departure dates and the destinations of the East Indiamen leaving 
from England in 1812.
TABLE 64. Departures and destinations of the East Indiamen, 1812.
As can be noticed from the table, even if there were 57 ships sailing to the 
East that year, there were in fact only ten occasions to send mail to Asia as the 
ships sailed in convoys. Additionally, there were only a few occasions to send 
mail to each destination. In five of the ten convoys there were ships sailing for 
802 In 1780, the East Indiaman Grosvenor, homeward bound and full of passengers including 
many prominent members of Bengal society, ran ashore on the African coast 500 miles from 
the Cape. Although 135 persons reached shore, none was ever heard of again, except for four 
of the crew who eventually reached Cape Town by foot. Between 1761 and 1834, eleven 
of the 541 East Indiamen (the ‘packets’ excluded) disappeared without trace on the voyage. 
Additionally, 48 were lost at sea, four were condemned for other reasons, 15 were burnt, 
another 15 were captured by the French, three more were captured but recaptured, and one 





























4.1. 7 5 - 1 - 6 1 - -
1.3. 6 - 5 1 - 5 - 1 -
10.3. 7 1 4 7 - - - - -
25.3. 7 - - - - 7 - - -
8.4. 8 1 7 8 - - - -
15.5. 8 1 - 5 2 - - - 2
4.6. 5 - - 5 - - 1 - -
14.7. 2 - - 2 - - - - -
21.9. 1 - - 1 - 1 - - -
24.12. 6 5 - - - 6 1 - -
total 57 13 16 30 2 25 3 1 2
Source: Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters 1813. ‘Ships in the East India Company’s 
service &c.’ – Several ships intended to trade in more than one port, making the 
total of destination ports more than 57. Additionally, there were two ships sailing 
for Australia.
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Bombay, 13 in total. The ships for Madras, 16 in total, sailed in three convoys 
in March–April. Almost every convoy included ships for Bengal (Calcutta), 
30 in total. The 25 ships for China (Canton) sailed in five convoys.
There were also three ships sailing for Bencoolen, Sumatra, one for 
Ceylon, one for Penang off the Malayan coast, and one for Batavia in Java 
during the year. If the mail-carrying ship was not sailing directly to China 
but via India, as usually was the case, the duration of the mails for China 
lengthened remarkably.
Four of the convoys to the East departed within six weeks in March–April 
1812, while there was a five-month period from mid-July to the end of 
December, when only one ship sailed to Asia.
The duration of sailings varied depending on the weather and navigation, 
as well as the size and load of the ships, etc.  An average ‘double voyage’, 
i.e. the round trip from London to the Asian ports and back home, took one
year and five months.803 This included at least two to three months spent at
ports in India, and even a longer time in China.
Only occasional trips were made to Southeast Asia. These journeys were 
for Batavia, Bencoolen, and Penang. At least two ships made a call at Malacca 
on their way to China.804
803 The figures referring to the voyages shown in Table 64 have been calculated from Lloyd’s 
Register for Underwriters 1813, ‘Ships in the East India Company’s service, &c.’; Lloyd’s 
List 1812 and 1813, passim. 
804 See Lloyd’s List 14.5.1813.
FIG. 29. The East Indiamen usually sailed in convoy to minimize safety risks. The 
heavily armed vessels looked like men-of-war and also acted like them, if needed. 
This impressive fleet of East Indiamen in the China Seas was painted by William 
John Huggins, ca 1820–1830. © National Maritime Museum London.
Content (photo) removed from the open access version of this book.
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There were no EIC ‘packets’ sailing to India between 1809 and 1814, and 
only one sailed during the last-mentioned year.805 Thus, the East Indiamen 
were the only means of sending mail to Indian or other Asian ports in 1812, 
in addition to the men-of-war. All the EIC ships sailing for China were large, 
over 1,200-ton vessels, while the size of the ships exclusively for India varied 
between 500–950 tons. Of the 32 smaller ships, 14 were chartered by the 
EIC for one, four, six or eight voyages. Most of them departed together on 
10 March or 8 April, 1812.806
As Lloyd’s agents in various Asian ports did not normally report the exact 
sailing dates, and only seldom the arrival dates, even if the arrival itself 
had been announced in Lloyd’s List, it is not possible to draw conclusions 
about the time spent at different ports, or the time between a mail arrival 
from London and the following ship departure. Thus, it is not possible to 
calculate information circles from the 1812 material. A couple of examples 
may clarify how business information transmission between Britain and the 
Asian trading posts worked at that time.
On 1 March, 1812, five large East Indiamen sailed from Portsmouth in 
convoy, protected by the Navy warship Pique Frigate. Of the East Indiamen 
the Cuffnells, the David Scott, the Royal George and the Winchelsea were 
on the way to China via Madras, at which port they arrived on 11 June, after 
a rather fast 102 days of sailing. The Surat Castle took a route for Penang 
and from there directly to China. According to maritime intelligence from 
Madras, the four ships ‘were to sail for China about 25th July’, but due to 
some unknown delays, they sailed on 16 September.
Further on, we only know about the movements of the David Scott and the 
Royal George. They were reported to have arrived together at Malacca on 25 
October and in China, meaning Canton, on 13 January 1813. The ships were 
reported to be ‘off Portsmouth’ on 9 August of the same year, and they arrived 
at Gravesend on 13 August. The two other vessels Cuffnells and Winchelsea 
had arrived two months earlier, on 7 June, together with the fifth ship Surat 
Castle, probably having sailed together from China.807
The next vessels to sail for India departed from Portsmouth on 10 March, 
1812. They sailed to Madeira in a huge convoy including about one hundred 
ships bound for the West Indies, South America, Africa, Madeira and East 
India, and were protected by the warship Loire Frigate. The ships Asia, 
Astell, Bengal, Earl St. Vincent and Prince Regent were bound for Madras 
and Bengal. The Chapman and Lady Carrington were on the way to Bombay 
and Bengal, while the Coldstream and Larkins were headed for St. Helena 
and Bengal. They were all chartered, medium size Indiamen between 550 
and 950 tons.808
The Asia, together with the Earl St. Vincent and Prince Regent, probably 
also the Astell, arrived in Madras on 13 July, after 125 days of sailing. The 
805 Robertson, B 27.
806 Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters 1813. 
807 Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters 1813; Lloyd’s List 23.10.1812, 9.2.1813, 14.5.1813, 
4.6.1813, 8.6.1813, 10.8.1813 and 16.8.1813.
808 Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters 1813.
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Bengal had arrived four days earlier. They all sailed together for Bengal and 
arrived at St. Helena on their home voyage, being reported to have sailed on 
26 November. They arrived at Gravesend on 16 May, 1813, with no reason 
for the delay given.809
The Coldstream and Larkins had arrived at St. Helena on 3 June and sailed 
from there for India on 7 July. They departed from Bengal on 27 December 
and arrived together at St. Helena on 16 March, 1813. Finally, the Larkins 
arrived at Gravesend together with a convoy including the Cuffnells, Surat 
Castle and Winchelsea, from China, on 7 June while the Coldstream was 
accompanied by the David Scott and Royal George, also arriving from China, 
on 13 August.810
Due to missing information and uncertainties in the newspaper intelligence 
as a whole, and especially at wartime, we cannot draw many conclusions from 
the details above. It seems clear that the sailings were conducted purely for 
trade purposes, including the administrative needs of the company in India, 
and that the mails arrived when they arrived. It is difficult to estimate whether 
the ships that sailed directly back to Britain from India without continuing to 
China could take with them answers to letters sent by earlier Indiamen. At 
least the ships Asia, Astell etc., which arrived at Gravesend on 16 May, 1813, 
must have carried answers to letters delivered by themselves on the outward 
journey as well as to letters delivered by the large Indiamen that had sailed 
earlier but continued to China. Even in this case the fastest answers were 
taken home by the same ships which took the letters in the other direction. 
An answer to a letter for India was thus received in somewhat over fourteen 
months, and the answer from China in somewhat over fifteen months.811
It was officially stated that it took 180 days on average to send a letter 
from Britain to India.812 This did not mean, however, that the duration of an 
average information circle would have been approximately one year. The 
departures from the destination ports were seasonally limited and even the 
announced departure dates could be postponed by months. The sailing routes 
and ports of call varied, and several problems could delay the ship’s voyage. 
When private traders entered the East Indian markets in growing numbers 
after emancipation, the slow and very unpredictable system of information 
transmission had to be reviewed. This took place between 1815 and 1819.
The development after the abolition of the EIC monopoly
The closing of the European ports by Napoleon and the long continuance of 
the war with France had led to a decline in British trade. For this and several 
other reasons, the Government made a decision to allow outside merchants 
admission to the Indian markets. After a hard struggle to postpone the evil day, 
the EIC finally lost the monopoly in India under the Charter Act of 1813.
809 Lloyd’s List 6.11.1812, 9.2.1813, 16.4.1813, and 18.5.1813.
810 Lloyd’s List 24.7.1812, 8.9.1812, 9.2.1813, 11.5.1813, 11.5.1813, 8.6.1813, 10.8.1813 and 
16.8.1813.
811 Calculated from Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters 1813, ‘Ships in the East India 
Company’s service, &c.’; Lloyd’s List 1812 and 1813, passim
812 Eibl-Kaye, April 2004, 113:85.
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Private traders, who had been allowed to ship goods only in the ‘privilege’ 
space of the EIC ships, were now able to use their own vessels, although they 
had to be at least 350 tons burthen. In addition, they had to obtain a licence 
for each voyage from the EIC upon payment of fee, and the ships could only 
use a few specific ports in India: Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, as well as 
the port of Penang. Private traders could not ship goods direct from India to 
the ports of continental Europe, and, to protect the West Indian sugar trade, 
an extra duty was charged on sugars imported from the East Indies over and 
above the duty levied on the West Indian sugars.813
Despite the restrictions, private trade proved to be more profitable and 
extensive than that of the EIC, and a consolidating Act of 1823 declared that 
this trade might be carried on by British vessels with all places within the 
limits of the EIC charter, except for China. Finally, the Charter Act of 1833 
took away the exclusive privilege of trade with China, too, with effect from 
22 April 1834, and by the end of that year the last of the East Indiamen had 
been sold to new owners.814
Although the war continued till 1815, the number of ships sailing for India 
more than doubled during the first years of free trade – from 57 in 1812 to 
135 in 1815. In 1825, the number of ships sailing for India and other Asian 
destinations was 220 and in 1832, the last whole year of the EIC monopoly 
in China, the number of outgoing ships was 280. Additionally, there were 
an increasing number of ships sailing for Australia, frequently returning via 
Asian ports. Their number was six in 1815, 50 in 1825, and 114 in 1832.815
The opening up of the Indian market had several consequences and 
side effects. One was that imports from the mother country increased 
progressively. For example, whereas 30 British ships entered the port 
of Calcutta during the 1814–1815 sailing season, this increased to 91 in 
1816–1817 and to 132 in 1817–1818. After the war, American traders also 
frequently visited Calcutta, but not usually the other Indian ports, which 
were further away. The lively traffic soon caused a glut in the market and the 
over-heated situation calmed down within a few years. Fluctuations would 
be typical in the future, too.816
813 K. Charlton, ‘Liverpool and the East India Trade’ in Northern History. A Review of the 
History of the North of England. Volume VII. Reprint. (University of Leeds, England, 
1972), 54–55; Cotton, 125.
814 Cotton, 125. Many of the old East Indiamen continued in Chinese waters, however. 
According to the statistics from the port of Hong Kong, 11 former East Indiamen, about 
1,200 tons on average, arrived at that port between August 1841 and December 1842, 
three of them even twice. Most of the vessels were carrying government stores from 
Britain, or from other colonies. See ‘Ships arriving Hong Kong Aug. 41 – Dec. 42. From 
the ‘Chinese Repository’ for Jan. 1843’ Appendix 41-B in Lee C. Scamp, Far East Mail 
Ship Itineraries. British, Indian, French, American, and Japanese Mail Ship Schedules 
1840–1880. Volume I. (Texas, 1997), 398–406.
815 Calculated from the statistics of Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters 1813, 1816, 1826, and 
1833. – The word ‘Australia’ is used here and further in this study for the geographic 
areas known then as New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land (equivalent to the current 
Australian states of New South Wales and Tasmania).
816 The Liverpool merchants who had led the campaign against the EIC were among the first 
to send their vessels to India. The first ship, mentioned also in the British Parliamentary 
Papers in 1831–1832, was John Gladstone’s Kingsmill, which sailed for Calcutta in May 
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From the business information transmission point of view, one of the 
main consequences of the changes in market conditions was that the need 
for communications with Asia quickly increased manifold, while at the same 
time the only mail carrier, the EIC, withdraw its interests from merchandise in 
India and concentrated on the China trade. Basically this meant that, although 
the Company continued to sail to India for its own purposes, sailings were 
less frequent than earlier and the Company had no interest in carrying mails 
under the rule of the Post Office.817
Now the Post Office was facing a new situation. The mail service to Asia 
needed to be organized without high expense, but as fast and reliably as 
possible. The Post Office never planned to have its own vessels for the Indian 
route, as it had in the North Atlantic, the West Indies and South America. 
The Indian Packet Letter Act of 1815 enabled the use of private merchant 
vessels as packets during periods when there were no EIC ships sailing for 
the East. These ships had to be carefully chosen from the departing vessels, 
taking into account Lloyd’s recommendations. Thus, between October 1815 
and October 1816, 16 vessels carried official mail from Britain to India. Five 
of them were naval vessels, four were East Indiamen (with three of them 
sailing in a convoy together with one of the naval vessels) and seven were 
private merchantmen. Most of the mails (six out of seven) were carried by 
naval vessels from India to Britain.818
The system was not very successful. The naval vessels were warships and 
did not sail for business information transmission purposes. They did not call 
at all ports needed, but sailed directly from London or normally Portsmouth 
to Madras and Calcutta. There was also great difficulty in obtaining tenders 
from private ships for mail carrying, as they did not want any restrictions in 
their stay in India, the trade there being the main purpose of their voyages. 
For users, the postage fee for packet letters was considerably higher than for 
1814. It was followed by two other Liverpool vessels in 1815 and no less than 17 more 
ships in 1816. In 1832, they already numbered 34. (‘A List of Vessels that have cleared out 
from the Port of Liverpool for the East Indies, since the passing of an Act of Parliament 
21st July 1813…’ in Liverpool Street Directories, 1818. Appendix, 140–141.) For the 
statistics, see ‘Number of Ships and Amount of Tonnage Entered Inwards at the Port of 
Calcutta between 1793 and 1831’ in BPP, Colonies, East India 8 (1831–1832). Appendix 
to the Report from Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company with an 
Index [II Finance and Accounts] Part II, Commercial, 772, 786. – Not all vessels under 
the British flag in Indian ports had arrived from England, however. There were dozens 
of Indian ‘country ships’, carrying the British flag and with British officers and lascar 
crews, sailing between India and other Asian ports. In addition to exporting cotton, they 
were also the main carriers of opium to China on behalf of the EIC. See Anne Bulley, 
‘The country ships from India’ in Richard Harding, Adrian Jarvis and Alston Kennerley 
(eds.), British Ships in China Seas: 1700 to the Present Day (Liverpool, 2004), 35–41.
817 The value of the EIC’s merchandise exports from England to India decreased from 
£710,700 in 1814–1815 to £71,900 in 1824–1825 and £2,600 in 1826–1827. Moreover, 
whereas the value of military stores carried by the Company to St. Helena and India was 
£944,100 in 1826–1827, it had decreased to £92,000 by 1830–1831. See BPP, Colonies, 
East India 8…An Account of the Exports by the East India Company for each Year, from 
1814; distinguishing Military Stores from Merchandise. Appendix, No. 26, 767.
818 See Geoffrey Eibl-Kaye, ‘The Indian Mails 1814 to 1819. Administration of the Packet 
Service and its Demise ’ in The London Philatelist, Volume 113, May 2004, 113:114–
119.
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private ship letters. The Act of 1819 finally ended the confusion. All letters 
to and from India would be treated as ship letters, carried by any vessel, 
and the charge would be the same, 4d sea postage plus the inland letter rate 
for landing. Outgoing letters of less than 3 oz were charged sea postage 
of 2d.819
Private merchantmen as mail carriers – the forgotten period in postal 
history
The period from 1819 to the mid-1830s, when the overland route via Suez 
was gradually brought into use, has remained untouched in the history 
of communications. Those scholars who study the history of the EIC are 
generally not very interested in the late period, and postal historians have 
found it difficult to collect maritime intelligence on the hundreds or even 
thousands of private merchant vessels. Well known authorities in postal 
history have even claimed that ‘before 1837 the only means [for letter 
communication with India] lay round the Cape of Good Hope in ships 
belonging to the East India Company’.820
John K. Sidebottom briefly mentions private merchantmen as mail carriers 
in The Overland Mail: ‘…the mail sent via the Cape to India amounted to 
only 150 bags a year, but, of course, very many more letters went to India 
without passing through the Post Office. The Cape service – operated by 
private ships including ‘East Indiamen’ – was roughly a weekly one…’821 The 
present study is apparently the first attempt to find out how communications, 
especially from the business information transmission point of view, really 
functioned between British and Asian ports during that period.
The number of private vessels sailing for Indian ports grew steadily 
throughout the period between 1812, the last year of the EIC monopoly in 
India, and 1832, the last year of its monopoly in China. There were annual 
fluctuations, but the general trend was upwards. British ships dominated the 
Indian trade. After the Napoleonic wars, other nationalities also took a share 
of it, however. Vessels under American, French or Portuguese flags could 
be seen at the port of Calcutta although not often in the other Presidencies. 
In practice, most mails for Britain and other places in Europe were carried 
by British merchantmen, naval vessels here excluded.822
Table 65 shows how the number of departures from British ports for Asian 
destinations grew with the gradual abolition of the EIC privileges.
Although mail carrying was not a business for shipowners, the 
improved communications undoubtedly served trade, giving more frequent 
opportunities for information transmission. The more ships there were 
819 See Eibl-Kaye, ‘The Indian Mails…’ May 2004, 113:114–124; Robertson, D 21 – D 
25.
820 Moubray & Moubray, 180.
821 John K. Sidebottom, The Overland Mail. A Postal Historical Study of the Mail Route to 
India (Perth, Scotland, 1948), 48. He refers to General Post Office records.
822 The Americans were frequent visitors in Calcutta in the 1790s, but disappeared during 
the last war years. Detailed statistics of the major Indian ports in 1793–1830 can be found 
in BPP, Colonies, East India 8,… Appendix, No. 30, 772–839.
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sailing on the route, the more even was the distribution of departures within a 
calendar year. While the former East Indiamen had carefully chosen the best 
winds for their sailings, growing competition forced shipowners to send their 
vessels out at any time of the year. This naturally meant that there were more 
ships arriving from and departing for India and other Asian ports throughout 
the year, and letters could be answered more often.
To get a clear picture of how communications worked, how long it took 
to carry mails from Britain to different Asian ports or to get answers to 
them, how frequent the traffic was on different routes and what the major 
problems were, one specific year has been examined in more detail. This 
year is 1832, the last ‘normal’ year when the large East Indiamen were still 
in the China service. At that time, merchant vessels offered the only means 
of sending letters to Asian ports, while steamers had not yet taken on their 
future role as mail carriers.
The ships sailing from Britain to India or other Asian trading posts, 
including Australia, in 1832 have been followed throughout their voyages 
for two and a half years until the end of June 1834, by which time most 
of them had returned home. Some vessels were still on their way at that 
time, and several would never return. Many vessels were fast enough to 
start – and in some cases even complete – a second voyage within the time 
1812 1815 1825 1832
January 7 11 15 11
February – 10 18 19
March 20 2 11 22
April 8 26 13 16
May 8 26 27 28
June 5 8 26 36
July 2 5 22 35
August – 4 6 24
September 1 10 18 21
October – 4 15 27
November – 3 12 15







Source: Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters 1813, 1816, 1826, 1833; Lloyd’s List of 
the above-mentioned years, passim. The figures with a ‘+’ are departures, which were 
published without an exact sailing date. The ships to New South Wales and Van 
Diemen’s Land are not included in the figures. Their total number was 98 in 1832.
TABLE 65. The departures of vessels from British ports to India, China & other 
Asian destinations during some selected years between 1812 and 1832.
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period. Only the round trips which started in 1832 have been taken into 
account, however.
By 1832, the number of ship departures from Britain for the Asian and 
Australian ports – China still being the monopoly of the EIC – had increased 
to approximately 400 per year. Most of the ships were individually sailing 
private merchantmen and, as it was peace time, there was no need to sail in 
convoys. However, ship captains still preferred to sail in company with one 
or a few other vessels to avoid security risks.823
Due to insufficient data in some 20 cases, 378 of the approximately 400 
merchant vessels have been included in this study. Of these ships, 128 sailed 
for Madras and Bengal and 76 for Bombay. In addition, 37 vessels, 20 of them 
being large East Indiamen on their last voyages under the flag of the EIC, sailed 
for China mainly via Indian ports but also directly via the Sunda Straits.824
The Indian trade ports were not the only places of interest east of the 
Cape of Good Hope. Equalisation of the duty on sugar from Mauritius in 
the mid-1820s had rapidly increased the export of sugar from that island.825 
In 1832, no fewer than 47 ships were reported to have sailed from Britain 
for Mauritius as their main destination port. But even though the Liverpool 
merchants often referred to the growing Mauritius sugar trade as an example 
of the positive consequences of trade emancipation,826 only three of the 
47 vessels were in fact from Liverpool. Seven vessels came from Bristol, 
Glasgow and Edinburgh, and the rest from London.
The Southeast Asian ports were growing rapidly as well. New business 
opportunities had opened up after the war. Since the EIC expedition to Ceylon 
in the early 19th century, Colombo had become a frequently used port of call 
on the way to Bengal. The former Dutch Batavia became an often visited 
port on the way to and from China and Australia, and the newly established 
colony of Singapore, ‘founded’ by Sir Stamford Raffles as late as in 1819 
and belonging to the British crown from the early 1830s, was visited by no 
fewer than 62 British vessels in 1832. 17 vessels also sailed for Manila in 
the Philippines.827
There was fast development in the Australian colonies, New South Wales 
and Van Diemen’s Land, too, even though there was not much basis for any 
serious trade yet. After the United States gained independence in 1775, Britain 
had started to transport convicts to Australia. By the 1820s, the number of 
penal transports had increased significantly, and in the census of 1833, no 
fewer than 40,000 people out of the total Australian population of 60,000 
823 This can be noticed from the sailing dates published by Lloyd’s List in 1832, passim. The 
East Indiamen continued their old tradition and generally sailed together.
824 Calculated from the maritime intelligence published by Lloyd’s List 1832–1834.
825 See Charlton, 63. – Sugar production at Mauritius grew from 10,481 tons in 1825 to 
20,485 tons in 1826, and to 32,750 tons in 1830. See Noel Deerr: The History of Sugar. 
Volume I. (London, 1949), 203.
826 See Charlton, 63.
827 The figures have been calculated from the maritime intelligence published by Lloyd’s 
List 1832–1834. – Batavia, Singapore and Manila were not usually ports of destination 
but ports of call on the way to somewhere else. Therefore the figures in table 66 give a 
different picture of their role in the Asian trade than the text above.
East India and Australasia
318
were convicts. The rest consisted of free emigrants, 10,000 of them being 
children under 12 years old. Some British administrative and military groups 
need to be added.828
The Australian colonies did not offer attractive business opportunities 
compared with the Asian countries. The purchasing power of the population 
was very limited and there was little to export.829 The growing need for 
manufactured articles from Britain and the export of wool, together with 
the continuing emigrant and convict transports, nevertheless increased the 
traffic considerably.830
There were thus several types of business going on in the Indian Ocean 
in the early 1830s. In addition to the traditional East Indiamen sailing for 
India and China, there were private merchantmen on their way to India or 
some of the Southeast Asian ports. There was the Mauritius sugar trade and 
the various ships for Australia, many of which were carrying emigrants or 
convicts and arriving back home via different Asian ports.831
To differentiate these businesses, it may be useful to examine the sailings 
by the homeports of vessels. Before the emancipation, the trade with India 
and other related Asian ports was dominated by London, as the city was the 
domicile of the EIC. After 1815, Liverpool took a notable share of the Asian 
trade. Glasgow participated with a smaller share, while the other British port 
towns only sent a few vessels to Asia each year, if any.
By 1832 London had lost approximately a third of the Asian shipping 
business to its rival ports. One quarter of the sailings now departed from 
Liverpool. The other British ports together accounted for less than 10% of 
the sailings.
Table 66 shows that Calcutta was considered the most important 
destination by the London merchants. The Bengal area was still the 
cornerstone of the EIC, and would be for 25 more years. But the Liverpool 
merchants and shipowners were now equal with London in the Bombay 
trade, and they had taken a remarkable share of the business in Madras and 
Calcutta. No fewer than 60 vessels from Liverpool sailed for India in 1832 
– more than one per week on average.832
828 See BPP, Crime and Punishment, Transportation 2, 1837. Report of the Select Committee 
on Transportation. Appendix, No. 10, 261.
829 By comparison, the populations of India and China were approx. 260 million and 395 
million respectively in 1830. See Mitchell, 55.
830 The value of Australian wool exports grew from £35,000 in 1830 to £849,000 in 1840, 
and to £2,305,000 in 1850. Although wheat exports had also started by 1850, they were 
worth little for decades. See Mitchell, 649.
831 Some vessels coming from Australia stayed in the Indian Ocean and China Sea for years 
as tramp ships without returning to England. Most of the 21 convict ships of 1832, having 
left their human freight at Sydney or Hobart Town, proceeded to the Asian trading posts. 
Strikingly often it was just these vessels that were wrecked in bad weather, the cargo 
being ‘thrown over the board’ or sold locally with the remains of the ship, far away from 
the sea assurance inspectors at home. Of the six vessels lost during a voyage to or from 
Australia, five were convict ships on their way back home, while one was an emigrant 
ship on the way to Australia, which was destroyed by fire off Brazil with heavy loss of 
life. (The tragic loss of the Hibernia was described in Lloyd’s List 3.5.1833.)
832 Liverpool shipping expanded in several directions during the 1830s. For example, the 
Brocklebanks merchant house increased their sailings not only to Calcutta (from four in 



















London 4 26 7 25 61 3 36 6 79 247
Liver-
pool 8 32 – 1 28 5 3 2 16 95
Glas-
gow – 10 – – 8 1 2 2 – 23
Other* – – – 1 1 1 6 1 3 13
Total 12 68 7 27 98 10 47 11 98 378
Source: Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters 1833; Lloyd’s List, 1832–1834, passim.
* ‘Other’ includes three vessels from Edinburgh, four from Bristol, three from 
Greenock and one from Hambro. Two ships sailed from Plymouth and Portsmouth, 
originating probably from London.
London clearly dominated in terms of trade volumes, and even more in 
terms of values. The total tonnage of the vessels sailing from London to 
Madras and Calcutta in 1832 was 32,150 tons and to Bombay 12,740 tons. 
The corresponding figures of Liverpool were 9,350 tons and 12,740 tons 
respectively.833
The average vessels sailing from London to the different Australasian ports 
were nearly 400 tons on average, even if the large East Indiamen of over 1,200 
tons are excluded. The average Liverpool vessels were approximately 330 
tons, while the ships of other ports were even somewhat smaller. Typically, 
the ships for India were larger – over 400 tons on average – than those sent to 
Batavia or Manila, which were only 240–280 tons on average. The smallest 
ships of fewer than 200 tons were mainly for sailing to the Australian colonies 
or Mauritius, which probably showed that the trade carried on with these 
places was not at the same level of sophistication as that carried on with 
some more important areas.834
The difference in the value of imports was striking. On the India route, 
London dominated the trade in the very high valued silk and indigo – which 
had traditionally been part of the EIC monopoly, even after the gradual 
abolition in the 1820s – as well as most of the coffee, also importing two thirds 
of the saltpetre, three quarters of the sugar and 70% of the pepper. Liverpool 
thus had a minor share of these imports, and about half of the quantity of the 
1830 to nine in 1840) and to Bombay (from none in 1830 to four in 1840), but also to 
‘Lima etc.’ (from two in 1830 to seven in 1840) and to St. John’s (from two in 1830 to five 
in 1840). The sailings for India must therefore be seen as a part of the general growth in 
trade and not as a separate phenomenon. For the Brocklebanks sailings, see John Frederic 
Gibson, Brocklebanks 1770–1950, Volume I (Liverpool, 1953), 88.
833 Calculated from Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters, 1833.
834 Calculated from Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters, 1833.
TABLE 66. Asian and Australian trade in 1832, number of departing British ships 
by home port and destination.
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low valued rice and cotton. London’s share of the official value of imports 
from India in 1830 was £2,681,730 and Liverpool’s £333,710. Additionally, 
all bullion was shipped to London, worth some £815,000. In total, the value 
of imports to London was more than ten times that to Liverpool.835
Although the value of the Liverpool shipping for India was clearly inferior 
to that of its wealthy London rivals, communications with India benefited 
considerably from the fact that there were 147 ships sailing for India during 
the year instead of just 87. In addition, the ships from London often stayed 
for a long while at port in Portsmouth or Plymouth before sailing out, thus 
extending the length of the voyage. At least 36 vessels called at these ports 
on their way to India and stayed there for more than ten days on average 
before starting the voyage. Even if there was an ‘express’ mail from London 
to Portsmouth and Plymouth, the letters which were sent while the ship was 
at Gravesend or Deal were already two weeks old when she left the coast of 
England. Liverpool ships sailed out directly.836
The hard competition had considerably shortened the duration of sailings 
compared to the days of the EIC monopoly. The fastest journeys between 
Britain and India were made in fewer than 100 days, the records in 1832 
being 83 days from London to Madras, 98 days from London to Calcutta, 
and 93 days from Liverpool to Bombay. The fastest sailings homewards were 
about two weeks longer in each case.
An average sailing from Liverpool to Bombay took 125 days and the 
home voyage 128 days in 1832–1834. An average sailing from London took 
134 days while the home voyage took 130 days.837 Even the slowest sailing, 
174 days from Liverpool to Bombay, was shorter than the average sailing 
of 180 days two decades earlier. The figures include stops for watering and 
provisions.
The same improvement in speed could be seen in the round voyages. 
While the fastest East Indiamen had returned from India in about 14 months 
before the abolition of the monopoly, the fastest round trip was now made 
in somewhat over eight months, the record Liverpool–Bombay–Liverpool 
round trip taking 246 days.838
Due to the frequent traffic that had arisen between Britain and India, the 
information circle was easily shorter than the duration of a round trip by one 
specific vessel. In the best case, it could work in the following way:
835 The values of imports are based on the statistics published in BPP, Colonies, East India 
8... Part II Commercial, 1831–32. Appendix No. 4. Imports – Calcutta, Madras and 
Bombay, 1830, 575.
836 Calculated from the maritime intelligence published by Lloyd’s List 1832.
837 The averages are calculated from 13, 12, 10 and 18 voyages respectively.
838 Calculated from the maritime intelligence published by Lloyd’s List 1832–1834.
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Thus the combination of faster sailings and more frequent departures at 
both ends of the journey enabled a major improvement in business information 
transmission. Although the record trip by the ship Boyne has been taken as 
an example on purpose, the homeward sailings were about average in length. 
A merchant who wrote letters to his business partners in Bombay in early 
April, now received answers in mid-November or early December – probably 
half a year earlier than before.
Due to missing dates, especially concerning the Bombay arrivals, it 
is not possible to calculate the average length of information circles. An 
average round trip – from home port to home port – was 309 days, i.e. some 
ten months, and remembering that all ships had to use about a month for 
unloading and reloading in Bombay, the average information circle must 
have been fewer than 300 days. Answers to letters left Bombay sooner than 
the ship in which they had been carried.
There was still plenty of variation in the duration of information 
transmission. Even if the system now enabled two information circles 
in 20 months or less, their length varied significantly, as can be seen in 
Table 68.
TABLE 68. Consecutive information circles enabled by private merchantmen between 


















9.4.32 Boyne 16.7.32 18.7.32 Hero 16.11.32 221 days
or 1.8.32 Lady 
Feversham 10.12.32 245 days






















19.10.32 Columbia March 
33
1.4.33 Ospray 23.8.33* 308 days
Source: Lloyd’s List, 1832.
* Arrival in Glasgow.
TABLE 67. An example of fast information transmission by private merchantmen 
between London and Bombay, 1832.
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Not only had sailings become faster but port stays had also shortened 
radically. The average stay in Bombay – in the cases where both the arrival 
and departure dates were reported – was 30 days, if two extra long 76-day 
stays for unknown reasons are excluded. The ships also sailed quickly from 
Britain, some vessels being on the way back to Asian waters before the end 
of 1832. Not only information but also freight and capital moved faster than 
ever earlier.839
An average voyage from Britain to Madras took 118 days and back home 
in 126 days, while an average voyage to Calcutta took 137 days and back 
home in 141 days.840 The differences were due to the varying lengths of 
sailing routes, and obviously the ships were also more heavily loaded on the 
way homewards.
While the ships often called at Madeira or the Cape on the way to the 
east, it was common practice to call at St. Helena on the home voyage. It 
was from there that most shipowners and merchants learnt that the vessel 
they were waiting for would soon be arriving. Even if the ships did not stay 
long at St. Helena – normally only a day or two – some of them sailed home 
faster and could tell news of the ships coming behind them. The last leg of 
the voyage from St. Helena to England took approximately two months on 
average – 59 days calculated from 124 voyages – but the variance was great, 
from 39 to 90 days.841
While information transmission with India had improved remarkably, the 
opportunities for communications with China still remained much the same 
as before. While the private merchantmen sailed to India in some four months 
on average, the record being less than three months, the trip to China via 
India took 7.5 months (224 days) on average.842 As can be seen from table 
69, there was no difference in the duration of information circles depending 
on the route in India.
In real life, information transmission from London to Canton probably 
did not take the eight months indicated above. For example, the William 
Fairlie arrived in Madras on 1 June and there were certainly country ships 
departing for China before the large vessel from Europe was ready to proceed. 
839 For example, the Caledonia departed from Liverpool for Bombay on 3.1.1832 and again 
on 20.11.1832; the Fortune from Glasgow on 7.1.1832 and on 13.11.1832; and the Sir 
Francis Burton from Liverpool on 8.1.1832 and on 24.10.1832. There are plenty of similar 
examples of consecutive departures in 1833. (Lloyd’s List 1832–1833).
840 Calculated from the maritime intelligence published by Lloyd’s List 1832–1834. If the 
ship was sailing for Calcutta but called first at Madras, only the duration of the voyage 
as far as to Madras has been recorded. Due to the long distance, ships sailing for Calcutta 
often called at Madeira, the Cape or Mauritius for watering or provisions, which added 
a few days to the total length of the voyage. The stops are included in the figures. – The 
averages have been calculated from 36, 14, 43 and 38 voyages respectively. The reason 
for the low number of home voyages from Madras is that most ships sailed to Calcutta 
via Madras but home directly, or even if they called at Madras, it was left unreported.
841 Calculated from the maritime intelligence published by Lloyd’s List 1832–1834. At least 
160 ships of those which sailed from England in 1832 made a call at St. Helena on their 
home voyage. In 124 cases at least the departure date from that port was reported in 
Lloyd’s List, and additionally 32 arrivals of which the departure date was not reported.
842 Calculated from the maritime intelligence published by Lloyd’s List 1832–1834. – The 
averages have been calculated from 11 voyages.























12.10.32 25.10.32 Canning 6.3.33 386 days
14.2.32 Marquis of 
Camden,
via Bombay
20.10.32 25.10.32 Canning 6.3.33 386 days
Source: Lloyd’s List, 1832–1833.
TABLE 69. An example of information transmission by the East Indiamen between 
London and Canton, 1832–1833.
The problem, however, was that there were no ships leaving from Canton to 
Europe with answers before the sailing of the Canning on 25 October.
Starting from the late spring of 1832, the sailings of the large East Indiamen 
were rapid and direct, with no interruptions apart from the stop at St. Helena 
on the home voyage. The Company was in a hurry, and the duration of the 
round voyages of the last vessels sailing directly via the Sunda Straits to 
China was only a year on average, the record being 10.5 months only. The 
last four sailings from London to Canton took no more than 107 to 117 days. 
While the average home voyage directly from Canton to London took 125 
days, the fastest sailing homewards took only 116 days.843
The main problems in business information transmission between Britain 
and China were the seasonal character of the sailings (most departures took 
place during the first half of the year), the complicated routes (most ships 
sailed via India, where they stayed at ports for weeks or even months) and 
the long passages.
The size of the vessel had surprisingly little to do with the duration of 
the voyage. The emancipation of the Asian trade had drastically increased 
the number of small ships on the Asian routes. Table 70 shows the change 
in ship sizes on the Asian trade routes from 1812 to 1832. As can be seen, 
almost all vessels on these routes were more than 500 tons in 1812, but 20 
years later more than 70% were less than that. Simultaneously with this 
development, however, the average speed of information transmission 
increased remarkably, as has been shown above.
843 Calculated from seven voyages. The departure dates from China were not always 
reported.
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Contrary to some earlier assumptions, the large East Indiamen of 1300 
to 1400 tons were not slow, but sailed rapidly if there was a need for that. 
However, a small 294-ton merchant vessel from Liverpool could manage the 
route within approximately the same time, as can be seen from Table 71.
TABLE 71. The fastest sailings from Britain via Anjer (Sumatra) to China, 1832.
Yet small ship size was not generally a special advantage either, even if 
mail packets were normally small compared to the large merchantmen. In 
fact, the main benefits of small vessels in mail service were probably mainly 
financial. They sailed with a smaller crew and were fast to load and unload.
On the route to Australia, all ships weighed less than 550 tons, and more 
than 40% of them were less than 300 tons. Of the smallest vessels, only two 
were among the 12 fastest, while six of the 26 largest ships of 401 to 500 
tons were among the fastest. An average outbound voyage took 138 days 
and an average homeward voyage 156 days, probably due to different routes 
and stays at port.844
844 Calculated from Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters 1833 and Lloyd’s List 1832–1834. 
– The reporting from Sydney and Hobart Town was not very accurate. No fewer than 27
arrivals were reported in Lloyd’s List without any date or giving just a ‘previous to’ date









London 1.5.32 Lord Lowther, 1332 
tons
16.8.32 107
London 25.5.32 Earl of Balcarras, 1417 
tons
13.9.32 111
London 25.4.32 Edinburgh, 1335 tons 17.8.32 114
London 25.4.32 Berwickshire, 1332 tons 20.8.32 117
Liverpool 10.6.32 Walter, 294 tons 6.10.32 118
Calculated from Lloyd’s List, 1832–1833.
TABLE 70. Ship sizes on the Asian trade routes in 1812 and 1832, excl. Australia.
Ship size, tons %  of vessels, 1812
 (n=56)
% of vessels, 1832 
(n=280)
100–499 1.8  71.0 
500–999 55.3 22.0 
1000–1499 42.9 7.0 
Source: Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters, 1813 and 1833.
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Size, tons Number of ships Number of this size of ships





Calculated from Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters 1833 and Lloyd’s List 1832–1834. 
The total number of vessels was 98, but the size of six remained unknown.
TABLE 72. The size and speed of vessels on the Australian route, from Britain to 
New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land 1832.
A few further records show even more variety. On the Calcutta route, 
the fastest sailing from London took only 98 days by the 1,333-ton East 
Indiaman Macqueen. The 650-ton Duke of Northumberland sailed from 
Portsmouth to Calcutta in 105 days and back to London in 116 days. The 
360-ton Samuel Brown of Liverpool sailed for Calcutta twice in 1832. Her 
first sailing outwards took 113 days and the second 115 days. The 282-ton 
Collingwood sailed from Liverpool to Calcutta in 111 days.845 The duration 
of the voyage seemed to depend less on the size of the vessel and more on 
factors such as the load, the skills of the captain and his men, and especially 
the weather.846
Merchant ships as news carriers
By 1832, Lloyd’s List was publishing maritime intelligence from distant 
Asian ports more often and more accurately than earlier, partly because of 
growing interest but also as a consequence of improved communications. 
The intelligence was now received in London faster and more frequently 
than earlier, enabling a better news service for readers.
To illustrate how the news from different Asian ports reached British 
interest groups, a few cases have been picked out from the maritime 
intelligence published by Lloyd’s List during the period in question.
The 666-ton James Sibbald, commanded by Captain Darby, had sailed 
from London for Calcutta on 14 June 1832, arriving at Bengal on 2 November. 
The news of the ship’s arrival was brought to England by the Duke of 
Lancaster, which sailed from Sand Heads (off Calcutta) on 1 December. She 
arrived in Liverpool on 25 March and those who waited for news about the 
James Sibbald found the needed information in Lloyd’s List on 29 March, 
which were reported to have arrived were also reported to have sailed from Hobart Town 
and Launceston, while only 36 of the 70 vessels which were reported to have arrived were 
also reported to have sailed from Sydney.
845 Calculated from Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters 1833 and Lloyd’s List 1832–1834
846 Also the qualities of the ship were naturally important: the rigging and the number and 
size of sails, the form of the hull, metal cover, technical equipment on board, etc. See e.g. 
Ojala (1999), 226–241, 435–436.
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together with news about several other ships which had arrived in Calcutta 
before 1 December. It took the Duke of Lancaster 114 days to sail to England 
and the news about the arrival of the James Sibbald was 147 days old when 
published.847
By the time the owners in Britain learnt the good news about the ship’s 
safe arrival in Calcutta, things had changed drastically in India. The following 
information about the James Sibbald arrived rather soon after, brought by 
an unknown vessel which had arrived at Bordeaux. The news, dated in 
Paris on 14 April, read shortly: ‘The James Sibbald, Darby, from Bengal to 
London, is lost on Point Gordewain, entrance of the Coringa Bay. Crew and 
Passengers saved.’848
What had happened? Was the ship really a total loss? Where were the crew 
and passengers? There was news arriving by different ships from India, but 
it took almost two more months to learn the whole story.
The next news about the ship came by the Lady Flora, which had sailed 
from Madras on 10 January. She landed the mails off Margate on 27 April and 
arrived at Gravesend three days later after 110 days of sailing. The short news 
report, dated on 9 January, read: ‘The James Sibbald, Darby, from Bengal to 
London, grounded on a Sand Bank off Coringa Point 29th ult. and there is but 
little hope of saving her either the ship or cargo. The Passengers had arrived 
at Masulipatam.’849 This information was 112 days old when published. After 
this, nothing more was told about the passengers. However, the fate of the 
ship and cargo was important, and the reporting continued.
The following news came by the Duke of Buccleugh, which had sailed 
from Calcutta on 14 January. Dated two days earlier at that port, the story 
read: ‘By last advices from the James Sibbald, which got on shore about 
15 miles below Coringa 28th ult. she was being lightened, in the hope of 
getting her off.’850 The Duke of Buccleugh sailed from Bengal via the Cape 
of Good Hope and St. Helena in 113 days and the news was 115 days old 
when published. However, it showed that the agent in Calcutta did not know 
well enough what happened at Coringa Bay. Although the news was the most 
up-to-date at the time, it would turn out to be too optimistic.
The following piece of news gave a different view: ‘Madras, 3d Jan. 
The James Sibbald, from Bengal to London, on shore on the Coast, is full 
of water. About 1000 chest of indigo, with some other portions of cargo 
have been saved.’851 The London, which carried the news, had sailed from 
Madras nine days later than the agent had dated his report. She was a large 
East Indiaman of 1,332 tons, probably heavy loaded. She was reported off 
the Wight on 5 May, but the news was published as late as on the 10th, 128 
days old. For the owners, this was good news, however. One thousand chests 
847 For maritime intelligence, see Lloyd’s List respectively. – The news about ship arrivals 
were usually sent in long lists and it often happened that the earliest arrivals on the list 
could be weeks older than the latest, depending on how long ago there had last been 
communications from that port to London.
848 Lloyd’s List 19.4.1833.
849 Lloyd’s List 30.4.1833.
850 Lloyd’s List 7.5.1833.
851 Lloyd’s List 10.5.1833.
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of indigo were worth some £45,000 while the value of the ship must have 
been considerably less.852
The fate of the vessel was clarified in Lloyd’s List 11 days later: ‘The hull 
of the James Sibbald, wrecked off Coringa, was to be sold 15th inst.’853 This 
news, dated on 21 January in Madras, arrived by the Coromandel, which was 
reported arriving off the Wight on 18 May. The ship had sailed from Madras 
on 24 January and arrived at Gravesend on 24 May.854 Despite the fact that 
Lloyd’s List was published only twice a week at the time, news was often 
published before the ship carrying it had de facto arrived at the homeport. In 
this case, the news seems to have been landed ‘off the Wight’.
And the final news about the wrecked vessel was reported in Lloyd’s List 
on 14 June, two months after the first news about her accident, and 5.5 months 
after it happened: ‘The cargo saved from the James Sibbald, wrecked off 
Coringa, has been reshipped per Charles Eaton, Fowle, arrived at Madras.’855 
This news had been sent by the Wellington, which sailed from Madras on 24 
February, and it was 110 days old when published.
The story is a good example of how news arrived, not only slowly but 
sometimes also in a confusing order. The mails bearing news of the disaster 
were carried by six different ships which sailed from India within 1.5 months. 
The first piece of news, arriving from Paris, was short but quite correct, and 
the rest was additional information. Lloyd’s List seems to have published 
everything they heard about the ship, even contradictory information. 
The paper never made a complete story about the disaster. There was no 
space or need to return to the matter. The readers could draw their own 
conclusions.
Another example tells about several British vessels which got into trouble 
in a severe storm at Bengal in May 1833. The interest groups – whether they 
were owners of the ships and their cargoes, underwriters, family members 
of the crew and the passengers, or anyone who had an interest in the ships’ 
fortunes – received the bad news by a Lloyd’s List report published on 1 
October:
‘Calcutta, 24th May. A severe Gale commenced here on the evening of 
the 20th instant, and continued with great violence for 24 hours. The Duke of 
York, Locke, from London & Madras, is high on shore about half a mile to the 
southward of Hedgellee Creek. The Lord Amherst, Hicks, bound to London, 
is stranded abreast of Kedgeree Light House, and reported to have broken 
her back. The Eamont, Nash, bound to Penang, Malacca and Singapore, is 
on shore and bilged a little below the same place, and within a cable’s length 
of the General Gascoyne, Fisher, bound to Mauritius, which is said to be 
also bilg’d. The Robert, Blyth, bound to Liverpool, is high and dry above 
Kedgeree; and it is feared that they may all be considered as wrecks. – The 
Sultan, Mitchell, bound to Mauritius, it is hoped has got to sea, altho’ there 
852 The value of indigo is calculated from BPP, Colonies, East India 8... Part II Commercial, 
1831–32. Appendix No. 4. Imports – Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, 1830, 575.
853 Lloyd’s List 21.5.1832.
854 For maritime intelligence, see Lloyd’s List respectively.
855 Lloyd’s List 14.6.1832.
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are apprehensions entertained of her either having foundered or gone on the 
Sand, in which case all hands must have perished.’
The report continues in the same Lloyd’s List issue: ‘Calcutta, 25th May. 
There is a probability of the Robert being got off; but the hopes of saving 
the other ships are very faint. No doubt a large portion of their cargoes may 
prove uninjured. Two people have been washed on shore from the Sultan, 
who report that they were blown from her at the instant after her masts went, 
but nothing is known of her afterwards. All concur that this Gale was more 
violent than any other in recollection.’856
The news must have been brought by the Lord William Bentick, which 
arrived from Bengal on 29 September.857 She was a convict ship, which had 
sailed from Hobart Town via Batavia and Madras to Calcutta and was now 
on the way back home, having been out for 17 months. She sailed from 
Calcutta on 3 June, and was the first ship to enter Britain with the news about 
the storm damage. For information transmission, any vessel which was on 
the way homewards was good enough. The news was 130 days old when 
published, but the freshest available. A duplicate of the report might have 
been carried by the Bengal, which departed from Calcutta on 24 May, 1833, 
but the ship arrived in London as late as on 4 November.858
It took several weeks before any additional information about the disaster 
in Calcutta was received by arriving ships. On 8 November Lloyd’s List 
reported:
‘The Duke of York, Locke, from London; the Lord Amherst, Hicks, bound 
to London, and the Eamont, Nach, which were driven on shore near Calcutta 
in June, have been condemned. The Robert, Blyth, bound to Liverpool, and 
the General Gascoyne, Fisher, bound to Mauritius, which were driven on 
shore at the same time, would be got off.’
This news was carried by the Hooghley on her home voyage from a 
relatively efficient round trip to India. She had departed from London on 4 
December, 1832 and arrived in Calcutta on 19 April 1833 from Madras. In 
June she departed homewards and on 6 November she was reported at Deal, 
where she also landed the mails.859
In November, more news arrived concerning the wrecked vessels: 
‘Mauritius, 26th July. The Samuel Brown brings accounts that the Genl 
856 Lloyd’s List 1.10.1833.
857 Her arrival was reported in Lloyd’s List on the same day.
858 Lloyd’s List respectively. – The wrecked Lord Amherst also carried mails for the East India 
Company. Five letters in the general correspondence of the EIC, dated between 27.12.1832 
and 3.5.1833, give evidence that the Lord Amherst’s mails were finally taken to London 
by the ship Juliana. She sailed from Bengal on 16.7.1833, having been delayed by loss 
of anchors and grounding in the Hooghley River, apparently without major damage. Her 
mails were landed at Portsmouth on 19.12.1833 and the letters were finally received by 
the EIC in London on 23.12.1833. The oldest letter was 361 days and the freshest 234 
days old when received in London. – General Correspondence of the EIC, E/4/142 (BL, 
IRO). For the Juliana’s incident, see Lloyd’s List 10.12.1833.
859 For maritime intelligence, see Lloyd’s List respectively. The ship also brought other sad 
news: ‘The Hooghley, Reeves, arr in the Downs from Bengal, passed on the 20th August, 
in lat 35 S long 21 E during a hurricane, a vessel dismasted, also the contents of a ship’s 
deck, mast, boats, batches, and topmast with rigging on.’ (Lloyd’s List  8.11.33)
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Gascoyene, bound here, which was on shore in the [river] Hooghley 2d 
June, was proceeding to Bengal to be docked and repaired.’860 ‘Liverpool, 
17th November. The Robert, Blythe, bound to Liverpool, ran on shore in 
the Hooghley, was got off previous to 23d June.’ ‘Kedgeree, 17th June. 
The General Gascoyene, Fisher, bound to the Mauritius, floated at high 
water.’861 And ‘Calcutta, 24th June. The General Gascoyene, Fisher, bound 
to Mauritius, which was on shore in the Hooghley, has put back here.’862
It remains somewhat uncertain by which ship the news from Mauritius was 
brought to England. The tiny Clorinda, only 183 tons, arrived from a long 
voyage to Hobart Town, Sydney, Singapore and Mauritius on 18 November. 
She had left Mauritius on 28 July, two days after the letter to Lloyd’s List 
had been written, and probably landed the news on her way to Glasgow a 
few days earlier.863
Both the pieces of news published on 18 November were brought by the 
Janet, also on the way to Glasgow, on her way home from Manila, Singapore 
and Calcutta. The reports were received at Liverpool, maybe from Holyhead 
by the optical telegraph, and forwarded to London.864 The carrier of the news 
published on 22 November cannot be identified due to a lack of maritime 
intelligence.
The final results of the incident could be read in Lloyd’s List on 10 
December, almost 2.5 months after the first distressing news about the incident 
had been published: ‘Bengal, 23d July. The Lord Amherst, Hicks, has not 
been got off, being broken, bilged, totally dismasted, and filling with the 
tide.’ And ‘The Eamont, hence to Singapore, has been sold, with the cargo, 
as she could not be got off.’
This news had been dispatched by the Patriot King, a regular trader 
from Liverpool, already on her second voyage to India within the examined 
period. She left Calcutta on 2 August and was reported arriving at Milford 
on 7 December. She arrived in Liverpool on 16 December.865
The examples clearly show the great diversity of the mail-carrying ships, 
but also how useful it was from the information transmission point of view 
that there were many vessels sailing home from Asian waters throughout 
the year. Even though the length and routes of the sailings varied, the ships 
carried complementary news. Any ship could be a news bringer, if not for 
a specific merchant, at least for the business community as a whole. As all 
these ships were considered mail carriers by the Post Office, we can assume 
that important business letters were also carried by the same means as the 
Lloyd’s agents’ reports for the newspaper.
To highlight the difference between information transmission on the 
frequently sailed India route and on the China route (still the monopoly of 
the EIC), one more example might be useful. On 9 April, 1833 Lloyd’s List 
published the following piece of news:
860 Lloyd’s List 15.11.1833. 
861 Lloyd’s List 19.11.1833.
862 Lloyd’s List 22.11.1833.
863 For maritime intelligence, see Lloyd’s List respectively.
864 Lloyd’s List 19.11.1833. The arrival of the ship was reported in the same issue.
865 For maritime intelligence, see Lloyd’s List respectively.
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‘Singapore 8th Nov: The Moffat, Cromartie, [a smaller East Indiamen of 
820 tons] from London to China and Halifax, put here 6th instant, with loss 
of main and mizzen masts, and having sustained damage during a Gale in the 
China seas, which commenced on the 22d and continued till 26th ult. (Mem. 
It was expected that the Moffat would be ready for sea about 28th Nov.)’
Four weeks later Lloyd’s List reported that the Moffat had arrived in 
China on 10 January. Two weeks later the paper published contradictory 
news: ‘The Moffat, Cromartie, from London, which put into Singapore 
and was stated in the List of 7th inst. to be arrived at China on the 10th 
January, had not arrived there on the 26th of that month.’866 This was 
alarming, as the sailing from Singapore to Canton normally took only 
eight to ten days.
All these news items were carried to England by East Indiamen on their 
way back home. After the Earl of Balcarras had left Canton on 26 January 
without any information about the damaged Moffat, no vessels sailed from 
China for a month. In fact, the Moffat had arrived in Canton only three days 
after the departure of the Earl of Balcarras but the news about the happy 
turn of events did not reach England before the arrival of the following East 
Indiaman, the Reliance, in mid-June.867
The last example shows that even if the sailings from China by the large 
East Indiamen were not necessarily longer than by the ships from India, the 
long periods between the sailings caused unnecessary delays in information 
transmission. This would gradually change when trade with China was opened 
up in the following year.
The total number of mails carried by private sailing ships via the Cape 
was remarkable. In 1833, the Post Office statistics recorded 3,725 bags of 
mail for India, carried by 427 ships from 17 British ports.868 Against these 
figures, it was not surprising that the pressure for faster communications with 
Asia would grow both in England and in the East
Steaming via the Cape of Good Hope vs. the Overland route
The first attempt to establish a steamship service between England and India 
took place in 1825, when the steamer Enterprise was taken from Southampton 
around the Cape of Good Hope to Bengal, sponsored by the wealthy merchant 
houses of London and Calcutta. The 479-ton ship was built especially for 
the venture. Her journey was made only six years after the first eastbound 
Atlantic crossing by the Savannah, with very similar results: although the 
trip was technically successful, the effort turned out to be a commercial 
failure. Instead of the planned 70 days, it took the vessel 113 days to reach 
Bengal. The ship ran out of coal and had to proceed under sail for more than 
half of the voyage.869
866 Lloyd’s List 7.5.1833; and 24.5.1833.
867 Lloyd’s List 14.6.1833.
868 See Sidebottom, 59–60. Obviously the figures also include mails for other Asian ports 
than India.
869 Daniel Thorner, Investment in Empire. British Railway and Steam Shipping Enterprise 
in India 1825–1849 (Philadelphia, 1950), 23; Moubray & Moubray, 180.
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The Enterprise was never taken back to Europe again. She remained in 
the Indian Ocean, mainly at Bengal, but was evidently also used by the EIC 
as a contemporary mail carrier between Bombay and Suez from 1826 to 
1833.870
By chance, the Enterprise was piloted up the River Hooghly by a Thomas 
Fletcher Waghorn, a former naval officer now working for the EIC. He 
was convinced that the future of communications with Europe lay in steam 
propulsion, but soon realised that a shorter and more profitable route should 
be found for the service.  Between 1826 and 1830, Waghorn was actively 
advocating, first in India and later in England, the idea of establishing a fast 
steamship service from England to Egypt to link up with a similar service 
from Suez to India.871
The overland route was not a new innovation; it had been in limited use 
since the early 17th century. There were in fact two alternative routes: one 
connecting the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf via Aleppo, Baghdad and 
Basra; and another one connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Sea via 
Alexandria and Suez.  By the late 1650s, the EIC had developed a custom to 
send overland letters from India to London every summer, usually in August, 
to advise of the safe arrival of ships, of the expected state of the market, of the 
plans for the next outbound fleet and of the amounts of Indian commodities 
to be purchased before the rains. The route may also have been used for 
sending duplicates of letters carried homeward by ships around the Cape of 
Good Hope. The Overland route was used in both directions.872
The EIC sent their own dispatches via the Persian route, from London via 
Marseilles (or Leghorn), Aleppo and Basra (or Gombroon) to Surat in India. 
The transit took at least six months, but eight months was more usual and 
over ten months was not at all uncommon. It was often difficult to find a safe 
means of communication through the different war arenas in Europe, while the 
Middle Eastern deserts rife with plague, invasions and raids were dangerous 
as well.  Although the Red Sea route had been considered a number of times 
in the 17th century, nothing had happened by the end of the 18th century due 
to the resistance of the EIC, which wanted to stick to its old traditions. The 
Red Sea route was probably faster, but it was not safer or more regular, and 
it was generally condemned as hot, mysterious and distinctly unhealthy.873
When Thomas Waghorn advocated direct steamship communications 
between England and India via Egypt, he unwittingly aroused strong feelings 
870 For the later years of the Enterprise, see Thorner, 23; Moubray & Moubray, 180; 
Sidebottom, 14; and Robertson, B 42. – The mail service was probably just an annual 
dispatch by the Bombay Government up the Red Sea to the EIC agent at Alexandria, to 
be forwarded to a Mediterranean steam vessel. The ship also carried dispatches for the 
Indian government during the first Burmese war. See Sidebottom, 8, 55.
871 Moubray & Moubray, 180; Sidebottom, 14. – For the background of Thomas Waghorn 
and his early attempts to find support for a steamship service around the Cape of Good 
Hope, see Sidebottom 15–19; for his career, see Cable, 53–64.
872 Holder Furber, ‘The Overland Route to India in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, 
first published in Journal of Indian History, 29 (Trivandrum, 1951). Republished in 
Rosane Rocher (ed.), Private Fortunes and Company Profits in the India Trade in the 
18th Century (Variorum, 1997), see 116–117.
873 See Furber, 117–133; Moubray & Moubray, 180; and Cable, 56–57.
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among the different parties. The EIC offered limited support but little financial 
backing, while the British Post Office rejected most of his proposals out of 
hand. The Anglo-Indian merchants had differing opinions. The Bombay 
Government and mercantile community had nothing against the idea, as the 
Overland route would have brought Bombay, on India’s west coast, 1,000 
miles closer to England than either of the east coast ports of Calcutta and 
Madras. The merchant houses in London and Calcutta, then the hub of India’s 
political, economic and military life, were for a direct steamship service to 
Bengal, via Suez or around the Cape.874
Fighting against the time of changes
The EIC was naturally not very interested in supporting anything that 
would mean better business communications for its rivals who had actively 
fought against the Company’s privileges in India and elsewhere. The 
Government of Bombay, in close intimacy with the Bombay mercantile 
interests, pressed the EIC in the 1820s to open up a steamship route from 
Suez to the Red Sea and eastward across the Arabian Sea to Bombay. 
The Company finally agreed to supply the engine for a wooden steamer 
built in the Government shipyard at Bombay. The ship, tactfully named 
Hugh Lindsay after the Chairman of the Court of Directors of the EIC, 
was launched late in 1829. She made her maiden voyage in the following 
March from Bombay to Suez in 33 days. The costs of this and later voyages 
by the vessel were so high that the EIC forbade any further steam trips 
to the Red Sea.875
In fact, the Company was not interested in improving even its own 
information transmission. A deeper look at the EIC’s General Correspondence 
from Bengal, Madras and Bombay to London, sent in 1832–1833, presents a 
striking picture of the Company’s general attitude towards communications 
between East India and the mother country.
C.H. Philips has examined the communications process of the EIC in
his general study of the Company in 1784–1834. According to him, Lord 
874 Thorner, 25–28; Moubray & Moubray, 180. – More than a dozen pamphlets were published 
in Britain for and against the different shipping and route plans. For a useful list, see 
Thorner’s bibliography, 184–186. – Even as late as 1838, one of the hopeful advocates of 
the longer sea route, Sir John Ross, Captain of the Royal Navy, published a plan to collect 
£500,000 capital for a new India Steamship Company for steam communications to India 
via the Cape. The service was planned to reach only as far as Point-de-Galle in Ceylon, 
probably to get support from both the Bombay and Calcutta merchants. The continuation 
of the trip by local means would have made the duration of information transmission 
equally long to both the main trade ports. Ross calculated that the trip between England 
and Ceylon would be made in 46 days. The plan included three steamers and two store 
ships for coaling. See Sir John Ross, On Communication to India in Large Steam-Ships, 
by the Cape of Good-Hope (London, 1838), 3–44. For the different interests, see Cable, 
68–69.
875 See Thorner, 25–26; Sidebottom, 61–62. – How long it took for the mails to arrive in 
England by this trip remains unclear. According to Thorner, it took 59 days in grand 
total, ‘an impressively brief period for that age’. According to the Moubrays, however, 
the estimated time taken for the whole trip would have been 61 days ‘had there been a 
steamship to take the mails from Alexandria’.  See Moubray & Moubray, 181.
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Ellenborough, President of the Company’s Board of Control from 1828, made 
several efforts to improve the speed of communications between India and 
London. Having been appointed President, Ellenborough was shocked to 
find that the home government was only dealing with events that had taken 
place in India over two years before. In his view, London had abandoned 
effective control over the Indian Governments, and he ‘determined to remedy 
the evil without delay’. As Philips puts it, ‘the first and obvious step was… 
to establish steam communication between India and England via the Red 
Sea… The ‘chairs’ adopted his suggestion and within ten years a monthly 
service by this new route was established.’876
Ellenborough also turned his attention to the system of preparing dispatches 
in reply to the letters of the Company’s Governments in India. Under the 
existing system the latter sent home all information in huge, general letters, 
which took a considerable time to prepare and included both trivial and 
important matters. No attempt was made in London to deal with the more 
important matters first. Instead, all subjects were replied to paragraph by 
paragraph in strict numerical order. The system was certainly slow and 
clumsy. Simultaneously, the number of folio volumes received from India 
grew every season, without any increase in the staff which would take care 
of preparing the drafts.877
Ellenborough estimated that one year would be time enough to send and 
receive an answer to a dispatch between London and India. He made four 
suggestions, namely that 1) both the Board and the India House should 
increase their staff, 2) the method of conveying information through huge 
general letters should be replaced by one in which each subject was to be 
dealt with in a separate letter, 3) an abstract of each letter should be written 
on the cover so that the home government could deal with the more important 
letters first; and 4) all consultations to be sent home should be lithographed, 
thus saving the time involved in copying them by hand at the India House. 
According to Philips, Ellenborough carried through his proposals despite 
strong opposition by the ‘chairs’, achieving a beneficial increase in efficiency 
and dispatch in the system of correspondence.878
A closer look at the Company’s General Correspondence of 1832–1833 
in the India Record Office, British Library, gives a rather conflicting picture 
of the overall efficiency by which the improvements were carried through. 
A portion of 1,422 letters from Bengal, Bombay and Madras show clearly 
that there were major differences in the communications culture of the three 
presidencies. Calcutta was the most phlegmatic in its communications. 
Letters written in Fort William frequently waited for months at port before 
a ship to England took them on board. E.g. the ship Isabella dispatched 31 
letters written in Calcutta between April and November 1832 when arriving 
in London in early April 1833. The Georgiana dispatched 29 letters written 
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early September, 1833.879 Even if these are extreme examples, it is hard to 
understand why the letters were not put on board earlier departing vessels.
As can be seen in Table 73 (in the end of the book, p. 429), most ships 
carried letters which had been written over a period of several months. On the 
other hand, it can be noted that letters written during one and the same month 
were carried by several ships; e.g. the letters written in Calcutta in December 
1832 were taken to London by 12 different vessels. In reality, the number of 
letters was larger than can be observed from the table. The correspondence 
in the EIC records includes first copies, duplicates or triplicates of letters, 
depending on which one arrived first. In most cases, there is a handwritten 
note ‘Read in Court’ with a date close to the date when the letter was received, 
indicating that this was the first copy that arrived.880
The EIC preferred to send the letters by ships which were chartered by 
the Company, or which had formerly been in its service. Of the 24 ships in 
Table 73, no fewer than 18 were or had been chartered by the Company. 
Letter copies sent by several vessels proved to be a useful system, as two of 
the ships were wrecked during the home voyage. As can be seen, the vessels 
often sailed close to each other, due to safety reasons and old tradition. As 
a result, there were long periods when no letters arrived from Bengal with 
EIC correspondence: two months in the spring, another two months in the 
summer and several one month periods in the autumn.
The table shows that the letters (both originals and copies) were collected 
in ships which were loading at port, without any knowledge of their actual 
departure dates. Many vessels carried letters to London which had been 
written even before the ship had arrived in Calcutta. The ‘ranking’ of 
how the first, second and third copies were divided between the ships for 
England seems to have depended on the expected departure date, as well as 
the reputation of the ship, its Captain and its owners in the eyes of the EIC 
officials in Calcutta.
The latter principle meant that e.g. the Liverpool ships were excluded. Of 
the nearly 700 received letters in the EIC General Correspondence, sent from 
Bengal in 1832 and 1833, only one was carried by a Liverpool vessel. This 
was the Hindoo, owned by the prosperous Brocklebank family of Liverpool. 
The letter, an original dated on 25 June, 1833, must have been important as 
it was sent by the next possible vessel. The Hindoo sailed on 8 July.881
Even in the best case, there was usually at least one week’s lag between 
the date of the freshest letter and the ship departure from Bengal, probably 
due to the time-consuming trip in the river Hooghley from the Docks of 
Calcutta to Sand Heads at the Bay of Bengal, near Kedgeree, from where 
most ship departures we are reported.
879 The EIC, General Correspondence from Bengal, E/4/138–142 (BL, IRO).
880 There are a few exceptions, when the examiner of the EIC has made a note that the first 
copy had arrived by another ship, usually earlier. The date when received was always 
marked on the letter, as well as the name of the ship by which it had arrived. There are 
no postal markings in the correspondence. Most of the thick letters have just been folded 
in half lengthwise and sent in bundles.
881 The EIC General Correspondence, E74/143 (BL, IRO); Lloyd’s Register for Underwriters 
1833; Lloyd’s List 8.11.1833.
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There is an astonishing difference in the total speed of information 
transmission if we compare the EIC mails with the news sent by Lloyd’s 
agents from Bengal to England during the same period,882 partly by the 
same ships on the very same journeys. For example the Hooghley, which 
carried to Lloyd’s List the news that the ships Duke of York, Lord Amherst, 
and Eamont, driven on shore near Calcutta, had been condemned in June, 
arrived in early November after a rather slow trip of 146 days. But the age of 
the letters which the ship carried simultaneously for the EIC varied between 
163 and 274 days. The fastest vessels which brought Lloyd’s news in the 
examples did not seem to carry EIC letters at all, even though some of them 
did on an earlier or a later voyage.
Despite Lord Ellenborough’s efforts to speed up the EIC communications 
between India and London, letters from Calcutta did not always follow his 
instructions. Instead of writing a separate letter on each issue – although 
this did often happen – the reports could just as well include two to four 
hundred carefully numbered paragraphs, all written by hand, extending up 
to 200 pages.883 A long memorial by Sir Charles Metcalfe to the Court of 
Directors in London, dated on 24 July, 1832, included answers to 38 earlier 
letters from 11 May to 10 August 1831, plus one from 4 November 1831. His 
topics covered Bombay, China, Company’s Servants, College, Miscellaneous, 
Marine, Navy, Post Office, Public Instructions, Pension, Profit & Loss, Prince 
of Wales Island, Singapore & Malacca, Telegraph, Vaccination and Law 
– in nearly alphabetical order. The letter was received in London by the ship 
Juliana on 23 December, 1833.884 Thus, the Court received answers to their 
questions sent two and a half years earlier.
The communications from London to Bengal were no faster than in the 
other direction. Although the draft books of the Company in the India Record 
Office do not include information about the ships by which the letters were 
sent and thus no indication of how long it took to receive them, the contents 
give some idea of the speed of the EIC communications as a whole.
With reference to the figures above, it is no wonder that the Company 
had no interest in investing in faster communications between London and 
Calcutta. Its own system of communications was so outdated that there was 
really no significant difference whether a letter was received one or two 
months earlier or later.
In Bombay, the culture was rather different. As can be noticed from 
Table 74 (in the end of the book, p. 430), most ships stayed in Bombay for 
a shorter period than in Calcutta, and letters were not kept waiting for so 
long. Even though the duration of the sailings from Bombay to London was 
approximately the same as from Calcutta, the letters from Bombay were 
never older than ten months on arrival. The usual time lag of the Bombay 
letters was six to eight months, while from Calcutta several letters were 
882 See Chapter VII.1.
883 For example, letters from Calcutta 31.12.1832 (339 paragraphs, 170 pages); 13.7.1833 
(263 paragraphs, 94 pages); 22.8.1833 (402 paragraphs, 200 pages)); and 21.11.1833 
(453 paragraphs, more than 200 pages). The EIC, General Correspondence from Bengal, 
E/4/141–144 (BL, IRO).
884 The EIC, General Correspondence from Bengal, E/4/140 (BL, IRO).
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more than 12 months old when received in London. In the best cases, 
communications from Bombay worked really well: for example the letters 
written on 23 January, 1833 arrived in London by the Lady Raffles on 24 
May, 1833, in 121 days.
Where did the difference derive from? Ever since the emancipation 
of the East Indian trade in 1813, Bombay had been more open to private 
merchandise, while Bengal had been more strictly under the old rule. No fewer 
than 22 of the 31 sailing vessels which brought EIC mails from Bombay, 
dated between January 1832 and June 1833, were private merchant vessels 
without any connection to the Company, and none of them sailed under a 
valid EIC charter.885
Of the 436 Bombay letters of that period, no fewer than 90 were carried 
by Liverpool vessels.886 These dispatches arrived in England by three vessels 
at the end of the period, in March–April 1833. The Cordelia brought no 
originals, but ten duplicates and six triplicates; the John Taylor carried five 
originals, two duplicates and 25 triplicates; and the Royal George eight 
originals and 35 duplicates. Most originals had evidently been sent by London 
vessels, and the Liverpool ships had been relied on as second and third 
carriers because nothing else was available. However, they arrived before 
885 The EIC, General Correspondence from Bombay, E/4/ 517–519 (BL, IRO); Lloyd’s 
Register for Underwriters 1833.





Answer to a letter 
from Bengal
Date of the 
letter(s) now 
answered
Time lag between 
writing the original 
letter and writing the 
answer









11.7.1832 Public Department 1.11.1831 253 days










1.8.1832 Law Department 8.2.1831 540 days
TABLE 75. Time lag between writing letters and drafting the answers between 
London and Bengal, the East India Company, 1832.
Source: The EIC, General Correspondence from London to Bengal, E/4/ 735 (BL: 
IRO).
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the vessels which carried the originals, and therefore these letters have been 
kept in the Company’s records.
Even though there was a steamship connection by the Hugh Lindsay, 
only one letter from Bombay was carried by that vessel and further via the 
Overland route during January 1832 – June 1833. This small letter, consisting 
of two thin sheets and a normal sheet for cover, was written on 4 January, 
1833, with instructions to be carried by steamer and further via Malta. The 
letter was from the Management of the Medical Retirement Fund in Bombay, 
claiming that they had not received any government aid for three and a half 
years, ‘which has nearly proved fatal to the institution’. The letter arrived in 
London on 9 April, 95 days after being written.887
887 The EIC, General Correspondence from Bombay, E/4/ 519 (BL, IRO).
FIG. 30. The letter dated on 19.3.1832 in Madras, was carried by one of the three 
Navy vessels which took mails home to England that year. The letter was handstamped 
by the Madras G. P. O. on 27.4.1832 and carried by the HMS Crocodile, arriving in 
London on 10.9.1832, in 175 days from the writing and 136 days from Post Office 
to Post Office.
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The location of Madras made its communications different from both 
Calcutta and Bombay. Many ships put in on their way to Bengal or on the 
way homewards. However, it seems that the ships which took mails from 
Calcutta did not carry the mails from Madras even if they stopped there, and 
vice versa. Of 292 letters sent from Madras to London in 1832, less than a 
third were carried by ships which had a former or current connection with 
the EIC. A significant portion of the mails (69 out of 292, or 24%) were 
taken home by three Navy vessels, while no letters were sent by this means 
from Calcutta or Bombay (see Fig. 30). Liverpool ships were not used for 
carrying EIC mails from Madras. As the ships usually did not stay long at 
that port, the letters left sooner from there than from Calcutta. In addition, 
the durations of the sailings from Madras were clearly shorter than from 
Calcutta or Bombay due to the shorter sea voyage.888
Compared with the manner by which Lloyd’s agents used the existing 
network of private communications to send maritime intelligence to England, 
the EIC had definitely lost its touch – and obviously also its interest – in 
improving information transmission. The unbelievable inefficiency of the 
management, combined with general conservative attitudes must have been 
one of the main reasons for the Company’s final collapse. While it had been 
possible to ignore the changing times in the shelter of a monopoly, the EIC 
soon noticed that it could not keep its earlier position in the new environment, 
in which the competitors were entrepreneurs instead of government officials 
and accustomed to using all existing means of communication for their 
benefit.
Building a Monopoly
In search of better communications – The Peninsular Company enters the 
scene – Via Marseilles – Mixed service – Royal Charter for the P&O – The 
EIC service to India – Mail sailings to China – The P&O mail monopoly 
begins – Geographical distance, a relative concept
In search of better communications
At home in England, Select Committees of the House of Commons resolved 
in 1832 and 1834 that steam communication with India via the Red Sea was 
practicable, that under proper arrangements the expenses could be greatly 
reduced, and that a regular service should be opened, the net costs of which 
should be defrayed equally by the British Government and the EIC.889
The Committee also supported an alternative route from Alexandretta, 
on the Syrian coast, overland to the Euphrates, and then down that river for 
1,000 miles to the Persian Gulf, and on to India. This plan was originally 
888 The EIC General Correspondence from Madras, E/4/ 364–365 (BL, IRO); Lloyd’s List, 
January 1832 – June 1834, passim.
889 See Thorner, 26; Sidebottom, 59.
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placed before the Committee and warmly endorsed by the EIC, and it was 
supported by the British Government which wanted to counteract Russian 
interests in the Middle East. The mercantile houses looked at the Euphrates 
plan rather coldly, considering that it was yet another attempt by the EIC to 
defer any effective action. The efforts by the Company and the Government 
to operate steamers on the Euphrates in 1835–1837 were not successful, 
and one of the small vessels was in fact lost in a sudden storm with almost 
all hands.890
Additionally, the Select Committee of 1834 determined that the Admiralty’s 
Malta packets should be extended to Egypt and/or Syria as necessary. In 
addition to the old Falmouth sailing packet route to Vigo, Oporto and Lisbon, 
the Admiralty had conducted a naval steam packet service on the England 
– Gibraltar – Malta (– Corfu) route since 1830. The Mediterranean service
was needed for British control over Malta and the Ionian Islands, conquered
during the Napoleonic wars, as well as Gibraltar, which had belonged to
Britain since 1713. In March 1835, this naval steamship mail service was
extended to Alexandria.891
Now there was a steam-powered European leg for the East India service 
via Alexandria and Suez. In the Indian Ocean, the EIC finally added two 
large steamers to the Indian Navy for the Suez–Bombay run, to the delight 
of Bombay and the discomfiture of Calcutta. The Overland route between 
Alexandria and Suez was pioneered by Mr. Waghorn, whose efforts to carry 
mails through the desert proved to be so much more efficient than the official 
service that he was appointed by the EIC as Deputy Agent and Superintendent 
for the Indian mails in Egypt from June 1837.892
The Indian mails were made up at the General Post Office in London on 
the first of each month and the naval steam packet sailed from Falmouth 
on the 3rd or 4th, depending on the weekday. The average duration of the 
voyage by the Admiralty steam packets via Malta to Alexandria was 22.5 
days, varying between 20 and 26 days, while the homebound voyage took 
a few days more.893
The Overland trip was made by donkeys and river boats from Cosseir or 
Alexandria to Cairo, and from there by camels to Suez. The crossing took 
several days. In Suez, the mails were taken on board the Hugh Lindsay which 
took them to Aden, from where they were taken to Bombay by one of the 
EIC’s two new steamers, the Atalanta or the Berenice. By these means, the 
mails were carried from England to India in 74 days and in the other direction 
within 64 days on average. These figures are calculated by Sidebottom from 
the dates of postmarks on some covers carried by the Waghorn service. The 
duration of the trip varied between 60 and 81 days eastwards and between 
56 and 123 days westwards.894
890 See Thorner, 26–27.
891 For the Mediterranean mail routes and services, see Moubray & Moubray, 142–143, 
155–162; and Tabeart (2002), passim.
892 See Sidebottom, 63–72.
893 For the sailing dates of 1835, see Tabeart (2002), 27–30.
894 Tabeart (2002), 25–28; Sidebottom, 38–39, 61–69. Lively descriptions about the early 
overland crossings can be found in Cable, 81–84; and Sidebottom 73–75. – The donkey 
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From Bombay, the mails were sent to Calcutta by runners (dawks), which 
normally made the trip between the two ports in a fortnight.895 But the mail 
service by the EIC steamers did not function satisfactorily. It was more 
or less mismanaged, highly irregular, and at times quite unsafe. In June 
1838, one batch of mail from Calcutta was delayed for so long at Bombay 
that it took 135 days to reach London; the next batch from Calcutta was 
again delayed at Bombay and finally dispatched via the Persian Gulf route, 
where Arabs captured part of it and scattered the letters over the desert. The 
Calcutta community’s frustration and disappointments reached a climax in 
the summer of 1839 when the EIC steamers left Bombay for Suez on two 
successive occasions without waiting for mails known to be on the way 
from Calcutta.896
Besides these postal arrangements, the London merchants had in 1836 
formed a committee to set up a commercial enterprise, the East India Steam 
Navigation Company, in order to link Britain via the Suez–Overland route 
with all the Indian ports, China and Australia. The reaction to this plan in 
Calcutta was somewhat mixed. Although a better mail service was naturally 
welcomed, the Calcutta community disliked the idea that Bombay would 
be the company’s initial terminus. With little support from India and strong 
opposition from the EIC, the new company soon foundered. A revised plan, 
submitted by a chief London lobbyist for Calcutta interests, was accepted 
by the leading India houses in London in late 1838. In Calcutta, however, 
the opinions were again split due to a simultaneous local plan to start a mail 
service by at least one direct steamer on the Calcutta–Suez run.897
The Peninsular Company enters the scene
The steps which the British Government and the EIC now took separately, 
but not unconnectedly, to improve the steamship service between Britain and 
Egypt and between Suez and India, undermined all the plans and campaigning 
of the Anglo-India merchant houses during 1825–1840. When the EIC finally 
gave way, the Directors were not anxious to strengthen their longstanding 
opponents. Instead, taking advantage of the dissension and controversies 
which separated Bombay merchants from Calcutta merchants, and Calcutta 
merchants from London merchants, the EIC bypassed them all and awarded 
its coveted support and the contract to a complete newcomer to the eastern 
seas, later known as the P&O.898
Obviously there was also a practical reason for this decision. The Peninsula 
Steam Navigation Company (PSNCo), as the company was called at that 
time, had already gained a good reputation in conducting a mail service 
on the Falmouth–Vigo–Oporto–Lisbon–Cadiz–Gibraltar route from 1837, 
service ended when the railway was opened between Alexandria and Cairo in 1856 and 





898 See Thorner, 32, 38–39.
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after having won the postal contract advertised by the Government for 
public competition. The company carried mails from England to the Iberian 
Peninsula once a week, using five steamers, for an annual payment of £29,600 
and with fines for each delay of 12 hours or more.899
From September 1837, the Indian mails had been carried by the PSNCo 
steamers from Falmouth to Gibraltar, from there by the Admiralty packets via 
Malta to Alexandria, by different means along the Overland route to Suez, 
and finally by the EIC steamers from Suez to Bombay.900 The chain of the 
different services, here in the homeward direction due to lack of eastward 
dates, can be described by using an example:
The mails from Calcutta were sent by runners across India for Bombay 
on 11 September, 1837, and taken there on board the EIC steamer Atalanta, 
which sailed for Suez on 27 September. The sources available do not enable 
us to calculate the duration of the 1,700-mile sea voyage, but the mails 
– having meanwhile also been taken across the desert via Cairo by camels,
riverboats and donkeys organized by Mr. Waghorn and his partners – left
from Alexandria by HMS Volcano on 7 November. The ship arrived at Malta
on 11 November and another naval steamer, HMS Firefly proceeded with the
mails on 17 November, arriving at Gibraltar on the 23rd to forward the mails
to the PSNCo’s Iberia, which sailed for England on the following day. The
ship arrived at Falmouth on 2 December and the mails were forwarded by
mail coach to London, where they arrived on 4 December.901 The trip took
84 days, which was not immensely better than what could be achieved by the
fastest sailing vessels directly – and much more cheaply – from India.
In 1838, the Overland trip from Bombay to London took 64 days on 
average, the duration of the voyage varying between 50 and 100 days. To this, 
about a fortnight should be added for the dawk service between Calcutta and 
Bombay, and two days for the mail coach between Falmouth and London. 
Thus the Calcutta mails arrived in London in 80 days on average. The fastest 
mail arrived in 65 days while the slowest dispatch took 118 days.902
Via Marseilles
Mr. Waghorn’s private express service was still able to make faster voyages 
than the official mail by using alternative means of transport where available. 
To avoid transit delays, typical for the official mail, he opened agencies at 
899  Reg Kirk, The Postal History of P&O Service to the Peninsula (London, 1987), 1–11. 
– The PSNCo had started privately on the route already in 1834. Its main partners,
Brodie McGhie Willcox and Arthur Anderson, were from Ostend (although originating
from English-Scottish parents) and Shetland respectively, and were therefore not highly
appreciated by the London merchant houses. The main proprietor and shipowner, Richard
Bourne, was from Dublin, and in fact some of the first vessels used Liverpool as a branch
terminal. About the early history, owners, etc. see Cable, 6–36.
900 See Kirk (1987), 12–13; Tabeart (2002), 40–46. Tabeart also corrects some dates published 
by Kirk, referring to the ships’ logs.
901 See Kirk (1987), 13; Tabeart (2002), 44. – The sources available for this study lack 
information about the EIC’s eastbound sailing dates of this period, thus making it 
impossible to calculate information circles.
902 Calculated from the sailing dates published by Kirk (1987), 13.
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Alexandria and Malta to forward dispatches by the quickest steamers to 
Marseilles, to proceed by railway, coach and steamer for England, where they 
arrived some ten days before the Post Office mails. The arrangement soon 
received official attention by the Lords of the Admiralty and the Postmaster 
General, and to stop this uncomfortable competition, new arrangements 
were soon made for sending mails to India via Marseilles, from where the 
Admiralty packets would take the dispatches to Malta, to be forwarded to 
Alexandria.903
In May 1839, the new overland route via Marseilles was taken as an official 
alternative to the Post Office mails. The single postage rate for a letter to India 
by British packets via Marseilles would be 2s. 8d. and by French packets, 
in case British were not available, 3s. 1d., while the postage rate 2s. 6d. for 
the all-sea route from Falmouth by the PSNCo would remain unaltered.904 
Compared to the private ship letter rate via the Cape, which was 4d. plus the 
inland rate only, the costs of greater speed were still high.
The faster route via Marseilles was soon given preference by the Admiralty 
steamers. The all-sea mails via Gibraltar had to wait at Malta for several extra 
days, even ten or 12, for a packet while the mails for Marseilles left soon 
after the steamer had arrived from Alexandria.905 The mails from Alexandria 
arrived now via Malta at Marseilles in 11 or 12 days, while about five more 
days were calculated for the journey between Marseilles and Calais on the 
English Channel.906
Mixed service
In 1840, there was thus a mail steamship service from England to India, via 
the Red Sea, and mails could be sent from Bombay or Calcutta even further 
903 This arrangement was enabled by the Anglo-French postal convention of 1839, which 
allowed closed mails through France for India. See Sidebottom, 84–90, Tabeart (2002), 
187–190.  – Tabeart notes that ‘a number of failures by the PSNCo ships slowed the 
average course of the mails from Malta to Falmouth to 19 days, with a correspondingly 
poor Alexandria–Falmouth time, averaging 29 days.  These compare very unfavourably 
with the last all-RN figures homewards of 16 ½ and 23 days respectively’. In fact, also the 
transit times at Malta between the two Royal Navy steamers compared very unfavourably 
in 1838: instead of the normally one or two days’ transit time at Malta during the ‘all-
RN’ service in 1837, it now took three to four days, even six, to get the mails from one 
Admiralty vessel to another. At Gibraltar, the reasons for lengthened transit times were 
different. Even if normally smoothly conducted, in four cases the mails were delayed 
in transit between an Admiralty packet and a PSNCo vessel due to a breakdown of the 
latter. The delay in these occasions was seven to nine days. For the quote, see Tabeart, 
(2002), 50, and for the transit dates and notes, 38, 49–52.
904 Sidebottom, 89. – The convention was a major improvement compared with the earlier 
period when the charges for a letter to India via Marseilles were 10d. British, 3s. 9d. French 
plus 1s. steam postage from Suez to Bombay, the total being 5s. 7d. See Tabeart (2002), 
187. – The French Post Office had started several steamship lines on the Mediterranean
routes in 1837. They carried mail between Marseilles and Malta, Athens, Constantinople,
and Alexandria. The service was three times monthly. Yet the Overland service by the
French started only in the 1860s, when the Egyptian railway had already been built. For
the early French services in the Mediterranean, see Salles, Tome II, 9–35.
905 See the sailing dates by Tabeart (2002), 54–55, 189–190.
906 Tabeart (2002), 189.
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to the East, although not yet by steamer. There were several independent 
players taking part in the long transmission process, and delays here and there 
could not be avoided. The duration of business information transmission was 
still far from satisfactory.
FIG. 31. The letter dated in Manila, the Philippines, on 10.2.1842 includes a bill 
of lading, informing the Fredrick Huth banking company in London about sending 
goods to their customer in England by two ships (one of which was the Garland Grove, 
an English frigate on her way homewards after having carried female convicts to 
Australia). The letter was written by a clerk but the owner of the company added with 
his own handwriting on the top right corner that the original letter should be sent via 
Bombay (the Overland route) while this letter should be sent by the Spanish merchant 
ship Dos Amigos on her way to Cadiz. In Cadiz, the letter was forwarded by the 
British Consulate (‘B. C. Cadiz’ handstamp on the cover) to the P&O’s Peninsula 
route steamer Royal Tar on her way from Gibraltar homewards. The ship arrived in 
Falmouth on 13.8. and the letter arrived in London on 15.8.1842, in 186 days.
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As the sailing dates of the Eastern route are well covered by several postal 
historians, there is no need to go to the archives to find out when the different 
mail carriers departed or arrived at ports on their way to Australasia. Reg 
Kirk’s monumental studies on the P&O schedules have been published in 
several volumes, mainly in the late 1980s. Lee C. Scamp has found lots of 
interesting details especially concerning the China route, published in a large 
volume in 1997. And finally, Colin Tabeart has collected the Admiralty steam 
packet sailing dates of the Mediterranean service, published in 2002. Having 
all this data in hand, we can pick up an example to see how the system worked 
in practice (see Table 76).
Sources: Kirk (1987), 65; Tabeart (2002), 62, 191; and Scamp, 10. – February had 
29 days in 1840.





















By railway London–Marseilles 4.2.– ~9.2. 5
HMS Alecto (Adm.) Marseille–Malta ~10.2.–13.2. 3 1
Both mails: 
continued by HMS 
Megaera (Adm.)
Malta–Alexandria 14.2.–20.2. 6 8 /1
Overland Egypt, by 
camels etc.





Suez–Bombay 27.2.–13.3. 15 
(?)
Overland India, by 
runners
Bombay–Calcutta between 13.3. 
and 27.3.
14 incl.
HMS Larne (Adm.) Calcutta–
Singapore





Total, all-sea London–Canton 24.1.–30.5. 127 incl.
Total, express London–Canton 4.2.–30.5. 116 incl.
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The example enables a few observations. First of all, the bulk of mails 
from Falmouth were in this case delayed due to the late departure of the Royal 
Adelaide. With the Saturday mails from London, she should have sailed on 
Monday, 20 January but was reported to have left on the 24th. She arrived 
at Gibraltar via Lisbon and Cadiz on 1 February. The transfer of dispatches 
seems to have been conducted smoothly, as the Admiralty packet Volcano 
started her voyage from Gibraltar to Malta on the same day. However, the 
mails from Falmouth had to wait at Malta no fewer than eight days, until 
the Admiralty packet Alecto arrived from Marseilles with the express mails 
and all the dispatches could be taken on to Alexandria.907
The Overland voyage across Egypt and the time taken by the Berenice 
to steam from Suez to Bombay was 22 days in total. The mails arrived in 
Bombay on 13 March, the all-sea mail via Falmouth and Gibraltar in 55 
days and the express dispatches via Marseilles in 38 days, a very good 
record compared with earlier information transmission by private sailing 
vessels in 125 days on average.908 The China mails were then probably 
carried to Calcutta by the dawk service, as they were taken from that port to 
Singapore by HMS Larne, reported to have departed on 27 March. As the 
trip to Singapore took no more than three weeks, she arrived there in mid-
April. The following vessel for Canton, being the Actif, departed on 5 May 
and arrived, probably via some other port, at Canton on 30 May with the 4 
February mails.909
The last part of the trip could not be called effective by any measurement. 
The ‘express’ mails arrived in China 78 days later than the Bombay merchants 
had received their part of the dispatches which had been sent on the same day 
from London. The 116-day express mail transmission from London by the 
Overland route to China actually took longer than the fastest direct sailings 
by the East Indiamen in 1832.910
Royal Charter for the P&O
In 1840, the second contract between the Post Office and the PSNCo stretched 
the company’s activities to the Mediterranean as the European link in the 
Indian service. This was an exclusive Royal Charter for a mail steamship 
service to the East, comparable with the Cunard Line’s in the North Atlantic 
and the Royal Mail Line’s in the West Indies.
The charter included an annual subsidy of £34,200 for the Alexandria 
service during the next five years, as well as the right of incorporation with 
limited liability – a lucrative deal as the shareholders of the rival companies 
907 Also Tabeart notes the poor connectivity at Malta between the Admiralty packets and the 
all-sea route via Gibraltar. The Malta–Marseilles packets clearly had priority in the mail 
service, which was ‘quite understandable – a principle reason for establishing the entire 
packet network was for the Government to get the earliest possible intelligence from [or 
to] the far-flung British Empire’. Tabeart (2002), 66.
908 See Chapter VII.1.
909  For the last leg, see Scamp, 10.
910 The last commercial East Indiamen, which departed from London in April and May, 
1832, sailed to Canton via Anjer, Java, in 107 to 111 days. See Chapter VII.1.
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would be unlimited. The geographical enlargement of operations caused 
a need to change the company’s name to the Peninsular and Oriental 
Steam Navigation Company. The capital of the new company was fixed 
at £1,000,000. In addition to the five steamers of the former PNSCo, two 
larger ones – the Great Liverpool of 1,400 tons, and the Oriental of 1,787 
tons – were chartered from a company which had lost the transatlantic mail 
contract given to the Cunard Line.911
From September 1840, the all-sea mail service between Falmouth and 
Alexandria was taken care of by the P&O. The packets departed from 
Falmouth on the second of each month, called at Gibraltar and Malta only, 
and proceeded immediately after coaling. The ships were larger than the 
Admiralty steamers used earlier on that route, and one and the same vessel 
took the mails all the way from Falmouth to Alexandria, thus avoiding delays 
in transfer from one ship to another at the different ports. As a result, the 
duration of the all-sea trip from Southampton via Gibraltar reduced from an 
average of 28 days in 1839 to 16 in 1841.912
The P&O mail contract included a clause that the company would provide 
a service from Suez to India within two years. Which part of India, was not 
specified. While the attitudes among the disappointed Anglo-Indian merchant 
houses towards the P&O remained cool, their financial support for any route 
was limited.913
The EIC offered a rather modest bonus of £20,000 a year for five years 
if the P&O successfully inaugurated a service between Calcutta, Madras 
and Egypt – which left to the EIC the monopoly of the shortest and most 
direct route to Bombay, which they were then covering with their own naval 
steamers. And indeed, this arrangement by the EIC continued until the P&O 
took over the Bombay route in 1852.914
The British Government finally awarded the P&O a contract for 
the route Suez–Ceylon–Madras–Calcutta for an annual payment of 
£115,000.915 For this service, and to cover the whole route from England to 
India – and later to China and other places in the East – much preparation 
was needed.
911 Norman L. Middlemiss, Merchant Fleets. P&O Lines (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 2004), 17; 
Tabeart (2002), 59; Thorner, 35–36. – The Royal Charter of 1840 is reprinted by Kirk 
(1987), 92–94.
912 Calculated from Tabeart’s figures (2002), 52–53; for the P&O sailings, see 69–70. See 
also Tabeart (2002), 59–66.
913 As late as 1847, three-quarters of P&O’s shares were held in Ireland, presumably by 
Richard Bourne and his business allies. See Cable, 68–71; Thorner, 36–38.
914  Cable, 69; Thorner 36. – In 1849, P&O made a further attempt to dislodge the EIC from 
the Bombay route by offering a £24,700/year contract for an extended Suez to Bombay 
to Australia link. The EIC service between Suez and Bombay was costing the British 
and Indian governments no less than £105,000/year at that time. The offer was declined 
even though it was at that time often quicker to send the mails to Bombay by the P&O 
service via Calcutta. The matter was hotly debated in the Parliament and the EIC was 
left in no doubt what the country thought of it. Three years later the EIC lost a complete 
ship load of mail in the Red Sea; and during the next few years the Bombay–Suez link 
was gradually transferred to P&O. See Middlemiss (2004), 18–19; and Reg Kirk, P&O 
Bombay & Australian Lines – 1852–1914 (Norfolk, no printing year given), 43.
915 See Cable, 78; Middlemiss (2004), 18.
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The P&O organized overland route facilities of its own, including small 
tugs and barges to convey passengers along the Mahmoudieh Canal between 
Alexandria and Atfeh, and a larger Nile river steamer. As the goods had to 
be carried by camel, caravans of 3,000 to 4,000 animals were needed to 
transport a single shipload. Even the coal for vessels in the Red Sea area went 
across Egypt by camel-back. This was necessary as, due to the unfavourable 
monsoons, it could not be sent by sailing vessels as was the normal practice 
in sending fuel to the eastern stations. The P&O also opened a hotel in Cairo, 
reserving it almost exclusively for its own passengers.916
On 24 September 1842, the ‘large and powerful’ Hindostan of 2,018 tons 
departed from Southampton and arrived in Calcutta on Christmas Eve, in 91 
days, having coaled at Gibraltar, Cape Verde, Ascension, St. Helena, Cape 
Town, Mauritius, and Galle in Ceylon. Two more purpose-built vessels 
arrived in 1843 and 1844.917 Now when there were enough steamers for the 
service, a new contract was made between the Government and the P&O for 
the Calcutta line, and another for a new China line from Galle via Singapore 
and Penang to Hong Kong. The latter was opened in August 1845.918
The EIC service to India
Until the P&O started their mail service to Bengal, both the Bombay and 
Calcutta merchants were served by EIC steamers from Suez to Bombay. 
This part of the trip, together with the overland crossing in Egypt, took 20 
days in 1841, while the total voyage between London and Bombay took 36 
days.919 Even if this was a radical improvement compared with the duration 
of information transmission only a few years earlier, a brief look at the 
information circles raises some questions.
As can be seen from Table 77 (in the end of the book, p. 431), the departures 
from England were punctual. Although there was not always a sailing from 
Bombay on the first day of each month that year, it happened nine times 
out of 12, however. Yet long delays – from 17 to 29 days – at both ends of 
the journey between the arrivals and departures were typical. If there had 
been a more frequent service, the duration of the voyage itself would have 
enabled 4.5 consecutive information circles per year, leaving a good four 
days margin at both ends.920
For the mails to and from Calcutta, the service was even poorer. At least 
one month had to be counted for the return trip between the ports of Bombay 
and Calcutta, and in real life this was hardly enough. As there was no direct 
steam ship service to Calcutta, the existing means of information transmission 
worked as follows:
916 Middlemiss (2004), 17–18. – More about the Overland route arrangements by the P&O, 
see Cable, 85–93.
917 Kirk, The P&O Lines... 11; Middlemiss (2004), 18.
918 Kirk, The P&O Lines.., 11; Middlemiss (2004), 18.
919 Calculated from the sailing dates published by Scamp, 10, 31–32, 47.
920 Calculated from the sailing lists of Scamp, 31–32, 37–38, 47.
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TABLE 78. Consecutive information circles enabled by the express services between 
London and Calcutta, 1841.
 
Compared to 3.5 information circles per year between London and 
Bombay, only 2.5 could be managed by the existing means of communication 
between London and Calcutta. In the example, the mails from Calcutta arrived 
in London on 5 May, and answers to them just missed the India mail, which 
left on the day before. This happened again, when the India mails arrived 
on 7 October, and the express dispatches had been sent three days earlier on 
the 4th.921 Letters from Calcutta always missed the next mail ship departure 
from Bombay due to the long and troublesome voyage between the two 
ports. In terms of information circles, there was no real use for the Marseilles 
express service, as answers to letters could not be sent sooner than they were, 
anyway. But if the message was urgent, the express service naturally saved 
a few days in the one-way voyage.
The P&O Calcutta Line from Suez to Madras and Calcutta started in early 
1843, first with only one steamer, and finally from the beginning of 1845 
with three vessels. From January 1845, the service was conducted monthly. 
The China Line started a monthly service in the summer of 1845.922 Until 
then, all business information transmission to the East was taken care of by 
a combination of the P&O, Admiralty, EIC and various private merchant 
vessels as described above.
A memorandum of covers received at Bombay by the EIC steamer 
Berenice in March 1845 gives an idea of the number of letters and newspapers 
carried from England to India and China at that time. The all-sea mail via 
Southampton included 24,400 letters, 30,000 newspapers and seventy-five 
921 See the sailing lists of  Scamp, 31–32, 37–38, 47.



















































4.11. Berenice 12.12. ~30 days
Source: Sailing lists of Scamp, 31–32, 37–38, 47; Tabeart (2002), 69–73, 191–192.
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boxes, while 6,000 letters, 8,000 newspapers and 38 boxes arrived by the 
express service via Marseilles. Additionally, the mails carried by the Berenice 
included 1,700 letters from foreign countries, as well as 5,000 newspapers 
and 28 boxes.923
The monthly P&O steamship service all the way from Europe via Suez 
to Calcutta was definitely an improvement, but it could not alone serve the 
Bengal merchants satisfactorily.  It often happened that the steamer from 
Calcutta had just departed, or she departed on the same day as the mails from 
Europe arrived. In these cases, the EIC steamer from Bombay to Suez could 
still be reached by the dawk service across the Indian mainland. According 
923 The memorandum was originally published by the Bombay Times on 26.3.1843, see 
Scamp, 98. On arrival, the Berenice was about ten days delayed due to engine problems. 
See Scamp, 93, 98.
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By rail 7.11. Details 
missing
Sources: Scamp, 93–103, 108–117; Kirk, The P&O Lines…, 11, 23–24. – There are 
several differences in the sailing data between Kirk and Scamp. The latter has been 
used here in case of confusion, as it is newer and based on thorough examination of 
local newspapers as well as Kirk’s studies. – From 1843, the P&O mail departures and 
arrivals were directed via Southampton instead of Falmouth, which was sensible due to 
the newly opened railway connection. The arriving mails were normally postmarked in 
London on the same or the next day after the ship’s arrival. See Kirk (1987), 20–21.
TABLE 79. Consecutive information circles enabled by the co-operating services 
of the P&O Calcutta Line and the EIC Bombay Line between London and Calcutta, 
1845.
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to Scamp who refers to the Calcutta newspapers, the service was in general 
use, this route thus complementing the direct P&O all-sea mail service.924
Many of the local problems were classic examples, typical also in the 
early mail services in the Atlantic and the West Indies, as has been shown in 
the previous chapters. When the Hindostan arrived at Calcutta on 8 March, 
1845, the Bentick departed on the same day, or two days later, depending 
on the sailing data used. The Hindostan met serious problems on her way 
to Calcutta in early June and arrived on the day after the mail ship for Suez 
had departed. But using the dawk service, answers to the letters could be sent 
via Bombay, from where the EIC mail steamer was leaving for Suez on the 
20th. Thus there was, in fact, a bi-monthly mail service from Calcutta, even 
if it did not enable heavy bulk mail dispatches.925
Mail sailings to China
The real difficulty in Eastern communications was between India and China. 
The mails were carried by an ad hoc basis from Bombay or Calcutta, probably 
via Singapore, to Canton by varying merchant ships, which happened to sail 
for China. By comparing the sailing data published by Scamp with a ‘Chinese 
Repository’ list of port arrivals in Hong Kong between August 1841 and 
June 1843, we get some interesting background to the mail-carrying sailing 
vessels between India and China. Having dispatched the mails at Canton, 
many of the ships arrived within a few days in Hong Kong. Of the 17 mail 
carriers on the list, eight were loaded with opium, five reported general cargo 
or sundries, one carried cotton, one coals, and two arrived in ballast.926 It is 
clear that the main interest of these ships was not to carry mail as rapidly as 
possible, but to take care of their own businesses.
There were different mixtures of mail routes also in the Southeast Asian 
leg of the journey. An example: the EIC steamer Cleopatra took the European 
mails from Aden to Bombay, where she arrived on 5 August, 1841. At the port 
of Bombay, most of the mails were taken on board a private merchantman, 
the Parkfield, which sailed for China with a general cargo on the 10th. The 
EIC steamer Madagascar left Calcutta on 16 August, but without any of 
the dispatches that would probably arrive from Bombay on the 19th by the 
dawk service. Instead, the ship arrived at Canton on 12 September with fresh 
Singapore newspapers and a few London papers that she had picked up from 
HMS Larne in Singapore. The Larne arrived at Canton from Madras on 19 
September with some Indian government dispatches and Madras letters, but 
with no business letters from Bombay. The Parkfield arrived at Canton with 
the London mails from July as late as 4 October, after ‘56 days out’ as the 
Repository noted .927
924 See Table 80.
925 For the sailing dates, see Scamp, 93–103, 108–117; and Kirk, The P&O Lines..., 11, 
23–24. See also Table 79 for the consecutive information circles.
926 For the sailing lists, see Scamp, 31, 47–48, and 62; for the ‘Chinese Repository’ see 
Scamp, 398–413.
927 See Scamp, 31, 35, 399. If the ‘56’ is correct, the ship departed from Bombay on 9.8. and not 
on 10.8. as has been estimated by Scamp. For the information circulation, see Table 80.
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As the last irritant in the matter, those few dispatches brought by the 
Madagascar ‘though landed at the Hotel, could not be opened in consequence 
of a recent order of yours to the contrary, but were sent to Hong Kong and 
returned here four days afterwards’. This was due to an order by the British 
Superintendent of Trade that all mail arriving at Macau was to be sent to 
the new Post Office at Hong Kong for processing, even though most of the 
merchants still resided at Macau. In consequence, the merchants who received 
dispatches by the Madagascar were unable to reply to their letters by the 
City of Palaces, which soon left Macau for Calcutta.928
As long as there was no organized mail system in the Southeast Asian 
part of the route, the dispatches were carried as described above. It often 
happened that a minor part of the mails arrived before the bulk, but whether 
these were the mails for which senders had paid an extra fee in London cannot 
be verified without seeing the rate markings on letters which were carried by 
these different means. This could probably be discovered by postal historians 
collecting covers from Asian mail routes.
 
928 The quote is from the merchants’ complaint to the British Superintendent of Trade. See 



























































































Source: Sailing lists of Scamp, 31–32, 37–38, 47.
TABLE 80. Consecutive information circles enabled by the fastest mail services 
between London and Canton, 1841, an example.
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The mails often arrived by nearly identical merchantmen from Bombay to 
China, but the duration of the journey varied greatly. For example, the major 
part of the mails was sent from Bombay by the merchant ship Westmoreland 
on 12 September, 1841. She arrived at Canton on 21 December while some 
the mails already arrived by the Monarch on 6 November. The latter had sailed 
from Bombay on 16 September. The same letters from London could be taken 
from Bombay to China in 51 or in 100 days, depending on which vessel the 
authorities in Bombay happened to put them on board at the port.929
The duration of the fastest possible information transmission via the 
Overland route from London to Canton varied between 79 and 126 days 
in 1840, between 65 and 119 days in 1841, and between 61 and 110 days 
in 1842.930 But most of the business letters did not arrive by these fastest 
communications, as has been shown by Scamp, who has examined a wide 
range of newspapers for more details.931
Canton Press calculated the following averages for the voyage between 
London and China: 104 days in 1840, 91 days in 1841 and 88 days for 1842. 
Yet these were not the averages for the normal mail, but the very first news 
arriving in Canton by different ships, often not the main mail carriers.932
It was normal that arriving vessels carried on board some latest newspapers 
from the port of departure, and therefore general news often reached the 
East Asian colonies faster than business letters, which formed one major 
shipment. Table 80 shows the information circulation enabled by the mixed 
service in 1841.
This mixed service, with the leg from India to China covered by private 
sailing vessels, enabled only 1.5 consecutive information circles per year 
between London and Canton, one circle taking some eight months. And yet 
it was fortuitous that the mails from India arrived in London on 4 September, 
just two days before the next departure date of the express mail. If the London 
mails had been sent off just before the Asian dispatches arrived, the next 
opportunity to reply to letters from Asia would have been several weeks 
later. In this case, the replies from England would have arrived in China on 
23 January, 1842.933
The new trade port of Hong Kong was growing rapidly. The ‘Chinese 
Repository’ reported 147 arrivals in August–December 1841, and 371 
arrivals in the whole calendar year 1842. Most vessels were on different 
inter-Asian routes, but 20 ships sailed directly from London or Portsmouth, 
and 14 from Liverpool. On arrival, these vessels had been out for 135 and 
130 days, respectively, on average.934
The John O’Gaunt sailed from Liverpool in 108 days, arriving in China 
on 9 July, 1842. If she carried private ship letters, they must have been sent 
on 23 March at the latest. This was a week earlier than the bulk mail from 
929 For the example, see Scamp, 10, 15.
930 See the table about arrival dates of the Overland mails from England in China 1840–1843 
by Canton Press 11.3.1843, republished by Scamp, 16.
931 For the year 1841, see Scamp, 32–35.
932 For the Canton Press table of 11.3.1843, see Scamp, 16.
933 For the sailing dates, see Scamp, 31–32, 37–38.
934 For the ‘Chinese Repository’ 1842–1843, see Scamp 398–406.
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England left for the Overland route, and about ten days earlier than the last 
dispatches of express mails could be sent via Marseilles. And in this month, 
the Overland mail reached Canton rather quickly, via Bombay by the Sir 
Herbert Compton and via Calcutta by the famous opium clipper, the Red 
Rover, both arriving on 22 June.935 The fastest mails arrived in 77 days, which 
was close to a record. The Overland route appeared to be a better choice, at 
least this time, but private ship letters were naturally more economical.936
Private merchant vessels continued to carry the official China mails from 
India until the first P&O steamer, the Lady Mary Wood, made her first voyage 
from Galle via Penang and Singapore to Hong Kong with the bulk mails of 
20 June and express mails of 24 June from England, arriving on 13 August, 
1845.937 This new arrangement took the London mails to Hong Kong in 50 
days, thus halving the normal duration of information transmission in one 
night. This was one of the occasions in the history of world communications, 
where a mere logistical arrangement was able to revolutionize the duration 
of information transmission, without radical new inventions, but using what 
already existed.
When the P&O was allowed to expand its services to China, the government 
did not even ask for bids from any other company. It was considered that 
the company had already invested so much in the service that it would have 
been unjust not to give them the business. Additionally, the cost of the P&O 
services east of Suez averaged 17s 1d per mile only, while the estimated cost 
of the Admiralty packets was 42s 6d.938
While the P&O Calcutta Line service via Galle actually made no major 
difference in communications with Bengal compared with the shorter sailing 
to Bombay and the inland runners, the steamship service from Galle definitely 
improved the information circulation with China. Instead of sailing via India, 
the mails were forwarded from Galle directly by a mail steamer to Penang, 
Singapore and Hong Kong.
As can be noticed from Table 81, the new system enabled 2.5 consecutive 
information circles each year compared with only 1.5 in 1841 (see Table 
80). The new service more than halved the time taken by the sailing vessels 
around the Cape, the mails now being carried in about two months in each 
direction.
This happened simultaneously with the beginning of the golden era of 
the American-built sailing clippers, which took over a great part of the tea 
trade between China and London in the late 1840s. Since the abolition of 
935 See Scamp, 47, 49, 404.
936 There is also evidence of mails arriving by private sailing vessels directly from 
England faster than the Overland mail. Scamp refers to Chinese newspapers 
which reported ‘news brought by Folkstone’ which included ‘accounts from 
London to the 3rd October’. The Folkstone had sailed from England in three 
months and three weeks, and the regular October mail was at that time delayed 
by trouble in Egypt. The newspapers also reported that the Narranganset, from 
Liverpool, brought the latest dates of 20.10.40 ‘but a very few letters’. Both 
these ships sailed via the Cape of Good Hope. See Scamp, 32.
937 Scamp, 93, 122.
938 Moubray & Moubray, 187.
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the monopoly of the East India Company in China in 1833, the nature of the 
British tea trade had thoroughly changed. In the days of the EIC monopoly, 
the term ‘new season’s tea’ did not really exist. Tea, as bought in London 
from a retailer, was never less than 18 to 24 months old. The East Indiamen 
always sailed from China during the favourable monsoon between November 
and March, and when the teas arrived in England some five or six months 
later, they were stored in bonded warehouses for about a year, since a large 
reserve was necessary in case the China fleet failed to arrive. When the 
business was opened for competition, the import of fresh tea became very 
lucrative. The merchants had no difficulty in selling the new crop as soon as it 
arrived at the docks, and the glamour attached to tea carried by a well-known 
ship could procure even higher prices – we still remember, for example, the 
famous Cutty Sark, one of the British tea clippers from the sunset of this 
period in the 1870s.939
TABLE 81. Consecutive information circles enabled by the new P&O China Line 
services, London–Hong Kong, 1846.
 
939 For the British tea trade, see MacGregor (1952), 3–30. – For changes in the construction 
of private merchant vessels in order to increase the speed, see MacGregor (1952), 33–188, 
passim.
Source: Kirk, The P&O Lines…, 11, 23–24, Tabeart (2002), 197, Scamp, 131–134.
* The arrival date is an estimate (Marseilles arrival + four days).
** Due to the delay in the Indian Ocean, the express mails seem to have missed
the Admiralty packet for Marseilles at Malta and were carried together with the bulk 
mail to Southampton by the P&O steamer Oriental. Thanks to the railway connection, 
the mails were in London on the same day when the ship arrived in Southampton. As 
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The fast American clippers, built for the California run in the late 1840s 
and 1850s, naturally took their share of the profitable tea trade. Instead 
of returning in ballast to New York after their arrival in San Francisco, 
they continued across the Pacific to China, loaded rapidly up with tea, and 
proceeded to London. This was now possible as Britain had abrogated the 
remaining provisions of the old Navigation Acts in 1848 and opened up 
commerce to ships of foreign origin on equal terms with British vessels. 
Up to the time of the American Civil War, at least 139 cargoes of tea 
were landed in Great Britain by American ships, most of them ‘Yankee 
clippers’.940
Even if greatly admired for their speed, the tea clippers were not often an 
alternative for the steamship mail service via the Overland route. As in the 
California run, the clippers sailed a much longer seaway than the steamers 
and could not make a shortcut across an isthmus, as the steamship companies 
did at Panama and Suez. The fastest journeys in the tea trade took less than 
100 days from China to London941 but compared with the mail transmission 
of only two months by steamship, the option was not very attractive and 
was mainly used for consignee’s letters. But the new rapid form of tea trade 
benefited greatly from fast business information transmission, and would be 
one of the main reasons for further development of communications between 
Europe and China in the 1860s.
The P&O mail monopoly begins
During the 1850s, the P&O gradually gained a rather complete monopoly on 
the eastern routes. In addition to the Southampton–Alexandria route already 
taken care of by the company, the express service between Marseilles and 
Malta, earlier carried out by the Admiralty, was transferred to the P&O from 
January 1853 as a part of a new mail contract.
The mails were made up in London on the 8th and 24th of each month to 
leave at 8 p.m. that day. No more than 60 hours were allowed for the railway 
transit through France and the shipment in Marseilles. Thus the vessels from 
Southampton and Marseilles would arrive at Malta simultaneously. The 
Southampton mails departed on the 4th and 20th of each month respectively. 
According to the schedule, the trip took 14 days, including a stoppage at 
Gibraltar and another for coaling at Malta. 942
Additionally, the P&O voluntarily entered into increasing postal 
commitments. The Calcutta and China lines were served twice a month 
instead of monthly. The company also gradually took over the Bombay 
route, the mails being first carried by the Calcutta steamer and later directly 
from Suez via Aden to Bombay twice a month. In addition, the P&O started 
a mail service between Singapore and Australia, via Batavia, although it 
940 See Cutler (1961), 167–169, 226–239.
941 See sailing lists of the American tea clippers between China and England 1850–1860, 
published by Cutler (1961), 467–474; and sailing lists of the British tea clippers on the 
same route 1848–1875, published by MacGregor (1952), 200–232.
942 See Kirk, The P&O Lines..., 13; and Kirk (1987), 106.
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was interrupted three years later due to the need for steamers in the Crimean 
war.943 The Australian mails will be discussed later in this chapter.
After the Crimean War in 1854–1856, the British faced further problems 
in the East – the Second Opium War with China in 1856–1858, and the 
Indian Mutiny in 1857–1858.944 In such circumstances, fast information 
transmission between England and Asia was crucial not only to the interests 
of the merchant houses, but also to the British crown. To cope with this 
problem, and apparently also to discourage French plans to dig a canal from 
Port Said to the Gulf of Suez, the Overland railway across the Egyptian desert 
was finalized and opened in 1859.945
The mail service to Bombay, which had taken over a month in each 
direction in the early 1840s even via Marseilles and the Overland route in 
Egypt, could be conducted in just 23 days in 1858. A letter from the writer’s 
collection illustrates a good example of this speed. The cover from Clifton, 
England, to Bombay on 16 August, 1858, was sent via London on the 17th, 
being addressed ‘via Marseilles’. It was taken by the P&O steamer Cadiz 
943 No fewer than 12 P&O mail steamers served in the Black Sea area during the war. By 
agreement with the British Government, the line to Australia was abandoned and the 
China Line was degraded to a monthly one. The new line to Italy – at that time a cargo 
line – was also dropped. See Kirk, The P&O Bombay…, 2–3; Reg Kirk, Australian Mails 
via Suez 1852 to 1926 (Kent, 1989), 4.
944 For the Second Opium War, see e.g.  James (2000), 238–241. For the Mutiny, see Cain 
& Hopkins, 284–288; and Lawrence James, Raj. The Making of British India, (London, 
2003), 233–298.
945 For a French view of Franco-British relations during the building of the Suez Canal, see 
Zachary Karabell, Parting the Desert. The Creation of the Suez Canal (London, 2004), 
passim.
FIG. 32. The letter sent on 16.8.1858 from Clifton, England, to Bombay, was carried 
along the express route via Marseilles and Overland via Suez, arriving in Bombay 
by the P&O steamer Cadiz on 9.9.1858 in 23 days. (See the text.)
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from Suez on 27 August to Bombay, where it arrived on 9 September and was 
handstamped in the Bombay Post Office on the same day (see Fig. 32).946 The 
one-way voyage from London to Bombay had been considerably shortened, 
but did the information circulation improve correspondingly?
From March 1859, mail transmission to the East was taken care of by the 
P&O as a weekly service. The China and Calcutta mails were transmitted 
from Southampton in the 1st week, the Bombay mails in the 2nd, the China 
and Calcutta mails in the 3rd, and the Bombay & Australia mails in the 4th 
week of each month.947 By examining the consecutive information circles on 
the India and China routes, we will notice an interesting point.
In 1859–1860, the information circulation between England and Bombay 
ran as follows: The all-sea mails for Bombay via Southampton, Gibraltar and 
Malta to Alexandria, overland to Suez and further by another P&O vessel to 
Bombay were carried in approximately one month on average, i.e. 30 days 
eastwards and 32.5 days westwards. The number of consecutive information 
circles was 4.5.
946 SRLC.
947  Kirk, The P&O Bombay…, 11–12. The departure dates from Southampton were the 4th, 
12th, 20th and 27th of each month. The express mails via Marseilles departed eight or 
even nine days later for the same steamers from Aden to the different Asian ports. See 


















































































Sources: Kirk, The P&O Bombay…, 12, 47.
* The Malta was laid up at Aden due to a breakdown. The mails for Bombay were 
carried by the Concordia, no arrival date in Bombay given.
TABLE 82. Consecutive information circles between London and Bombay via 
Southampton, March 1859–March 1860.
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The duration of eastward voyages varied between 28 and 34 days, while the 
westward voyages took 28 to 42 days. An average information circle between 
London and Bombay via Southampton took 71 days. The shortest time to get 
an answer to a letter from Bombay by this means was 59 days and the longest 
time was 82 days.948
As the departure dates from Southampton for the Bombay mails were the 
12th and the 27th of each month, and one information circle normally took 
something between two and two and a half months, the system enabled rather 
fast answers to letters arriving from India. The system served quite well the 
Southampton bulk mail service. The express route via Marseilles gives us a 
slightly different view.
TABLE 83. Consecutive information circles between London and Bombay via 





























































































Sources: Kirk, The P&O Bombay…, 12, 47; Kirk 1989, 58–64; Proud, 23–51.949 
– Two P&O vessels from Marseilles to Alexandria (‘N.N.’) remain unknown. This
does not affect the schedules, however.
948 The average duration of the eastward voyages was calculated from 18 trips and of the 
number of the westward voyages from 19 trips. The average duration of information 
circles was calculated from 15 consecutive cases during the period. The sailing dates are 
published by Kirk, The P&O Bombay…, 12, 47.
949 Hector Proud (Edward B. Proud, ed.), The British Sea Post Offices in the East. British 
Maritime Postal History Volume 4, (East Sussex, 2003).
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As can be noticed, the duration of a single trip varied between about three 
to four weeks. The shortest information circle took 57 days and the longest 
67 days. Even if the one-way express service was usually several days faster 
than the bulk mail transport and thus shortened the duration of a single voyage 
notably, the benefit could not be fully transferred to those who paid for rapid 
communications. The express service enabled five consecutive information 
circles per year instead of four and a half by bulk mail – but no more.
In information circulation between England and China, the difference 
between the all-sea mail and the express service was even less significant, 
as can be noted from Tables 84 and 85.





















Arrival  in Alexandria 20.1. 2.5. 2.9. 5.1.1860








Arrival  in Galle 6.2. 21.5. 19.9.








Arrival  in 
Hong Kong
27.2. 5.6. 8.10.
Ship and departure 







Arrival in Galle 15.3. 22.6. 28.10.








Arrival in Suez 30.3. 20.7. 15.11.








Arrival  in 
Southampton 18.4. 6.8. 5.12.




Sources: Kirk, The P&O Lines…, 45–47, Proud, 18–42.
* The Ottawa departed with the European mails on the same day as the Norna
arrived. The chance that the recipients had an opportunity to answer their letters may 
be just theoretical. Probably some of the recipients could answer, while the others 
did not. The following mail steamer departed on 15.3.1859.
** The Norna departed with the European mails on the same day as the Aden 
arrived. The following mail steamer departed on 22.6.1859.
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The one-way trips between London and Hong Kong were typically six days 
shorter in each direction via Marseilles than via Southampton, as that was the 
time lag between the departures from those ports, while the trip east of Suez 
was made by the same vessels. The system had some apparent benefits, but 
it also included several elements which could have been improved.
The benefit of shortening the voyage by paying extra for the express service 
worked only in the European part of the trip. Even there the problem was 
that the arriving letters could often not be answered immediately, but had to 









Departure from London 10.1.1859 26.4. 10.8. 26.11.










Arrival  in Alexandria 19.1. 4.5. 18.8. 5.12.










Arrival in Galle 6.2. 21.5. 2.9. 23.12.










Arrival in Hong Kong 27.2. 5.6. 20.9. 13.1.1860








Arrival in  Galle 15.3. 22.6. 17.10.








Arrival in Suez 30.3. 20.7. 2.11.








Arrival in Marseilles 11.4. 29.7. 9.11.
Arrival in London 13.4. 31.7. 11.11.
Duration of the 
information circle, days 93 96 93
TABLE 85. Consecutive information circles London–Hong Kong 1859, express via 
Marseilles.
Sources: Kirk, The P&O Lines…, 45–47, Proud 18–42.
* The Ottawa departed with the European mails on the same day as the Norna
arrived. The chance that the recipients had an opportunity to answer their letters may 
be just theoretical. Probably some of the recipients could answer, while the others 
did not. The following mail steamer departed on 15.3.1859.
** The Norna departed with the European mails on the same day as the Aden 
arrived. The following mail steamer departed on 22.6.1859.
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FIG. 33. The Ripon, built in 1846, served the P&O for 26 years, mainly between the 
UK – and Alexandria. (Cable: A Hundred Year History of the P&O, 1931).
arrival was by express via Marseilles or by the all-sea mail via Southampton. 
Even if it was possible to answer quicker by sending the answers by the all-
sea mail which departed sooner, they did not arrive at the other end faster, 
but by the same mail steamer.
There was no express service available in India or China that was similar 
to using the Marseilles express route in Europe. Instead, there were major 
disadvantages built into the system, especially at the port of Hong Kong. 
This can easily be noticed by picking out the arrival and departure dates of 
the mail steamers, as in Table 86.
In examining mail arrivals in Hong Kong in 1859, we can notice from 
Table 86 that the P&O mail steamer for Galle, from where the mails were 
forwarded to Aden, departed in five cases on the same day as the European 
mails arrived in Hong Kong. Even if the local post office had been efficient 
enough to dispatch the arriving mails – which naturally depended very much 
on the time of day the ship arrived – the merchants would not have had many 
hours to answer their letters. If the mail ship from Galle arrived in the evening, 
there was no time at all. The next opportunity to send letters to Europe was 
after some two weeks, varying between 11 and 17 days.
In a few cases the mail ship arrived one to four days after the mails for 
Europe had departed from Hong Kong, and there was not even a theoretical 
possibility to reply to the letters earlier than some two weeks later.  There 
were several cases where there were two mail arrivals without any 
departing mails in between, and two departures without anything arriving 
in between.
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In fact, Table 86 shows a list of lost opportunities, although half of the cases 
depict a nicely working system. Even if the mails departed punctually from 
England, there were more than enough opportunities for them to be delayed 
TABLE 86. Mail arrivals and departures by the P&O steamers in Hong Kong, 
1859.
Mail arrival in Hong Kong,
ship and date
The first possibility to send answers to the 
letters:
Departure from Hong Kong, ship and date
Cadiz 15.1. Singapore 15.1.
Cadiz 30.1.
Pekin 27.1. Cadiz 30.1.
Ottawa 11.2. Pekin 15.2.
Norna 27.2. Ottawa 27.2.
Norna 15.3.
Malabar 19.3. Singapore 31.3.
Singapore 26.3. Singapore 31.3.
Cadiz 10.4. Aden 13.4.
Pekin 24.4. Cadiz 24.4.
Pekin 5.5.
Ganges 9.5. Ganges 22.5.
Norna 20.5. Ganges 22.5.
Aden 5.6. Norna 5.6.
Malabar 22.6.
Singapore 22.6. Malabar 22.6.
Singapore 5.7.
Pekin 9.7. Pekin 22.7.
Cadiz 23.7. Cadiz 10.8.
Granada 5.8. Cadiz 10.8.
Ganges 22.8. Granada 24.8.
Malabar 7.9. Ganges 12.9.
Singapore 20.9. Singapore 28.9.
Norna 8.10. Malabar 13.10.
Cadiz 23.10. Norna 29.10.
Cadiz 15.11.
Ottawa 16.11. Ottawa 30.11.
Ganges 29.11. Ottawa 30.11.
Pekin 14.12. Ganges 15.12.
Malabar 27.12. Pekin 30.12.
Sources: Kirk, The P&O Lines…, 42–47, Proud 18–49. 
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during a trip consisting of several different steamship journeys, as well as 
railway trips and reloading at ports between the sea voyages. The arrivals in 
Hong Kong varied by more than a week and so did the departures. The time 
that the mail steamers normally spent at port in Hong Kong varied between 
five days and three weeks, with some longer exceptions.
To speed up mail delivery in the arrival port, the Post Office authorized 
the shipping companies to arrange sorting of the mails on board during the 
long sea voyages. The idea was adopted from the French packets in the 
Mediterranean and first used on the Australian route by the British in 1858, 
when the European & Australian Royal Mail Company held the Charter 
for that mail route. There were two authorized clerks on board the ship to 
sort and handstamp each letter before they were landed upon arrival at the 
destination port. From 1859, the British packets in the Mediterranean also 
sorted their mails between Alexandria and Southampton.950 This arrangement 
probably saved money for the Post Office as the work could be done during 
a longer period at sea, instead of the normal rush at the local Post Office at 
the port of destination, with several clerks trying to sort a large amount of 
letters and newspapers as quickly as possible. The system was widely used 
by the railways, too. In addition to increased work efficiency, it naturally 
speeded up information transmission.
Geographical distance – a relative concept
As discussed in Chapter VII.1., the number of sailings for Australia grew 
constantly in the 1820s and 1830s. The mails between Europe and Australia 
were carried by private merchantmen, and especially the mails homeward 
were often badly delayed. There was no interest among shipowners to commit 
themselves to regular sailings, as homeward cargoes were difficult to obtain 
in Sydney.951 Many ships sailed from Australia to Chinese or Indian waters in 
hope of more valuable freight952 and there was no sense in sending European 
mails in that direction before the Overland route had been introduced.
Finally the British Government made an agreement with the brothers 
Henry and Calvert Toulmin for a monthly mail service by sailing vessels 
around the Cape of Good Hope to Australia. The service was in use from 
1844 to 1848, but it never worked satisfactorily. The Postmaster General of 
New South Wales reported in 1846 that the average time taken by the post 
office packets on their trips to Sydney was 124 days, twelve days more than 
the average for the private merchantmen. The colonists in Melbourne and 
Van Diemen’s Land were even more dissatisfied with the Toulmin packets, 
as they sailed to Sydney only. The ships carried Melbourne mails to Sydney 
950 Proud’s study covers the Mediterranean Sea Post Offices as well as the Sea Post Offices 
on the Bombay–Suez (later Aden), Bombay–Karachi, Rangoon–Calcutta and Penang–
Singapore–Hong Kong routes, lists of marine sorters, used cancellations and different 
timetables, partly up to the 20th century.  See Proud, passim. – For the beginning of 
sorting mail at sea, see Proud 13–17; for the French Sea Post Office markings of the 
Mediterranean packets, see Salles, Tome II, 51–139.
951 Moubray & Moubray, 198.
952 See Chapter VII.1.
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to be returned to Melbourne by boat or by the recently established overland 
mail. As the complainants put it: ‘our letters [are] taken past our doors and 
sent back to us after a delay of three to six weeks with a six-fold postage’. 
If the packets had stopped at Melbourne, the Sydney merchants would not 
have used the service. They definitely did not want to depend on shipments 
from Melbourne.953
This was not the only aspect similar to the long quarrel about the mail 
service in India. What might be called a ‘Battle of the Routes’ followed. One 
alternative for a steamship mail route was a transpacific route via Panama by 
the Royal Mail Lines. The problem was that the railway across the isthmus 
did not exist yet. The all-sea route around the Cape of Good Hope was 
seriously considered as it was used by the merchantmen, emigrant ships 
and the Toulmin packets. There was also the possibility to diverge from the 
P&O line at Galle or Singapore, and to come down the western coast of the 
Australian continent around Cape Leeuwin, or to sail via Torres Strait and 
straight down the east coast to Sydney. All these alternatives had their pros 
and cons and the discussion continued.954
In 1847, the P&O offered a monthly service from Singapore to Sydney, 
if they would also get the contract for the Aden–Bombay Line which was 
still held by the EIC. According to Robinson, the offer was rejected partly 
due to growing fears of a monopoly being built up by the P&O in the 
eastern seas and partly because the EIC was unwilling to surrender the 
Bombay Line.955 It was clear that the latter was not interested in giving 
up the service between Bombay and Aden, and it was equally clear 
that the EIC would not expand its mail service to Australia. So nothing 
happened.
By 1851, some decision had to be made. Until then, the trade between 
Britain and the distant Australian colonies had remained modest, but the 
gold rush changed it all. As Michael K. Stammers puts it: ‘As soon as the 
news of the discovery of the new goldfields was brought back to England, 
many people were tempted to sail out in the hope of digging up a fortune. 
Australia had a predominantly agricultural economy at the time of the gold 
finds. Consequently, the little manufacturing industry that existed could 
not cope with the needs of the great influx of new settlers and it was also 
deprived of labour because of the all-powerful attraction of gold. Gold 
exports enabled the Australians to import vast quantities of all kinds of 
manufactured goods from England to satisfy the wants of her new people, 
and also provided capital to invest in projects to extend the economy. The 
building of railways was one especially important example. All the materials 
– the rails, the locomotives, the coaches, the bridge components, the signals
– were nearly all made in Great Britain and shipped out. Due to the rapidly
increasing number of people and large quantity of British exports demanding
shipment, the Black Ball Line [of Liverpool, not to be mixed with the
953 Robinson  (1964), 186–189. When the Toulmin service ended in early 1849, private 
sailing ships were again the only means of sending letters to Australia.
954 Robinson (1964), 189–190.
955 Robinson (1964), 190–191. For further details, see also Moubray & Moubray, 199.
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American namesake in the North Atlantic] and its competitors enjoyed an 
unprecedented boom.’ 956
The statistics are impressive. The annual number of passengers for 
Australia rose from about 21,000 in 1851 to almost 88,000 in 1852, and 
continued on this level for several years. The number of inhabitants in New 
South Wales expanded from 119,000 in 1841 to 179,000 in 1851 and 249,000 
in 1855 and the lately established Victoria (including Melbourne) grew from 
12,000 in 1841 to 237,000 in 1851 and 409,000 in 1855.957
The passenger fares to Australia rose rapidly, and so did the freight rates. 
Cargo space was offered by the Black Ball Line, the main shipping line for 
Australia, in mid-1852 at £7 per ton, while premier express freight, like 
the new crop of teas from China, never went much above £ 4–5 per ton. It 
was easy to find a full crew in Liverpool as there were many who wanted 
to work their way out to Australia, but it was difficult to find crew from 
Melbourne back home, unless the most highly inflated wages were offered. 
Nevertheless, the Black Ball Line and several other quickly established – or 
already existing – shipping lines, including the famous White Star Line, 
conducted now frequent sailings to the distant colonies.958
The Australian sailings were organized as a bi-monthly line service, 
following the example of the American sailing packets in the Atlantic. Even 
the competition between the shipping lines followed the Atlantic example: 
speed was one of the main stepping stones to prestige. Using the latest 
scientific studies of winds, currents and the technique of ‘Great Circle Sailing’ 
by Lieutenant M. F. Maury of the U.S. Navy, and by ordering fast clipper 
ships from the best American shipyards, the average passages to Australia 
shortened markedly. It was reported that the average passage of Liverpool 
ships to Australia was reduced to 110.5 days from the earlier 120 in 1852, and 
further to 105.5 days in 1853, which compared favourably with the London 
averages for the same years of 123 and 126 days respectively.959
But this was not enough; a mail steamship line was also needed. In 1852, 
the British Government made a compromise, believing that a trial between 
two different routes at the same time would show which one was better. The 
mails would thus be taken by the newly established Australian Royal Mail 
Steam Navigation Company around the Cape of Good Hope every second 
month, alternating with the P&O service from Singapore to Sydney, a new 
leg of the company’s Asian services.960
The first steamer to reach Australia was the P&O’s Chusan, a small vessel 
of only 700 tons and 80 horsepower, which left from Southampton in mid-
May 1852 and arrived at Melbourne at the end of July.961 The trip to Sydney 
956 Michael K. Stammers, The Passage Makers (Sussex, 1978), 109.
957 Stammers, 125; Mitchell, 36.
958 See Stammers, 125–126; and for the early years of the White Star Line on the Australian 
route, Gardiner, 12–66.
959 Stammers, 78–81.
960 The P&O service went by the west coast of Australia, past Cape Leeuwin to King George’s 
Sound, Melbourne and Sydney. See Robinson (1964), 191–192.
961 To compare, the largest vessels in the North Atlantic service at that time were Collins 
Line’s Atlantic and Baltic, both 2,860 tons. See e.g. Staff, 131.
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took 84 days in all. Her arrival in Australia was celebrated as the beginning 
of a new era. But it would take several more years before the Australians 
really had a satisfactorily working mail service.
The Australian Mail Line service was a disappointment from the beginning. 
The Australian, although two times larger than the Chusan, and with engines 
four times as powerful, could not make the journey on the estimated schedule 
or even near that. On her first trip, she ran out of coal twice and finally arrived 
at Melbourne in 91 days, and Sydney four days later. Her return trip was 
even more disappointing, taking 113 days. The Australian’s second voyage 
was even worse than the first; she had to return to Plymouth twice with mails 
that were badly damaged by water. The mails for South Africa were finally 
sent by the General Screw Steam Shipping Company, which had had a mail 
contract for that route from 1850, and the Australian bags by the next P&O 
steamer.962
The Australian Mail Line steamers were almost uniformly behind 
schedule. Machinery breakdowns, insufficient arrangements for fuel and poor 
management in general were to blame. This was not unique, remembering 
the typical deficiencies of the time e.g. in the Atlantic, but as the trip was so 
much longer, the effects multiplied.963 Within less than a year, the Australian 
mail line gave up, and in October 1853 the mail service via the Cape was 
taken over by the General Screw Company. The company turned out to be 
much more efficient, and its flagship, the Great Britain of 3,200 tons, made 
her first trip to Australia in 65 days.964
But the difficulties were not over yet. In the following year, the Crimean 
War began and the Government needed all available steamers for troop and 
horse transports. In practice, all mail steamship companies had to reduce their 
mail sailings due to the war service, including both the P&O and the General 
Screw Company. In 1855, the mail service for Australia was again carried 
out by sailing ships, with monthly mail contracts hastily made between the 
Government and the Liverpool-based sailing ship companies, the Black Ball 
Line and the White Star Line.965
The bold sailing ship companies competed seriously with steam power. 
One of the Black Ball Line’s new American clippers, named the James 
Baines according to the owner, ran from Boston to the Rock Light off the 
British coast in 12 days, and from Liverpool to Hobson’s Bay in Australia 
in 64 days – ‘carrying 700 passengers including 80 first-class, 1400 tons of 
962 Robinson (1964), 191–193. – For the General Screw mail contract to South Africa, and 
for some time even via Mauritius to Calcutta, see Robinson (1964)173–175.
963 For more details on the miserable performance of the Australian Mail Line, see Moubray 
& Moubray, 200.
964 See Robinson (1964), 193–194.
965 For the Cunard Line ships at the Crimean war, see e.g. Babcock, 117–118; for the P&O 
see Kirk (1989), 4; for the Royal Mail Line, Bushell, 80–85. For the Australian mail 
contracts with the Black Ball Line and the White Star Line, see Robinson (1964), 194–195; 
Stammers, 144–146. – The PR value of a mail contract was so high for any shipping 
company that it was even used afterwards. The Black Ball Line advertised its Australian 
service by ‘British and Australian ex-Royal Mail Packets’ after having lost the contract 
to the steamships in 1857. The advertisement of James Baines & Co is kept among the 
Accounts and papers of Henry Eld Symons, LRO, 380 MD, 20.
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of the Australian mail clippers from the contranct period 1855-1856, see Tabeart (2004), 
144–160. – There was also a plan to start a mail steamship service via the Pacific in the 
early 1850s. With the Royal Mail Line heading the project, a new company called the 
Australasian Pacific Mail Steam Packet Company was formed in order to start a steam 
traffic service between Europe and Australia via Panama and Tahiti. The project slowed 
down in early 1854 due to the Crimean War, which postponed the Government’s interest 
in such mail contracts. See Bushell, 90–93. 
967 See the sailing data by Tabeart (2004), 144–160.
Content (photo) removed from the open access version of this book.
FIG. 34. The Marco Polo was one of the best known clipper packets on the Australia 
route in the 1850s. She was owned by the Liverpool-based Black Ball Line, which 
together with the White Star Line shared the mail contracts to Australia during the 
Crimean War. On her maiden voyage to Melbourne in 1852, the Marco Polo created 
a world record by sailing out in 68 days and home in 76 days, less than six months 
out, the first time this had been achieved. (Tabeart 2004, 139) © National Museums 
Liverpool (Merseyside Maritime Museum).
cargo and 350 sacks of mail containing over 180,000 letters’. The average 
outward voyage of the three fastest Black Ball Line clippers took 84 days, 
and the homeward voyage, run by Cape Horn, 93 days.966 In fact, there was 
no great difference whether the Australian mail service was conducted by sail 
or steam during the early 1850s. Journeys of some 90 days on average – all 
ships were not at all as speedy as the fastest clippers or steamers – enabled 
no more than two information circles per year, if even that.967
After the war, the British authorities invited tenders for mail contracts 
via Egypt to Australia. The P&O offered to carry the mails between Suez 
and Australia for £140,000 per year, while a newcomer, the European & 
Australian Royal Mail Company, offered a service for £185,000, without 
including the Malta–Marseilles branch in the tender. It was a heavy blow 
to the P&O prestige when the contract was awarded to the European & 
Australian Line. The latter company was quite unprepared to start the 
966 Stammers, 144; Robinson (1964), 195. Colin Tabeart has collected all the sailing dates 
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service, having neither ships nor facilities for repair and coaling east of Suez. 
Beginning with chartered ships, the service started in January 1857.968
The European & Australian Line service ended in bankruptcy after 24 
round trips. Kirk goes through all the voyages in his study of the Australian 
mails, depicting the reasons that led to the failure of the company. A few 
quotes from Kirk tell quite a lot:
‘Oneida was not available to take the 11.3.57 voyage from Suez – not 
having arrived at that port. Her next mail voyage was from Galle 31.11.58 
when she again broke down, in this case, before reaching Aden. The mails 
and passengers at Suez on 11.3.57, had to wait for Simla on the 28th. The 
European & Australian Company lost the whole of the subsidy for this mail 
transit from Sydney to Southampton – it was swallowed up by penalties for 
late mail.’ – ‘Despite her [the Emeu’s] quick passage, she arrived too late 
to take the August mails from Sydney. What happened to any mails from 
the French postal service is not known.’ – ‘European with engine trouble, 
lost time between Galle and Sydney. Her arrival time at Sydney [18.10.57] 
968 Details about the start of this service vary. For example, Robinson states that the P&O lost 
the contract as they were unwilling to stop at Freemantle and Adelaide, but the timetables 
published by Kirk show that the European & Australian Line steamers did not stop there 
either. Kirk also notes that the latter company was not subjected to financial penalties 
e.g. if the Marseilles steamer was late, although the refusal to submit to the system of
penalties was mentioned by Robinson and Cable as the most important reason why the
P&O could not accept the details of the contract as desired by the government. See Kirk
(1989), 6–8; Robinson (1964), 195–196; Bushell, 93–94.; and Cable 137–140.
FIG. 35. The letter dated on 6.3.1856 and sent from Melbourne on 8.3., was carried 
by the White Star Line clipper packet Mermaid, which sailed on 13.3. with 99 
passengers, 37,020 ounces of gold, 50,000 sovereigns, wool, etc. and arrived in 
Liverpool on 9.6.1856. (Tabeart 2004, 153) The letter was on the way for 95 days 
from the writer to Liverpool and was received latest on the next day in London. The 
sea journey took 88 days.
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was 8 days 19 hours later than specified by contract – for which penalty was 
£1,800. At first it was advertised that she would leave with the November 
mails but […] she was unable to leave before 11.12.57. On 19.10.57 the 
Sydney Post Office advertised that the Aberdeen barque Oliver Cromwell 
would leave with the mails on the 25th, and proceed via the Cape of Good 
Hope to London…’ – ‘Naturally she [the Emeu] was not available to take 
the 27.10.57 departure from Suez. As always, the European & Australian 
Line were handicapped by not having a replacement steamer, or charter 
steamer, available at the time. Officially: ‘No mails from Suez to Sydney, in 
consequence of the accident to Emeu. By an alternation in the terms of the 
contract, the penalty will be deducted from the next quarterly payment.’ By 
nepotism, most of the penalties were eventually remitted.’969
The owners of the European & Australian Line lost over £700,000 within 
the two years of service,970 despite the fact that they had a mail contract, 
showing once again clearly that a government mail subsidy did not make a 
shipping company prosperous if it could not manage its business. To keep 
the service going, the Royal Mail Line – the well-known contractor for West 
Indian mails – took over the management of the European & Australian Line 
service for half a year until a new contract was made with the P&O for the 
Australian mail service from Suez via Mauritius to Australia, starting in 
early 1859.971
From the viewpoint of information transmission, the following is how 
information circulation would have functioned if the sailings had been 
carried out as planned in the European & Australian Line mail contract, 
starting from 1857.
969 Kirk (1989), 13–21. – The barque Oliver Cromwell mentioned above sailed to London 
in 97 days, arriving 30.1.1858. See Kirk (1989), 39.
970 See Robinson (1964), 196; Cable, 140.

































16.1. 21.1. 24.1. 27.1. 9.3. 11.3. 22.4. 25.4. 29.4. 4.5.
16.5. 21.5. 24.5. 27.5. 9.7. 11.7. 22.8. 25.8. 29.8. 4.9.
16.9. 21.9. 24.9. 27.9. 9.11. 11.11. 22.12. 25.12. 29.12. 4.1.
Source: Kirk (1989), 8.
TABLE 87. Consecutive information circles, London–Sydney, as planned in the 
mail contract, 1857.
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The service of the European & Australian Line was nicely planned, 
enabling three annual information circles between England and Australia. 
There was enough time between arrivals and departures in Britain, also 
affording a smooth service for the bulk mails via Southampton, arriving 
on the 6th and leaving on the 12th. The dispatches would be more hurried 
in Sydney, but the letters could still have been answered in two days. The 
colonists in Melbourne would have had more time for their answers, as the 
ship off-loaded the mails at Melbourne four days before arrival at Sydney, and 
picked up the homeward mails four days after departure from Sydney.972
But the reality was rather different. Table 88 shows the information circles 
enabled by the European & Australian Line during its first year in service.
Even if the performance of the European & Australian Line was poor 
compared to the requirements of the mail contract, its service enabled nearly 
2.5 consecutive information circles within the first year. This was better than 
972 Kirk (1989), 8.
TABLE 88. Consecutive information circles between London and Sydney enabled 
by the European & Australian Line service, 1857.
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could be afforded by the shipping companies which used the route via the 
Cape exclusively. But also two of the three European & Australian Line ships 
– which happened to be part of the annual information circulation picked out
for the table above – sailed eastwards around Africa to take their positions
on the Australia – Suez route. Although they used the Overland route for the
mails in 1858, the company’s performance was even weaker, and only two
consecutive information circles could be achieved.
While this was theory, the practice was even somewhat poorer, probably 
not only because of problems in the shipping itself, but also due to the business 
practices or lack of information which would have enabled merchants to use 
the fastest connections.
The accounts and papers of Henry Eld Symons, already discussed in 
the context of South America, include a dozen letters from Geelong and 
Melbourne, both in Victoria, Australia, sent in 1857.973 They illustrate in an 
interesting way how communications between a Liverpool merchant house 
and its distant trade partners worked during this period.
The first letter in chronological order was sent from Melbourne on 14 
March, 1857 by the European & Australian Line steamship, European. The 
ship departed from Sydney on 11 March on schedule and the mails arrived 
at Southampton on 9 May, the letter being handstamped in the Liverpool 
post office already on the same day. The trip took 56 days. Also the second 
letter, dated and handstamped in Melbourne on 14 April, was transmitted in a 
satisfactory way, the Columbian departing from Sydney on schedule and the 
mails arriving in Southampton from Alexandria by the Jura on 11 June. The 
letter arrived in Liverpool on the next day, 58 days after being written.974
The next two letters were almost three weeks late on arrival. The first 
letter was dated on 12 June, but handstamped in the Geelong post office 
on the 24th. The other was sent from Melbourne on the 22nd. They were 
carried by the European among nearly 15,000 other letters and more than 
17,000 newspapers. Her scheduled departure date from Sydney was 11 June, 
but she left on the 20th, nine days late. This explains why the letter from 
Geelong was written so early, while the Melbourne letter was written with 
the knowledge that the ship was late. Further delay was caused to the mails, 
as there was no European & Australian Line steamer waiting in Alexandria, 
the Etna being elsewhere. The P&O ship Ripon finally took the mails after a 
week’s waiting and they arrived at Southampton on 4 September. The mails 
via Marseilles arrived a week earlier by another P&O vessel, the Vectis, but 
as the letters in question had not been sent by express, they were carried by 
the all-sea route.975
The letter from Geelong was on its way for 85 days, and the letter from 
Melbourne for 75 days, after being written. It is important once again to 
notice that the ten days difference between the time of writing and receiving 
these two letters had nothing to do with the duration of the transport itself 
but was due to delays on shore.
973 The Accounts and Papers of Henry Eld Symons, LRO, 380 MD, 9–21.
974 For the sailing dates, see Kirk (1989), 14, 32.
975 For the sailing dates, see Kirk (1989), 14, 33.
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For some reason, Henry Eld Symons did not answer these letters by the 
following mail steamer, which left Southampton on 12 September, but by 
the one after that, in October. This was an unlucky decision for his business 
communications, as will soon be noticed.
The next two letters from Australia arrived on 25 September, having 
been sent from Geelong on 21 July and from Melbourne on 22 July, and 
transferred in 66 and 65 days respectively. This time, too, there were problems 
in Alexandria. The Etna should have been there for the mails arriving on 8 
September from Australia, but as there was no European & Australian packet 
in sight, the British Consul exercised his authority and had them loaded onto 
the P&O vessels on the 12th.976
Henry Eld Symons did not always mark the answering dates on his business 
letters, but he did mark on the covers from Geelong arriving on 5 and 25 
September that he had answered them on 15 October. He sent the letters by 
the express mail which departed from Marseilles on the 18th. They arrived 
in Alexandria on the 25th, but there was again no steamer to take the letters 
from Suez to Australia, as the Emeu had grounded a few days earlier on the 
Guttal el Bunna reef, 120 miles from Jeddah, and was not available. The 
October mails arrived in Melbourne on 8 January 1858, 85 days after being 
sent from Liverpool. The answers to the letters sent from Australia in June 
1857 were thus dispatched almost seven months later. The delay was partly 
Mr. Symons’ own fault, however. If he had used the opportunity to send the 
letters of 5th September by the next mail steamer to Australia, they would 
have arrived in Melbourne on 13 November.977
The next letters, sent from Geelong on 11 August and from Melbourne 
on 12 August arrived in Liverpool on 17 October within 67 and 66 days 
respectively, but the credit for this was not due to the European and Australian 
Line, which failed to organize the trip. The August mails from Australia did 
not arrive until November, together with the September mails. Instead of 
waiting for that, the letters for Mr. Symons arrived directly in Liverpool by 
the Royal Charter, an auxiliary steamer owned by Gibbs, Bright & Co., a 
well-known Liverpool merchant house and shipping company.978
In December, Mr. Symons received three letters from Australia within three 
days. Two of them, sent from Geelong on 12 September and from Melbourne 
on 16 September, arrived on 7 December after a series of adventures. After 
the Emeu had struck a reef off Jeddah on 22 October, the Captain and the 
Admiralty Agent together with two passengers took the Marseilles portion 
of the mails and left the ship in an Arab boat. After four days sailing, partly 
in heavy rain almost filling the boat, they touched Jeddah, where they were 
hospitably received by the Governor-General. Finally they returned to the 
Red Sea in the hope of being sighted by a passing ship. They were seen by 
976 For the sailing dates, see Kirk (1989), 35.
977 For the sailing dates, see Kirk (1989), 33–35, 39.
978 Both letters were directed ‘Per Royal Charter’ and handstamped by ‘PAID LIVERPOOL 
SHIP OC 17 1857’ on arrival. For the arrival of the August mails, see Kirk (1989), 35; and 
for the Royal Charter, see Stammers, 164–166, 201, 436, 446. The Royal Charter formed 
together with the famous Great Britain the auxiliary steamship service of the Liverpool 
and Australian Steam Navigation Co. For the Great Britain, see Fogg, passim.
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the P&O steamer Madras on 18 November and the mails arrived at Suez on 
the 19th. The British Consul at Alexandria reported on 5 November that the 
Emeu had arrived at Suez without the Marseilles portion of the mails. Three 
weeks later on the 26th the safe arrival of the mails was reported, but at least 
some of the letters annotated ‘via Marseilles’ were sent via Southampton. 
They arrived there on 6 December, including Mr. Symons’ dispatches which 
were delivered in Liverpool on the next day, having been 86 and 82 days 
on their way. One more letter, sent from Geelong on 12 October arrived on 
10 December by the next mail without major difficulties, the trip taking 59 
days.979
The last letter from Melbourne was dated on 16 November and it arrived 
via Southampton in Liverpool on 13 January 1858 in 58 days. The reason for 
the improved service was that the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, better 
known for its West Indian mail service, had taken over the management of 
the European & Australian Line in September 1857. From 1 June 1858 they 
took over the postal contract as well, until a new contract was made with the 
P&O from the beginning of 1859.980
What happened to the information circles, when the P&O took over the 
Australian route at the beginning of 1859? The service started in the same way 
as its predecessors, by sending the first vessels to Australia via the Cape of 
Good Hope. Table 89 shows how well the first year of the P&O mail service 
for Australia fulfilled the expectations of faster information transmission.
TABLE 89. Consecutive information circles between London and Sydney enabled 
by the P&O service, 1859.
979 For the trip to Jeddah, see Kirk (1989), 35–39; Bushell, 94. The stories vary somewhat 
but it makes no major difference from the postal historical point of view.
980 The cost for the British Government was £6,000 each month in addition to the annual 
£185,000. The Royal Mail Line also refused to pay any penalties regarding late arrivals 
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Source: Sailing lists published by Kirk (1989), 57–61, 151–156.
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The P&O would have managed the requirement for three consecutive 
information circles, if their steamer Malta had not been docked at 
Mauritius for five days in October due to repairs to her air-pump tanks. 
Now she arrived in Sydney on 15 November, while the Benares had 
departed the day before. This caused a four-week delay in answers to 
the letters.981
In 1860, the P&O service enabled three consecutive information circles 
between London and Sydney, starting on 18 January, 1860, and ending on 
12 January, 1861 – but only just. The steamer Emeu arrived at Sydney on 
14 March at 4.50 a.m. while the Northam sailed on the same day at 15.14 
p.m.982 As the mails had been sorted on board during the voyage, there was
some hope of being able to receive the letters and answer them in time. The
Melbourne colonists were again luckier, being able to use several more days
for their answers. In fact, the P&O ensured three consecutive information
circles for Melbourne, but not necessarily for Sydney.
The P&O had received the mail contract to Sydney as a leg for a newly 
established service from Aden to Mauritius, but they soon realized that there 
would be several benefits in directing the route via Galle, thus combining 
several mail routes via one hub. The system had been in use by the Royal 
Mail Line in the Caribbean since the early 1840s. Although the route via 
Galle in Ceylon was only 143 miles shorter than the route via Mauritius, 132 
hours were saved by proceeding via Galle. And even more important, the 
stretch of over 3,000 miles between Mauritius and King George’s Sound in 
Australia could be avoided.983
The route via Mauritius was abandoned, the last mails being dispatched 
from London on 18 February and from Sydney on 14 February 1860. The 
next modification to the routine was the change of departure dates, from 
the 18th to the 26th in London and from the 14th to the 22nd in Sydney, 
to find a better match with the other Asian mail routes. From now on, the 
ship from Suez did not sail to Sydney but via Galle to Calcutta, while the 
Australian mails were transferred to a ship from Bombay, which took the 
mails from Galle to Sydney. As a result of these adjustments, the average 
duration of a normal trip from London via Marseilles and Suez to Sydney 
decreased from 53 to 49 days. In the other direction, the difference was 
only one day.984
It took about 20 years from the start of the steamship service across the 
Atlantic to get a working mail service by steamers to Australia. Geography 
was not on the side of the Australians. While the distance from England 
to India and China was clearly cut by the Overland route, thus making the 
981 For the sailing dates of these ships, see Kirk (1989), 61, 155. Also the following month’s 
ship was late, probably due to repairs. She arrived in Sydney on 15 December, while 
the vessel with mails for Europe had again left on the day before. See Kirk (1989), 62, 
156.
982 See the sailing lists published by Kirk (1989), 64–69, 158–162.
983 See Robinson (1964), 197; Kirk (1989), 65.
984 Calculated from the sailing schedules published by Kirk (1989), 57–69, 151–162. Only 
six ‘normal’ sailings have been included from both years, leaving out trips via the Cape 
or trips with exceptional delays due to repairs.
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use of steamers profitable, the distance to Australia was about the same via 
Suez as it was via the Cape. Contrary to the India and China routes, or, for 
example, the route between New York and California in the Western world, 
there was no ‘leverage effect’ in using steamers on the Australian route. Only 
when organized as a leg from Galle, could the special costs of the Australian 
mails be tolerated. With respect to the voyage to Galle, the mails for Calcutta, 
Bombay or China could share the costs of the Australian dispatches.
Figure 35 depicts how the P&O mail service was organized in the early 
1860s. The example is from January–February 1861. The rather new P&O 
iron screw steamer, the Ceylon, 2,110 tons, sailed from Southampton with the 
British all-sea mails on 20 January at 2.35 p.m. She made a call at Gibraltar 
on the 25th and arrived at Malta on the 29th, proceeding for Alexandria on 
the following day. She arrived there on 2 February at 3.53 p.m.
The express mails left from London by train on the 26th, were taken over 
the English Channel and across France to Marseilles and there on board the 
15-year-old P&O paddle steamer Euxine, of 1164 tons. She departed on 28
January at 10 a.m., calling at Malta on the 31st and arriving at Alexandria
on 3 February at 3.25 p.m., one day later than the larger shipment of all-sea
mails from Southampton had arrived. Even if both vessels called at Malta,
FIG. 35. The P&O Australasian mail service network, 1861.
Source: Sailing lists of Kirk (1989), 69, 164; Proud, 76.
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no reloading of mails took place there. It was obviously cheaper and faster 
to let both vessels continue all the way to Alexandria instead of reloading 
and continuing by one ship only.
The vessels did not stay long at Alexandria. The Euxine departed with the 
Australian, Chinese and Calcutta express mails for Marseilles already on 4 
February at 4.05 p.m. and the Ceylon with the respective all-sea mails for 
Southampton five minutes later. They arrived in Marseilles on 10 February 
at 10.55 p.m. (the mails being in London on the 12th) and Southampton on 
16 February at 9 p.m. respectively.
Meanwhile, the mails from Europe were taken from Alexandria by train 
to Suez on 4 February, the P&O iron screw-steamer Colombo, 1,865 tons, 
departing from there on 5 February at 0.25 a.m. She arrived at Aden on the 
10th and at Galle on the 20th. Having unloaded the Australian and China 
mails at Galle she proceeded to Calcutta on the 21st. She called at Madras 
on the 24th and arrived in Calcutta on the 27th.
The China mails were taken from Galle by the Singapore, which departed 
on the 22nd, called at Penang on 1 March, Singapore on the 3rd, proceeding 
the next day and arriving in Hong Kong on 13 March. From there the mails 
for Shanghai were taken by the Aden on 14 March, arriving on the 20th. 
The mails for Foochow departed on the same day by the Manilla which 
arrived at Swatow on the 16th, proceeding on the following day, staying 
at Amoy between the 18th and the 20th and arriving finally at Foochow on 
the 23rd.985
The Singapore was a ten-year-old vessel of 1,190 tons and the Aden and 
Manilla were small coastal steamers (the Aden an iron screw) of 812 and 
646 tons respectively. They were all owned by the P&O.
The Australian mails were taken from Galle by the 1,330-ton iron screw 
steamer Northam, which had arrived from Bombay on 17 February. The ship 
now departed for Sydney on the 21st and called at King George’s Sound 
on 11 March and Melbourne on the 18th, before arriving at Sydney on the 
21st at 1.50 p.m.986
The system was totally in the hands of the P&O and it worked like a clock, 
mostly. The European mails were sent weekly from Southampton, and six 
or seven days later from London for the express transmission via Marseilles, 
in the following order: AC, B, C, B, AC, B, C, B, etc., A being Australia, C 
being Calcutta and China, and B being Bombay.987
The mails arrived by the two routes – via Gibraltar or via Marseilles – in 
Alexandria, to be forwarded to one and the same vessel in Suez which took 
them – excluding the Bombay mails – to Galle, where they were transferred to 
mail steamers for different destinations. There was no unnecessary reloading 
on the European side, and the ship from Suez also continued with the Calcutta 
mails from Galle without reloading.
985 Swatow, Amoy and Foochow were Chinese ports north of Hong Kong, Foochow being 
about half-way to Shanghai. The modern names of the ports are Shantou, Xiamen and 
Fuzhou.
986 Kirk (1989), 69, 164; Proud, 76; Middlemiss, 96–106.
987 The departure dates for the all-sea mails from Southampton were 7th (C), 12th (B), 20th 
(AC) and 27th (B). See Kirk (1989), 77.
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FIG. 36 The letter, written probably in gujarati, includes a bill of lading as well 
as a circular, dated on 15.1.1884, showing the changes in the Shanghai stocks of 
Malwa and Bengal opium. Within a two weeks period, no less than ten steamers had 
brought new opium to the port. The Hydaspes, Brindisi and Pekin were P&O mail 
steamers, and  the Djemnah was owned by the Messageries Maritimes. The letter 
has been carried by a P&O steamer, as it bears the ship cancellation ‘Peninsular 
and Oriental Steam Navigation Company’on the front side of the cover.  
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Galle in Ceylon was the main hub in the Australasian mail service, while 
Hong Kong served as the hub for Chinese mails. The 3,000-mile sea voyage 
from Southampton to Alexandria partly in the difficult Atlantic conditions 
was carried out by the newest and fastest iron screw steamers, which could 
make 13 knots. The ships for the express service in the Mediterranean were 
smaller, while the distance between Marseilles and Alexandria was about 
2,000 miles.
The vessel which carried the mails from Suez to Galle – some 3,400 miles 
in varying monsoons – was also a rather large iron screw steamer, while the 
long Australian run – about 6,000 miles – was conducted by a medium-size 
steamer. From this we may conclude that most passengers for Australia 
generally choose the cheaper sailing vessels and that the P&O route was 
mainly used for mail and fine freight services. For example the Northam 
could take only 127 passengers.988
The Bombay mails were carried separately from the others, alternating 
with the Calcutta, China and Australia mails. As in the time of the EIC 
service, the mails were taken from Suez via Aden to Bombay directly without 
stretching the voyage to the distant Galle. But also the Suez–Aden–Bombay 
route actually continued to Galle, as the steamer which carried the mails 
would continue from there to Sydney. For example the Northam carried the 
European mails from Suez on 14.1., arrived in Bombay on 28.1. and left for 
Galle on 12.2., arrived there on 17.2. and proceeded on 21.2. to Sydney. The 
route between Bombay and Galle, the main hub of transports for China, was 
obviously not necessary for the mail service. But the P&O had ‘inherited’ 
the opium business from the EIC and was the chief exporter of Malwa opium 
from Bombay to China, while Bengal opium was mainly carried by local 
and American companies.989
Opium earnings brought relative stability over the whole range of the 
P&O’s lines for about four decades, and finally ceased as late as in 1917, 
after a ten-year period of reduced trade based on an agreement by the Indian 
and Chinese governments.990 This lucrative trade was probably one of the 
basic reasons for competitors’ complaints about the P&O mail contracts. In 
the late 1860s, when steamship technology had been improved and the Suez 
Canal had been opened, it was not long before there were several competitors 
in the Eastern waters, mail contract or not. This will be discussed in the 
following chapter.
The P&O mail service enabled consecutive information circles between 
London and the different Australasian ports in 1861 as follows:
988 For distances, see e.g. Kirk, The P&O Bombay..., 5, for ship details, Middlemiss, 
96–106.
989 See Stephen Rabson, ‘The Iron Hong. P&O and the Far East from 1845’, in Richard 
Harding, Adrian Jarvis & Alston Kennerley, British Ships in China Seas: 1700 to the 
Present Day (Liverpool, 2004), 120,124.
990 Rabson, 124.
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TABLE 90. Consecutive information circles on the London–Calcutta–London route 
enabled by the P&O service, 186
.
Source: Sailing lists published by Kirk in The P&O Lines…, 54–55.
* There was no departure for Galle at the end of September due to an attempt to
reduce the service to a monthly one. The old system continued in October, however. 
See Kirk, The P&O Lines…, 55.











26.1.1861 13.3. 16.3. 26.4. 91
26.4. 6.6. 12.6. 29.7. 94
10.8. 21.9. 15.10* 28.11. 110
10.12.** 24.1.1862











26.1.1861 27.2. 9.3. 13.4. 77
26.4. 27.5. 9.6. 17.7. 82
26.7. 2.9. 10.9. 17.10. 83
26.10. 30.11. 10.12. 13.1.1862 79
TABLE 91. Consecutive information circles on the London–Hong Kong–London 
route enabled by the P&O service, 1861.
TABLE 92. Consecutive information circles on the London–Shanghai–London route 
enabled by the P&O service, 1861.











26.1.1861 20.3. 23.3. 13.5. 107
27.5. 11.7. 19.7. 15.9. 111
26.9. 18.11. 23.11. 13.1.1862 109
Source: Sailing lists published by Kirk (1989), 69–75, 162–169.
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TABLE 93. Consecutive information circles on the London–Foochow–London route 











26.1.1861 21.3. 24.3. 13.5. 107
27.5. 15.7. 19.7. 15.9. 111
26.9. 16.11. 20.11. 13.1.1862 109
Source: Sailing lists published by Kirk (1989), 69–75, 162–169.
TABLE 94. Consecutive information circles on the London–Sydney–London route 












26.1.1861 21.3. 22.3. 13.5. 107
27.5. 15.7. 22.7. 15.9. 111
26.9. 21.11. 23.11. 13.1.1862 109
Source: Sailing lists published by Kirk (1989), 69–75, 162–169.
As can be noticed, the system was cleverly built. It combined the different 
mail routes in an effective way. All ports (except Bombay) were served via 
Galle, and the schedules matched well. Calcutta’s location near Galle – only 
six days sailing – enabled four consecutive information circles per year, 
each between 11 and 12 weeks. The mail service from London to Shanghai, 
Foochow and Sydney enabled three consecutive information circles per year. 
Each circle took about 3.5 months.991 As can be seen, the voyage back and 
forth from Galle to all these places was calculated so that the mails could be 
carried from Galle to Suez by one and the same steamer.
For the Hong Kong trade, the system was a kind of lucky wheel. Due to its 
geographical location nearer Galle than Shanghai, for example, its merchants 
991 From 1866, there was also a contract mail route across the Pacific from Sydney via 
Wellington, New Zealand, to Panama, across the Isthmus by railway and from Colon by 
steamer to Southampton.  The leg between Australia and Panama was taken care of by the 
Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Company and the leg between Colon 
and Southampton by existing Royal Mail Line services. This eastbound route enabled 
2.5 to three consecutive information circles between Sydney and England per year. The 
length of the sea voyage sometimes caused the classic situation, where the mails arrived 
soon after the next ship to Australia had departed. The line existed for only three years. 
For the sailing data, see Tabeart (2004), 271–281.   
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could occasionally benefit from the second monthly departure, thus shortening 
the length of the information circle. But as can see from Table 91, this did 
not always work, and even if it did, the schedule was tight and for practical 
reasons probably impossible.
In England, the departures from Southampton enabled the same number of 
consecutive information circles with each of the Australasian ports (except 
for the ‘extra’ Hong Kong mails) as the express route via Marseilles, but 
a single journey was some six days longer. The time to answer the all-sea 
letters arriving via Southampton was naturally short, as they arrived later 
than the express dispatches and departed earlier. But as a whole, the system 
worked well. It can be stated that the P&O reached the same level of shipping 
management in the early 1860s as the Royal Mail Line did in the Caribbean 
and especially in South America during the same period. And in both areas, 
this was the time when the French entered the scene.
Further Development
Competition with the French – The Suez Canal and the compound engine 
increase the number of rivals – Mails for South Africa – The introduction 
of the telegraph
Competition with the French
The French had operated in the Mediterranean mail service since the 1830s, 
but it was only in the early 1860s that the French Government made a decision 
to extend the service to the rest of the world. As already discussed in earlier 
chapters, the Government made a mail contract with Compagnie Générale 
Transatlantique, or the French Line, for a mail steamship service to and from 
the United States and the Caribbean and with Compagnie des Messagerie 
Impériales for a service to and from South America and the Far East.
Messagerie Impériales started its service to the ports east of Egypt only 
after the railway between Alexandria and Suez had been completed, thus 
avoiding all the trouble with camel caravans, river boats, and related issues. 
And as in South America, where the French could just copy a tried and true 
system already established by the Royal Mail Line, so in the East, Messagerie 
Impériales could easily follow the guidelines set by the P&O in organizing 
its routes in a well functioning way.
Messagerie Impériales signed a mail contract in June 1861 and the 
service started gradually over the next few years. French Post Offices were 
established at Suez, at Saigon in French Indochina, in Vietnam of today, and 
at Shanghai; postal agents were appointed at several places and, up to July 
1864, no fewer than a dozen mail steamers were placed on the principal line 
and its branch services.992
992 See Raymond Salles, La Poste Maritime Française. Tome V. Les Paquebots de L’Extrême-
Orient (Limassol, 1993), 9–15.
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As can be noted in Figure 35 (see p. 375), the P&O had established an 
extra mail service between Singapore and Saigon already in 1861. This mail 
route mainly served the French troops in China, until Messagerie Impériales 
got their own service started in late 1862.993
The French service included mail transmission from Europe via Marseilles 
to Alexandria, by train to Suez and from there via Galle and Saigon to Hong 
Kong. The first mails departed from Suez on 27 October, 1862. A branch 
line connected Hong Kong with Shanghai from early 1863, and this line was 
continued from Shanghai to Yokohama in Japan from 1865. Other branch 
lines served French interests at Calcutta via Galle and Madras from late 1862, 
and at Bourbon (Réunion) and Mauritius by a direct voyage from Suez from 
September 1864.994
Did the British - French double service to Hong Kong, or later to Shanghai, 
speed up business information transmission? Not very much, but it was 
a minor improvement in the development of communications, anyway. 
Compared to the P&O service between London and Hong Kong in 1861 
993 The P&O service for Saigon is mentioned for the first time in Kirk’s sailing lists at the end 
of July 1861, but according to Salles the period lasted from February 1861 to June 1862. 
The French service for Indochina was inaugurated in October 1862. See Kirk (1989), 72, 
166; Salles, Tome V, 25–27, 30–31. Kirk reports the last P&O departure from Saigon on 
1.12.1862 and the last arrival on 3.1.1863. See the sailing lists by Kirk (1989), 80, 177.








































19.1. - - 23.2. 26.2. 
French 
service




18.4. 19.4. 21.5. 23.5. 
French 
service




18.7. 19.7. 19.8. 23.8. 
French 
service









Sources: Sailing lists of Salles, Tome II, 189 and Tome V, 28–29; and Kirk, The P&O 
Lines…, 63–64.
* The P&O steamer Behar broke a shaft and was towed to Singapore. The mails
for Hong Kong were carried by another P&O vessel, the Ottawa, after a notable 
delay. See Kirk, 63.
TABLE 95. Consecutive information circles on the London–Hong Kong–London 
route, 1865.
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depicted in Table 91, the double service enabled four consecutive information 
circles per year, at least in theory. In late 1865, the machine breakdown of the 
P&O steamer Behar caused a serious delay in the rest of the chain and made 
it impossible for merchants to answer the October mails by the November 
steamer from Hong Kong. Without that incident, the double service would 
have enabled four full circles that year. On the other hand, the P&O service 
alone could only accomplish 3.5 consecutive circles. See Table 95.
The French departures from Hong Kong matched nicely with the British 
arrivals, leaving two to four days’ time for answers. This did not always work 
the other way round, however. During 1865, four departures of the P&O 
vessels were on the day of a French arrival, three departures were before a 
French arrival, and only five departures were well-timed at one-to-four days 
after a French arrival.995
In Shanghai, the arrivals and departures of the two mail services did not 
always match in the optimum way for merchants, or anyone else. It should 
be remembered that, most probably, as in South America, people used any 
service that would bring their messages as fast as possible to the destination. 
Nationalistic feelings did not hinder British merchants from using French 
services, or vice versa. But even if the departure dates from Marseilles were 
fixed – the British dates being the 12th and the 18th (closing the mail in 
London two days earlier) and the French date being the 19th – the arrival and 
departure dates at Shanghai varied, causing both delays and overlapping.
In 1865, an average passage from Marseilles to Shanghai took 47 days, 
excluding cases where there were two or three machine breakdowns or other 
major incidents. The British trips varied between 42 and 54 days, while the 
French service varied between 45 and 50 days. This naturally caused problems 
in schedule planning.
As can be noticed in Table 96, there were in fact several periods when the 
French steamers took home answers to mails carried by their own service, 
as well as to those carried by the British service, but also vice versa. In 
between, there were ships leaving Shanghai before any new dispatches had 
arrived from Europe. Even if the French service was only once a month, they
always carried the freshest answers back home, while every second British 
mail steamer actually left on her homeward trip with a minor portion of 
important letters, the major part having already been taken home a few days 
earlier by the French service.
The explanation for this was naturally the hard competition between the 
two companies, not so much concerning the mails (for which they both got 
paid through their contracts), but more concerning the passengers and cargo. 
In the coming years, the P&O could not help but notice that the French 
steamers were newer, more comfortable, faster and more conveniently 
scheduled. Such things as a laundry on board could do a lot for the comfort 
of passengers on a six-week voyage. But already in the 1860s, the P&O had 
to face the fact that the French were taking over not only its passengers, but 
also its cargoes. Messagerie Impériales increased its silk transportation from 
995 Calculated from the sailing lists published by Salles, Tome V, 28–29; and Kirk, The P&O 
Lines…, 63–64.
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Shanghai from 11.7% of the total in 1863 to 42.4% in 1866, ‘because its ships 
went direct to Suez, and sailed 2 or 3 days before P&O’s’. Silk contributed 
£119,000 to P&O’s income in 1869, but within two years its freight rates 
dropped by 65%.996
996  See Rabson, 123. In fact, the Messagerie ships did not sail directly from Shanghai to Suez 
but there was a change in Hong Kong, and as noted in the text above, P&O changed its 
departure dates from Shanghai in late 1865 to match the French departures (and the French 
again changed their departures and the P&O followed). Nevertheless, the P&O cargoes 
TABLE 96. Mail arrivals and departures of the British and French mail steamers 
in Shanghai, January–June 1865.









British 31.1. British 9.2.





British 28.2. British 9.3.





British 31.3. British 9.4.





British 27.4. British 6.5.





British 27.5. British 6.6.





French 3.7. British 5.7.
British 25.6. British 5.7.
Sources: Sailing lists of Salles, Tome V, 37; and Kirk, The P&O Lines…, 62–64. 
– Most of the French arrival dates are estimates (Hong Kong departure date + four) 
as Salles does not always give the exact dates for 1865 and 1866.
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The Suez Canal and the compound engine increase the number of rivals
The P&O’s problems did not end with the strong French competition in Far 
Eastern waters or with several ship wrecks during these years.997 Both the 
company and the British Government had totally misjudged the importance 
of the Suez Canal, which the French diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps had 
promoted with great enthusiasm from the mid-1850s. Instead, the P&O had 
invested heavily in the Egyptian railway and in the accommodation and 
related facilities on the Overland route. The British Government and the 
press were strongly against the Canal, which they thought could be a political 
risk during a war, if it were in French hands, as it was planned to be. British 
investors refused to subscribe for Canal Company shares, wishing that the 
plan would be forgotten because of the economic and technical risks included. 
Against all presumptions, the Canal project was completed in 1869. The new 
route shortened the voyage to and from Asia by thousands of miles compared 
with the traditional seaway around the Cape, which was still in general use, 
excluding the mail steamers.998
Simultaneously with the Canal opening, another great invention facilitated 
steamship trade with the East. The compound engine, even though it had been 
in limited use since the mid-1850s, had not earlier been fully appreciated by 
shipowners. It had mainly been used in the Pacific during its earliest period, as coal 
was expensive there and fuel economy was thus of great importance. Nearer Britain it 
was not so highly esteemed, as there was plenty of fuel and it was low-priced.999
After 1861, the P&O gradually began to build steamers with compound 
engines, the Mooltan being the first vessel with the new technical 
construction.1000 Despite being one of the first to introduce the compound 
engine, the P&O had an average of 170 sailing ships employed each year 
to carry coal to the Eastern depots. For example, the company had a coal 
and mails were carried by three different ships to Suez with changes in Hong Kong and 
Galle. The company preferred to serve the Calcutta merchants by direct sailings to Suez 
with no changes en route. See the sailing lists published by Kirk (1989), e.g. 91, 187.
997  At least the following mail-carrying vessels were lost in the P&O service east of Suez 
between 1843 and 1875: the Pacha with 16 lives in 1851, the Douro in 1853,  the Erin 
in 1857, the Alma in 1859, the Canton also in 1859, the Malabar in 1860, the Colombo 
in 1862, the Corea with 103 lives in 1864, the Niphon with 13 lives in 1868, the 
Benares also in 1868, the Carnatic with 26 lives in 1869, and the Rangoon in 1871. See 
Middlemiss, 92–108. – The French losses between 1862 and 1875 were the Hydaspe in 
1864, the Nil with 142 lives in 1874 and the Neva in 1875. See Haws (1999), 20–36.
998   For the Suez Canal project, see Karabell, passim.; for the Canal and the P&O, see Cable, 
153–168. – At that time, the eastern seas provided a major source of employment for the 
sailing fleet, while the Atlantic was already dominated by the steamers. In 1868, over a 
million tons of sailing ships left British ports for the Far East, a greater tonnage than the 
sailing fleet that headed for North America that year. See Max E. Fletcher, ‘The Suez 
Canal and World Shipping, 1869–1914’ in The Journal of Economic History, vol. XVIII 
(December 1958), No 4, 558.
999   See Fletcher, 557.
1000 After the Mooltan, the following steamers in the P&O fleet were also provided 
 with compound engines during the first half of the 1860s: Poonah, Carnatic, 
 Rangoon and Golconda in 1863, Delhi and Baroda in 1864, and Tanjore in 1865. 
 Many of these and several other P&O steamers were later re-engined with more 
  powerful compound engines.  See Middlemiss, 107–110.
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shed for 6,000 tons at Shanghai, another for 10,000 tons at Hong Kong, and 
another for 2,200 tons at Yokohama.1001
In the 1860s, coal prices varied greatly in different parts of the world 
depending on the freight costs. While coal could be shipped to New York 
for 6 s. per ton and the more expensive Welsh coal for 11 s., a shipment to 
Gibraltar cost 14 s., to Alexandria 19 s., to Bombay 24 s., to Galle 27 s., to 
Hong Kong 33 s. and to Shanghai 45 s. Interestingly, the coal freight to Suez 
was 40 s., more than double the price to Alexandria.1002 This was because 
the coal was taken to Suez overland across the desert due to the adverse 
monsoons in the Indian Ocean.1003
The most important innovation of the compound engine was its economical 
fuel consumption. While the consumption of coal had been reduced from 
the eight to ten pounds per horsepower per hour used in the 1830s to fewer 
than four pounds in the mid-1860s, the compound engine further reduced 
fuel consumption to somewhat over two pounds of good coal per indicated 
horsepower per hour.1004 Together with the shortened sea route enabled by the 
Suez Canal, this notably improved the conditions for profitable shipping. It 
meant that not only the subsidized mail companies but any shipowner could 
play a role in the Far Eastern business. Among the most important were the 
Ocean Steam Ship Co. (the Blue Funnel Line) of Liverpool, the Glen Line 
owned by MacGregor and Co. of Glasgow, the Castle Line owned by Thomas 
Skinner and Co., the Shire Line founded by Captain D. J. Jenkins, and other 
companies operating ships in East Indian and Chinese waters, such as the 
British India Steam Navigation Co. and Jardine Matheson and Co.1005
The hopes of the Mediterranean nations that the opening of the Suez 
Canal would bring great prosperity to their maritime fleets at the expense 
of Britain were doomed to disappointment. The advantage of being brought 
several thousand miles closer to the huge markets and resources of the East 
by the Canal seemed to have only an illusory cash value for the shipowners of 
France, Italy, Russia and Austria-Hungary. As far as shipping was concerned, 
the Canal had been ‘cut by French energy and Egyptian money for British 
advantage’.1006
1001  See Cable, 166; Rabson, 121–122.
1002 ‘Coal from Liverpool, Birkenhead or Garston’, in Boult, English & Brandon’s 
  Freight Circular 6.6.1863. (SRLC).
1003 See Cable, 92. – For further statistics about coal export freight rates from 
 Britain (1818–1913), see Charles K. Harley, ‘Coal Exports and British Shipping, 
 1850–1913’ in Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 26, Number 3, July 
  1989, 334–336.
1004 See Fletcher, 557. – For a technical description of the progress of steam 
 shipping, especially the compound engine, see Holt, 1–9. – Alfred Holt, originally 
 a railway engineer, became interested in the Far Eastern trade in the 1860s and 
 started a steamship line by steamers with developed compound engines between 
 Liverpool and the coast of China in 1866. See Francis E. Hyde, Blue Funnel. A 
 History of Alfred Holt and Company of Liverpool from 1865 to 1914 (Liverpool, 
 1956), 11–23. See also Cooper, 226–227. – For wider economic aspects of the 
 change from coal to steam during a somewhat later period, see Kaukiainen 
  (2004), 113–128.
1005  See Francis E. Hyde, Far Eastern Trade 1860–1914 (Liverpool, 1973), 21–23.
1006  Fletcher, 564.
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But the growing competition caused a remarkable cut in freight rates. In 
1866, the P&O carried specie – partly gold, partly silver – worth nearly £11 
million, and earned about £230,000 for it. Six years later, they carried nearly 
double the amount of specie, but received only £60,000. In another example, 
having carried 46,000 bales of silk for £110,000 in 1868, the company 
carried 50,000 bales for only £44,000 three years later – equivalent to only 
37 percent of the old rate. The highest classes of cargo moving between 
England and India or China were quickly transferred to the steamship, 
including cotton goods, cowhides, ginger, indigo and tea. But the steamers 
also took a substantial portion of low-value, bulky commodities such as jute 
cuttings or rice.1007
Falling freight rates were a problem not only for the shipping companies 
trading with the Far East, but everywhere. The decline which started in the 
1860s continued right up to the early 1890s, with annual decreases of real 
freight rates by 2.5 to three percent. According to Harley, the timing of the 
decline suggests that the introduction of the new technology was the main 
source of the general decline in rates.1008
For the P&O, the increasing competition on the Far Eastern routes was 
most unwelcome. A great deal of the company’s investments in the East lost 
their significance and they were just written off in the accounting. The P&O 
lost much of its earlier income, and even the British Post Office used the 
opportunity to tell the company that if it started transporting the mails through 
the Canal instead by railway as was stated in the contract, the company’s 
subsidy would be reduced by £30,000 a year. The generously subsidized 
French, Italian and Austrian shipping companies, which had widened their 
Mediterranean services east of Suez after the Canal opening, carried all their 
mails through the cut. Passengers were naturally attracted to these lines and 
away from the P&O because there was no need for themselves and their 
baggage to be trans-shipped. The situation led to a farce where the P&O 
vessels went through the Canal, but the mails were unloaded at Alexandria 
and taken by train to Suez and there loaded back onto the ship. This continued 
until a revised contract allowed the mails to be carried through – but only after 
the company accepted a reduction of the subsidy by £20,000 a year.1009
Despite the bitter claims and competing bids for government mail contracts 
by the British rivals, the P&O continued to conduct the mail service on 
the Far Eastern routes.1010 Several branch services were taken care of by 
1007 Cable, 164; Fletcher, 560–561. For the Far Eastern freight rates, see also Hyde 
  (1973),  24–26.
1008  See Harley (1989), 315.
1009  See Cable, 165–166.
1010  For example, the Ocean Steam Ship Company of Alfred Holt competed seriously 
 for the mail contracts on the China route in 1867 and 1879, but lost. Holt’s 
 public arguments about the injurious effects of the subsidies on freight and passage 
 rates may be somewhat exaggerated, in view of the quickly changing 
 business environment and its effects as a whole. And even if he strongly criticised 
 the contract system, Holt continuously repeated attempts to secure one for his 
 own company. See Hyde (1956), 40–42. – This happened simultaneously with 
 William Inman’s efforts to capture the mail contract from the Cunard Line in the 
 North Atlantic. Lamport & Holt, the well-known shipping company in which 
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other companies, e.g. Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co.’s British India Steam 
Navigation Co. had served on the Calcutta–Rangoon route from the mid-
1850s and on the Calcutta–Karachi, Bombay–Karachi and Bombay–Basra 
routes from the early 1860s.1011
In addition to the already mentioned changes in the business environment 
concerning the mail service to the Far East, there was an additional challenge 
to meet in Europe. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 stopped the railway 
connection from Calais through France to Marseilles. The bridge over the 
Oise at Creil was blown up in September that year. For a time, other routes 
were tried, but they were either overrun by the invading Prussians, or their 
  Alfred Holt’s brother George was a main partner, also held a mail contract 
  between Liverpool and South America in 1868–1876. See Howat, 159–174.
1011  See Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets, British India S.N. Co. (Hereford, 1991), 
  12–13. Kirk mentions that the company also had a mail contract between Sydney 
  and England via Suez and Naples from 1879. See Kirk (1989), 240–241.
FIG. 38. Mail bags being brought on board a mail steamship at Brindisi, 1872.
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circuitous nature caused unacceptable delays.1012 In early November, a new 
route was introduced via Brindisi in Italy. The change did not affect the total 
duration of information transmission. While the trip by train was longer 
from the Channel coast to Brindisi than to Marseilles, the trip by steamer 
from Brindisi to Alexandria was shorter than from Marseilles to Alexandria. 
Thus, an average trip from Sydney to London in 1870 took 50 to 52 days, 
independent of the railway route in Europe.1013
By the mid-1870s, the speed of the mail services to and from the Far East 
had reached a level at which it was difficult, and probably unnecessary, to 
improve it. The systems worked satisfactorily, and the most urgent news 
could always be transmitted by telegraph. The arrival of the Asian telegraph 
will be described later in this chapter.
As a final example of the P&O services in the East, Table 97 shows the 
consecutive information circles enabled by the company’s mail sailings to 
and from Shanghai in 1875.
TABLE 97. Consecutive information circles enabled by the P&O service between 













~7.1.1875 11.1. 23.2. 26.2. 7.4. ~11.4.
~15.4. 19.4. 27.5. 30.5. 16.7. ~20.7.
~22.7. 26.7. 1.9. 5.9. 21.10. ~25.10.
~28.10. 1.11. 12.12. 17.12. 27.1.1876 ~31.1.
Source: Sailing lists published by Kirk, The P&O Lines…, 86–87. – The London 
departure and arrival dates are estimates. In the mid-1870s, the railway trip from 
London to Brindisi probably took three days instead of four, as in 1870. This would 
leave some more time for answering letters in England.
The P&O service for Shanghai was now working about as well as it could 
at this time period. The sailings enabled nearly four consecutive information 
circles a year, and there was no difficulty in answering letters in due time in 
either Shanghai or England. The one-way trip took about six weeks in each 
direction. Because the French service was also bi-monthly from mid-1871 and 
the two companies’ departures took place on alternate weeks, there was now 
a well-working weekly service to and from Shanghai all year round.1014 This 
1012 The reorganizing of mail services, including changing departure dates etc. are 
  explained by Kirk (1989), 127.
1013  Calculated from the sailing dates published by Kirk (1989), 123–130, 211–220.
1014 See the sailing lists published by Kirk, The P&O Lines…, 86–87; and Salles, 
  Tome V, 105.
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arrangement had been introduced at the same time as Messagerie Impériales 
doubled their service in July 1871.1015
After this, the speed of business information transmission could not easily 
be improved due to the long voyage.1016 But using the same model as in 
the South American mail service, the alternate sailings made it possible for 
merchants to provide weekly information about their business affairs, even 
though it took nearly three months to receive a response.
Mails for South Africa
For South Africa or St. Helena, places of such importance during the heyday 
of canvas, the steamship mail service via the Overland route was of as little 
significance as it was for Australia. While East India and China had been 
connected to Europe by regular mail steamers from the early 1840s, South 
Africa was not considered important enough for subsidised steamship services 
for a long time. Mails were sent to and from the colony by sailing ships 
calling at the port, without any certainty of schedule or safe arrival. Prior to 
1857, however, there were two attempts to conduct a regular steamship mail 
service between England and South Africa. From December 1850 to 1854, 
the General Screw Steam Shipping Company provided a monthly service 
to the Cape, and from August 1856, there was a contract with the Lindsay 
Line for less than a year. Despite the £30,000 mail subsidy, both companies 
ran into trouble and had to abandon the service.1017
In 1857, the British Government awarded the South African mail contract 
to a new company, to be known as the Union Line. It was to provide a bi-
monthly service, and would receive an extra bonus of £250 per day from the 
Cape Colonial Government each time the mail ship arrived from Plymouth 
in less time than the agreed 35 days. For this reason, the Union Line mail 
steamers were ‘more frequently under contract time than any others, the next 
being those of the Cunard Line’.1018
The progress made in speeding up the voyage over the next few years can be 
read from the mail contracts. While the Union Line vessels were allowed to use 
38 days for a one-way trip in the 1863 contract, the allowed duration of the trip 
was decreased to 35 days in 1868, 30 days in 1873 and 26 days in 1876.1019
 This progression was no less remarkable than in any other place where mail 
steamships took over from traditional sailing vessels. In the early 1830s, the 
1015  See Salles, Tome V, 104.
1016 For comparison, in 1900 the P&O sailings to Shanghai, via Brindisi or Marseilles, 
 took some 32 to 35 days and enabled approximately five consecutive information 
 circles  per year. See the sailing lists published by Kirk, The P&O Lines…, 140–141.
1017 See Cattell, 11. – From 1852, the General Screw service was lengthened by a leg 
 via Mauritius to India. This route was never profitable as the P&O already used 
  the Overland route for mails to Calcutta. See Robinson (1964), 172–175.
1018 See Robinson (1964), 175–176. For the early years of the Union Line, see 
 Murray, 1–31. According to Cattell, the first contracts allowed the company to use 
 38 days for the voyage. Thus, it is possible that Robinson means the contract of 
  1868. See Cattell, 12.
1019   In the 1893 mail contract, the allowed duration of the trip was only 19 days. See 
  Cattell,  12.
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duration of voyages by merchant sailing ships between England and the Cape 
of Good Hope had been 82 days outward and 72 days homeward on average. 
The mails departed only if there was a ship available, which meant that the 
letters were sometimes waiting at Cape Town for several weeks before they 
were picked up by a homeward bound vessel. The tea clippers of the 1860s 
and 1870s made the home voyage faster, but even they used about 50 days 
between passing the Cape and arriving at London. As the sailing ships did 
not carry public mail at that time, their speed was not of much importance 
in this regard, however.1020
Until 1872, the Union Line kept its mail contract without difficulty, sailing 
from England on the 10th and 26th of each month.1021 The factual sailing 
dates are not published by Cattell or any other postal historian, but a rough 
calculation shows that the system enabled four consecutive information 
circles between England and Cape Town. For the colonialists at Durban in 
Natal on the East Coast of South Africa, the trip was 800 miles longer than to 
the Cape and needed a further inter-colonial service. To be able to calculate 
the duration of these voyages, correspondence from that period would be 
needed for reference.
The situation changed abruptly in 1872, when the Castle Line, established 
by Donald Currie of Liverpool (who earlier worked for the Cunard Line), 
started a regular service between England and South Africa. Their ships 
were newer and faster and made the trip in 25 days, the sensational record 
of 1873 being 23 days. At that time, the Union Line ships sailed on the 10th 
and the 26th of each month, so the Castle Line vessels left from Dartmouth 
three days before the Union Line steamer and as they were faster, arrived at 
the Cape almost as soon as the competitor ship, which had left Southampton 
eleven days earlier. Naturally, people started to endorse their letters to be 
carried by these steamers instead of the official mail service. While the mails 
carried by the Castle Line steamers were considered private ship letters, they 
were also notably cheaper, the ½ oz. letter fee being only four pence against 
the one shilling rate charged for the official mail.1022
Before the mail contract with Union Line came to an end in 1876, the Cape 
Colonial Government negotiated with Donald Currie about a supplement mail 
contract. The Cape colonialists wanted cheap postage, more frequent mails 
and no amalgamation between the Union Line and the Castle Line, which 
would lead to a monopoly. The healthy competition led to a satisfactory 
situation in which the bi-monthly mail service by the two companies was 
organized so that there was actually a weekly service in both directions.1023 
1020 The 1832 averages are calculated from Lloyd’s List maritime intelligence 1832–
   1833. The outward trip average covers 45 trips and the homeward average 43 trips 
made during that period. The tea clippers for London were not often reported passing 
the Cape, even if those on their way to New York were. The average duration of 
the trips therefore covers only eight voyages, calculated from the sailing dates 
published by McGregor, 200–232.
1021  See Cattell, 12–15.
1022  See Cattell, 12–16; Robinson (1964), 178–180.
1023 See Cattell, 16; Robinson (1964), 182–183. The two companies were finally 
  merged in the early 1900s during the South African war, forming the well-
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This must have increased the number of consecutive information circles to 
five or probably six per year, although it cannot be verified here due to a 
lack of sailing data.
The introduction of the telegraph
As in other parts of the world, the telegraph came to the East in small 
portions, shortening the duration of communications by a few days here 
and there. The principal telegraph lines in Europe were completed in the 
1850s and 1860s, and internal networks were linked across national borders 
to form an international system. From the early 1850s, it was also possible 
to lay submarine cables on shorter routes, e.g. in the English Channel. Due 
to economic and political reasons, it was mainly the British companies 
which were behind the laying of cables between the Mediterranean 
islands and the mainland in the 1850s. The cable which would run the 
length of the Mediterranean was started at the eastern end of the sea 
when Glass, Elliot and Co. prepared a line between Alexandria, Tripoli 
and Malta. It subsequently became the joint property of the company 
and the British Government. In 1866, a new and modern cable was laid 
between Alexandria and Malta by the British-owned Anglo-Mediterranean 
Telegraph Co.1024
 known shipping line called the Union-Castle Line. See Marischal Murray, 
  Union-Castle Chronicle 1853–1953 (Glasgow, 1953), 134–139.
1024  See Jorma Ahvenainen, The Far Eastern Telegraphs (Helsinki 1981), 13–14.
FIG. 39. Combined use of telegraph and ordinary mail. The telegram, sent Overland 
by the Alexandria, Cairo & Suez Telegraph Company, was forwarded from Suez (note 
the B02 handstamp) to Bombay by the P&O steamer Benares, which departed from 
Suez on 12.6.1864 and arrived in Bombay on 24.6.1864. The overland telegraph was 
most likely built in accordance with the railway, around 1859.      
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With the completion of the cables between Malta and Alexandria, 
telegraphs from London and other cities in Western Europe reached 
Alexandria via Sicily and Malta, which had been connected in 1859. In 1870, 
two important lines were again completed: the line between Marseilles and 
Malta, which provided a direct link between London and Alexandria via 
Paris and Marseilles, and the Falmouth, Gibraltar and Malta Company’s 
cable between England and Malta, which provided a British line all the way 
from London to Alexandria.1025
The earliest telegraphic communication with India was established in 
1864–1865 using a combination of land and sea lines. The route followed 
the Turkish Government’s line from Constantinople to Fao, via Baghdad. 
From Fao, the Indo-European Telegraph Department, financed by the Indian 
Government, laid coastal cables (the Persian Gulf Cables) to Karachi via 
Bushire and Jask. This line was soon extended by a land line across Persia 
across Bushire to Teheran. Shortly afterwards a service was inaugurated 
between Teheran and Moscow via Tiflis. There were now two alternative 
telegraph communications between Western Europe and India, one via 
Constantinople and the other via Moscow. However, both these lines 
proved to be rather week and unreliable, and new options were sought very 
soon.1026
The new telegraph system was built by the Anglo-German Indo-European 
Telegraph Company, which was established by Werner von Siemens and 
registered in Britain. The line was built across Continental Europe, through 
Prussia, then via Kiev, Odessa and the Caucasus to Julfa on the border 
between Russia and Persia. From there the line continued to Teheran where 
it was connected with the Indian Government lines. The line was completed 
in 1869, but for various technical problems, it was brought into general use 
the following year. Simultaneously a new rival, the British Indian Telegraph 
Company, entered the scene, building a submarine cable from Alexandria to 
Bombay via the Red Sea and Aden.1027
The cable to Bombay was continued by the Indian Government’s land lines 
to Madras and via Penang to Singapore by the end of 1870. The following 
year a cable from Singapore to Hong Kong via Saigon was finished and, in 
addition, Australia and the Dutch East Indies were connected to the British 
lines. By October 1872, a land telegraph stretched across Australia to the 
south coast, thus connecting Adelaide and the south-eastern colonies with 
the mother country.1028
 For the Far Eastern trade, the new means of communication was naturally 
very welcome, although the use of it was limited to the most urgent messages. 
For example, the number of telegrams sent from India grew from 311,000 
in 1867 to 577,000 in 1870 and 907,000 in 1876. The respective numbers of 
mail items sent during these years were also growing fast: from 69 million 
1025  Ahvenainen (1981), 14.
1026  Ahvenainen (1981), 16.
1027  Ahvenainen (1981), 16–17.
1028  Ahvenainen (1981), 17–19; Robinson (1964), 272.
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in 1867 to 86 million in 1870 and 119 million in 1875.1029 In other words, the 
number of telegrams sent was 0.45% of the number of items sent by mail in 
1867, growing to 0.67% in 1870 and to 0.76% in 1876. It was only in the late 
1880s that the number of telegrams sent in India reached 1% of the number 
of sent mail items. This gives an idea of the nature of telegraph usage. As 
everywhere else, it was expensive, and often unreliable.
Jorma Ahvenainen describes in an interesting way the political, cultural 
and economic difficulties met while laying telegraph cables in Chinese waters, 
as well as building the Siberian line to the East. For further details, his book 
on the Far Eastern Telegraphs is warmly recommended.1030
From the viewpoint of this study, it may be relevant to note that there does 
not seem to be a specific date when the telegraph ‘took over’ from traditional 
business communications. Where the telegraph existed, it was used to shorten 
the duration of information transmission in critical situations. An early note 
by Kirk verifies that the new system was immediately adopted by the shipping 
companies, when such an option was available, and that there also existed an 
early telegraph line east of Suez: ‘‘Northam’ arrived at Suez on 26.4.59 with 
the Bombay mails and ‘Emeu’ should have arrived the day after. Both sets 
of mails should have left Alexandria on 29.4.59 – by ‘Nepaul’ (Marseilles) 
or by ‘Ripon’ (Southampton). But Alexandria had no news of ‘Emeu’. The 
submarine telegraph cable was out of action between Aden and the Red Sea 
Telegraph Station at Suakin (‘the gutta-percha perished’ – British Library 
records). Thus Alexandria would not know about the ‘Emeu’ until a signal 
was received from Suakin.’1031
An interesting letter by Alfred Holt gives detailed directions to the 
Agamemnon’s Captain Middleton for the ship’s first voyage to Shanghai in 
1866. In addition to orders regarding schedules, ports, coaling, cargo and 
various agents to be met, as well as arrangements for separate cooking for 
Chinese passengers, there were also requirements to send information to the 
owners from different places. From Mauritius, a letter should be sent to an 
agent in Alexandria to be telegraphed to England with the following short 
text: ‘Agamemnon Mauritius Monday twenty eight May’ with the correct 
date replaced instead of the date given. Holt refers to the foreign telegrams 
which are sometimes ‘almost incomprehensible’.1032
Holt also writes that if there is a chance of writing to Ceylon before the 
mail leaves for Suez, the Captain should write to an agent at Galle and request 
him to send a similar telegram. ‘Of course you will not write to both.’ At 
Galle, the Captain should write by the first mail to the agent and ask him 
to send a similar telegraph to the one from Mauritius to inform the owners 
about the ship’s safe arrival. On the way homewards, the agent at Galle 
should telegraph the owners about any deviations from the plan. It would 
also be a convenience if the Captain could telegraph home when passing 
1029  Mitchell, 773.
1030  See Ahvenainen (1981), 17–58.
1031  Kirk (1989), 149.
1032 ‘Directions to Capt. Middleton when sailing to China with the Agamemnon on her 
 first voyage April 19th 1866’, Blue Funnel, Ocean Steamship Co. OA 2583, (MMM).
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Lisbon, and if he could not, he should try to telegraph from some place in 
the English Channel.1033
For the mail contract companies, the telegram was a valuable tool as the 
problems met by one of their vessels often caused a chain of delays in their 
service. For any shipowner, the telegraph was a management tool which 
made it possible to keep better control over their businesses far away. To 
speed up information transmission between Europe and the Far East, it was 
now possible to ask the agents in e.g. Alexandria to telegraph the most urgent 
news to London, while the mails were still on their way for a few days.
Thus, from the 1860s, the real duration of information transmission was 
often shorter than the fastest steam ship connection. As in the case of the 
North Atlantic mail route (where the telegraphs shortened the duration 
of information transmission between Ireland and London, or between 
Newfoundland and New York, long before the Atlantic cable was laid), or 
as in the case of South America (where merchants could use the telegram 
between their positions and the northern coast of Brazil, and between Lisbon 
and London), so the Far Eastern trade benefited from partial solutions for 
years before the long intercontinental lines were established.





Earlier studies have already shown that the speed of one-way information 
transmission grew markedly during the 19th century before the introduction 
of the intercontinental submarine telegraph. The interesting question which 
has not been systematically examined to date is: Why? What happened? Was 
the change from sail to steam and from mail coach to railway the only proper 
answer? And did the shortening of one-way trips automatically improve the 
information circulation of business enterprises? For a merchant, it was often 
critical to be able to reply to letters rapidly, not just to receive news from the 
other side of the ocean.
Due to their own maritime and trade interests, the British became the 
forerunners in organizing regular overseas mail transmission, first by sailing 
packets and, as soon as the technology was developed enough, by steamships. 
Only a few months after the first successful transatlantic crossings entirely 
by steam power in 1838, the British Government decided to organize regular 
mail steamship services on the Empire’s most important trade routes: to North 
America, the West Indies and East India.
Instead of building and managing a fleet of steamers itself, the British 
Post Office ‘outsourced’ the overseas mail services by giving a Royal 
Charter to three shipping companies, which would take care of the mail 
sailings: the Cunard Line, the Royal Mail Line, and the P&O. This happened 
simultaneously with a few other revolutionary ideas: the change of British 
inland postage rates from different fees depending on the length of the journey 
to a uniform one penny rate, and the introduction of the first pre-paid postage 
stamp in the world, the Penny Black.
From July 1840, the Cunard Line’s vessels sailed across the Atlantic on 
bi-monthly schedule, or monthly in winter. The P&O started their sailings 
first to the Mediterranean in 1840, and then to India, China and even 
Australia. The Royal Mail Line started their sailings to the West Indies in 
early 1842.
Diagram 39 shows the change from sail to steam in the common mail 
services on the various trade routes. As can be noticed, steamships were taken 
in use in mail transport within an approximately 15 years’ period. Whereas 
the first mail-carrying steamers crossed the Atlantic in 1838, the first mail 




steamship service to Sydney lasted only a couple of years, and started again 
after the Crimean war in 1857.
As can be noticed in the diagram, there was an ‘overnight change’ from 
sail to steam on the West Indian and South American routes, as the British 
Post Office replaced the Falmouth sailing packets by the Royal Mail Line 
steamers in January 1842 (the West Indies) and in January 1851 (South 
America). Even though the other government-sponsored mail steamship 
companies started their service on specific dates as well, there was generally 
a shift period of several years when letters were carried by different means 
of communication. The reasons for the delays varied. On the North Atlantic 
route, for example, the American sailing packets could compete successfully 
with the early steamers on the way eastwards due to prevailing winds and 
currents. At Panama, the construction of the railway across the isthmus took 
several years. In India and China, the East India Company could fight against 
changes for several years. And Australia was just too far away to provide a 
business for the early steamship companies.
The development of two-way communications, which was important 
for business correspondence, has been examined in this study by using the 
method of calculating the consecutive information circles enabled by various 
means of communication. The following diagrams will show the development 
of business information transmission on the different mail routes between 
1815 and 1875.
Diagram 39. From sail to steam on the different 
mail routes, 1815-1875
N.Atlantic West Indies S.America Panama India China Australia
1815
1875




On the North Atlantic route the number of consecutive information circles 
enabled by the mail systems of the period grew from three to five per year, 
when the American sailing packets started their line service between New 
York and Liverpool. The change from sail to steam in 1838 did not bring a 
major improvement in the information circulation, even though the duration 
of westbound voyages in particular decreased remarkably. The reason for 
this was that the steamship voyages were organized by different independent 
companies which could not afford a regular line service.
While 15 round voyages by the pioneering steamers enabled only six 
consecutive information circles per year for merchants in England and 
New York in 1838 and 1839, the 20 annual round trips of the Cunard Line 
steamers with regular sailing dates enabled eight consecutive information 
circles already in the early 1840s.
Although there was a more or less regular steamship service in the North 
Atlantic from 1838, the shift period during which mail was carried across 
the ocean by both steamers and sailing packets lasted until the late 1840s. 
This was due to the fact that the eastbound voyages by steamers were not 
remarkably faster than by sailing ships and there were weekly sailing packet 
departures from New York, while the steamship departures took place less 
often. The captain’s fee for carrying a private ship letter was considerably 
lower than the official postage fee. How relevant the information cost was 
from the sender’s point of view is difficult to estimate, as it was the recipient 
who mostly paid for the letter.
The general speed and regularity of sailings, as well as the expectations 
regarding the safety of the mail transmission, were reflected in the business 
practices of the merchant houses. It was common practice to write duplicates 
and even triplicates of letters to ensure that at least one would be received, 
and preferably as soon as possible. During the shift period from sail to steam, 
the original letter was sent by steamer and the copy by sailing packet, or 
vice versa. Later on, the original letter and the duplicate were sent by two 
consecutive steamers, and finally the steamship service was considered so 
reliable that duplicates were not sent any longer.
The growing trade and improving steamship technology soon attracted 
competitors to the North Atlantic route. The U.S. Postmaster General awarded 
subsidized mail contracts to three shipping lines, of which the most important 
was the Collins Line on the New York – Liverpool route. When the Cunard 
Line also opened a direct mail route to New York, there were two weekly 
steamship sailings in both directions between England and the United States 
from 1850. These changes alone enabled an increase in annual consecutive 
information circles from eight to twelve without any notable improvement 
in the speed of one-way voyages during the period when the companies were 
competing with each other (see Diagram 40).
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Even though the size and speed of the transatlantic vessels, as well as the 
frequency of their departures, grew constantly through the period from 1815 
to 1875, the number of consecutive information circles enabled by the various 
services did not improve correspondingly. While there were three times more 
sailings per year in 1875 than in the early 1850s, the number of options to 
send letters back and forth consecutively during the year only grew from 
12 to 14. Making an allowance for the length of the trip and the number of 
annual departures, the ideal number of information circles would have been 
nearly 17. But the transatlantic mail service had reached its maturity and was 
in fact stagnant at that time. There were several reasons for this.
The steamers had lost their position as ‘news bringers’ to the submarine 
telegraph in the same way as the American sailing packets had lost their 
position to the steamers 30 years earlier. In both cases, this led to growing 
irregularity and length of sailings. Although the mass of carried bulk 
mails was still growing decades after the introduction of the telegraph, the 
excitement of being the first to break the news had gone. The speed at which 
bulk documents or ordinary business letters were carried was not considered 
that important.
Secondly, no one was paying for the speed of bulk information 
transmission. After the lucrative mail contracts had been replaced by monthly 
agreements about carrying mail as normal freight, the shipping companies 
started to compete in other business areas, especially the passenger service. 
Saturday sailings from New York became popular and four companies 
sailed on the same day. Thus there were several days in the week with no 
mail departures at all.
Diagram 40. Liverpool - New York, development of the number of 
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The West Indies and South America
The Royal Mail Line started their steamship services to the West Indies one 
and a half years later than the Cunard Line started their North Atlantic service, 
and to South America at the beginning of 1851. In both cases, the change 
occurred overnight, though naturally the last Falmouth packets carried mails 
from their respective destinations on their home voyages. Diagram 41 shows 
the change in the number of consecutive information circles during this period 
with respect to the West Indies. The example is from the Demerara route, but 
the destination could be some other port in the Caribbean region as well and 
the result would be the same due to the circular mail route system.
As can be seen by comparing the years 1841 and 1842, the effects of 
the change from sail to steam were not very impressive on the West Indies 
route. Even if the duration of one-way sailings from Europe to the Caribbean 
became shorter, information circulation suffered from the complexity of the 
inter-island services (see Map 4 on page 238). Improvements took place 
over the next two decades. By re-routing several inter-island sailings and 
reducing their number, and by replacing transatlantic vessels with speedier, 
technologically more advanced ships, it was possible to increase the number 
of consecutive information circles from four to eight by the early 1860s. 
The overlapping French service in the Caribbean, starting in 1862, offered 
an alternative but did not really improve the number of options for faster 
information circulation.
Diagram 41. England - Demerara, development of the number of 
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The course of events on the South American route was different. The 
British government mail contract was awarded to the Royal Mail Line as late 
as at the beginning of 1851, while the Falmouth sailing packets had taken care 
of the mail service until then. By that time, many of the early problems with 
steamship technology and the streamlining of schedules had been overcome. 
Thus the overnight change from sail to steam in early 1851 immediately 
improved the number of consecutive information circles between London and 
Rio de Janeiro from three to 4.5 and between London and Buenos Aires from 
two to three. Additionally, the improvements in schedules and the speed of 
vessels enabled an even better service from 1859. The number of consecutive 
information circles between London and Rio de Janeiro increased to six and 
between London and Buenos Aires to four per year.
The French service, which was started in 1860 by Messageries Impériales, 
could not afford extra consecutive information circles due to the long voyage, 
but it played an important role in information transmission as the sailings 
were organized to complement the Royal Mail Line’s sailings instead of 
competing with them by offering simultaneous services.
California
The most striking improvement in the speed of information transmission by 
traditional means took place between New York and San Francisco. At the 
time when the Californian gold rush begun in the late 1840s, the only means 
Diagram 42. England - Rio de Janeiro / Buenos Aires, development 
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of communication to the West Coast of the United States was by sailing 
vessels around Cape Horn. Even by the fastest clippers, it took about four 
months to sail from New York to San Francisco. When steamship services 
were established between New York and Colon, as well as between Panama 
and San Francisco, the one-way travel time was reduced to some six weeks. 
In 1855, after the opening of the Panama railway, the duration of information 
transmission between New York and San Francisco was only 3.5 weeks. 
And finally, in the 1870s, the transcontinental railway took the mails from 
the East Coast to the West in about one week.
The Panama case includes a paradox: by sailing ship, which was the slowest 
means of communication, the journey in terms of miles was also the longest. 
The combination of two steamship lines and the overland crossing at Panama 
caused a double effect: the length of the journey was significantly shortened, 
while the speed was greatly improved due to the simultaneous change from 
sail to steam. The railway across the Panama Isthmus made the overland 
crossing shorter and easier to manage, again speeding up the journey. And 
finally, by using the shortest possible route and the fastest possible vehicle 
of the period, the duration of the journey was reduced to less than a week of 
the original four months or more (see Map 7 on page 284).
In the United States, the telegraph was brought into transcontinental use in 
the early 1860s, thus making the mail steamers mainly carriers of documents 
and confirmatory details instead of the first news of great events. This notably 
demoted the Panama steamship services, which never recovered to their 
Diagram 43. New York - San Francisco, development of the number 
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earlier level of performance after the American Civil War. The significance 
of the transcontinental railway as the ‘news bringer’ was never recognized, as 
the telegraph had already taken that place when the railway was completed. 
From the business information point of view it was nevertheless an important 
improvement.
East India and other Australasian destinations
On the East India route, the original situation differed from the other routes 
discussed. There was no government packet service and practically no private 
merchant ships sailing on the India or China routes due to the monopoly of 
the East India Company, or the EIC. After the abolition of the EIC monopoly 
in the India trade in 1813 and the China trade in 1834, great numbers of 
common merchant ships took over the Eastern routes. They made faster round 
trips than the East Indiamen and due to their large number, the information 
circulation between England and the trade ports east of the Cape of Good 
Hope improved markedly. Due to the long voyage, the number of consecutive 
information circles increased to only approximately 1.5 per year. The duration 
of sailings also varied greatly.
The development of the Overland route across Egypt was a major 
improvement in the communication between Europe and the Asian trade 
ports. After fifteen years of hesitation between the shorter route with the 
desert crossing on the one hand and steaming around the Cape on the other, 
the Overland route was adopted permanently in the early 1840s.
The British Post Office awarded a contract to the P&O for the mail 
service to India and later to China and other parts of Asia. The European leg, 
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which had been taken care of by the Admiralty, was first transferred to the 
P&O, while the EIC still took care of the Bombay mails. The P&O started 
the Calcutta Line in 1843 and the China Line for Hong Kong in 1845.
In the early 1840s, the express mails from London were taken across the 
Channel, then by railway from Calais to Marseilles, by Admiralty packets to 
Alexandria, by dromedaries and donkeys across the Egyptian desert, by river 
boats on the Nile, by steamers from Suez to Bombay and by dawk runners 
across the Indian mainland. The letters were then carried from Calcutta by 
private merchant ships to China. This chain of varying services could bring 
the news from London to Hong Kong in less than four months, of which more 
than 2.5 months were used for the last leg from Bombay to Canton / Hong 
Kong. Even a merchant ship sailing directly from England could sometimes 
bring the latest news faster to China than the expensive and complicated 
government system, and very much cheaper.
In 1843, the P&O opened its Calcutta route via Galle, Ceylon, and 
when the leg from Galle to Hong Kong was opened in 1845, the overnight 
change in the speed of information transmission was remarkable. The new 
arrangement took the London mails to Hong Kong in fifty days, thus halving 
the previous duration of the mail transmission. This was one of the occasions 
in the history of world communications, where just a logistical arrangement 
could revolutionize the speed of information transmission, without radical 
new inventions but by applying what already existed. In 1859, the London 
– Hong Kong service enabled 3.5 consecutive information circles per year,
one whole circle taking 93 to 96 days.
By 1861, the P&O had organized its sailings with great expertise. All the 
Australasian ports except Bombay were served via Galle, from where the 
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branch steamers continued to Calcutta, to Hong Kong (and from there to 
Shanghai and Foochow) and to Sydney in Australia. The ships returned to 
Galle simultaneously to reach the steamer for Suez, from where the mails 
were forwarded across the Egyptian desert by the newly opened railway 
and by ship from Alexandria – the express mail via Marseilles and by train 
directly to London, and the bulk mail via Gibraltar to Southampton.
By avoiding loading and reloading when possible and unnecessary 
waiting for late arrivals of mail-bringing ships at distant ports, the company 
had produced a smoothly working system which enabled three consecutive 
information circles per year with Shanghai, as well as with Foochow and 
Sydney. It took some 3.5 months to receive an answer to a letter sent to these 
places, but it was only about a quarter of the duration of the information 
circle of some thirty years earlier. The French service by Messageries 
Impériales complemented the system from the 1860s, as it had done on the 
South America route.
There had been notable geographical ‘leverage’ in the case of the Panama 
route combining New York and San Francisco in the 1850s, and the same 
phenomenon could be seen in the Overland route regarding information 
transmission to India and the Far Eastern ports. While the steamers were 
replacing sailing ships, new mail routes could be brought into use, thus 
considerably shortening the length of the route in miles, as well as the time 
used for information transmission. By building railways across critical 
shortcuts, a notable extra benefit could be achieved, e.g. over the Panama and 
Suez isthmuses, as well as between Calais and Marseilles, or later Brindisi, 
and across India to replace the dawk runners.
Diagram 46. London - Sydney, development of the number of 














number of consecutive information circles per year
Conclusion
407
But not all regions benefited from the shortcuts. For example, the Suez 
Overland route was a disaster for Australia. When ships travelled from Europe 
around the Cape of Good Hope, Australia was located almost as near the 
Cape as the East Indian ports or China – in fact many ships nearly passed 
Australia on their way to Canton or Manila. But when viewed from Suez, 
the geography was very different and Australia was thousands of miles away 
from the main trade routes.
The early steamers were not able to manage these distances and Australia 
was left alone for many years. The gold rush finally encouraged some 
companies to try, although with rather weak results. After the Crimean War, 
16 years after the company had begun its mail service to Calcutta, the P&O 
finally started a permanent line service for Australia. By 1872, only a dozen 
years later, Australia was connected by telegraph with the mother country. 
When the modern systems finally reached Australia, they entered rapidly.
The submarine telegraph did not cause a sudden revolution in overseas 
communications, but became an integral part of communications over a longer 
period. As the telegraph had been partly used for urgent inland connections 
from the late 1840s, it had benefited communications to some degree for 
years before direct overseas connections were established. Thus, the duration 
of information transmission across the Atlantic had been shortened years 
before the successful Atlantic cable was laid in 1866 by inland telegraph 
connections both in Britain and Canada / United States. The trip to South 
America was shortened by a telegraph line between London and Lisbon 
on the European side, and by a coastal telegraph line in Brazil. There were 
also several partially working land lines to India before the direct line was 
opened in 1870.
The laying of submarine telegraph cables between continents caused a shift 
period in information transmission that was similar to the change from sail 
to steam. Due to high prices and unreliable services, the telegraph was used 
only in urgent cases. The use of the telegraph was not usually an alternative 
to written letters, but these means of communications mainly complemented 
each other, as letters were needed anyway for sending instructions, 
explanations and business documents. Thus the information costs were not 
alternative; the choice was not usually made between sending a letter or a 
telegram but between sending only a letter, or a letter and a telegram. When 
the prices of telegrams were reduced, the latter alternative became a part of 
normal business practice.
Summary
The most notable changes in overseas business information transmission took 
place in the 1850s or early 1860s, depending on the distance of the region from 
the mother countries in Europe. This did not occur immediately when sail was 
transformed to steam but several years later when the shipping network had 
been organized in a more effective way and there were enough – but not yet 
too many – companies sharing the market for mail transmission. Additionally, 
several geographical hurdles were overcome by building railways across 
critical overland shortcuts like Panama and Suez.
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As most of these improvements took place within a decade in the mid-
19th century, this period must have been experienced as truly revolutionary 
by contemporaries. Without the wars and uprisings which consumed a great 
part of the mail steamship capacity for several years, e.g. the Crimean War, 
the Indian Mutiny, and the American Civil War, progress could have been 
even faster.
As long as the ships were considered as important news bringers, they 
acted accordingly. The departures were punctual and spread more evenly over 
a time period (offering one weekly departure instead of two simultaneous 
departures every second week, for example) which was more useful from 
the business information transmission point of view. The ideal situation was 
typically based on services by two or several competing companies each 
having a mail contract. In contrast, mixing a major passenger and freight 
service with mail transport generally caused declining interest in the speed 
of information transmission.
The North Atlantic was often the testing field for new information 
transmission systems, not only due to its economic importance but also 
because of the shorter run compared to the other routes. The struggle between 
the Cunard Line and the Collins Line obviously did not speed up specific 
voyages by more than one or two days, if at all, but their way of organizing 
sailings on alternative weeks, in the similar way as the American sailing 
packets had done, led to the same effectiveness of information circulation. 
Their combined performance was almost equal to what could be achieved 
25 years later by much more effective vessels operated by several companies 
on a nearly daily basis. If there was a revolution in early communications, 
it was probably in the North Atlantic in around 1850.
The more extensive was the geographical distance, the longer it took before 
a similar ‘revolution’ could take place on the other mail routes. The regular 
and frequent-enough line system conducted by several identical mail carriers 
was built up all over the world by the early 1860s – only a few years before 
the laying of the first intercontinental submarine cables. Thus the ‘revolutions’ 
followed each other. For contemporaries, it must have been a logical chain 
of improvements instead of one single event which changed it all.
In our days, the globalization of real-time international communications, 
first by fax and international phone calls, and then by mobile phones, text 
messages and the Internet, has changed our way of conducting business or 
even our personal relationships. Those who saw the development of regular 
steamship services with strategic overland shortcuts by railways at distant 
colonies and the speeding up of information circulation coupled with the 
increasing opportunities to use telegraphs for the most urgent messages, 
must have felt as we do now. While information and capital were moving 
faster than ever, people had to adapt their lives to the new communication 




The introduction of the intercontinental telegraph did not stop the 
improvement of ocean steamship services but complemented the 
communication, speeding up world trade and capital movements. For ocean 
shipping, the development up to 1875 was just the beginning.
The speed of mail steamers, especially on the North Atlantic route, grew 
steadily through the whole steamship era. While the Sirius made her first 
voyage in 18.5 days, by an average speed of only eight knots, the Germanic 
of the White Star Line doubled that speed to almost 16 knots in the 1870s. 
By the end of the 19th century, the average speed had risen to 22 knots, 
and the last record holder, the United States, crossed the Atlantic from 
the Bishop Rock lighthouse at the entrance to the English Channel to the 
Ambrose lighthouse ship off New York in 3.5 days in 1952, at an average 
speed of 34.5 knots.1034
There clearly was a correlation between the size of the vessel and her 
speed. From 1838 to 1899 almost all record holders were at the same time 
the largest ships in the world, excluding the giant Great Eastern, built in 
1860, which never was a Blue Riband holder, even if she definitely was the 
largest passenger ship ever built until the 20th century.
The rapid change after 1880 was mainly due to the increasing competition, 
which started in the 1870s. The ships were built larger and larger, partly to 
meet the needs of growing masses of emigrants and cargo transport, but also 
because first class passengers were tempted by more space and comfortable 
surroundings during their travel.
Luxury indeed became critical in the growing competition, and for instance 
the new Cunarders of the 1880s provided some 60% of the total net tonnage 
for cabin class accommodation, compared with only 20% for steerage.1035 
The image of steamship travel in the early 20th century given to the general 
public by the books and films about the ill-fated Titanic of the White Star 
Line was therefore not incorrect. But in addition to the well known details 
of the ship’s history, it should be remembered that also the Titanic bore in 
her name the abbreviation RMS – Royal Mail Steamer.
1034  Kludas, 146–147.




Diagram 47 shows the trend in steamship size and speed from the period 
of the contest between the Cunard Line and the Collins Line in the 1850s to 
the end of the 19th century. Later development was even more impressive, 
as can be seen in Diagram 48.
FIG. 40. The Atlantic cable telegraph from New York to Liverpool on 8.5.1912 informs 
the family members at home that the senders are going to travel by the Lusitania: 
‘Leaving lusitania tonight due arrive liverpool Tuesday morning all very well tell 
inquirers rash seeing us off love.’ The couple who sent the telegraph had arrived in 
New York three weeks earlier by the Mauretania simultaneously with the Titanic’s 
sinking on the same route.
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Diagram 47. Development of the size and speed of the fastest 
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Diagram 48. Development of the size and speed of the fastest 





















Size of the fastest Speed record
Source: Kludas, 36, 41, 49, 54, 72, 87 and 146–147.
Source: Kludas, 36, 41, 49, 54, 72, 87, 105, 114, 131, 136 and 146–147. – The 
Mauretania kept the record both in 1910 and 1920.
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But the progress was not as straightforward as could be assumed by looking 
at the diagrams. After a period of fast improvement in steamship building 
around 1910 – including the Cunard Line’s Lusitania and Mauretania in 1907 
and Aquitania in 1914, the White Star Line’s Olympic in 1911 and Titanic in 
1912, the French Line’s France in 1912, and HAPAG’s Imperator in 1913 
and Vaterland in 1914 – WW1 set back progress for years.1036
The period of stagnation in the development of speed can easily be noticed 
from the fact that the Mauretania kept the Blue Riband for almost 20 years, 
from September 1909 to July 1929, until finally the German vessels Bremen 
and Europa of Norddeutscher Lloyd took over.1037 Only a few years later, 
in 1936, improved maritime technology reached its peak in the form of the 
Queen Mary, 80,774 tons, which was more than a hundred times larger 
than the first transatlantic mail steamer, the Sirius of 703 tons, one century 
earlier.1038 The Queen Mary’s normal Atlantic crossing from New York to 
Cherbourg took less than 4.5 days at an average speed of almost 30 knots.1039 
During WW2, she once crossed the Atlantic with 15,740 troops and 943 staff 
– a total of 16,683 people on board, which is still a record.1040
The frequency of sailings depended very much on the emigrant flows. One
of the peak years was 1913 with almost 1,200 passenger steamship arrivals 
in New York, over 170 arrivals in Boston, over 90 in Philadelphia, and over 
50 in Baltimore – in total more than 1,500 passenger steamship arrivals from 
Europe at these ports during one year. The Cunard Line’s Mauretania made 
15 round trips that year, arriving in New York every third week. Alone, she 
could have run more consecutive information circles than all the steamers 
together that plied the same route in 1875. There was a regular service to New 
York from Glasgow, Liverpool, London and Southampton, from Antwerp, 
Bremen, Hamburg, Havre and Rotterdam, and from several Mediterranean 
and Scandinavian ports.1041
Despite the Atlantic cable, which had existed for more than 60 years, fast 
mail transmission across the ocean was still important and the number of 
mails was still increasing. The speed was still important and something to 
be proud of, as well as handling the mails at port.
Whereas all the Cunard vessels together had carried 2.6 million letters 
in 1851, their steamer Aquitania took 16 million letters on a single trip in 
1925. According to a newspaper article, the ship’s captain ‘wirelessed’ from 
the sea that the vessel would reach Quarantine, off New York, at 2.15 p.m. 
with more than 6,700 bags of mail (each containing 2,000 to 3,000 letters). 
Three mail boats were sent for the bags, and they were handled, separated 
and checked to be immediately taken to the Post Office stations and railroads. 
1036  For the vessels, see Bonsor (1975), vol. 1, 157, 415; Bonsor (1978), vol. 2, 661, 765.
1037  Kludas, 146–147.
1038  Kludas, 36, 131.
1039 For example, abstracts of logs from the sailings of the Queen Mary from New 
 York to Cherbourg and Southampton, 29.7.1936 and 23.6.1937, conducted in 
  rather different  weather conditions. (SRLC)
1040  See James Steele, Oueen Mary (Hong Kong, 1995), 187.
1041 The figures are calculated from Allan Morton, Directory of European Passenger 
 Steamship Arrivals for the Years 1890 to 1930 (Baltimore, 1998), 165–174.
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According to the article, this was done in 84 minutes. The largest single cargo 
of mails had been carried by the White Star Line’s Olympic in December 
1924, more than 14,000 mailbags. The total number of mailbags handled by 
the mail boatmen of New York that year was over 960,000.1042 In 1929, the 
three Cunard vessels Aquitania, Berengaria and Mauretania carried some 
255,000 mailbags from Southampton to New York, with at least 510 million 
letters in total.1043
While the transatlantic mail-carrying steamers continued to increase in size 
and speed up to WW2, there was no major need for such development on the 
Asian routes. For example the P&O vessels, which carried mails between 
London and Shanghai via the Suez Canal in 1913, were about 10,000 tons 
each, and their service speed varied between 15 and 17 knots. The average 
journey from London to Shanghai via Gibraltar, Marseilles, Port Said, Aden, 
1042 Evening World, 20.5.1925. PR 3.1/12h (CP). The figures probably included also 
  the  coastal mails for New York.
1043 ‘Big Three figures 1929 – From Marine Supt’s Records’. PR 3.1/12k (CP). 
– The Berengaria was the former HAPAG ship Imperator, which had changed
owner  after WW1 as part of war indemnities, replacing the Cunard ship Lusitania
which was sank with great loss of life by German torpedoes in 1915.
FIG. 41. Catapult mail was once again a combination of the fastest possible means of 
carrying mail across the Atlantic. In the late 1920s, despite the fact that the submarine 
telegraph had already existed for more than 60 years, it was thought to be worth the 
trouble to organize a system to take the express mails to an ocean steamer by small 
aircraft when the ship was already at sea, to be sent to the shore by the similar way 
in the other end. A letter from the first German catapult flight by the NDL steamer 
Bremen in July 1929 arrived from Düsseldorf to New York in seven days, having 
spent less than five days at sea.
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Colombo, Penang, Singapore and Hong Kong took nearly 38 days.1044 The list 
of ports visited depicts well the different nature of the sailings in the Indian 
Ocean compared to the Atlantic.
However, in 1929, the P&O’s Viceroy of India of nearly 20,000 tons made 
the trip between London and Bombay in 16 days, and the Australia route 
would see even larger vessels in the long run.1045
It was not the telegraph that finally took over the important overseas mail 
transmission from ocean going vessels, but it was aircraft.
In the 1930s, when air planes were not yet improved enough to carry mails 
across the Atlantic, a mixed system was developed to combine shipping 
and flights as had been done earlier with shipping and telegraph. ‘Catapult 
flights’ by small aircraft took express mails from shore to steamships that 
had departed the day before, and at the other end of the journey a similar 
system was carried out to bring catapult mails to shore before the ship arrived 
at port (see Fig. 41).
Aircraft started regular transatlantic flights in the 1950s and finally became 
the means of communication that took over the lead from the steamers after 
a successful 100-year period of mail transport across the oceans. In taking 
over the important fine freight, mails and passengers, air planes did not leave 
much to passenger liners. They died one after another, or merged to stay alive, 
changing their business to cruising, cargo transport or port systems.
Thus the final ‘revolution’ in the bulk of business information transmission 
actually took place several decades after the introduction of electric 
communications, at a time when telephone, radio and automobiles were 
already in common use everywhere, and even the TV was taking its first 
steps in world wide news transmission.
1044 For the Shanghai sailings, see Kirk, The P&O Lines…, 159. The mails from 
 Colombo  further to Shanghai were carried by even smaller vessels of 8,000 tons or 
  less. See Middlemiss, 121–135.
1045 The P&O steamers reached their peak in size and speed in the early 1960s, when 
 the largest vessels of over 40,000 tons and a speed of 27.5 knots were launched. 
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